Talk:T-schema

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The term 'T-schema' does not refer to the inductive definition of truth due to Tarski

This article is based on a (rather common) mistake: confusing the T-schema and the definition of truth given by Tarski. The T-schema is an adequacy condition which the definition of truth must satisfy, but it does not itself constitute a definition of truth. I will re-write this article to correct the mistake when I have the time if no one else will. Aatu 21:35, 13 December 2005 (UTC)[reply]

Quite, but there's not much harm in the confusion, since given appropriate assumptions in set theory, the T-schema uniquely determines an inductive truth valuation. I'm all in favour of clairty, but I'm not into overlabouring distinctions without a difference. --- Charles Stewart 03:59, 9 January 2006 (UTC)[reply]

Convention T vs. T-schema

An anonymous editor switched this article to the former: my instinct is that the latter is much more common. The Google test with the additional term "Tarski" (to avoid convention t-shirts and the like) suggests my intuition is well-founded. I'm changing the article back. --- Charles Stewart 03:59, 9 January 2006 (UTC)[reply]

Actually, the T-Schema and Convention-T is also not the same, neither is T-Schema and the form (T). Convention-T is the demand that every truth-definition imply all sentences of the form (T) "'S' is true if and only if S" in order to be a truth-definition, whereas the T-Schema is to be considered as the axiom schema corresponding to form (T) which is used when axiomatizing theories of truth. Eventhough T-Schema and the form (T) looks similar, they do not play the same role. For the mistake regarding Convention-T/form (T), Künne, W. Conceptions of truth 2003 pp 182-183. Sadly enough, Künne is using Schema (T) as a name for form (T). —Preceding unsigned comment added by 141.20.211.102 (talk) 14:56, 4 December 2010 (UTC)[reply]: The distinction between the form T and the schema T doesn't seem to matter much. See Heath (2001) p. 186 which even says that Dummett's more formally different formulation is equivalent "ignoring certain technicalities". This article needs a lot more substantive expansion before we worry about those. Tijfo098 (talk) 04:42, 15 April 2011 (UTC)[reply]

Reference for T-theories

I was not able to find a formalisation of the T-schema in either of the two references for this article (I also did a very quick google search and didn't come up with anything). Could somebody please add references for the formalisation of the T-schema in predicate logic or in modal logic, preferably both (I am by no means an expert in logic so I don't trust myself to do it myself). Joel Brennan (talk) 13:45, 11 October 2019 (UTC)[reply]