Talk:Russian invasion of Ukraine/Archive 19

This is an archive of past discussions about Russian invasion of Ukraine. Do not edit the contents of this page. If you wish to start a new discussion or revive an old one, please do so on the current talk page.

Archive 15

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Archive 17

Ordering of civilian and military casualties

The following ordering of civilian and military casualties came off as bizarre and POV,

It is estimated to have caused tens of thousands of Ukrainian civilian casualties and hundreds of thousands of military casualties.

so I re-ordered it to put military casualties first. The number of military casualties is a full order of magnitude greater than the number of civilian casualties.

The edit was reverted by @TylerBurden, with the reverter claiming that my paying attention to the ordering at all is bizarre. I was told to discuss it on the talk page.

When you have two separate statistics but one overwhelmingly larger than the other, it is usually somewhat more natural to put the larger statistic first, as it represents the more significant parameter. This is especially relevant when the ordering is relevant for propaganda purposes. It is well-known that civilian casualties (in all armed conflicts) are an important propaganda weapon. I am thus afraid the original wording could be perceived as propagandistic in nature.

The convention in armed conflicts is to mention combatant casualties prior to civilian casualties, especially when the former considerably exceeds the latter as is usually true. This is evident in the infoboxes of all major wars. I do not see any compelling reason here to stray from that convention. JDiala (talk) 21:47, 24 June 2024 (UTC)

Can you provide a link to this "convention"? Because like I mentioned in my edit summary, I don't think it matters, they are both described in literally the same sentence, and both are significant parts of the article, so the placement is subjective and thus there is no reason to change it. I also don't buy the propaganda argument, you could say the same thing about the edit you made placing civilians behind military based purely on numbers being some propaganda attempt to divert focus away from civilian casualties, which would be equally unconstructive. Since it has never been an issue until now I am guessing that most people aren't interpreting it the way you are. TylerBurden (talk) 23:31, 24 June 2024 (UTC)

This is a stylistic judgement. I don't think that, for stylistic judgements such as this, we require (say) a military handbook which says "mention military casualties before civilian casualties" or something. Rather, it is reasonable to make judgements as competent English speakers as to how a sentence should be optimally arranged to come off as neutrally as possible. I am making the judgement that it is better to put combatant casualties prior to civilian casualties, because the former exceeds the latter by a full order of magnitude. You claim that this could equally be interpreted as propaganda, but this is not true, because I have a logical, non-propaganda explanation for my version (italicized in the prior sentence), whereas you do not for yours.

Imagine one of the first sentences on the 9/11 article writing something like "the attacks killed dozens of soldiers in the Pentagon, as well as around three thousand civilians". That would be a bit weird as the framing appears to emphasize the soldiers dying, despite the nature of the attack (a terror attack on civilians) and that far more civilians died. This would thus not be a natural or neutral way to word things consistent with WP:IMPARTIAL, particularly in the lead where it is especially crucial to be impartial. Likewise here, this is an armed conflict where the overwhelming majority of people dead on both sides are armed soldiers. The immediate emphasis on the comparatively low number of Ukrainian civilian casualties strikes me as strange. This is especially considering that the ratio of civilian-military casualties is not unusually high in this particular war (unlike many other armed conflicts). A reasonable reader could interpret this as having a propagandistic slant. This is not consistent with the project's goals.

I feel that this is ultimately a difference of opinion. Unlike a content dispute, it is difficult to "prove" that a particular sentence has a biased tone, and we might not be able to come to an agreement. For this reason, I welcome input from other editors.

Finally, I am not sure why the fact that the issue has not come up before is relevant. It is quite frequent (in fact, the norm) that a revert made at any given point in time was not something previous editors noticed. JDiala (talk) 04:49, 25 June 2024 (UTC)

I tend to agree. RadioactiveBoulevardier (talk) 19:43, 2 July 2024 (UTC)

Well since you said it was convention, I was hoping you would back it up with a link. Like you said, this more comes down to stylistic judgement and personal interpretation. I don't think a single editor saying "I agree" constitutes consensus, since they also provided no link to the claimed convention. So unless that is done or it's clear that more people interpret it as POV, I think your change was premature. TylerBurden (talk) 19:53, 4 July 2024 (UTC)

@TylerBurden: You are not engaging with the points made. As I have told you, stylistic judgements can be made by native speakers of the English language without citing a formal convention. There is no expectation of this as this is not an issue of content but of writing. I have given sound rationales for the change which you have not addressed, and I already have another editor agreeing with me. Furthermore, the discussion has been stagnant for a over a week. I do not believe it is a reasonable standard to demand an even more overwhelming consensus for this, especially since this is a minor issue. JDiala (talk) 20:06, 4 July 2024 (UTC)

You're acting as if you're fixing a typo, you're not. Your argument is "there are more dead soldiers", that's true, but the number of civilian casualties is not insignificant. And please, don't act as if two editors agreeing with each other is "overwhelming consensus". TylerBurden (talk) 20:15, 4 July 2024 (UTC)

@TylerBurden: This is a bit more than a typo, but not by much. I don't think "well, yeah, but lots of civilians died too" is engaging with my point in good faith. I'd be happy to start an RfC if you'd like. JDiala (talk) 20:36, 4 July 2024 (UTC)

@TylerBurden: Instead of an RfC, c or WP:DRN are also options. Would you be willing to accept the outcome of either of those processes? JDiala (talk) 21:02, 4 July 2024 (UTC)

Sure, I already said I'd accept more people interpreting the same "POV" view as you as grounds to change the order. It should be noted that you've already recieved a topic ban in WP:PIA for POV issues. TylerBurden (talk) 00:39, 6 July 2024 (UTC)

@TylerBurden: It is inappropriate for you to refer to a sanction I have in another unrelated area as a substitute for an actual argument. Topic banned editors are allowed to edit in other areas, even contentious ones. You have provided no evidence that my conduct in this interaction is inappropriate or POV. Referring you to WP:PA, WP:GRAVEDANCING, WP:GF. JDiala (talk) 01:05, 6 July 2024 (UTC)

I think it is quite relevant when someone who is complaining about "POV" based not on policy or guidelines but on subjective personal opinion is already topic banned for the same conduct in another WP:CTOP. No one has said you are not allowed to edit, it is relevant nonetheless. You can also stop pinging me, I have the page on my watch list. Thanks. TylerBurden (talk) 01:11, 6 July 2024 (UTC)

It is disappointing that an editor with such experience lacks a basic appreciation of WP:GF. You cannot engage with my arguments and instead choose to make personal attacks. I have started a discussion on administrator SFR's page about your conduct. JDiala (talk) 01:34, 6 July 2024 (UTC)

If you view this as a personal attack, I don't think there is any point in engaging further with you. TylerBurden (talk) 01:56, 6 July 2024 (UTC)

As a WP:3O, there is no clear convention in WP or elsewhere as to how this should be ordered. It does not require an overwhelming consensus to determine the order. One of these has to come first; therefore the other is second. This rather trivial issue has already killed way too many electrons. In my opinion, an RfC on this question would be disruptive because of its trivial nature. Cinderella157 (talk) 01:48, 6 July 2024 (UTC)

Thank you for your feedback. When you write "[it] does not require an overwhelming consensus", do you agree that the current 2-1 should be adequate to decide it? What is your stance on what should be done? JDiala (talk) 01:57, 6 July 2024 (UTC)

That's the point I've been trying to make since the beginning, since they both have significant coverage in the article and are mentioned right next to each other the order of it should not matter. TylerBurden (talk) 01:58, 6 July 2024 (UTC)

The order doesn't matter. Two people think it should be one way; one person thinks otherwise; and nobody else gives a brass razoo - including myself. So why the fuck are the two of you still arguing over it as if it means the end of the world?

PS I can solve this with the toss of a coin if you both agree since nobody else gives a toss and that is how much it matters. Cinderella157 (talk) 02:11, 7 July 2024 (UTC)

Genocide SYNTH in lead

@TylerBurden: The Wallenberg paper with the 30 genocide scholars only concludes that there is a "serious risk" of genocide and incitement to genocide, not an actual genocide. This is WP:SYNTH. Furthermore, the child article states the far weaker conclusion that the genocide allegation has only been stated with "varying degrees of certainty" by genocide scholars, and in no place states a scholarly consensus that Russia is currently perpetrating a genocide. Per WP:SS, the parent article should summarize the child article. I object to the current sentence in the lead on these grounds. JDiala (talk) 01:31, 6 July 2024 (UTC)

"To many observers, the erasure of Ukrainian nationhood in the occupied territories and frequent denial of Ukraine’s right to exist is evidence the Russian invasion is genocidal in nature. Some 30 genocide scholars, the Genocide Watch organisation and several national parliaments have supported this assertion."

This is directly quoted from the source, and on top if it there are several others cited. TylerBurden (talk) 01:43, 6 July 2024 (UTC)

Stating that something is "genocidal" is not the same as asserting that it a genocide, which the lead sentence does. It could encompass a variety of strictly weaker things, such as incitement to genocide. This is SYNTH and OR. The actual Wallenberg paper does not definitively state that it is a genocide. JDiala (talk) 01:54, 6 July 2024 (UTC)

The sources either describe it as genocide (Jade McGlynn) or various other mentions of genocide. I wouldn't be opposed to changing it to "characterised by scholars as genocidal in nature". TylerBurden (talk) 02:05, 6 July 2024 (UTC)

Agree this would be a good change in wording. Moxy🍁 02:12, 6 July 2024 (UTC)

I'm fine with this. It's worth noting that Jade McGlynn, a historian and not a legal expert or genocide scholar, is a rather weak source for such a strong claim. Please note that WP:RS takes into consideration the quality of sources as well, and for such a contentious and strong claim it is best to err on the side of caution. That said, I agree with our compromise of "genocidal."

I also think the democide allegation should be removed from the lead. This does not appear to be a particularly notable allegation and there aren't nearly as many sources for it. I'm not sure it's due weight for the lead. JDiala (talk) 02:21, 6 July 2024 (UTC)

In fact, I've carefully looked at the cited sources and none of them state that the war is a "democide." I'm going to remove this myself as it's an unsourced claim. JDiala (talk) 02:35, 6 July 2024 (UTC)

Jade McGlynn is most certainly NOT a “weak source”. Volunteer Marek 04:57, 7 July 2024 (UTC)

I have added the qualifier "some" before "scholars", as this characterization is not a unanimous or consensus position among scholars of genocide. All of the cited sources acknowledge this in various ways: the first three are the opinions of single scholars in which they address the ongoing scholarly debate. The citations from the fourth article, the statement from the 30 genocide scholars and the Genocide Watch organization, are more significant, but I think there is a higher threshold for stating this as the scholarly opinion without qualification (our own article we wikilink to includes "allegations" in its title in reflection of this). — Goszei (talk) 06:31, 6 July 2024 (UTC)

I scrolled through the Allegations of genocide of Ukrainians in the Russo-Ukrainian War and there is no one saying there is no genocide in Ukraine. It's pretty safe to just state it as it is. ManyAreasExpert (talk) 09:51, 6 July 2024 (UTC)

Lead changes

I have implemented a series of changes in the lead section between this and this revision which I will explain here:

Added a mention of Russia's demands for security guarantees that Ukraine not join NATO, whose relationship with Ukraine forms the primary topic in the Background and Prelude sections. According to many analysts, this is the true underlying cause of the war (beyond Putin's Russian irredentist/neo-Nazi state/"demilitarise and denazify" pretext), and so should be mentioned in the lead.
Trimmed the fourth paragraph, which deals with international reactions and secondary effects (I moved the mentions of ecocide and food crisis here). I think that the UN General Assembly resolution is important enough to mention here, but that the ICJ and Council of Europe should be saved for the body. The same goes for the "terrorist state" designations by the Baltic states and corporate withdrawals.
Added a mention of the EU and the US as the primary contributors of humanitarian and military aid, which is highly significant from a geopolitcal standpoint and detailed in the body.
Moved the genocide allegation from the first lead paragraph to the fourth, wikilinking it from the ICC investigation sentence. This better reflects its WP:DUE prominence as a matter under ongoing investigation by several bodies and interpretation and debate by scholars. If in the future the genocide becomes something closer to a consensus among scholars or widely-accepted historical fact, it should be moved to the first paragraph.

— Goszei (talk) 19:19, 6 July 2024 (UTC)

I wholeheartedly endorse these changes on the grounds you mentioned. This is an excellent step towards neutrality. Thank you for the excellent work! JDiala (talk) 19:57, 6 July 2024 (UTC)

Such drastic changes require consensus. I do not think they have have such.

“Many analysts” is vague and unsourced. Many other - really most - analysts are clear on the fact this had nothing to do with NATO.
No comment currently on 2 and 3.
Strongly disagree with moving it.

Volunteer Marek 04:37, 7 July 2024 (UTC)

On the third point your text made it seem like these were the only countries which sanctioned Russia. Volunteer Marek 04:48, 7 July 2024 (UTC)

A consensus is not required to edit or make changes to the article. Whether they are substantial changes or not does not factor into bold editing. ~~Your 04:46, 7 July 2024 edit appears to be disruptive.~~ Mr rnddude (talk) 05:06, 7 July 2024 (UTC)

No, but if someone objects to changes to long standing text, then yeah it’s a good idea to seek consensus.

What exactly is “disruptive” about my edit? If consensus isn’t required to make changes to an article then undoing such changes is even less problematic, no? Volunteer Marek 05:10, 7 July 2024 (UTC)

I mean, you yourself basically say pretty much what I just said here Volunteer Marek 05:12, 7 July 2024 (UTC)

Also, I did end up moving the paragraph beginning with info on ecocide roughly to where Goszei wanted it. I do think the text itself was better previously. Volunteer Marek 05:23, 7 July 2024 (UTC)

Reverting because you have a genuine objection is fine. Reverting solely because prior approval was not sought isn't.

That said, it had appeared to me that you'd removed the ecocide material rather than moving it. The highlighting in the diff tripped me up. I've struck the portion of my comment relating to the edit and apologize for my error.

I think the edit you've linked to isn't quite comparable. There was an on-going discussion of that material, which had been disputed by several editors on specific grounds including being based on actual misinformation. At that point, a consensus with adequate sourcing is required. Mr rnddude (talk) 06:15, 7 July 2024 (UTC)

I do have a genuine objection. In particular I object to the removal of the info that leading up to the invasion Kremlin denied they had any intent to invade. That’s key info and should stay. I also object to over emphasizing and treating as legitimate Russian propaganda claims regarding NATO. I certainly object to using one to remove the other. Volunteer Marek 16:14, 7 July 2024 (UTC)

The NATO thing is not merely Russian propaganda claims. There are plenty of RS (both news and academic), not to mention innumerable opinion pieces by analysts, including some rather big names, discussing it extensively. While it might be better to focus on those sources rather than the blatherings of Peskov and Zakharova, that does not negate the notability or prominence of the NATO angle. RadioactiveBoulevardier (talk) 21:17, 7 July 2024 (UTC)

(thanks for striking that part and I understand the confusion - with text being moved it’s always messy to figure out what’s going on) Volunteer Marek 16:15, 7 July 2024 (UTC)

I think your revert is hard to justify. We encourage bold editing. Bold editing by definition does not require consensus on the talk page. If you object to the edit, you can revert. But you should have a reason for the revert besides “you need consensus first” which is not really a reason. Furthermore when an edit consists of multiple changes it is usually encouraged to do a partial reversion rather a wholesale reversion (WP:REVONLY). If you revert everything I’d expect a point-by-point criticism of each part of the edit on the talk page which you haven’t provided. JDiala (talk) 14:03, 7 July 2024 (UTC)

I did specify my objections and my edit was indeed partial. That’s why it was done in a couple separate edits. Volunteer Marek 16:17, 7 July 2024 (UTC)

Volunteer Marek, it appears you do not want discussion of NATO in the lead, since you reverted my edit. As I discussed in my edit summary, I think NATO should be discussed in the lead for a simple MOS:LEAD reason: it is discussed at length in the body in the prelude section, and the lead is supposed to summarize the body. It is also factually a correct statement that Russia demanded security guarantees that Ukraine not join NATO in the run up to the war and this was a major diplomatic issue. I want to emphasize that discussing NATO is not justifying Putin's actions. The Treaty of Versailles is frequently cited as a cause of WWII but no one suggests it justifies Hitler's wars of aggression. But we have to discuss the geopolitics honestly and a part of this includes mentioning Russia's threat perception vis-a-vis NATO. JDiala (talk) 13:44, 7 July 2024 (UTC)

First, you not only added stuff about NATO to the lede, you also removed the fact that Russia was denying it was going to invade in the build up to the invasion. Second, since most analysts and sources regard the demands regarding NATO as a pretext and red herring for invasion pushing it into the lede is WP:UNDUE and WP:FRINGE. Yes, the pretext is mentioned in the body, lots of things are, it’s a big article. Most of the text is explaining the context, which is necessary but can’t fit into the lede. Volunteer Marek 16:17, 7 July 2024 (UTC)

On the first point, you are correct I did remove the invasion-denial part. I stand corrected on that point and I apologize for the oversight. I do not really have an objection to the inclusion of that. On NATO, it seems that you are confusing two separate things. You seem to think the previous version of the lead claimed that NATO expansion was the actual reason Russia invaded. This is indeed a contentious claim, although I would not describe it as "fringe" and Goszei has convincingly argued below that there are legitimate reasons to believe it is more than a pretext. The key thing to note, however, is that, this was not what the previous version said. The previous version said that Russia "demanded security guarantees that Ukraine not join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)". In other words, this was merely a description of what Russia said publicly in the diplomatic crisis preceding the invasion, without any prejudice towards its actual intentions. That NATO expansion was what Russia claimed to have been a threat is not really disputed. JDiala (talk) 17:11, 7 July 2024 (UTC)

Ok, we can work this out. The part that I have a problem with - and this issue arises frequently when dealing with situations like this - is that presenting one side’s claims can make it seem as if those claims are legitimate. In this particular context the problem is that Russia made several demands prior to invasion, all of them highly unrealistic (withdrawal of NATO forces from Poland, “denazification” of Ukraine, etc). Why mention this particular one? As Gordon’s edit summary said, Putin was throwing out all kinds of claims and demands, while whole time denying he was planning to invade. And this is how it generally works with invasions - make impossible demands, then claim that since these weren’t met, you aren’t really the aggressor, but a victim. So again, why this particular one? I wouldn’t be completely opposed to mentioning NATO issues in the lede but we do need to be careful with the wording. At the time Putin invaded, Ukraine wasn’t slated to join NATO. Volunteer Marek 17:45, 7 July 2024 (UTC)

There are two responses to your question "Why mention this particular one?" First, it's not just "this particular one." The paragraph in question discusses a variety of Russian reasons to invade, including "demilitarization", "denazification", supporting the pro-Russian forces in the Donbas conflict, and also unstated Russian intentions which analysts ascertained like a denial of Ukraine's right to exist and irredentism. Second, the NATO stuff is particularly important because it was the principal point of contention in the diplomatic crisis preceding the war. It was a direct Russian ultimatum: guarantee you don't join NATO, or else.

With respect to your other point, "presenting one side’s claims can make it seem as if those claims are legitimate", this is just not something I agree with. We have to respect our readers' intelligence. If a claim is not stated in wikivoice and is directly attributed to a third party, then the educated reader should clearly understand that we are not endorsing the factuality or legitimacy of said claim.

Here is a thought for a compromise. Mention the Russian demand that NATO not expand eastward. However, also state the Ukrainian counterargument: that sovereign states have a right to join whichever alliances they please. JDiala (talk) 18:32, 7 July 2024 (UTC)

Here's a fair solution. The revision in question should have read,"In late 2021, Russia massed troops near Ukraine's borders, having demanded security guarantees that Ukraine not join NATO while denying any plan to attack." This proposition appears to be factually unassailable with no bias whatsoever. Chino-Catane (talk) 22:10, 7 July 2024 (UTC)

Russia massed troops near Ukraine's borders, having demanded
Russian demands have been evaluated by academic sources, and that evaluation should be in the article body. If it's not there then it should be added. After that we may think why russian demands, without academic comments, should be presented in the lead. ManyAreasExpert (talk) 23:00, 7 July 2024 (UTC)

VM, what makes you say that it is a red herring[…] and WP:FRINGE? Apart from the source pool, common sense seems to come into it. Sure, invading a country is an unlawful escalation, but that doesn’t negate that there was a bona fide diplomatic crisis. RadioactiveBoulevardier (talk) 21:31, 7 July 2024 (UTC)

I believe this discussion has got off onto the wrong foot. All versions of the article text (both existing and proposed) require consensus, and both I and Marek thus far have followed standard practice through the WP:BRD cycle. The purpose of this discussion is to build a consensus, as we are doing.

I disagree with Marek's argument that "analysts are clear on the fact this had nothing to do with NATO" and that "NATO stuff was obvious red herring". NATO is currently mentioned 36 times in the article text. We link to Enlargement of NATO, and describe Ukraine's 2008 bid, Russia's opposition on security grounds then, and NATO's declaration that Ukraine would eventually join. If anything, it fails to mentions NATO enough. Our article at Ukraine–NATO relations describes how Yanukovych's government officially abandoned the goal of joining NATO in 2010 before it was ousted by the pro-EU revolution in 2014, resulting in a political turnaround. Our article at Russo-Ukrainian War describes how NATO and the U.S. began training and arming the Ukrainian military in 2014; both are still deeply involved in these capacities. At a very minimum, it is clear that Ukraine's complex relationship with NATO forms part of the broader geopolitical story of the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the post-Soviet conflicts (see our article on the Russo-Georgian War, which mentions the diplomatic crisis over NATO in its lead), and Ukraine's internal divisions, which all can agree at least contributed to the war.

A backgrounder by the Council on Foreign Relations think tank, published in 2023, summarizes the analyst positions on the war's causes as such:

Some Western analysts see Russia’s 2022 invasion as the culmination of the Kremlin’s growing resentment toward NATO’s post–Cold War expansion into the former Soviet sphere of influence. Russian leaders, including Putin, have alleged that the United States and NATO repeatedly violated pledges they made in the early 1990s to not expand the alliance into the former Soviet bloc. They view NATO’s enlargement during this tumultuous period for Russia as a humiliating imposition about which they could do little but watch. [...]
In the weeks leading up to its invasion, Russia made several major security demands of the United States and NATO, including that they cease expanding the alliance, seek Russian consent for certain NATO deployments, and remove U.S. nuclear weapons from Europe. Alliance leaders responded that they were open to new diplomacy but were unwilling to discuss shutting NATO’s doors to new members. [...]
Other experts have said that perhaps the most important motivating factor for Putin was his fear that Ukraine would continue to develop into a modern, Western-style democracy that would inevitably undermine his autocratic regime in Russia and dash his hopes of rebuilding a Russia-led sphere of influence in Eastern Europe. “[Putin] wants to destabilize Ukraine, frighten Ukraine,” writes historian Anne Applebaum in the Atlantic. “He wants Ukrainian democracy to fail. He wants the Ukrainian economy to collapse. He wants foreign investors to flee. He wants his neighbors—in Belarus, Kazakhstan, even Poland and Hungary—to doubt whether democracy will ever be viable, in the longer term, in their countries too.

I believe this demonstrates the topic is more than just a "red herring", and that it is consistent with mentioning both Russia's NATO-related security demands in late 2021 as well as Putin's irredentist statements in this article's lead, as my version proposes. — Goszei (talk) 16:12, 7 July 2024 (UTC)

wrt to NATO We are talking about this specific text by which was reverted by GordonGlotall and then readded by JDiala. I still agree with Gordon here. First issue is that it removes the denials. Volunteer Marek 16:44, 7 July 2024 (UTC)

And his edit summary is correct - Putin also demanded NATO’s withdrawal from Poland and Baltic, recognition of occupation of Crimea, a change in Ukrainian government, etc. Why focus on this particular pretext?

In regard to the CoFR - again, you have these “some scholars”. Anyone who’s been following this conflict knows who these “some scholars” are and the fact that you can count them on fingers of one hand. The same source you quote gives the actual reason for invasion in the last paragraph you quote. Volunteer Marek 16:50, 7 July 2024 (UTC)

I believe you are mistaken, I (not JDiala) made the change to that sentence in this revision, and I stand by it. It's obvious that Russia would deny plans to invade Ukraine (as opposed to openly announcing its intention), so it isn't worth stating. We should instead state what Russia did openly announce, which were its demands, no matter how disingenuous or non-viable they were. Our GA on the Prelude to the Russian invasion of Ukraine devotes a large part of its lead to describing the demands, and this lead should devote one sentence to doing so. Regarding the CoFR, it does not present the second viewpoint as the "actual reason for the invasion", but presents both as factors in Putin's decision to go to war.

If you need further evidence, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg himself said this to the EU Parliament in 2023:

The background was that President Putin declared in the autumn of 2021, and actually sent a draft treaty that they wanted NATO to sign, to promise no more NATO enlargement. That was what he sent us. And was a pre-condition for not invade Ukraine. Of course we didn't sign that. The opposite happened. He wanted us to sign that promise, never to enlarge NATO. He wanted us to remove our military infrastructure in all Allies that have joined NATO since 1997, meaning half of NATO, all the Central and Eastern Europe, we should remove NATO from that part of our Alliance, introducing some kind of B, or second class membership. We rejected that. So he went to war to prevent NATO, more NATO, close to his borders. [emphasis added] He has got the exact opposite.

— Goszei (talk) 17:25, 7 July 2024 (UTC)

Yes, but JDalaia was the one who restored it after it was reverted.

And I think the denial is important. He wasn’t saying “if NATO agrees to my demands I won’t invade”, he was saying “oh, we’re just doing training exercises, we’re not planning an invasion”.

Also I do think the last paragraph lays out the real reason for invasion. Volunteer Marek 17:50, 7 July 2024 (UTC)

Anyone who’s been following this conflict knows who these “some scholars” are and the fact that you can count them on fingers of one hand. [emphasis added]^{[citation needed]} Really? Quite a lot of scholars outside agenda-pushing think tanks have taken this view. The basic principles of intl rel and poli sci naturally lead to such conclusions. It is pretty mainstream in the relevant fields, even if non-academics want to cancel it for their own reasons. It’s hard to see a fundamental difference between people employed by the Atlantic Council or the American Enterprise Institute, who happen to have degrees, promoting narratives consistent with their employer’s overall goals, and similar phenomena in the hard sciences in which people with degrees are paid to write about the purported safety of their employer’s products (plastics, greenhouse emissions, prescription drugs, etc.) in situations where independent research shows otherwise.

Do you seriously doubt that the Russians have a monopoly on propaganda/info ops? Or is it that you don’t believe there’s anything threatening about a giant permanent alliance of the world’s most developed powers with an integrated command structure sitting on one’s border? Or is it that hybrid regimes aren’t allowed to feel security threats? Get real(ist). It may be easy for Europeans to gloss over inconvenient bits, but if my country spent only as much on defense as our average ally, we could afford decent social programs and pay off our debt.

Of course none of this excuses going and invading a sovereign country from a legal or ethical perspective.

RadioactiveBoulevardier (talk) 22:00, 7 July 2024 (UTC)

Please see comments below by Manyareasexpert and GordonGlottal. Also see WP:NOTAFORUM. Also, no spending as much on defense as “average ally” would not enable the US to “pay off its debt” (whatever that means) or even “afford decent social programs”, nevermind that these are just more red herrings here. Volunteer Marek 05:01, 8 July 2024 (UTC)

This is not only cringeworthy, but violates WP:NOTFORUM. TylerBurden (talk) 21:07, 9 July 2024 (UTC)

Wow, so much discussion that I had to have a look. Why would not we edit the article body first and then the lead. I remember reading reliable sources both saying NATO expansion was an excuse for Russia to invade, and assessing Russia was feeling threatened by it. Let's talk sources. The burden is on those who request the change. ManyAreasExpert (talk) 21:26, 7 July 2024 (UTC)

+1. This discussion has wandered very far from valid methods. Anyone who is here to build an encyclopedia should please state their case strictly in terms of reliable secondary sources. This talk page is not a forum for lay political argument. GordonGlottal (talk) 22:56, 7 July 2024 (UTC)

Russian threat perceptions

To editor Asarlaí: With regards to your reversion, which sentence(s) and source(s) in particular are you accusing of being instances of Russian propaganda? Chino-Catane (talk) 17:57, 9 July 2024 (UTC)

The lengthy section you added was one-sided and gave undue weight to the Kremlin's claims of the "threat from NATO expansion". This is one of the excuses Putin gave for invading. The only sources used were those that support the Kremlin's narrative. It gave no opposing views or counter-arguments, and it took the Kremlin's claims at face value - even tho' most Western analysts believe they're only a pretext.

We could write an equally-lengthy section about the Kremlin's other claims: its denial of Ukrainian nationhood and statehood, "Ukrainian Nazis", "genocide in Donbas", etc. But, like the "NATO expansion" claim, they're already mentioned in the article, and writing a whole section for any of them would likewise be giving them undue weight.

As I said in my edit summary, if your content belongs anywhere, it would be Russia–NATO relations. But it would need to be re-written to include opposing views. – Asarlaí ^(talk) 10:34, 10 July 2024 (UTC)

I agree that an entire section on "Russian threat perception" is probably undue. However, I don't agree with removing properly sourced content altogether by dismissing it as propaganda. You can have it underneath "background" but without its own section. The size of the added material should be somewhat reduced. JDiala (talk) 19:36, 10 July 2024 (UTC)

The "Background" section and the "Prelude" section already mention the Kremlin claims about NATO several times. – Asarlaí ^(talk) 19:45, 10 July 2024 (UTC)

Right, only to dismiss them as meritless or a pretext. There is another perspective that Russian fears were to some extent merited. JDiala (talk) 20:16, 10 July 2024 (UTC)

"one-sided": The entry takes no sides. The notion that Russia perceives NATO and its expansion as a threat is a matter of fact. Russia's perception of a NATO threat, which is not exclusive to a military threat as summarized in my entry, directly relates to Russia's invasion of Ukraine. This is not controversial.

"support the Kremlin's narrative": You are projecting a pre-conceived notion of some narrative onto a set of facts that are not disputed.

"undue weight to the Kremlin's claims": My entry made no reference to any claims whatsoever, nor does it assign moral justification to any claim made by any belligerent.

"one of the excuses Putin gave": A neutral observer would not use the word "excuses". A neutral observer would say, "...one of the reasons Putin gave..."

"opposing views or counter-arguments": There are no views opposing the notion that Russia's perceptions of a NATO threat relate to its invasion of Ukraine. Chino-Catane (talk) 21:07, 10 July 2024 (UTC)

"The notion that Russia perceives NATO and its expansion as a threat is a matter of fact" - Whether the Kremlin really believed NATO enlargement to be a threat, or was merely using it as a pretext for invasion, is a matter of debate. It is most definitely controversial and disputed. What isn't disputed is that Putin claimed the invasion was provoked by NATO.

This article already says that Russia allegedly felt threatened by NATO enlargement. It already says that Putin related this alleged threat to the invasion. Here are some quotes from the article:

"when Ukraine and Georgia sought to join NATO in 2008, Putin warned that their membership would be a threat to Russia. Some NATO members worried about antagonising Russia".
"Russia demanded that NATO end all activity in its Eastern European member states and ban Ukraine or any former Soviet state from ever joining NATO. Russia threatened an unspecified military response if NATO followed an 'aggressive line' ".
"Putin said that Russia was being threatened ... that a hostile NATO was building up its forces and military infrastructure in Ukraine".

We also link to other Wiki articles discussing this NATO aspect in more detail.

So, why do we need to go further and include a lengthy section about this one particular aspect? This article is already very long, and it's not the place for lengthy discussion of Russia's perceptions of NATO. – Asarlaí ^(talk) 22:20, 10 July 2024 (UTC)

To editor Asarlaí: "Whether the Kremlin really believed...": My entry doesn't mention the Kremlin or its beliefs. What the Kremlin believes is not a suitable topic of investigation because it cannot be investigated. Is it a matter of controversy that, "a majority of surveyed Russians believed Russia had reason to be afraid of NATO countries"? Think about the answer to that question along with my assertion "the notion that Russia perceives NATO and its expansion as a threat is a matter of fact".

Now let's address the three quotes you mention, in sequence.

"In 2002, Putin said that Ukraine's relations with NATO were 'a matter for those two partners'. However, when Ukraine and Georgia sought to join NATO in 2008, Putin warned that their membership would be a threat to Russia." The second statement presents a Russian threat perception, preceded immediately by a statement made 6 years prior that invalidates it. The first sentence is pulled from an article that begins, "Russian president Vladimir Putin wants you to believe that NATO is responsible..."
"Russia demanded that NATO end all activity in Eastern Europe and ban Ukraine or any former Soviet state from ever joining NATO. Russia threatened an unspecified military response if NATO followed an 'aggressive line.' These demands were widely seen as non-viable..." This presents a Russian action against a perceived threat, which is immediately dismissed.
"Putin said that Russia was being threatened: he falsely claimed that Ukrainian government officials were neo-Nazis under Western control, that Ukraine was developing nuclear weapons, and that a hostile NATO was building up its forces and military infrastructure in Ukraine.": This presents a Russian threat perception labeled as false.

There exist three instances in this article of Russian threat perceptions being presented, juxtaposed with sentences that dismiss them.
"why do we need to go further and include a lengthy section": 334 words is not lengthy. This article does not need to go further in presenting Russian threat perceptions, it just needs to start.
"This article is already very long": This article is very long because it includes a detailed timeline of events. Chino-Catane (talk) 10:09, 11 July 2024 (UTC)

"There exist three instances in this article of Russian threat perceptions being presented, juxtaposed with sentences that dismiss them." - I wouldn't say that they're dismissed; rather that they're juxtaposed with the facts. Do you suggest that we add evidence that might support them?

"334 words is not lengthy. This article does not need to go further in presenting Russian threat perceptions, it just needs to start." - I'm not against presenting Russia's perception of a "NATO threat". The article already does. Nor am I against adding a wee bit more about it. But I'm against devoting 300+ words to it, on top of what's already there; and I'm not the only one. For balance, we'd have to write more about Russia's/the Kremlin's other perceptions, like how it sees Ukrainian sovereignty and nationhood. We'd probably also have to write more about Ukraine's perceptions. But as I said, the article is already very long, and is not the best place to discuss these things in great detail. There are other articles for that. – Asarlaí ^(talk) 11:44, 11 July 2024 (UTC)

"juxtaposed with the facts"

The two instances of Russian threat perceptions are positioned very far apart, sequenced with facts deliberately positioned so that readers immediately dismiss them. This is not a useful presentation of the Russian view, which is critically important information in an article describing the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The single instance presenting Russian action on its threat perceptions was also similarly sequenced with, "...widely seen as non-viable", with no cited WP:RS. Russian threat perceptions do not need to be "supported". They need to be presented in such a way so readers understand that Russian threat perceptions are mortally serious.

"we'd have to write more about Russia's/the Kremlin's other perceptions"

This can be handled concisely.

"Ukraine's perceptions"

Ukraine's perceptions played no part in Russia's decision to invade it. Ukraine's self-defense requires no explanation. Chino-Catane (talk) 05:57, 12 July 2024 (UTC)

We mention it, it deserves no more coverage. Slatersteven (talk) 13:17, 11 July 2024 (UTC)

You mention it in passing only to dismiss it entirely. There's no consideration given to the opposing view that the threat perception had a legitimate basis. JDiala (talk) 18:44, 11 July 2024 (UTC)

Russian threat perceptions require at least 300 words of uninterrupted prose. An uninterrupted exposition of the Russian view is critically important in an article titled Russian invasion of Ukraine. Chino-Catane (talk) 06:06, 12 July 2024 (UTC)

Why? Slatersteven (talk) 09:54, 12 July 2024 (UTC)

[1] - Yes, that was very good reversion. This is all hypothetical at best or a propaganda at worst. "Russia considered NATO expansion a threat to its national security"? Yes, but only if Russia would attack first. "Ukrainian entry into NATO ... represented a direct challenge to Russian interests"? Yes, but only if Russia would attack Ukraine. "Russia's world view as being rooted in pragmatic geopolitics aimed at enhancing its power and security."? This is a provable nonsense. Did Russia achieve such goals by attacking Ukraine and forcing the further enlargement and militarization of NATO and Ukraine? By losing a half million of its own people as dead and wounded? If anything, Russia has lost its power, security, reputation and even people. My very best wishes (talk) 01:01, 13 July 2024 (UTC)

There is some truth here. Putin did plan to attack Ukraine and potentially other countries, and therefore, NATO was a threat. And of course all Baltic republics would be occupied by Russia already if they were not members of NATO. And right now Putin has created a choice: he will either subjugate Ukraine or NATO will have to intervene more directly. Hence a threat. But none of these perceptions by Putin justified the invasion, as the included text implied. Rather, the perceptions came true because of the invasion. My very best wishes (talk) 02:19, 13 July 2024 (UTC)

Belarus as belligerent

The infobox lists Belarus as belligerent on the Russian side. This is sourced to a piece of information on the BBC which itself is sourced to a Facebook post by a Ukrainian adviser to the defence minister. I hope editors here agree that this is an extremely poor sourcing for Wikipedia to formally implicate a country in an international war.

To-date, the role of Belarus for Russia has been nearly identical to the role played by Poland, Romania or Germany for Ukraine: as a training and resupply ground, arms supplier, and political backer. There's no good evidence that Belarusian troops are or have been taking active part in hostilities. While bilateral relations are in a rather poor state, neither country is openly engaged in hostilities against the other.[2]

In this view, I propose removing Belarus as belligerent. — kashmīrī ^TALK 18:38, 27 June 2024 (UTC)

The role of Belarus has not been at all similar - nevermind “identical” - to that of Poland, Romania or Germany. Ukraine is not attacking Russia from the territory of Poland, Romania or Germany. Russia did attack Ukraine from the territory of Belarus. This is pretty straight forward. Volunteer Marek 05:29, 7 July 2024 (UTC)

The main reason we list Belarus as a belligerent is that Russian troops were allowed to invade from Belarus. Ukrainian troops may train in foreign countries but always return to Ukraine before entering combat. Russian air attacks were also staged from Belarus. No country has permitted Ukraine to stage air attacks from their territory. GordonGlottal (talk) 19:51, 27 June 2024 (UTC)

Please see the very complete discussion here. GordonGlottal (talk) 19:53, 27 June 2024 (UTC)

Under this reasoning it could be argued that Belarus ceased its "belligerency" sometime around 2022, as Russian troops have not moved between Belarus and Ukraine since April of that year, and it is not apparent that Russian artillery and air strikes have since taken place from Belarusian territory or airspace.

A compromise might include a qualifier something along these lines:

Russia

Supported by:

Belarus (2022)

SaintPaulOfTarsus (talk) 20:22, 27 June 2024 (UTC)

if there is a source which makes such an argument, let’s see it. Volunteer Marek 05:31, 7 July 2024 (UTC)

Which argument, specifically? SaintPaulOfTarsus (talk) 06:22, 7 July 2024 (UTC)

Is it true that nothing has been staged from Belarus since 2022? The Ukrainian army reported a launch from Belarus on 5 August 2023 (Source). GordonGlottal (talk) 00:07, 28 June 2024 (UTC)

Claim not verified independently - the source (CNN) only mentions is in passing, attributing it to an unreliable source (a different belligerent). Insufficient for an encyclopaedia IMO. Anyway, a missile launch by Russian troops stationed in Belarus does NOT make that country a belligerent. In other articles, we don't consider single instances of territory use as sufficient to consider the entire country a belligerent in a war. — kashmīrī ^TALK 01:41, 28 June 2024 (UTC)

If I remember correctly, the infobox used to say that. Benpiano800 (talk) 02:20, 13 July 2024 (UTC)

@GordonGlottal The close of that discussion highlighted that there was no consensus to list Belarus as belligerent. That was more than 6 months ago, and a new discussion is warranted. — kashmīrī ^TALK 01:43, 28 June 2024 (UTC)

I guess it's been long enough for another RFC. But only if you think there's a real likelihood of changed consensus—be respectful of everyone's time. Note that another RFC is unlikely to be permitted for quite a while if two fail 7 months apart. GordonGlottal (talk) 02:20, 28 June 2024 (UTC)

Belarus is not listed as a belligerent. It is listed as a supporter and there was clear consensus to keep [Belarus] there. This is affirmed twice in the RfC close.

This is the single most discussed element of the article and has hosted near a dozen RfCs and innumerable edit-requests and proposals across the two main articles. All bar one RfC has closed with no consensus. The Belarus RfC is the exception. 'A new discussion' without clear preliminary endorsement is doomed to status quo. Mr rnddude (talk) 04:35, 28 June 2024 (UTC)

I support @Kashmiri's proposal for removal. The United States has provided far more lethal military support to Ukraine than Belarus has provided to Russia. Ukraine Armed Forces would not be able to make biweekly payroll without economic support from NATO. Russia can continue to prosecute this war even if Belarus removes itself completely from the situation. The same cannot be said for Ukraine if the United States steps away completely. Where is the neutral balance here? This particular aspect of the info box betrays a systematically biased point of view. Alternatively, simply have the info box express the fact that Ukraine is supported by the United States. Chino-Catane (talk) 18:50, 28 June 2024 (UTC)

Thanks. It's not only that. Ukraine is being actively armed by Europe and the US, it keeps receiving incredible amounts of military hardware, equipment, munitions, training, military intelligence, etc. The collective West has embarked on an economic war against Russia, seizing its assets and blocking its trade. Belarus has not done anything resembling that – generally, the West is much more engaged in the Ukrainian war than Belarus has ever been. If Belarus, by simply allowing Russian troops on its territory in line with its international obligations (CSTO), is called a "belligerent" by Wikipedia, what will be the right term for the Western countries so active in Ukraine? — kashmīrī ^TALK 20:37, 28 June 2024 (UTC)

Russia invaded Ukraine from Belarusian territory. The US (or EU or NATO or whatever) did not invade Russia from Ukrainian territory. Or at all. Simple as that. Volunteer Marek 05:27, 7 July 2024 (UTC)

Nothing in the CSTO treaty required Belarus to do any of this, not that it matters. I want to modify what I said earlier slightly in response to this exchange: Your proposed understanding of the conflict is fundamentally rejected by the vast majority of English Wikipedia editors and by the sources English Wikipedia has chosen to elevate as reliable. An RFC from this perspective is guaranteed to fail. It will be an enormous waste of editors' time and effort. Wikipedia is not a place to right great wrongs. Please find a more productive use of your editorial energy. GordonGlottal (talk) 22:24, 28 June 2024 (UTC)

Why do you keep insisting that Belarus is listed as a "belligerent" when you have already been corrected above? Belarus is not listed as a belligerent, so your whole suggestion here is built on either you misreading or a misrepresentation of what the article actually says. TylerBurden (talk) 17:37, 30 June 2024 (UTC)

Thanks to Manyareasexpert for publishing an explanation offering reasons why this article labels Belarus a "co-belligerent supporter" and not the United States. Belarus permitted Russia to stage its pre-invasion force and launch missiles from its territory. Similarly, we in the United States staged our forces for the 2003 invasion of Iraq from somewhere. We also launched air support for that invasion from somewhere. Were those pre-invasion staging territories and air support launch pads labeled as "co-belligerent supporters" in the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq? Chino-Catane (talk) 16:18, 30 June 2024 (UTC)

Answer to this question seems to be that we list Turkey and Kuwait as belligerents proper (under "coalition of the willing"). The US didn't distinguish between different types of military support for the invasion and included hosts as full members of the coalition. See 2003 invasion of Iraq. GordonGlottal (talk) 04:31, 2 July 2024 (UTC)

Mentioning NATO in lead

Continuing from the discussion above: (1) Should we mention NATO in the lead section? (2) If so, how should this be done (should it be presented in the context of the security guarantees demanded by Russia in December 2021, or in some other way)?

My favored wording is In late 2021, Russia massed troops along Ukraine's borders and issued demands including a ban on future expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), especially to Ukraine. The demands were broader, including the withdrawal of NATO troops and weapons from all of Eastern Europe (presumably in an attempt to extract maximum concessions), but the reason this particular demand should be highlighted is because it was the most immediate point of negotiation, given the circumstances of the crisis. I don't think that a clause like denied any plan to attack or similar should be included, because (1) it is obvious Russia would ~~do this~~ deny this, and (2) the denials became moot after December 17, as massing troops around a country and then issuing a list of demands of that country clearly constitutes a tacit threat of invasion. To be clear, simply mentioning Russia's demands does not present them to readers as legitimate, though I will note that if Russia didn't intend to negotiate at all, it wouldn't have issued any ultimatum. Indeed, documents recently published by the New York Times have revealed that in the spring 2022 talks, shortly after the invasion started, Ukraine agreed to Russia's demand that it become a permanently neutral state and never join NATO. The situation has now changed, but this demonstrates that this particular point of negotiation was and continues to be real, and should thus be presented to our readers. — Goszei (talk) 07:15, 9 July 2024 (UTC)

@JDiala, Volunteer Marek, Mr rnddude, RadioactiveBoulevardier, Chino-Catane, Manyareasexpert, and GordonGlottal: Pinging all those who have participated in this discussion so far. — Goszei (talk) 07:18, 9 July 2024 (UTC)

the reason this particular demand should be highlighted is because it was the most immediate point of negotiation
Again those are personal opinions. Another question is why should the lead provide Russian demands but not their assessment by RSs, which assessments are already in the article.

I don't think that a clause like denied any plan to attack or similar should be included, because (1) it is obvious Russia would do this, and (2) the denials became moot after December 17
Again those are personal opinions. And no, it wasn't obvious, and as far as on February 23 everybody in Russia were laughing and making fun of Ukrainians for them to get concerned with possible invasion rumors. ManyAreasExpert (talk) 08:31, 9 July 2024 (UTC)

Agree. In the run up to the invasion the question of “will they invade or won’t they?” was a huge deal and many commentators were assuring us that Russia wouldn’t invade based on Russian denials. It is also not obvious. Ultimatum in such situations aren’t necessarily rare. In 1991 US pretty much said “leave Kuwait or we’ll invade” - there were no denials. In this case the denials themselves were a propaganda campaign and Kremlin disinformation so yes, they’re important. Volunteer Marek 16:45, 9 July 2024 (UTC)

Here's how the Council on Foreign Relations summarized Russia's demands:
Russian draft treaties on security guarantees released in the run-up to the invasion focused on NATO, not Ukraine. The three key demands in these treaties were an end to NATO expansion, a prohibition on the deployment of offensive weapons along Russia’s borders, and the withdrawal of NATO infrastructure back to the lines of 1997, when the NATO-Russia Founding Act was signed two years before the first post-Cold War wave of expansion.

What Does Putin Really Want in Ukraine? Chino-Catane (talk) 10:16, 9 July 2024 (UTC)

I support your NATO background addition [3] but please don't base it on outdated sources, as, after the start of the invasion, every pre-2022 source is outdated, and will be deleted. Use, for example, ~~Putin's Wars and NATO's Flaws - Google Books and~~ Evaluating NATO Enlargement - Google Books . ManyAreasExpert (talk) 11:15, 9 July 2024 (UTC)

Putin's Wars and NATO's Flaws isn't scholarly, it's a book by a journalist without significant academic credentials or significant background in Russia/Ukraine. It's a low quality source. JDiala (talk) 00:06, 10 July 2024 (UTC)

This is better then pre-2022 sources and existing NATO-related text could be enhanced. There are more in-depth assessments however. For example, There is no question that Russia—its leaders, expert analysts, and public— reacted negatively to NATO enlargement right from the start. Despite some contrary statements, Russia’s opposition was fairly consistent over time. But there is little evidence that NATO’s enlargement per se was the primary cause of Russia’s concerns or fears about the West. There is little evidence of any direct Russian military reaction to enlargement, and Russian experts knew that enlargement actually made NATO harder to defend. Evaluating NATO Enlargement - Google Books ManyAreasExpert (talk) 16:16, 9 July 2024 (UTC)

I can only reiterate what I said above: editor discretion is strictly limited by policy, which requires us to follow reliable secondary sources. Valid wiki arguments take the form "RS1, RS2, and RS3 all say X" never "X must be true according to the following evidence and logic". Please state your argument exclusively in terms of secondary sources if you're here to build an encyclopedia. Then others can reply with alternate sources, critiques of your sources, critiques of your summary, etc. This is the only way it can work. GordonGlottal (talk) 20:40, 9 July 2024 (UTC)

To editor Manyareasexpert:What's the policy justification for this pre-2022 source ban? Only 2 / 9 citations in the International treaties subsection were published after January 1, 2022. How can this ban be justified for a Background section where history must be discussed? For example, the WP:GA assessed article Russo-Georgian War does not adhere to this condition. Chino-Catane (talk) 17:51, 9 July 2024 (UTC)

No ban but the source should be related to article topic and those pre-event are just don't. ManyAreasExpert (talk) 19:38, 9 July 2024 (UTC)

The cited sources generate information describing "Russian threat perceptions". Which particular sentence(s) and source(s) do you believe are unrelated to the background of the historic episode we are labeling "Russian invasion of Ukraine"? Chino-Catane (talk) 21:19, 9 July 2024 (UTC)

There was serious reassessment after the actual event did happened. Why should we use pre-invasion sources to describe the invasion, given there are plenty post-invasion assessments. ManyAreasExpert (talk) 21:45, 9 July 2024 (UTC)

It's not at all unusual to use sources about the background context of an event published prior to that event. If you're claiming that there was a "serious reassessment" sufficiently serious to deprecate older sources, you need a source for that. JDiala (talk) 23:40, 9 July 2024 (UTC)

The source should be on topic. You seem to question the validity of the sentence There was a serious reassessment of the event after the actual event did happened. I think we should stop here. ManyAreasExpert (talk) 23:42, 9 July 2024 (UTC)

All of the sources in question are on topic. You are also misquoting your own sentence. You originally said "there was serious reassessment after the actual event did happened" and now you are saying "there was a serious reassessment of the event after the actual event did happened". It's hard to glean the point you're trying to make. As you've been told, you need an evidence-based, WP:RS backed reason to discard pre-2022 sources. This is not normally done. JDiala (talk) 23:57, 9 July 2024 (UTC)

All of the sources in question are on topic.
Let's have a look at the first source CIAO: Strategic Analysis: NATO Eastward Expansion and Russian Security (archive.org) of contested edit [4]. Nowhere it mentions the Russian invasion of 2022. No surprise here, since the source dated November 1998. So no, your statement is wrong.

You are also misquoting your own sentence. You originally said "there was serious reassessment after the actual event did happened" and now you are saying "there was a serious reassessment of the event after the actual event did happened"
So do you agree that There was a serious reassessment of the event after the actual event did happened is valid? ManyAreasExpert (talk) 08:17, 10 July 2024 (UTC)

Sources from prior to the invasion by definition do not take into account the invasion in their assessment. That does not mean that they are irrelevant for discussion on the background context of the invasion. JDiala (talk) 09:16, 10 July 2024 (UTC)

discussion on the background context of the invasion
That should be source's conclusion, not yours. ManyAreasExpert (talk) 09:27, 10 July 2024 (UTC)

This isn't the standard used for sourcing. Editors are allowed to adjudicate whether a given source is relevant to a given article. As you've been told, it's routine practice for older sources to be used for for the background sections of a given article. JDiala (talk) 09:33, 10 July 2024 (UTC)

To editor Manyareasexpert: Since you did not respond to the question, "Which particular sentence(s) and source(s) do you believe are unrelated...", I take this to mean that every sentence in my reverted edit is related to the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

"Why should we use pre-invasion sources..."

Every sentence in my reverted edit was factually correct, generated from sources that no one has flagged as poor work or discredited. I have no issues with using newer sources to improve the entry, but this is no reason for my entry to not appear in the article as it was presented.

"...describe the invasion..."

My Background subsection titled "Russian threat perceptions" does not describe the invasion itself. As Russia built up its invasion forces, it publicly stated demands concerning NATO 1 2 3. My entry presented historical facts concerning Russia's perceptions of NATO. Those facts have not changed, nor have they been disputed. Chino-Catane (talk) 03:48, 10 July 2024 (UTC)

No point arguing for the usage of pre-2022 sources, given there are plenty of sources which actually mention the article subject. You can even use the one given above. I even quoted some of its conclusions above. Here's more:

Some Western observers, even after February 2022, recognise the role of agency and contingency in a backhanded way, when they wonder why Russia’s vast bureaucracies, and the majority of people did not recoil in horror when their leader launched his war. Unfortunately, historic inves tigations into the impact of NATO enlargement on the Russian elites have become side-lined by current security and geopolitical concerns in the West. Still, as this essay suggests, it would have been much better for Western leaders to acknowledge what happened in 1991–1999 and in Ukraine between 2004 and 2008 without prevarications. A candid effort to get the story of NATO expansion straight and why Ukraine was left exposed to Putin’s fury would not affect any policies and attitudes that Putin’s brutal attack generated. Nor it would lessen the support for Ukraine’s cause. But it would have settled the issue once and for all, and thus denied Putin’s machine of propaganda lies, as well as his sympathisers in the West, any real grounds for credibility. (the chapter end paragraph) ManyAreasExpert (talk) 08:51, 10 July 2024 (UTC)

"No point arguing for the usage of pre-2022 sources": The use of pre-event sources in a background section does not require defense. There exists no policy nor general practice of excluding them, as the three aforementioned WP:GA articles demonstrate. I'm not seeing how your block quote relates to Russian threat perceptions with respect to NATO. Chino-Catane (talk) 19:28, 10 July 2024 (UTC)

Here are two WP:GA-assessed articles about armed conflicts that cite sources in their background sections published before the episode itself: Battle of Kilinochchi (2008–2009) and 2008 Mumbai attacks. Chino-Catane (talk) 03:59, 10 July 2024 (UTC)
another up-to-date source: NATO and the Russian War in Ukraine - Google Books
A third option was put forward by Russia in December 2021 as an alternative to a full-scale invasion and was then ignored by the West that remained and remains wedded to the principle of self- determination: to force Ukraine to abjure any application to join the EU or NATO and to guarantee its neutrality by a great-power congress, involving Russia itself and America, of course, and NATO collectively (Bismarck must be laughing and weeping in his grave). Such a proposal not only flies in the face of the principle of self-determination but has also been deprived of any credibility by the behaviour of Russia itself as it had entered into just such a great-power agreement with the Budapest Memorandum of 1994. In this, the US and Britain stepped in as guarantors of an agreement between Russia on the one hand and Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine on the other that if the latter surrendered to Russia the nuclear weapons stationed on their territory at the time the USSR was dissolved, Russia in turn would promise not to touch their frontiers. Which Russia, in the case of Ukraine, has blatantly ignored since 2014. ManyAreasExpert (talk) 08:55, 10 July 2024 (UTC)

You really do need to engage with the arguments others are making to defend your position. Chino-Catane's point is that non-up-to-date sources are routinely used for the background sections of major events (including wars). You should address this. JDiala (talk) 09:19, 10 July 2024 (UTC)

That could not be used as a justification to violate the argument that sources should be on topic of article subject. ManyAreasExpert (talk) 09:24, 10 July 2024 (UTC)

Please engage with the argument. We've cited numerous examples of GA-tier articles which source in a given way. Clearly, your views are not congruent with what the WP community considers correct sourcing. JDiala (talk) 09:33, 10 July 2024 (UTC)

Wrong. See WP:OR : To demonstrate that you are not adding original research, you must be able to cite reliable, published sources that are directly related to the topic of the article. ManyAreasExpert (talk) 09:43, 10 July 2024 (UTC)

Yes, and you are misinterpreting what “directly related” means in this context. I will reiterate what I said earlier. “We’ve cited numerous examples of GA-tier articles which source in a given way. Clearly, your views are not congruent with what the WP community considers correct sourcing.” If you are incorrect and someone corrects you, it is generally wiser to be humble and accept the feedback rather than digging your heels in. JDiala (talk) 17:28, 10 July 2024 (UTC)

You can't override WP:OR with some local consensus. No more false theses please. ManyAreasExpert (talk) 18:00, 10 July 2024 (UTC)

It's not a violation of OR. You just don't understand what OR is. JDiala (talk) 18:12, 10 July 2024 (UTC)

No false theses please. ManyAreasExpert (talk) 18:25, 10 July 2024 (UTC)

Manyareasexpert's citations of WP:OR on this point is accurate. The way to write a background for this article is to cite present, up-to-date sources that provide the background information and analyses themselves. You do not need, nor should you be referring to, outdated sources to achieve this. You will be hard pressed to present a convincing argument for how a source that cannot so much as discuss the article's subject is directly related to it.

The argument from GA rests solely on other content and is an invalid justification there-in. Any editor can review and promote a GA, even whilst it contains violations of any policy. A major recent incident resulted in one of the most prolific GA authors having nearly all (5 of the original 233 retained GA status) of their GAs delisted and being site-banned because of the innumerable problems that those articles had and the intractability of their own problems. Even aside that, both GAs being cited here were listed over 15 years ago. They don't represent current practices at GAN. But lest anyone be led astray, even if they were FA articles listed yesterday, that does not mean they are devoid of any problems, only that all identified problems were resolved.

If you are incorrect and someone corrects you, it is generally wiser to be humble and accept the feedback rather than digging your heels in shows a complete lack of self-awareness. Mr rnddude (talk) 19:29, 10 July 2024 (UTC)

I think it's important for you to understand that the position and interpretation you are defending is something absolutely in the fringes. This isn't a case of one or two GA articles which may or may not be good; this is basically everything. Nearly all reasonably large articles on a major recent geopolitical event have at least some sources published prior to the event's occurrence particularly in the "background" (or similar) sections of the respective articles. If you hold your interpretation, fine, but it's probably best to get a strong consensus for it because you have a fringe view on policy. There's a preference for recent sources but this is not an absolute ban on older sources. Furthermore, even if we are to accept your interpretation, then that implies many of the sources in the current version of this article (published pre- February 2022) also ought to be removed. JDiala (talk) 19:55, 10 July 2024 (UTC)

There are indeed sources and statements within the present version of the background section that should be removed.

The position that Manyareasexpert espoused, is one I have re-iterated repeatedly, even on this very talk page. It is not one I am defending, it is one I am upholding: see 00:58, 11 December 2023. Mr rnddude (talk) 20:11, 10 July 2024 (UTC)

Fine, have it your way. I am actually seriously considering just systematically removing all pre-February-2022 sourced stuff in the background section. Do we have local consensus for this? We can't have one standard for material endorsing the pro-Ukrainian POV and another standard for the opposite perspective. JDiala (talk) 00:57, 11 July 2024 (UTC)

This would be fair. Chino-Catane (talk) 05:32, 12 July 2024 (UTC)

JDiala - I take it by your manual reversion, that you do not in fact endorse systematically removing all pre-February-2022 sourced material from the background section? Please clarify your actual stance and edit according to it. Rather than claiming one thing, than acting upon another. Mr rnddude (talk) 09:06, 13 July 2024 (UTC)

After discussion, of course. My main concern is you're being selective. It did seem interesting that the first target was something about NATO, rather than other things. JDiala (talk) 09:54, 13 July 2024 (UTC)

It is unnecessary to assign motives to my editing. I initially selected the paragraph with a citation needed tag and only one other dated source. The first thing I removed whilst editing, was not NATO, but the Russian invasion of Georgia. The relevance of which isn't well established within that paragraph. If your concern was that the removal of material about NATO above it shifted the article further away from NPOV, you should have stated that in your edit summary. It'd be a concern I could give due consideration for. Mr rnddude (talk) 10:18, 13 July 2024 (UTC)

There are a large number of claims based on pre-2022 sources. Removing them all in a haphazard fashion could negatively impact the quality of the article in the short-term. I think, if you want to do this, it is worth being circumspect in the process. I'd recommend attempting to find alternative sources based on post-2022 work before removing a given claim, or (if you yourself do not have time to source-hunt) consider temporarily putting a CN tag. JDiala (talk) 11:52, 13 July 2024 (UTC)

Thanks for your effort providing such a comprehensive explanation. ManyAreasExpert (talk) 20:28, 10 July 2024 (UTC)

"sources should be on topic": It is not controversial to state that Russian threat perceptions of NATO relate to the Russian invasion of Ukraine. [1 [2] [3] Every source I cited directly discusses Russian threat perceptions with respect to NATO. Chino-Catane (talk) 20:06, 10 July 2024 (UTC)

"another up-to-date source": I'm not seeing how this block quote relates to Russian threat perceptions with respect to NATO. Chino-Catane (talk) 19:32, 10 July 2024 (UTC)

Responding to the question on the top, no, we should not, at least in such context. One needs to propose a specific phrasing to approve or disapprove. My very best wishes (talk) 01:19, 13 July 2024 (UTC)

As about using pre-2022 sources, I think they can be used, but only if relevance of the content to the subject of the page is immediately obvious. If not, such content should be removed per WP:NOR. My very best wishes (talk) 16:04, 13 July 2024 (UTC)

Spelling mistake in image description

Could someone please fix the spelling mistake in the caption for the image of the Normandy format meeting, only is misspelt as "onyl". The caption is as follows:

"Negotiations for conflict resolution started in 2014, with the Normandy Format facilitating meetings until just before the fullscale invasion, facilitating in 9, December 2019 a meeting between President Zelensky and President Putin for the first and 'onyl' time"

Thank you :) 1mikeymouse1 (talk) 13:11, 16 July 2024 (UTC)

Fixed. Slatersteven (talk) 13:15, 16 July 2024 (UTC)

Misrepresentation of WP:ONUS

@TylerBurden: Your recent revert is in fact having nothing to do with WP:ONUS. It is true that that the onus is on those wanting inclusion to gain consensus for inclusion. This does not mean that the intermediate, temporary version as there is an ongoing discussion must be your version. For that, the norm is to maintain the status quo, see WP:STATUSQUO.

It is important for you to understand that the point of this is to discuss. This is how consensus is built on this encyclopedia. This is how editing disputes are resolved. You are not actually participating in any discussion, and haven't been involved in any discussion here since June 30th. This is not really in the spirit of the collaboration.

In addition, per administrator ScottishFinnishRadish you do in fact need consensus to remove established long-standing material, notwithstanding some contradictory-seeming policies. JDiala (talk) 23:44, 16 July 2024 (UTC)

This paragraph should go (agree with TylerBurden) because it is not about relations between former Soviet republics (the subject of the section), but about their relations with NATO. Hence this should be removed or made a different (sub)section. My very best wishes (talk) 02:00, 17 July 2024 (UTC)

There are two separate issues being raised here: STATUSQUO and NOCON. One of these is a policy, the other an essay. The opening sentence of NOCON is [w]hat happens when a good faith discussion concludes with no agreement to take or not take an action? I can stop here as we have a significant problem. We're dealing with Schrodinger's discussion. That is that the discussion has simultaneously concluded and is on-going depending on which state suits someone's purposes. NOCON only applies to the former state. If the discussion has concluded:

There are four editors – Manyareasexpert, My very best wishes, TylerBurden, and myself – contesting the material. Two identified that sources were used in a manner that constitutes original research; one has partially agreed excepting for material with immediately obvious relevance to the article irrespective of source age. There are two editors – ChinoCatane and yourself – whose position is contingent on the consistency of application of policy. Assuming that this was a compromise position and that the contingent factor has not been met, then we have two editors supporting retention.

All else being equal, the discussion ends with a super-majority (2:1) of editors supporting removal.

STATUSQUO is an essay. It does not represent a widely accepting community norm, per WP:GUIDES. There isn't an issue with citing it, but policy has priority. The policy being sought here is WP:PRESERVE which instructs that editors retain material that has flaws that would otherwise be included anyway without them. However, that policy applies to material that is neutral, verifiable, and free of original research. Given the preceding, the material is not subject to preservation. It can be removed. Mr rnddude (talk) 08:16, 17 July 2024 (UTC)

Now what? Compile a selection of sources on the Russian invasion of Ukraine that provide background coverage on NATO-Russia / NATO-Ukraine relations and an analysis on their impact leading up to the invasion. Write a paragraph or dedicated section about it from those sources. Mr rnddude (talk) 08:16, 17 July 2024 (UTC)

@Mr rnddude: It is true that STATUSQUO is an essay, but it is also not the main argument I'm using. The main argument is NOCON. Supplementary to that main argument were two auxiliary arguments, namely (1) STATUSQUO, and (2) a discussion with an administrator, SFR, who appeared to take my side which you can see in the link provided. It is misleading to suggest that STATUSQUO "does not represent a widely accepting community norm." If you read WP:GUIDES carefully, it only indicates that essays may not be supported by widespread consensus. Your assertion may or may not be true. Your discussion on WP:PRESERVE may be an argument for removing the material (which you could utilize in a discussion) but it doesn't justify reverting during an ongoing discussion. Anyways, as I've already told you, your views on OR are quite fringe. We don't really agree that using pre-2022 sources is OR; that is a point of contention, although again I have been cooperative with respect to trying to find compromises.

The prior discussion did not conclude, and a vote count does not imply consensus has been established. There was a legitimate concern I respectfully brought up in the end of the discussion that you did not respond to or engage with. This isn't a "Schrodinger's discussion"; this is a simple case of you not responding, and thus me concluding that a discussion has not concluded. I want to be clear that I do intend to be cooperative and fair, keeping in mind that my position is currently the minority position. I have no doubt that we can have a positive and constructive conclusion to this discussion. If you read my objections carefully, I am not even objecting entirely to the edit, rather merely suggesting a compromise.

We should also be careful to bifurcate the issues at hand here. The first is the actual content dispute. The second is the specific issue of whether TylerBurden's revert was justifiable. On the second point, I do not think TylerBurden's conduct is remotely defensible. In general, if there is an ongoing discussion going on about disputed content, it is not considered appropriate for an uninvolved editor to revert to his or her preferred version without participating at all in the discussion. TylerBurden has not even wrote anything on this talk page in all of July. His revert does not seem to me in the spirit of collaboration, which is what the policies we are debating are anyways intended to facilitate. JDiala (talk) 10:14, 17 July 2024 (UTC)

My views on OR are mainstream, that you are ignorant of it does not change that. You may not use sources that do not discuss an article subject to make claims about the article subject. Present that statement to any admin you like, they will tell you some variant of: no shit. I've been ignoring your casting of the term fringe because they are frankly so off-base that they are not remotely worth debating. Since you are absolutely insistent upon it, fringe has a specific meaning on Wikipedia that relates to the presentation of views in Wikipedia articles that depart significantly from the mainstream. It is inapplicable to editor interpretation of policies and guidelines.

If you haven't noticed, you are consistently finding yourself in disputes with other editors because of problems like this. I have no issue discussing any material within the article with you, but you need to stop lecturing highly experienced editors. Your approach does not appear collaborative to most editors, but combative.

I ignore some of what you write because any uninvolved, experienced editor would realise that it is wrong. For example, I would ignore your 'not a democracy' point as my assessment was more than a vote count as any editor can identify. I presented specifically used arguments and afforded them due weight. I treated the arguments with equal weight – I doubt most editors would – and only then did I assess that there is a clear majority position. You've misrepresented that as a straight vote count. This doesn't appear to me to be a good faith approach. I have skipped over other such errors because if I dissect every line this will be a wall of information. If desired, I can do that and post it to your talk page to read.

Lastly, the reason I haven't responded to your concern is that I am not available every day to edit. The last thing I wrote was: if you have an NPOV concern, I can give it consideration. I have not edited the material further. Recognising the present situation, I have proposed the least conflict ridden path forward. If you want to fight other editors over that paragraph, be my guest. If you want to move the article forward, re-read my 'now what?' comment. Figure out what hills are worth fighting for, and which should just be retreated from. Mr rnddude (talk) 12:09, 17 July 2024 (UTC)

@Mr rnddude: I do not think your OR views are mainstream. As brought up previously by Chino and I, virtually all other articles, including GA articles and homepage-linked articles, on current events allow for sources published pre-event in the background section. You can insist they're all wrong and GA articles are actually all bad (which is the argument you employed previously). Maybe you can make your case, but you cannot pretend it's mainstream. Definitionally, it's not mainstream if other articles (often edited by folks even more experienced than you) do not do this.

"Fringe" is an adjective in the English language, roughly translating to anything not clearly in the mainstream. I'm using the word in a generic English language sense, not in reference to the Wikipedia policy WP:FRINGE. This should be evident from me not capitalizing the word or appending the prefix "WP:" to the word. In general, whenever there is a law or a policy, there could be a range of interpretations to that policy. Some are mainstream interpretations. Others are less mainstream interpretations. I am using the adjective "fringe" in reference to what I consider your less mainstream interpretation.

Bringing up "combative" is funny. Let's compare our comments. You use profanity like "no shit". I use collaborative words like "compromise" and "respectfully." Who's really the combative one? The suggestion I had was simple and reasonable. If you are removing material based on it supposedly being based on an outdated source, it is probably a good idea to check if material you are removing can be substantiated by newer sources first.

Before we discuss moving forward, I will actually take up your offer on discussing the OR interpretation with an administrator. I was evidently too generous conceding compromises before actually even being confident that your position is a legitimate one. I will make a post on SFR's talk page. JDiala (talk) 23:55, 17 July 2024 (UTC)

Update on the last point: I was told by SFR to move the discussion to WP:NORN, which I have done. This question of OR really ought to get resolved before we move forward. JDiala (talk) 00:42, 18 July 2024 (UTC)

You can insist they're all wrong and GA articles are actually all bad (which is the argument you employed previously) - This is false. I have never said that all GA articles are wrong or that they are bad. This doesn't qualify even as a strawman as that would require the presence of straw. I said – repeating for the benefit of passers-by – that just because a GA does something that does not mean that it is endorsed by policy. The argument should not rest on other content (essay) alone. The GAs that Chino-Catane cited passed the process fifteen (15) years ago. They are not representative of the process in 2024. I have contributed to both the GAN and the FAC process both as a writer and a reviewer. I used to be actively involved in both, but have turned my attention elsewhere with my limited editing time. I am averse to having that time wasted by – in the politest terms I can muster – such poor quality engagement. This spat will not lead to the article improving. I am aware of the NORN discussion, and have posted there as well. That matter is now in the hands of other editors. Mr rnddude (talk) 06:06, 18 July 2024 (UTC)

Absolutely. To replace the first sentence, for example, one can use
Putin's War on Ukraine - Google Books
Russia subsequently prosecuted a military intervention in Crimea and Donbas in order to create a Georgia-style frozen conflict that would preclude NATO membership. This limited military intervention did not change the course of Ukrainian foreign policy, as Ukraine repealed its neutral non-bloc status in December 2014 and constitutionally enshrined EU and NATO membership as a strategic goal in February 2019. The collapse of Russian soft power in Ukraine, which was illustrated by opinion surveys showing less than 20% of Ukrainians with positive views of Russia31 and the inability of the pro-Russian Opposition Bloc—Party for Peace and Development to challenge for power, restricted Moscow’s non-military options. ManyAreasExpert (talk) 09:25, 17 July 2024 (UTC)

... or
Ukraine and Russia - Google Books
The year 2008 saw two pivotal events: the Bucharest NATO sum mit and Russia’s invasion of Georgia. At the Bucharest summit, NATO declined to offer Ukraine and Georgia Membership Action Plans but said that they could eventually join. Depending on one’s view, this com promise was either a concession to Russia’s concerns or an aggressive move to which it felt compelled to respond. Similarly, whether Georgia’s actions justified it being invaded by Russia was highly debatable. While both the United States and European Union were appalled by Russia’s actions, both made concrete efforts to put the episode behind them. In pursuing a “reset,” the new Obama administration was accused of appeasement and naivete, and the strategy brought few results.
The themes highlighted in Chapter 1 were all dramatically on view between 2005 and 2010. The security dilemma in central Europe was exemplified by the Bucharest summit: Ukraine and Georgia, fearing Russia, sought a formal alliance with NATO; NATO, worried about both those states but also about Russia’s reaction, tried to have it both ways – acceding to Russia’s opposition while reassuring Ukraine and Georgia – but even this was insufficient to assuage Russia’s fears of an intolerable loss. Mutually incompatible notions of the status quo exacerbated the security dilemma. For Russia, the perception after 2004 that Ukraine had been lost stoked resentment and determination to redress the problem. ManyAreasExpert (talk) 09:39, 17 July 2024 (UTC)

Welcome to include any of this or some parts of the removed text. This content is relevant because not accepting Ukraine to NATO left it vulnerable to attack by Russia (unlike Baltic Republics). This only needs to be well sourced, and the relevance to the subject of the page should be clear, e.g. as appears in this diff [5]. My very best wishes (talk) 15:12, 17 July 2024 (UTC)

not accepting Ukraine to NATO left it vulnerable to attack by Russia. Hell no. Russia would likely attack Ukraine even sooner should it see an increased risk of NATO infrastructure getting closer to its borders. Besides, in 2008, much of the Ukrainian military command was on Russian payroll, and Russia had a 100% visibility into, and much influence over, the flow of security information there. To include these UA structures in NATO information sharing mechanisms would be a suicide, nobody at NATO was ready for such a risk. Add to that the fact that Georgia attacked Russian troops first in Tskhinvali against NATO principles and explicit US advice (that's why nobody at NATO offered support beyond lip service) – and you start seeing that the outcomes of the Bucharest summit were only reasonable. Let's just follow the books and focus on facts and not OR-type what-ifs. — kashmīrī ^TALK 18:51, 17 July 2024 (UTC)

"not accepting Ukraine to NATO left it vulnerable to attack by Russia". Well, this is actually a well known claim by many, including Zelensky [6]: Zelenskyy didn't just single out the Russians – the murderers who hunted down pedestrians and cyclists. He also mentioned former German Chancellor Angela Merkel and ex-French President Nicolas Sarkozy. "I invite Ms. Merkel and Mr. Sarkozy to visit Bucha to see what the policy of 14 years of concessions to Russia has led to." Zelenskyy was referring to the NATO summit that took place in Bucharest in April 2008. So, why did not Merkel and others accept Ukraine to NATO? There were reasons as outlined in the linked investigation by Spiegel, but summarizing them is not easy. This can be used on the page of course. My very best wishes (talk) 01:20, 18 July 2024 (UTC)

If you have an issue with user conduct, do not discuss it here. Slatersteven (talk) 10:18, 17 July 2024 (UTC)

Subarticle on Ukrainian civilians arbitrarily detained in occupied UA + RU?

Do we have a sub-article on the issue of Ukrainian civilians arbitrarily detained by Russian authorities in the occupied Ukrainian territories and in Russian territory? Please respond at Template talk:Russian invasion of Ukraine#Ukrainian civilians detained in Russia: which article? or here. As stated over there, we have an 86-page Moscow Mechanism report The Moscow Mechanism Expert Report: On the Arbitrary Deprivation of Liberty of Ukrainian Civilians by the Russian Federation (Q127506242) but the topic doesn't seem to quite fit into any existing article. Boud (talk) 18:32, 18 July 2024 (UTC)

War crimes in the Russian invasion of Ukraine has an RfC

War crimes in the Russian invasion of Ukraine has an RfC for possible consensus. A discussion is taking place. If you would like to participate in the discussion, you are invited to add your comments on the discussion page. Thank you. JDiala (talk) 09:06, 25 July 2024 (UTC)

Undue weight given to Kharkiv Oblast in most recent section

This is a classic WP:NOTNEWS violation. All serious analytical sources are saying it's just a diversion from the Avdiivka–Pokrovsk, Toretsk, and Svatove–Kupiansk directions. In two of those directions, the Russians have conducted continuous offensive actions over the entire period under consideration (with operationally significant gains in the Pokrovsk direction). There's also insufficient coverage of the strategic-level campaigns, again reflecting "breaking news" weight rather than serious analytical RS.

I would suggest just calling it "current phase" until a better title can be found and agreed on. RadioactiveBoulevardier (talk) 09:31, 22 July 2024 (UTC)

Unfortunately, on current events WP is too often a reflection of the news cycle. That is just how it works (or doesn't) and then we have to come back and bash it into something encyclopedic. I would avoid using phase as it tends to connote it being a terminology accepted in sources. There have been several discussions on this to my recollection. I would suggest Current operations, Operations since November 2023 or some other such permutation. Cinderella157 (talk) 00:05, 23 July 2024 (UTC)

Have you ever thought about being WP:BOLD and fixing these problems you bring up? TylerBurden (talk) 15:26, 25 July 2024 (UTC)

Redundancy in BBC Casualty Figures Sentence

Under the "Casualty" section there is the sentence "BBC News has reported that Ukrainian reports of Russian casualty figures included the injured."

I believe this is redundant because it's commonly understood that casualty figures include both the dead and the injured. Specifying that the figures "included the injured" provides no informational value. IStalingrad (talk) 08:40, 30 July 2024 (UTC)

UNsure that is true. Slatersteven (talk) 11:44, 30 July 2024 (UTC)

It is. Casualties refers to deaths and injuries. Here's the OED definition for example: a person killed or injured in a war or accident. I've removed the statement because it is wholly redundant. As an aside, the sources are from the early months of the war (March-April 2022), they're really out-dated with regards casualty and fatality figures anyway. Mr rnddude (talk) 13:28, 30 July 2024 (UTC)

Yet the BBC saw the need to point this out, thus implying it was not how they were being presented. However the point about these being outdated is better. Slatersteven (talk) 13:38, 30 July 2024 (UTC)

I agree that it is worth considering the context of the BBC articles. The reason the author is underlining the fact that the term casualty includes injuries is that this article is specifically about determining the number of Russian fatalities. It's not that Ukraine is presenting the casualty figure as total deaths, just that the author is trying to estimate total deaths from available figures, and that included Ukraine's casualty estimates as an upper bound of possible deaths. The figures available to the author were: 6,000 claimed by Russia, 25,000 confirmed dead by the BBC, 40-60,000 dead according to the British government, and 200,000 total casualties according to Ukraine. It made sense for the author to clarify directly to the reader that the last figure includes injured given that context, but it was decontextualized here creating the redundancy since we weren't communicating those articles' purpose (to estimate loss of life). Mr rnddude (talk) 14:05, 30 July 2024 (UTC)

should north korea be listed beside belarus in the 'supported by' section

north korea has said it will put troops on the battlefield to help out in support roles NotQualified (talk) 17:00, 3 August 2024 (UTC)

They already sent weapons, ammo and supposedly tanks, but that kind of support does not qualiy to be included on this list. NK troops in my opinion should. YBSOne (talk) 18:58, 3 August 2024 (UTC)

https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2024/06/27/ukraine-russia-war-latest-news9/ NotQualified (talk) 19:12, 3 August 2024 (UTC)

I think we have to wait and see if reports of them arriving at the frontlines emerge, but then they would become beligerents. YBSOne (talk) 19:33, 3 August 2024 (UTC)

In short NO (at this time). Weapons suppliers have not been listed as supporter (many European and American countries have supported Ukraine this way), nor have been trainers. If you look back at this talk (and its archives) there has been extensive discussion whether to list Belarus at all - and the fact that it allowed Russia to organise attacks from its country was decisive there (this is obviously not the case for N Korea). Of course if we see regular N Korean troops engaged in the frontlines this may change, but that seems unlikely so far. Arnoutf (talk) 21:15, 3 August 2024 (UTC)

It will also depend on the nature of that troops deployment as the "urban rebuilders" may be just a smoke screen for now. YBSOne (talk) 21:47, 3 August 2024 (UTC)

See talk page archive, for every reason not to. Nothing has changed since the last time this was raised. When troops see combat this can be changed. Slatersteven (talk) 10:26, 4 August 2024 (UTC)

No. NK is much less engaged on the Russian side than the US and Europe are on the Ukrainian side. BTW, I'd remove Belarus, too, because no Belarusian forces ever took part in combat against Ukraine. We're an impartial encyclopaedia, not a propaganda outlet. — kashmīrī ^TALK 11:52, 4 August 2024 (UTC)

please do not confuse two issues. Slatersteven (talk) 11:54, 4 August 2024 (UTC)

They are mentioned as support for the use of their territory to launch an attack from. YBSOne (talk) 12:04, 4 August 2024 (UTC)

What you are referencing took place during the first ~40 days of a now ~2.5 year-long war. This epheremal use of Belarusian territory by Russian forces does not justify the infobox implying that Belarus has continuously provided this form of "support" from 2022 onward; we should aim to avoid this perception. I reiterate my call for a compromise based on the inclusion of a parenthetical qualifier:

Russia

Supported by:

Belarus (2022)

SaintPaulOfTarsus (talk) 10:16, 5 August 2024 (UTC)

Different issues, Belarus is not North Korea, this is about NK not Belarus. Slatersteven (talk) 10:45, 5 August 2024 (UTC)

This is a reply to YBSOne's comment about Belarus. SaintPaulOfTarsus (talk) 11:03, 5 August 2024 (UTC)

No, its a reply to this " This epheremal use of Belarusian territory by Russian forces does not justify the infobox implying that Belarus has continuously provided this form of "support" from 2022 onward; we should aim to avoid this perception. I reiterate my call for a compromise based on the inclusion of a parenthetical qualifier:", this is not about Belarus, so please stop trying to make it about it. Slatersteven (talk) 11:13, 5 August 2024 (UTC)

There is a clear note "Russian forces were permitted to stage part of the invasion from Belarusian territory. Belarusian territory has also been used to launch missiles into Ukraine. See also: Belarusian involvement in the Russian invasion of Ukraine", no need to explain it further or tag it in different way. YBSOne (talk) 12:32, 5 August 2024 (UTC)

Do we have evidence that Belarus has greenlit the use of its territory to launch missiles into Ukraine? As far as I know, they were isolated incidents only, not routine combat, and Russian army was only permitted to assemble in Belarus but never to fire at Ukraine from Belarusian soil. — kashmīrī ^TALK 15:43, 5 August 2024 (UTC)

Belarus has been discussed may time sand the consensus is to include it. here ism a link to the RFC [[7]], nothing has changed since then. Slatersteven (talk) 15:49, 5 August 2024 (UTC)

7 Aug 2024 Kursk incursion article?

I assume that by now we have 20kb of text on today's Kursk incursion, despite the near ~~lack~~ of WP:RS, in a new article. What is the article's name? Or is there only a subsection so far? Boud (talk) 17:05, 7 August 2024 (UTC) (edit Boud (talk) 17:11, 7 August 2024 (UTC))

August 2024 Kursk Oblast incursion. SaintPaulOfTarsus (talk) 20:30, 7 August 2024 (UTC)

Seems like I was right about 20kb, though it was really only a wild guess. Boud (talk) 02:23, 8 August 2024 (UTC)

March 2024 western Russia incursion and Timeline of the Russian invasion of Ukraine (1 August 2024 – present)#6 August seem to be the closest that I could find. Boud (talk) 17:08, 7 August 2024 (UTC)

One source: AJE - not enough for a new article. Boud (talk) 17:11, 7 August 2024 (UTC)

That is the issue, its kind of a Russian claim. Slatersteven (talk) 17:16, 7 August 2024 (UTC)

Mearsheimer critique

Mearsheimer views on Russian war are widely criticized - you could read it in John Mearsheimer if it would not be removed [8] . Thus Mearsheimer assessments here should be followed with assessments of his assessments. Which would make all of it too much for this article. Better to not to have Mearsheimer at all.

This is regarding latest edits [9] . ManyAreasExpert (talk) 16:28, 11 July 2024 (UTC)

I'm perfectly happy with including criticisms of Mearsheimer. That would be balanced. What I don't want is the total exclusion of Mearsheimer altogether, which was the previous consensus position for the article. The man is one of the most well-known, oft-discussed political scientists in the modern era. To dismiss him altogether simply because he doesn't tout the "Russia-bad" narrative editors here seem to endorse is a blatant violation of neutrality.

"Which would make all of it too much for this article" let's be honest, this is just a rationalization to avoid including anything which could give the appearance of criticism of Ukraine/NATO. It wouldn't be "too much" for the article, you could fit in his position and counters to it within one or two sentences. The POV pushing in this topic area is remarkable. JDiala (talk) 18:41, 11 July 2024 (UTC)

The sentence referencing Mearsheimer doesn't even require criticism. It's non-controversial. Chino-Catane (talk) 06:22, 12 July 2024 (UTC)

It is simultaneously the case that Mearsheimer is a significantly notable enough commentator that his analysis should be included; and that Mearsheimer's analysis on Ukraine has been widely criticized as being absolutely bunk. So no, it would not be better to not have him at all, unless we cannot do so without giving him undue weight or shielding from criticism; in which case it would actually be better. It's much the same as we should be doing for every other formerly respected academic who subsequently dived face-first into the "crank" pool (e.g. Theodore Postol on Syria) ⇒SWATJester ^{Shoot Blues, Tell VileRat!} 19:28, 11 July 2024 (UTC)

Either way fits the rules. ManyAreasExpert (talk) 19:40, 11 July 2024 (UTC)

Several of your sources are incredibly low-quality. One is some random from the Ayn Rand Institute (lol). One is a journalist without professional scholarly background (Katie Stallard). One is Carl Liles, some random unknown master's student from the University of Tartu (also lol). The others are more respected --- but of course scholarly disagreements between respected scholars are not unusual. While Mearsheimer does have provocative views on many topics, there is no evidence indicating he's regarded as a "crank." JDiala (talk) 20:59, 11 July 2024 (UTC)

I disagree with your assessment, but if what you're pushing for is for Mearsheimer's views to be included, then they have to come with appropriately sufficient context for how widely criticized he's been in the context of Ukraine, which may be more than just fitting in his position and counters to it within one or two sentences. To not do so would be giving his position undue weight and be just as blatant of a violation of neutrality as the one you were complaining about above. If we can't do that, then they shouldn't be there at all. ⇒SWATJester ^{Shoot Blues, Tell VileRat!} 23:08, 11 July 2024 (UTC)

If you think it's a due weight issue, a full survey of the field might be in order. I personally don't have the time to carry it out, but there are others active on this TP who have the wherewithal. RadioactiveBoulevardier (talk) 00:04, 12 July 2024 (UTC)

For a more reliable source I would recommend a well-researched and fairly well sourced video that thoroughly debunks Mearsheimer and others' claims in regards to the invasion, though it is not all that polite.

here A Miscellaneous Scholar (talk) 05:52, 8 August 2024 (UTC)

Better sources: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5. Irrespective of controversies over his larger framework, Mearsheimer's specific thesis on the Ukraine invasion (that it was the West's fault because Putin was trying to negotiate in good faith, and it could have been avoided with a pledge to keep Ukraine out of NATO) is shared by very few other scholars.

Actually, I think the page currently leans too far in the Realist direction by exclusively discussing military and diplomatic history in the "background" and "prelude" sections. Liberal researchers like Timothy Snyder argue that the invasion resulted from ideological and political evolutions within Russia itself, not just relations between Russia and other powers. GordonGlottal (talk) 22:55, 11 July 2024 (UTC)

So why not mention this in 1-2 sentences? Chino-Catane (talk) 06:36, 12 July 2024 (UTC)

I think small section "Motives for invasion" is out of place and undue on this page. This is not a part of "Background". These are questionable speculations by a couple of cherry-picked authors on why exactly Putin decided to attack Ukraine. This is an interesting question, but it is already covered at length in several sections of another page, Disinformation in the Russian invasion of Ukraine. There were several justifications by Putin and others: Denying Ukrainian statehood, an emergence of "right forces", genocide by Ukrainians accusations and of course the expansion of NATO. One of the cherry-picked authors (Mearsheimer) focuses on the last reason, "the root cause of the invasion to a U.S.-led effort to develop Ukraine into a liberal democracy and integrate it into the EU and NATO", which is basically a well known motif of Putinist propaganda. Yes, it needs to be described somewhere, but it was described already on another page. My very best wishes (talk) 19:57, 11 July 2024 (UTC)

In other words, this author is telling [10] that the full-scale invasion of Ukraine by Russia was fully justified, and that the justification was one provided by Putin. Author does not hide that his view is contrary to the mainstream views on this subject. Moreover, he is saying obvious nonsense, such as Putin was not bent on the occupation of Ukraine. How come when Russia has officially annexed all these territories (and Crimea) and included them to Russian Federation? This is such an obvious WP:FRINGE or propaganda. So, I am saying this page is not a proper place for including WP:FRINGE and debunking it. Only page Disinformation in the Russian invasion of Ukraine is. My very best wishes (talk) 20:39, 11 July 2024 (UTC)

It's not WP:FRINGE. The viewpoint that NATO expansion bears some degree of responsibility for the war is a minority view, but not totally outside the mainstream discourse. JDiala (talk) 21:22, 11 July 2024 (UTC)

Speaking on the essence of this (and as described in many sources), Ukraine had absolutely zero chance to be accepted to NATO before the invasion, and Putin knew it. And even now, it has very low chance to be accepted to NATO. My very best wishes (talk) 21:31, 11 July 2024 (UTC)

"Putin knew it": A living political figure's private thoughts and what they "knew" are generally not regarded as productive avenues of academic research. Chino-Catane (talk) 07:22, 12 July 2024 (UTC)

Russo-Ukrainian War started in 2014. A new state during a war and with an unresolved territorial dispute could not be accepted to NATO. Everyone knew it, not just Putin. In fact, by starting the low-intensity conflict in 2014, Putin effectively prevented Ukraine from accession to NATO. Putin is also well aware that NATO will not attack Russia. That's why he withdraw nearly all Russian forces from the border with Finland and sent them to Ukraine. My very best wishes (talk) 15:12, 12 July 2024 (UTC)

"out of place and undue on this page": I don't see how it is "out of place and undue" to include a short section presenting motives for invasion in an article titled "Russian invasion of Ukraine". It seems that you have a problem with a particular individual. What is your qualm with the sentence, "Neorealist scholar John Mearsheimer assigned the root cause of the invasion to a U.S.-led effort to develop Ukraine into a liberal democracy and integrate it into the EU and NATO."? Chino-Catane (talk) 07:12, 12 July 2024 (UTC)

I am not opposed to including some content on the subject of "Why Putin invaded Ukraine", but it should be focused on mainstream views, for example as summarized by the Institute for the Study of War, i.e. [11]. If this will be just a brief summary, then Mearsheimer simply does not belong there per WP:FRINGE.

According to ISW:

Russian President Vladimir Putin didn’t invade Ukraine in 2022 because he feared NATO. He invaded because he believed that NATO was weak, that his efforts to regain control of Ukraine by other means had failed, and that installing a pro-Russian government in Kyiv would be safe and easy. His aim was not to defend Russia against some non-existent threat but rather to expand Russia’s power, eradicate Ukraine’s statehood, and destroy NATO, goals he still pursues.

This is mainstream view on this subject.My very best wishes (talk) 16:04, 12 July 2024 (UTC)

I tried to include it (and was reverted), but it is indeed a question how exactly this should be framed on the page. My very best wishes (talk) 18:17, 12 July 2024 (UTC)

How is the sentence, "Neorealist scholar John Mearsheimer assigned the root cause of the invasion to a U.S.-led effort to develop Ukraine into a liberal democracy and integrate it into the EU and NATO.", even remotely controversial, especially when it is immediately followed by the presentation of a perspective that is probably praised by most of the editors of this article? There does not need to be any critical assessment whatsoever of that first sentence. Your suggestion that the presentation of a single individual's very reasonable view requires an "assessment of the assessment" is utterly ridiculous. Chino-Catane (talk) 06:20, 12 July 2024 (UTC)

If nothing else, even using the label “realist” or “neorealist” without proper context and explanation is kind of POV, since it implies those that disagree with him are “unrealistic” (in practice of course the exactly the opposite turned out to be true) Volunteer Marek 07:32, 12 July 2024 (UTC)

I'm sorry, this is ridiculous. These are schools of thought in international relations. A link to the page on realism or neorealism is adequate context for the correct meaning of these words. JDiala (talk) 19:54, 12 July 2024 (UTC)

I don't think it's ridiculous. It's not clear to me whether he's a "realist" or "neorealist", or what he's more often referred to in sources as an "offensive realist"; so just applying the label without context, even with a wikilink, doesn't really tell me anything about *why* Mearsheimer is associated with those schools of thought, or why the label is relevant to this article (which is not actually about Mearsheimer anyway). ⇒SWATJester ^{Shoot Blues, Tell VileRat!} 21:35, 12 July 2024 (UTC)

Agree with providing more descriptive description or omitting those narrow academic terms. ManyAreasExpert (talk) 22:11, 12 July 2024 (UTC)

I will remove this and we can discuss the wording here. Slatersteven (talk) 09:55, 12 July 2024 (UTC)

I'm looking at the structure and wording of the edit. I think if we want a section about the motivation behind the invasion, we can't start by immediately mentioning Mearsheimer's view, as he is a controversial figure. This would be WP:UNDUE and WP:FRINGE. We would need at least some sort of introduction describing the landscape of such discussions. As mentioned by other editors, a lot of this is discussed in the article Disinformation in the Russian invasion of Ukraine, which talks about all of the justifications used (often contradictory) by Russia. BeŻet (talk) 09:28, 15 July 2024 (UTC)

Map

Hi

We should have an alternate map with Ukraine+Kursk Oblast. Panam2014 (talk) 15:34, 9 August 2024 (UTC)

This is not the place for map discussion; there's already a discussion about such an issue here. Flemmish Nietzsche (talk) 15:35, 9 August 2024 (UTC)

Infobox: Russian invasion of Ukraine

I noticed that the map legend currently says "Formerly occupied by Russia," but it uses the same color to indicate areas where Ukraine has advanced into internationally recognized Russian territory. To reflect this accurately, I suggest updating the legend to: "Formerly occupied by Russia (includes areas now occupied by Ukraine in Russia)" or using a different color for areas now occupied by Ukraine in Russia.

Thank you! M.K.Dan (talk) 00:00, 15 August 2024 (UTC)

Done (changed to "Formerly occupied by Russia or Ukrainian-occupied Russian territory") for now until better colors are used in the article's map. Flemmish Nietzsche (talk) 00:06, 15 August 2024 (UTC)

Typo

There's a typo under International aspects -> foreign involvement -> Ukraine support. The section reads:

NATO members such as Germany reversed policied against providing offensive military aid to support Ukraine

I guess it's supposed to be 'policies' instead. Atanásio (talk) 14:58, 15 August 2024 (UTC)

Fixed. Thanks, Mr rnddude (talk) 15:18, 15 August 2024 (UTC)

PP

Will we need PP? Slatersteven (talk) 16:44, 15 August 2024 (UTC)

I already requested it. Jdcomix (talk) 16:46, 15 August 2024 (UTC)

So, yes we did. Slatersteven (talk) 17:12, 15 August 2024 (UTC)

Human Rights Abuses?

Sorry if this this is consider by Wikipedia editors to be overly-direct and to the point, but is not the section on human rights outrages shamelessly one-sided, unbalanced and anti-Russian? For have not the Ukrainians bombed civilians and used civilian buildings as fire bases?

2.27.2.80 (talk) 17:16, 12 August 2024 (UTC)

shamelessly what? Slatersteven (talk) 17:19, 12 August 2024 (UTC)

Thank you for pointing that out - I will update. 2.27.2.80 (talk) 17:27, 12 August 2024 (UTC)

Sources? Slatersteven (talk) 17:35, 12 August 2024 (UTC)

You just need to read the UN charter and Geneva Convention. So far in the war, Ukraine has acted within the scope of allowed attacks, and yes. Given the obstacles war brings and, especially cowardly Russian tactics and civilian neglection, including of its own, it is not ot always possible to avoid civilians, that may just pass by a military airfield or a command post. Also there is difference whether it targeted or an intentional homicideor not. Yet, it is all being investigated anyways by the presence of the ICC, which actually is still not ratified. Though, today Zelenskyy did submit ratification documents to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine.

Also there is a more deliberate answer here:

"When civilians die unintentionally as a result of a military attack targeting a legitimate military objective, such as a command post, it is generally referred to as collateral damage.

Collateral damage occurs when non-combatants or civilian infrastructure are unintentionally harmed during military operations directed at legitimate military targets. While collateral damage is not illegal under international law, the principles of distinction, proportionality, and necessity must be followed to minimize harm to civilians." AlasdarVan (talk) 05:01, 16 August 2024 (UTC)

Requested move 11 August 2024

The following is a closed discussion of a requested move. Please do not modify it. Subsequent comments should be made in a new section on the talk page. Editors desiring to contest the closing decision should consider a move review after discussing it on the closer's talk page. No further edits should be made to this discussion.

The result of the move request was: not moved to the proposed titles at this time, per the discussion below. While several comments focused specifically on the suggested move of this particular article, the discussion as a whole shows consensus against making all of the moves proposed here. Dekimasuよ! 05:57, 19 August 2024 (UTC)

– Comparing the way Wikipedia currently covers the war compared to reliable sources such as Encyclopedia Britannica, War on the Rocks, and Harvard, the reporting on the war by Wikipedia is quite different. Sources generally agree that the Russo-Ukrainian War started in 2014 but its main phase/escalation has been ongoing since 2022. Reliable sources generally do not use "Russian invasion of Ukraine" as the primary term for the war in its post-2022 phase: "Russo-Ukrainian War", or variants of that like "Ukraine-Russia war" (Sky News), "Ukraine war" (BBC News), are overwhelmingly the main term used. Encyclopedia Britannia has "Russian invasion of Ukraine" as a subsection of the article referring to the period from initial invasion up to around the Battle of Kyiv but uses different sections for events since then; importantly, very few reliable sources use the phrase "Russian invasion of Ukraine" for any recent events so it is simply misleading to use that title to for the catch-all sub-article about all of the events of the Russo-Ukrainian War since 2022.

For this reason, I think it's necessary to move this article (Russian invasion of Ukraine) to be clear that its scope is to serve as a sub-article of Russo-Ukrainian War to describe the events since 2022 in greater detail- and following a move, there would also be a good argument for restructuring this article, moving some content to the main Russo-Ukrainian War article and other articles.

The necessity of a move has become especially clear with the recent Ukrainian invasion of Russia which is clearly a part of the war but not part of the "Russian invasion of Ukraine", but there are also other events in the war which don't fall under the "Russian invasion of Ukraine" umbrella (e.g. the counteroffensive in Kherson, the Kerch Bridge bombing, etc), so overall as this article has grown over time and events have occurred, the present title has become steadily less accurate even aside from its lack of use by reliable sources. Chessrat ^{(talk, contributions)} 18:44, 11 August 2024 (UTC)

Oppose. Per WP:COMMONNAME Adriazeri (talk) 19:55, 11 August 2024 (UTC)

Oppose Exceptional evidence would be needed to show that the WP:COMMONNAME of the Russian invasion of Ukraine is not "Russian invasion of Ukraine". Also, let's just consider we did move to "Timeline of the Russo-Ukrainian War (2022–present)". Then what would happen to all the pages in Timeline of the Russian invasion of Ukraine? Would we label them, for instance, "Timeline of the Timeline of the Russo-Ukrainian War (2022-present) (24 February – 7 April 2022)"? That would simply not work. Ultimately, this RM should not have dealt with so many topics all together. For example, the Aerial warfare in the Russian invasion of Ukraine should not renamed to the proposed title, simply because it only deals with aerial warfare during the invasion, so there is no reason to make the scope unclear. As for the "Ukrainian invasion of Russia", this is, in fact, part of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. I will also note that the invasion is treated by RS's as an event, not simply as part of a timeline (as the proposed title would imply). It is also clear that the scope of this article is far beyond that of a timeline. Gödel2200 (talk) 20:06, 11 August 2024 (UTC)
Comment No evidence is provided by this user for the claim that the WP:COMMONNAME for the war since 2022 is "Russian invasion of Ukraine", whereas I provided WP:RS showing that that term "Russian invasion of Ukraine" was largely only used in early 2022 and is not used for the war in its current phase. Do you have any sources to back up your claim? Chessrat ^{(talk, contributions)} 21:46, 11 August 2024 (UTC)

There are multiple problems with using the sources provided in the initial response. Certainly, the first says "Ukraine-Russia war", and the second says "Ukraine war". But why would that mean that these outlets are referring to the invasion as such? They can label their coverage as the whole war, but that absolutely does not mean they are saying the "Russian invasion of Ukraine" is one and the same as the "Ukraine-Russia war", for instance. It is indisputable that RS's consider the invasion to be an event deserving separation from prior events. If you wanted to bring up the topic of whether, for example, we should be omitting some information from this article because it is not part of the invasion, that is a different discussion. Gödel2200 (talk) 22:06, 11 August 2024 (UTC)

This article is a broad overview of the Russo-Ukrainian War during its main phase between 2022 and the present; it is not primarily about the initial invasion in the first few months. The sub-articles which I propose moving also cover the entire war between 2022 and now, not just the initial invasion. Reliable sources which refer to the "Russian invasion of Ukraine" use that term for only the first few months in early 2022- so to remove information from outside that period would be to remove the vast majority of this article, which is obviously not desirable.

There are other options for titles this article, e.g. Russo-Ukrainian War (2022–present) or Overview of the Russo-Ukrainian War (2022–present), but the fact is that this article is about a period of the war covering two and a half years whereas RS usage of the term "Russian invasion of Ukraine" outside of the few months of Russian advances in 2022 is not widespread, so the current title is misleading and doesn't follow sources. Chessrat ^{(talk, contributions)} 22:34, 11 August 2024 (UTC)

Again, we could be having the discussion of whether or not to create new articles, and split this article. For instance, creating an article titled "Russo-Ukrainian War (2022-present)", and restricting the information contained in the article for the invasion (I will note that I am opposed to this). But that would be an entirely different discussion from the one we are having now. There was an invasion, whether you think the current phase of fighting should be called an invasion or not. The fact that some sources are now referring to the fighting ongoing right now without using "invasion" does not mean the invasion which started two and a half years ago should no longer be called an invasion. Gödel2200 (talk) 22:58, 11 August 2024 (UTC)

I'm not saying that the initial invasion two and a half of years ago shouldn't be called an invasion, but that this article is not primarily about the initial invasion. If this article were moved to another title, in theory I wouldn't oppose a split to create a new article at Russian invasion of Ukraine about the invasion in early 2022.

This article is currently essentially a summary/sub-article of Russo-Ukrainian War describing the progress of the entire war since 2022- it is just incorrectly titled. Chessrat ^{(talk, contributions)} 23:35, 11 August 2024 (UTC)

I'm not saying that the initial invasion two and a half of years ago shouldn't be called an invasion, but that this article is not primarily about the initial invasion. Well, yes, the article certainly is not primarily about the initial invasion. But we should remember that the invasion never ended, it is still ongoing. As far as I can tell, sources are not saying: "The invasion lasted up until this point, after which it is no longer an invasion." This is why it doesn't make sense to make a separate article for the initial invasion, and title the rest of it something else. Gödel2200 (talk) 01:44, 12 August 2024 (UTC)

Sure, but sources don't tend to use the term "invasion" beyond the initial months even if the invasion never ended, so if we are to reflect the usage of reliable sources for the article title, using the current title to cover the entire period from 2022 until now is inaccurate. Chessrat ^{(talk, contributions)} 09:48, 12 August 2024 (UTC)

The main problem with using sources like this is because both the invasion and the Russo-Ukrainian war are ongoing. The fact that some sources use "Russia-Ukraine war" doesn't mean they are saying the invasion ended; they could just be referring to the war in its larger context. If we were to label the fighting ongoing right now as something other than part of the invasion, we would need a consensus of sources explicitly saying that the fighting right now should not be called part of the invasion. Gödel2200 (talk) 13:40, 12 August 2024 (UTC)

We have an overwhelming consensus of sources that are clear that the fighting that has been ongoing for the last two years is part of the Russo-Ukrainian War (or a variant thereof). We very much do not have a consensus of sources using "Russian invasion of Ukraine" as the primary name covering the entire war during the period from 2022 until now. Therefore, if we are to follow sources, the title of this article should clearly be some form/derivative of "Russo-Ukrainian War".

It's also worth noting that not all reliable sources even use the term "Russo-Ukrainian War" for the period since 2014- some of them only use it for the post-2022 period (e.g. Al Jazeera). Chessrat ^{(talk, contributions)} 18:33, 12 August 2024 (UTC)

Oppose Per the well made points made by Gödel2200. --TylerBurden (talk) 20:24, 11 August 2024 (UTC)

Oppose, This article is not a timeline but still needs a specific phase name to describe it. The most common name besides Russo-Ukrainian War is currently in use. I also have to agree with Gödel2200, the Ukrainian invasion of Russia is currently not significant enough in the grand scheme of things to require large rescoping. Simply, that point is pretentious. ✶Qux yz ✶ 21:11, 11 August 2024 (UTC)

Oppose this isnt the Russo-Ukrainian war, this is the Russian Invasion of Ukraine Lukt64 (talk) 21:37, 11 August 2024 (UTC)

Oppose - No, this is not just a timeline of the war. Moreover, per Gödel2200, we would then have to rename many other articles downstream (unnecessarily), which could get messy fast. — That Coptic Guy^{ping me!} (talk) (contribs) 22:56, 11 August 2024 (UTC)

Oppose: while the titling of "Russian invasion of Ukraine" may seem to you to imply that this article, from a grammatical point of view, only covers the initial invasion, that is of course not the case as the WP:COMMONNAME often refers to the "invasion" being the period of the Russo-Ukrainian War from Feb. 2022 onward, (just look at any news outlet's coverage of the subject) including any operations outside Ukraine, despite the scope the name may imply. The title, at least in my view, does not deter us from covering any Ukrainian incursions or non-Ukrainian spillover matters, as for one I already added content about the August incursion in this article without anyone taking issue, and Ukrainian strikes on Russian territory and other "non-invasion" matters are covered by articles in this topic; sufficient sourcing was not provided to prove that events after the battle of Kyiv (the "initial" invasion) or engagements outside Ukraine are not covered under the topic of the "Russian invasion of Ukraine". Flemmish Nietzsche (talk) 23:13, 11 August 2024 (UTC)

Comment The claim the WP:COMMONNAME often refers to the "invasion" being the period of the Russo-Ukrainian War from Feb. 2022 onward needs citation. As far as I can tell, reliable sources do not use the term "Russian invasion of Ukraine" for the war as a whole but only for the initial invasion in the first few months (as outlined above). Chessrat ^{(talk, contributions)} 23:30, 11 August 2024 (UTC)

Oppose, the scope of all these articles is the 2022+ invasion, not the 2014+ war. Rename without rescoping makes no sense to me. — kashmīrī ^TALK 23:43, 11 August 2024 (UTC)

Oppose The scope of an article is defined by the lead section of the article in conjunction with the title. The invasion (2022+) is part of the Russo-Ukraine War (2014+). The scope of these articles is 2022+ not 2014+ and the Russian invasion of Ukraine article is more than a timeline. The proposal breaks more than it fixes and I don't see there is anything that needs to be fixed. Cinderella157 (talk) 23:53, 11 August 2024 (UTC)

Oppose. The main article is not a time line. And a timeline article already exists. KyuuA4 (Talk:キュウ) 04:28, 12 August 2024 (UTC)

Comment I think a lot of these "not a timeline" comments miss the entire point of the RM, which is that "Russian invasion of Ukraine" is not the common term for the war between 2022 and now. The current title doesn't even include the word "war"; this is very obviously a war. If you don't agree with the proposal to have this article be an overview timeline, this doesn't mean the current titles of all of the articles in question are at all accurate. Chessrat ^{(talk, contributions)} 10:03, 12 August 2024 (UTC)

Oppose, this is not a timeline. Moreoever, the sources do not follow the clear distinction given. The Britannica page Russia-Ukraine War dates the start of the war to 2014 and to 2022 in different places. CMD (talk) 04:53, 12 August 2024 (UTC)

Comment It might be snowing here? Cinderella157 (talk) 07:49, 12 August 2024 (UTC)

Oppose they are still invading, they are still invaders. YBSOne (talk) 11:17, 12 August 2024 (UTC)
Oppose As there was an invasion, now rewrites is another issue, but we do need an article about the initial invasion. Slatersteven (talk) 11:24, 12 August 2024 (UTC)
Support What is it called by sources? A quick check on a leading media outlet gives "Russia-Ukraine war updates". I won't bother with further checks because I know what the result will be. An equally quick check here shows that some editors appear to be taking sides in the war, which is what the current title is doing. Wars generally have names that are neutral even though one side is the bad guy - Falklands War, First World War, Vietnam War, The War of Jenkins' Ear. There are of course two sides to any war anyway, so neutrality is even more important. Invasions are not the same as wars, they are generally quicker and more specific and often part of a war, if they don't achieve their aim quickly. !940 was a German invasion of France, not the 1940 Frano-German war but had it gone on longer it would have been called a war. This war stopped being an invasion by March 2022. Roger 8 Roger (talk) 13:02, 12 August 2024 (UTC)
I don't necessarily disagree; on the other hand, quite a few media push the phrase full-scale invasion of Ukraine, which is actually the Ukrainian official narrative (they present the 2014 Crimea annexation as a limited-scale invasion of Ukraine). So, until we have a consensus how to name this armed conflict, incl. on whether to use that Ukrainian phrase at all, it will be difficult to separate the war from the invasions. — kashmīrī ^TALK 13:31, 12 August 2024 (UTC)
Oppose: I think changing the title would oversimplify a complex event. It's more than just a timeline. Waqar💬 15:16, 12 August 2024 (UTC)
Oppose A timeline seems to be already present here: (Timeline of the Russian invasion of Ukraine). I think its important to have a comprehensive piece covering the ongoing invasion itself, that is separate from it and the Russo-Ukrainian War article, which describes the greater conflict since 2014. "Russian invasion" is also a very frequently used and common term in for example German media. But also used alongside Russia-Ukraine War etc. internationally. The invasion hasn't ceased. So, technically it isn't wrong. I get your point but in my opinion, for the first two above mentioned reasons its not necessary to change the title. Maybe the articles require improvement as suggested by others, but that's a different topic.TheMightyGeneral (talk) 19:35, 12 August 2024 (UTC)
Oppose – I understand that the present structure of these articles is confusing, but I do not think that the proposer's solution will be an improvement. Previous experience dealing with this cluster of articles suggests that a reorganisation will be required once the conflict itself settles down or moves into some kind of new phase. At this stage, however, without the benefit of any established historiography, I do not think we are able to make any good decision. Therefore, I oppose this proposal. RGloucester — ☎ 01:48, 13 August 2024 (UTC)
Oppose This isn't a correct characterization of the common name. Most sources describe the escalation following February 2022 as an invasion. JDiala (talk) 07:08, 13 August 2024 (UTC)

Oppose Namely, the main article doesn't work as a timeline. Scu ba (talk) 22:16, 13 August 2024 (UTC)

Opposed - For the same reasons made by Gödel2200. Like seriously, what a terrible proposal. EmilePersaud (talk) 02:54, 14 August 2024 (UTC)

Note - why "timeline", without timeline i would support it Braganza (talk) 19:22, 14 August 2024 (UTC)

Comment @Braganza I proposed "Timeline" because I couldn't think of any better alternative to the current title, but that wasn't the main intent behind the RM at all. The main proposal is avoiding using "invasion" for titles of articles covering a period beyond the initial invasion in spring 2022.

I find it strange that most editors are only discussing that one "timeline" word whilst ignoring all other aspects of this RM. I'm quite happy to withdraw proposing "timeline" for inclusion in this article's title and focus on the rest of the issues with using "invasion" in the titles of articles covering the entire war over a period far beyond the spring 2022 invasion. Chessrat ^{(talk, contributions)} 21:48, 16 August 2024 (UTC)

Oppose One of the most bizarre suggested moves I have seen, as "Timeline" does not at all describe this article. Ultimograph5 (talk) 21:43, 14 August 2024 (UTC)

Comment - I think it is about time to SNOW close this. — That Coptic Guy^{ping me!} (talk) (contribs) 22:13, 14 August 2024 (UTC)

I thought that a while ago. Cinderella157 (talk) 22:19, 14 August 2024 (UTC)

Strongly Oppose just no. Great Mercian (talk) 13:46, 15 August 2024 (UTC)

Oppose there is already a timeline, see WP:SNOW.

JohnAdams1800 (talk) 19:15, 16 August 2024 (UTC)

Oppose This article isn't a timeline (Timeline of the Russian invasion of Ukraine and its subarticles are however), and the other proposed titles are too broad for the articles' scope.

Glades12 (talk) 07:47, 17 August 2024 (UTC)

Support Since Ukraine has now invaded Russia the title is surely out of date. This will still be true if Ukraine withdraws from Russia before Russia withdraws from Ukraine. Robert Brockway (talk) 08:04, 18 August 2024 (UTC)

Oppose per other users, this page would not work as a timeline. This is definitely WP:SNOW territory, can we get a close? -HappyWith (talk) 11:34, 18 August 2024 (UTC)
Oppose per the many reasons given by other users. – Treetoes023 (talk) 02:24, 19 August 2024 (UTC)
Comment I think this is a good proposal, however, as RGloucester notes, we need to rearrange all of our articles on this topic. I think this proposal would make more sense at a future date, and we would have to be careful about it, as the 2022 invasion is a whole new phase of the war, breaking the Minsk accords, which the invasion broke. IntrepidContributor (talk) 05:13, 19 August 2024 (UTC)

The discussion above is closed. Please do not modify it. Subsequent comments should be made on the appropriate discussion page. No further edits should be made to this discussion.

Map used too many times

The yellow, red and blue map of territorial control is used on way too many articles about the war. For example, the 2023 Ukrainian counteroffensive article has one of these maps despite Ukraine not having recaptured that territory during the counteroffensive. Are there not any better available thumbnails? The Russian Winter Offensive in Ukraine (2022–2023) article also has that same map as the thumbnail despite the offensive only being localized in northern Donetsk Oblast.Maxsmart50 (talk) 16:41, 20 August 2024 (UTC)

Should we add Ukraine’s incursion to the map?

I know that we have another article about that, but the incursion is still part of Ukraine’s efforts to fight back against the Russian invasion, so I feel like we should update the map to feature the incursion.

Source: https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-war-kursk-fighting-80671ef80c36b94dc1114506770cdd56 LordOfWalruses (talk) 19:46, 9 August 2024 (UTC)

No, as this is not about any invasion of Russia. Slatersteven (talk) 19:54, 9 August 2024 (UTC)

Well it is about the invasion of Ukraine (as this is a Ukrainian attack meant to strike back at and stretch out Russia’s forces invading Ukraine). LordOfWalruses (talk) 21:12, 9 August 2024 (UTC)

I came here for this very reason--to see what they were going to do about that map. I think Ukraine's response is well within scope, and they should add a 4th color. I propose green, for no other reason than it looking good with the other colors. 2604:2D80:CC12:0:E8CE:E6E4:D343:FC06 (talk) 20:34, 10 August 2024 (UTC)

I agree on all points; all I would add is that the shade of green should be the same general shade as the other colors on the map. LordOfWalruses (talk) 19:27, 12 August 2024 (UTC)

Although they didn't use green, they did add the incursion in light blue and I find this satisfactory. It achieves the goal of showing the incursion, its size, and location in context with reclaimed and occupied territory. The border is sufficient to distinguish Ukraine-occupied Russia from reclaimed territory. 173.22.131.171 (talk) 06:24, 27 August 2024 (UTC)

I think it's too soon. Let's wait a bit to see how it unfolds. Plus, as mentioned in the thread above, there's an article about the incursion in Kursk already. Rolando 1208 (talk) 21:07, 9 August 2024 (UTC)

Fair enough. LordOfWalruses (talk) 21:13, 9 August 2024 (UTC)

Belarus

I think it's time to remove Belarus from the infobox, here [12] is my reasoning. Rolando 1208 (talk) 23:33, 6 August 2024 (UTC)

I agree. There's no doubt Belarus significantly supported Russia in the initial invasion, but that was two and a half years ago and to say that Russia is still substantially supported by Belarus now is misleading. Flemmish Nietzsche (talk) 23:36, 6 August 2024 (UTC)

that was two and a half years ago and to say that Russia is still substantially supported by Belarus now is misleading
I thought that but found out that fresh academic sources still mention Belarus as belligerent so our article should follow sources. ManyAreasExpert (talk) 14:14, 7 August 2024 (UTC)

NOT again, have we just to come out of one of these discussions? Slatersteven (talk) 12:35, 7 August 2024 (UTC)

Have we though? The last RfC was 9 months ago!! I think it's time to reconsider it. Rolando 1208 (talk) 12:48, 7 August 2024 (UTC)

OK, lets have another RFC. But word the question carefully, as not everyone who took part in WW2 was there form beginning to end, but are still listed as belligerents. Slatersteven (talk) 12:50, 7 August 2024 (UTC)

I don't know how RfCs work. I'm just leaving this is in here so that a more experienced editor can start one. Rolando 1208 (talk) 12:54, 7 August 2024 (UTC)

Is an RfC really necessary? Does the explanatory footnote specifying that Belarusian support was really only during the initial invasion not suffice? Removing the mention altogether wouldn't be much better as Russia was substantially supported by Belarus early on, and thus deserves a mention, just not as a full "always has supported". Flemmish Nietzsche (talk) 12:55, 7 August 2024 (UTC)

I mean it's mentioned in the rest of the article isn't it? But to have it in the infobox seems like too much. Rolando 1208 (talk) 12:57, 7 August 2024 (UTC)

Yes, it is mentioned in the rest of the article, otherwise it wouldn't be in the infobox; why is having it in the infobox "too much" as long as the footnote clarifying support being largely exclusive to the initial invasion remains? Though it is definitely misleading to have the mention if the reader doesn't read the footnote, there is no "initial Russian invasion of Ukraine" article where Belarus would instead be an obvious inclusion, so any support which was given in the initial invasion should be given more weight in my view. Flemmish Nietzsche (talk) 13:06, 7 August 2024 (UTC)

I think a good solution to this problem was given in the preceeding discussion. We can simply add (2022) around where we mention Belarus' support, as that was when they allowed Russia to invade through their territory. Gödel2200 (talk) 14:08, 7 August 2024 (UTC)

To illustrate, direct military support only logistical maybe not now, Terratorial support not now, support in committing war crimes maybe, political support yes, economic support yes. THere may be other areas they still offer support as well. Slatersteven (talk) 14:32, 7 August 2024 (UTC)

Economic support how? Belarus has a much smaller economy. It's actually the other way around, Russia gave money to Belarus to support their economy. I'm not sure what you mean by political support? Belarus hasn't been involved in the war for more than two years. And Belarusian people don't seem to support this war either. Most importantly the army hasn't joined the Russians during this whole time. Basically the involvement only happened in 2022, after that, Belarus has been a neutral party in this war. Meanwhile you have other countries who currently sell weapons to Russia and they're not even mentioned in the infobox. Rolando 1208 (talk) 16:28, 7 August 2024 (UTC)

OLd, but this is what I mean [[13]] have to arms sales and coperation ended? Slatersteven (talk) 16:35, 7 August 2024 (UTC)

Less old [[14]], neither of these are usable, but they do not give the impression there is still ongoing cooperation, in the military, economic and polcrial fields. Slatersteven (talk) 16:37, 7 August 2024 (UTC)

Do you have one for 2024? Even the "less old one" doesn't seem very conclusive. Belarus' involvement is very clear in 2022 but after that the most we get is speculation (and possibly even original research). I'd say we remove it from the infobox, if Belarus gets involved again, we can put it back in there. @Kashmiri and @SaintPaulOfTarsus, what do you think about my proposal? Rolando 1208 (talk) 18:27, 7 August 2024 (UTC)

Oh and @Ybsone too. Rolando 1208 (talk) 18:31, 7 August 2024 (UTC)

Belarus made it into history, they should stay, for history's sake. "Russia attacked from territory of Belarus" is a historical fact and as such should not be removed, nor should the supporting side. YBSOne (talk) 21:02, 7 August 2024 (UTC)

But the infobox implies Belarus is still involved. Don't you think that's silly? Rolando 1208 (talk) 21:36, 7 August 2024 (UTC)

As long as over 10 Russian divisions are in Belarus - a de facto occupation - Russia will use the territory as a jumping off point if need be (again). 2603:6080:21F0:AB60:4D0E:9735:CDD4:BB18 (talk) 22:01, 7 August 2024 (UTC)

No I don't. Just as the map shows past conflict areas, so can infobox, clearly noted, show past (and/or present) supporters. YBSOne (talk) 22:55, 7 August 2024 (UTC)

Territory is irrelevant. The fact that the US has used military bases in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan to launch attacks on Afghanistan did not make these two countries belligerents. The UK firing ballistic missiles at Syria from its Akrotiri base did not make Cyprus a belligerent. What matters whether a country's government and military take part in hostilities; not whether alien forces are able to operate there. — kashmīrī ^TALK 23:29, 11 August 2024 (UTC)

History articles are an overall picture, not a snapshot of a particular point in time. Consider how things should appear if the event occurred 100 years ago and was not an ongoing current event. Cinderella157 (talk) 22:44, 7 August 2024 (UTC)
Yeah I get that, however I think it's silly to single out Belarus but then the other countries who are currently supporting Russia aren't even mentioned. It seems to go against NPOV. Rolando 1208 (talk) 00:42, 8 August 2024 (UTC)
Undue Infobox to be usable should be short and sweet. Belarus support for Russia is not one of the most noteworthy aspects of the war. (t · c) buidhe 04:11, 8 August 2024 (UTC)

I don't particularly agree with the inclusion but there is an affirmative consensus by RfC several times. We should only go down that path again if something has changed such that there is a reasonable prospect that the consensus would be overturned - otherwise, just starting up a new RfC might reasonably be considered disruptive given the history of the issue. Cinderella157 (talk) 00:44, 9 August 2024 (UTC)

Wasn't the last RfC nine months ago? The more time passes, the less relevant Belarus' actions in 2022 become. If not, we should be consistent and include all parties, NATO, North Korea, Iran, etc. Why single out Belarus? Rolando 1208 (talk) 17:15, 9 August 2024 (UTC)

As said at the time, because no one else allowed attacks from its soil, which has not changed. Slatersteven (talk) 19:26, 9 August 2024 (UTC)

[[15]], yes Belarus is (in effect) an indirect theater of war. Slatersteven (talk) 12:11, 12 August 2024 (UTC)

Do you think that the United States should be listed as a supporter of Israel on the Israel Hamas war page? The standards on this website for the enemies and foes of the united states are completely different, and this uneven application of the rules creates a systematic pro-US bias. 90.102.72.109 (talk) 19:28, 27 August 2024 (UTC)

Chechnya as a belligerent

Chechen republic ichkeria (at least as a government in exile) has had forces fighting for Ukraine in the war, should they be added as a belligerent? They also have a ministry of defence if I am not mistaken The Great Mule of Eupatoria (talk) 06:36, 19 August 2024 (UTC)

I seem to recall there had been some of the garrison troops in Kursk, but avoided real combat. I think we need some good RS to say they are now active combatants. Slatersteven (talk) 10:07, 19 August 2024 (UTC)

Not just in Kursk, but within Ukraine itself. Forces loyal to the Chechen republic of ichkeria (not the subjugated [[Chechnya|Chechen Republic]]) have been fighting alongside Ukraine in important battles like of Kyiv, Kharkiv, and bakhmut. Though as a state it has been defeated 24 years ago, the armed forces continue to operate in-exile and use the weakening of Russia in the war to possibly reestablish their state

https://thechechenpress.com/video/16908-naznachenie-komandira-obon-vs-chri-v-ukraine.html

https://www.rferl.org/a/ukraine-chechens-common-enemy-russia/32136592.html The Great Mule of Eupatoria (talk) 12:59, 19 August 2024 (UTC)

So they are mercenaries? Slatersteven (talk) 13:04, 19 August 2024 (UTC)

I wouldn’t say mercenaries. The best way I could describe is that the armed forces of the country are fighting alongside Ukraine, but their country itself is occupied and has been for 2 decades The Great Mule of Eupatoria (talk) 13:29, 19 August 2024 (UTC)

Agree. Valid point. Chechen Republic of Ichkeria and chechen opposition is important to the war and fighting against putinism and its own independence. Link to their involvement in the war, both since 2022, and 2014.

Read more: On 18 October 2022, Ukraine's parliament recognized the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria as a temporarily occupied state. AlasdarVan (talk) 23:48, 19 August 2024 (UTC)

Oppose. The Chechen Republic of Ichkeria holds no territory, is recognized by no country except for Ukraine, and there's no more than several hundred volunteers fighting under its name. It's not significant enough for the infobox, but can be mentioned in the body. — Goszei (talk) 16:22, 21 August 2024 (UTC)

weak yes - We already have de facto states as beligerents, and we would be doing a disservice to our readers to make an exception here. If Luhansk PR and Donetsk PR are included as belligerents despite being de jure part of ukraine, I think this should be included as well, for the purpose of encyclopedic consistency. If those two are removed, then (should this be included), this should be removed along with them. DarmaniLink (talk) 06:15, 1 September 2024 (UTC)

Time for others to chip in. Slatersteven (talk) 13:31, 19 August 2024 (UTC)

Is this a "key" fact without nuance that should be placed in the infobox? Cinderella157 (talk) 23:23, 19 August 2024 (UTC)
CHRI does fight for Ukraine, and if I am not mistaken it was also recognised as an “occupied territory” by Russia. Either in the infobox or in the foreign support section The Great Mule of Eupatoria (talk) 05:29, 21 August 2024 (UTC)
This does not address the question asked. However, others are addressing the question - ie it does not rise to be a key or significant fact that should be incorporated into the infobox (eg Goszei) and I would tend to agree. Cinderella157 (talk) 23:15, 21 August 2024 (UTC)
No, this is not an independent country. My very best wishes (talk) 16:37, 21 August 2024 (UTC)
Why do we mention the Luhansk PR and Donetsk PR in this context then? AlasdarVan (talk) 03:50, 22 August 2024 (UTC)
Good point! One could argue they should be included because of the International recognition of the Donetsk People's Republic and the Luhansk People's Republic. There was nothing like that with Chechen Republic. But I agree with you: I think they should be excluded because they were either a part of Russia (de facto) or Ukraine (de juro). My very best wishes (talk) 16:14, 22 August 2024 (UTC)

They were region in revolt against Ukraine, thus they are part of the reason for this war. Slatersteven (talk) 12:43, 22 August 2024 (UTC)
Oppose - Neither is it an important party nor does it exist as a state in any sense since the annexation Braganza (talk) 20:24, 3 September 2024 (UTC)
Oppose - These guys are basically glorified mercenaries of a non-existent state 2603:6080:21F0:AB60:1C7F:4B85:10E8:8EFB (talk) 23:02, 3 September 2024 (UTC)
Oppose Ichkeria hasn't existed for over two decades. Super Ψ Dro 10:33, 8 September 2024 (UTC)

Edit Request - Wrong location of a Paragraph

Hello, fellow Wikipedians

I have noticed that the fourth paragraph in the section Prisoners of war talks about barrier troops and has little to do with the text before and after. It seems to have been missed when the previously existing section Prisoners of war and war crimes was split apart. I would suggest to move the entire paragraph over to the next section, War crimes and attacks on civilians. Unfortunately, I don't know how or where it would fit.

There is also something I wanted to hear opinions on: Whether if even constitutes a war crime, and if there's a better section it would fit in. Using coercion and/or force on your own military to make them fight in a battle or the war is, at the end, "just" another (and very unethical) military tactic and up for that country to decide. If anything, I would say it's closer to being a crime against humanity, similarly to how (I assume) mass executions of 'disloyal' soldiers and citizens would count as one. Of course, all of that is assuming it's not explicitly listed in the rules of war. Thanks for the time! ShadowOfThePit (talk) 13:19, 10 September 2024 (UTC)

on the last part, that reads like wp:or, and as far as I know there have been no such accusations leveled against other armies that have used conscription in war time (for example). — Preceding unsigned comment added by Slatersteven (talk • contribs) 13:28, 10 September 2024 (UTC)

Extended-confirmed-protected edit request on 17 September 2024

This edit request to Russian invasion of Ukraine has been answered. Set the |answered= or |ans= parameter to no to reactivate your request.

I request to change the line "The invasion, the largest conflict in Europe since World War II,[13][14][15] has caused hundreds of thousands of military casualties and tens of thousands of Ukrainian civilian casualties." To "The invasion, the largest conflict in Europe since the Balkan Wars, has caused hundreds of thousands of military casualties and tens of thousands of Ukrainian civilian casualties." Mikituu (talk) 14:41, 17 September 2024 (UTC)

Singular conflict should not be compared to "Balkan Wars" a multiple conflicts. Hence it is compared to a single conflict, WWII. YBSOne (talk) 14:48, 17 September 2024 (UTC)

I would propose an alternative wording, "the largest military intervention in Europe since World War II". This would distinguish it from the civil wars that comprised the Yugoslav Wars (not the Balkan Wars that took place in 1912 and 1913). Peaceray (talk) 16:42, 17 September 2024 (UTC)

We don't need to qualify the statement that the war in Ukraine is the largest armed conflict in Europe since WW2. About 130,000–140,000 people were killed over a 10-year period in the former Yugoslavia, compared to 250,000+ in 2 years in Ukraine. There has also been at least double the number of people displaced, and a participant here being a permanent member of the UN Security Council with nuclear weapons certainly adds to its magnitude and historic nature. In addition to the sources used for the claim right now, I found the Council on Foreign Relations and RAND Corporation describing this war with the same phrase. — Goszei (talk) 18:36, 18 September 2024 (UTC)

Not done for now: please establish a consensus for this alteration before using the {{Edit extended-protected}} template. TylerBurden (talk) 19:23, 17 September 2024 (UTC)

Where is supported by list under Ukraine in info box?

Where is supported by list under Ukraine in info box? 202.47.36.141 (talk) 22:12, 22 September 2024 (UTC)

It's absent from the infobox on purpose. See FAQ item #4. Flemmish Nietzsche (talk) 22:16, 22 September 2024 (UTC)

WSJ did not claim 1 million dead in Sept 2024

This article claims WSJ reported 1 million dead in Sept 2024. They did nothing of the kind. As the cited WSJ article clearly states: 1 million dead or INJURED. Not exactly a small difference. This is the kind of thing that makes me wonder what the point of Wikipedia even is, or why it’s considered any more credible a source of information than a Reddit post. Should be corrected asap. Lukestark (talk) 01:39, 24 September 2024 (UTC)

"In September 2024, the Wall Street Journal reported that there were now one million Ukrainians and Russians who were killed or wounded" — note the lack of a full stop after "killed". Flemmish Nietzsche (talk) 01:48, 24 September 2024 (UTC)

Indeed. I’m hoping this was a correction based on my post here as I thought I re-read that sentence ten times with dropped jaw before posting here, but if not I don’t know what to say except to recede into the corner with tail between legs like a shamed puppy. Doesn’t help that I originally posted this accidentally on the talk page for “Russo-Ukrainian War” (apparently after an inadvertent thumb swipe to the article I was previously reading), so my batting average around here could be better. I’ll just go away now. Apologies. Lukestark (talk) 06:10, 24 September 2024 (UTC)

Requested move 22 September 2024

The following is a closed discussion of a requested move. Please do not modify it. Subsequent comments should be made in a new section on the talk page. Editors desiring to contest the closing decision should consider a move review after discussing it on the closer's talk page. No further edits should be made to this discussion.

The result of the move request was: closed. There is clear consensus to close this promptly and requestor has also indicated a desire to withdraw this. (non-admin closure) JDiala (talk) 07:36, 25 September 2024 (UTC)

Russian invasion of Ukraine → Full-scale Russo-Ukrainian War – The subject of this article is not just the invasion itself, but the entire war that followed the full-scale invasion. The common term for this conflict is the Russo-Ukrainian War. However, since there is already an article titled Russo-Ukrainian War, which covers the entire conflict starting from 2014, we need to include a disambiguator. A natural disambiguator is preferred, thus I propose Full-scale Russo-Ukrainian War. What are your thoughts? Sakakami (talk) 19:58, 22 September 2024 (UTC)

Procedural close – There has been no change to the core arguments since this discussion was held a month ago. The proposed rename is not a title used by reliable sources let alone the WP:COMMONNAME for this article subject. It therefore has virtually no possibility of being adopted. Mr rnddude (talk) 20:06, 22 September 2024 (UTC)

Well the common name is not "Russian invasion of Ukraine" (by this point) either, it is indeed "war in Ukraine" (which isn't an appropriate title) or "Russo-Ukrainian War". The previous RM was so unsuccessful mainly because of the suggestion to move this page to prefix with "timeline of", not entirely from the main point of the proposal. Maybe an alternative titling of "Russo-Ukrainian War (2022–present)" would work. Flemmish Nietzsche (talk) 20:11, 22 September 2024 (UTC)

Given articles like War in Afghanistan (2001-2021), War in Iraq (2013-2017), and war in Donbas, I wouldn't consider "war in Ukraine (2022-present)" to be an entirely inappropriate title, but I definitely prefer your proposal and concur that "Russian invasion of Ukraine" is no longer WP:COMMONNAME for the events described in this page. SaintPaulOfTarsus (talk) 20:41, 22 September 2024 (UTC)

A natural disambiguator is preferred over using years in parentheses. Additionally, 'Full-scale Russo-Ukrainian War' serves well as a non-judgmental, descriptive title. Sakakami (talk) 08:43, 23 September 2024 (UTC)

That isn't the WP:COMMONNAME for this conflict though (additionally, the label "full-scale" is about as unnatural as you can get). The common name is "War in Ukraine" both in colloquial and media usage (either that or "Ukraine war"), which Wikipedia has been trying to ignore for two years. This title runs afoul with Russo-Ukrainian War, which as an article is trying to carry a low-level, minor insurgency and a major war under the same umbrella. Thus the more sensible title for that article is Russo-Ukrainian conflict, which describes ten years of continuous conflict, but not of continuous war, akin to Afghan conflict. 🐔 Chicdat ^{Bawk to me!} 11:22, 23 September 2024 (UTC)

My belief has been for years that this article should be moved to Russo-Ukrainian War (or, better yet, War in Ukraine (2022–present)) and the article currently at that title should be moved to Russo-Ukrainian conflict (I believe that was proposed a while back). The so-called "Russian invasion of Ukraine", like in 2003 invasion of Iraq, should serve only to cover the first month or so of the war, while the rest, clearly a war, should be called as such. As for the preceding eight years, it mostly consisted of a low-intensity conflict for the first year and then a frozen conflict from Minsk to 2022. Calling that the Russo-Ukrainian War rather than the more appropriate Russo-Ukrainian conflict is fundamentally misleading. 🐔 Chicdat ^{Bawk to me!} 20:39, 22 September 2024 (UTC)

Completely agree. Given PaulOfTarsus' examples of similar titlings (war in Foo) I would support a move to War in Ukraine (2022–present) (which initially sounded too colloquial to me) and further a move of Russo-Ukrainian War to "Ukraine conflict (2014–present)" or "Russo-Ukrainian conflict" which appear to be more sensible and common names (see ngram) than "war", provided we are only going to use "War in Ukraine" for 2022 onwards. "War in Ukraine" has nonetheless been used by media since 2014, but to differentiate between the article readers will want to go to realistically (this one, which has far more coverage of events after Feb. 2022) and the broad, main article the titling of the latter should imply the scale of the conflict. Flemmish Nietzsche (talk) 21:02, 22 September 2024 (UTC)

Agree The conflict from 2014-2022 and the conflict from 2022-present are two related but separate conflicts. This article should move to take the "war" article. Basil the Bat Lord (talk) 06:46, 24 September 2024 (UTC)

Procedural close We should not keep having to deal with this issue, there is an article about the general war, that is a non argument. Slatersteven (talk) 10:43, 23 September 2024 (UTC)

Procedural close as per Slatersteven, Flemmish Nietzsche and others. GreatLeader1945 ^TALK 18:16, 23 September 2024 (UTC)

Oppose. The proposed name is nowhere near a COMMONNAME. When full-scale is used it is in lower case, i.e. as an adjective and not as part of the war's name. This makes the proposed name OR. I support the procedural close proposed by all others. It was important to me also to state what is wrong with the name. gidonb (talk) 19:09, 23 September 2024 (UTC)

Oppose, While consensus of a common name seems to be a bit all over the place, I have seen sources referring to this as the Russian invasion [of Ukraine]. Full-scale Russo-Ukrainian War never occurred and seems to be quite muddy as to what it is referencing (as someone who is not super well versed on Ukrainian history, I might confuse this with Crimea or even as a term to conjoin the Crimean and this invasions). ✶Qux yz ✶ 01:39, 24 September 2024 (UTC)

Oppose and close. WP:SNOW, WP:COMMONNAME Andre🚐 01:49, 24 September 2024 (UTC)

Oppose close per WP:SNOW. †TyphoonAmpil† (💬 - 📝 - 🌀 - Tools) 02:29, 24 September 2024 (UTC)

Oppose and close the RM is based on the fallacious premise that an invasion only lasts for some nominal period and then it becomes something else. The 2003 invasion of Iraq ended because Iraq had been (fully) occupied - ie the military objective had been attained. There is no analogy between what has happened here and what happened there. There is no good reason why the title should change. Cinderella157 (talk) 03:26, 24 September 2024 (UTC)
Oppose and speedy close - WP:SNOW and WP:COMMONNAME. Hansen Sebastian (Talk) 08:23, 24 September 2024 (UTC)
Thank you all for your valuable input and thoughtful contributions to this discussion. After carefully considering the points raised by everyone, I have decided to withdraw my request to move the article. Sakakami (talk) 08:37, 24 September 2024 (UTC)

The discussion above is closed. Please do not modify it. Subsequent comments should be made on the appropriate discussion page. No further edits should be made to this discussion.

RfC: Mention Russian demand on NATO expansion in lead?

The following discussion is an archived record of a request for comment. Please do not modify it. No further edits should be made to this discussion. A summary of the conclusions reached follows.

This RFC resulted in a consensus in favour of the proposed addition. Those in favour of the proposal showed that reliable sources consider the demands a significant part of the prelude to the war, and as a significant reason for the war. Those opposed to the proposal mostly argued that the demands were not serious, or that NATO expansion as a cause to the war is Russian propaganda, but provided few sources to support their claims. A great majority of the participants did not find these arguments convincing or relevant, and favoured inclusion. -- Maddy from Celeste (WAVEDASH) 10:02, 30 September 2024 (UTC)

Should the lead mention Russia's pre-invasion demand for a ban on future expansion of NATO to Ukraine? A proposed wording: "In late 2021, Russia massed troops near Ukraine's borders and issued demands including a ban on future expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to Ukraine." — Goszei (talk) 00:03, 13 August 2024 (UTC)

Prior discussion of this topic on this talk page can be accessed here, here, and here. — Goszei (talk) 00:03, 13 August 2024 (UTC)

Yes. The current version of the lead mentions two of the reasons which Putin has advanced for Russia's decision to invade Ukraine: (1) a Russian irredentism based on denying Ukraine's right to exist as a state, and (2) overthrowing its alleged neo-Nazi government (which we correctly identify as a falsehood). Equally important and relevant as these are Russia's pre-invasion security demands, issued on 17 December 2021 in the form of an ultimatum to the West, and whose most pertinent item was a ban on future expansion of NATO to Ukraine. Mentioning this point does not imply that it is the genuine reason behind the invasion, to the exclusion of the other reasons, but presents it as one among several, as the reliable sources do.

In reflection of the reliable sources which it cites, the current article body mentions NATO more than 30 times, mostly in the Background and Prelude sections. Here are representative sources which identify NATO expansion as one of the causes of the war, both within and beyond this article:

News "explainers" from major outlets, which all describe in detail the history of the collapse of the USSR, ensuing NATO expansion, and how this process caused increasing tensions between Russia and Ukraine over decades; all of these sources also describe the December 2021 security demands when discussing the causes of the war. For examples, see NYT, CNN, BBC, Al-Jazeera, Vox, Bloomberg, US News, and NPR. Most of these mention the "irredentism" and "denazification" points on either equal or lesser footing to the NATO expansion point.
U.S. think tanks including the Council on Foreign Relations: "Why did Russia launch a full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022? [...] Some Western analysts see Russia’s 2022 invasion as the culmination of the Kremlin’s growing resentment toward NATO’s post–Cold War expansion into the former Soviet sphere of influence. [...] Other experts have said that perhaps the most important motivating factor for Putin was his fear that Ukraine would continue to develop into a modern, Western-style democracy that would inevitably undermine his autocratic regime in Russia and dash his hopes of rebuilding a Russia-led sphere of influence in Eastern Europe." See also this article, which is specifically on the NATO point.
International relations scholars including both John Mearsheimer, a leading figure in the realist school, and Joseph S. Nye, a leader of the liberal school. Mearsheimer puts more emphasis on NATO expansion (see [16]), while Nye puts less but still examines it at length (see [17]: "the intermediate cause was a refusal to see Ukraine as a legitimate state [...] The prospect of NATO enlargement was a lesser intermediate cause").

I support the proposed wording. — Goszei (talk) 00:03, 13 August 2024 (UTC)

Goszei – You might be better served by presenting your proposed wording with the RfC question. It gives concreteness to the change that you are hoping to effect. Mr rnddude (talk) 07:32, 13 August 2024 (UTC)

Done. — Goszei (talk) 14:55, 13 August 2024 (UTC)

Yes. Doesn't matter if you disagree with it or think it's a pretext. The reality is that it is an aspect discussed heavily in reliable sources (as demonstrated by Goszei above), perhaps more than any other individual causative factor, and thus warrants inclusion in the lead. I will add another source in as a datapoint, a book I am currently reading, The Story of Russia by famed historian Orlando Figes released in 2022 following the invasion. The following is on p. 292-293.

"At the Bucharest conference in 2008, NATO had declared that, along with Georgia, Ukraine would become a member of the alliance once it met the necessary requirements (among them better measures to combat political corruption and ensure the rule of law). The declaration was opposed by several NATO leaders, especially the German chancellor Angela Merkel, who warned that it would be seen as a dangerous provocation by Russia. But George Bush forced the measure through. In his final months in the White House, he was desperate to leave a legacy of promoting US interests and democracy in the former Soviet Union. He was supported by the east European member states, which were most alarmed by Russia’s growing aggression. They saw Ukraine’s NATO membership as ‘an important historic opportunity to cage the bear’, in the words of Lech Wałęsa, the former Polish president.

NATO’s involvement in Ukraine set alarm bells ringing in Moscow. After the invasion of the Crimea, the alliance gave $3 billion in military aid to the Ukrainian government, helped it to modernise its weaponry and trained its troops in joint exercises in Ukraine. The war had strengthened Ukraine’s national unity. But it also gave rise to a violent hatred of Russia reflected in the cult of Stepan Bandera, the Ukrainian nationalist leader who had fought on the Nazi side against the Soviet army in 1944–5. Bandera streets and squares were newly named. Statues of the partisan leader were erected in cities such as Lviv and Ternopil. The Bandera cult was a gift for Moscow’s propaganda about the threat of ‘Nazis’ in Ukraine.

Putin saw the role of NATO in Ukraine as a direct military threat. In an hour-long address to the Russian people on 21 February 2022, he claimed that Ukraine would ‘serve as an advanced bridgehead’ for NATO’s forces to attack Russia unless Moscow intervened. Under the guise of its training missions, NATO, he declared, was building bases in Ukrainian cities like Kharkiv, near the Russian border, from which its nuclear missiles could reach Moscow in a few minutes. ‘It is like a knife to our throat,’ he said. From a Western point of view this seemed mad and paranoid. NATO, after all, was a defensive alliance and had no reason to attack Russia. But as Putin saw it, it was the conclusion to be drawn from his reading of the history of Russia and Ukraine." JDiala (talk) 00:23, 13 August 2024 (UTC)

Ah, yes the NATO (a defensive alliance) is such a threat that we have to invade Ukraine so now we (Russia) can border with 9 NATO countries instead of 5. "Putin saw" is clearly his pretext not a "causative factor". YBSOne (talk) 08:49, 13 August 2024 (UTC)

Why didn't Putin invade Finland for their accession in NATO? No "advanced bridgehead"? No "alarm bells"? NO "dangerous provocation"? Weird right? Almost as if Kremlin didn't work on destabilisation and propaganda against Finland. YBSOne (talk) 09:02, 13 August 2024 (UTC)

In a new book, the historian Orlando Figes argues that the war on Ukraine is only the latest instance of a nation twisting the past to justify its future. YBSOne (talk) 09:05, 13 August 2024 (UTC)

You need to read more than just the by-line. The reviewer criticizes Figes for blaming NATO’s expansion for creating “the very problem it was meant to counteract” because in Feifer's view it goes against his own case for the importance of invented enemies to Russia’s self-image. It's clear from that review that 1) Figes does place emphasis on NATO's role in the conflict and 2) that Feifer disagrees with that analysis. Mr rnddude (talk) 09:18, 13 August 2024 (UTC)

Yes, I agree. My point is that just because a historian reports what is Russia/Putin saying does not mean it is a causative factor. When we know that Putin just wants to recover/recreate his belowed Soviet Union and any sovereign states like Ukraine not sharing his idealistic vision need to be punished for their independence and forced into submission. Also on the outside they need to create fake image of being the ones in the right, "fighting nazism", "rescuing russian-speaking civilians" Allegations of NATO provocation and aggression etc. YBSOne (talk) 12:03, 13 August 2024 (UTC)

"Putin didn't invade Ukraine in 2022 because he feared NATO. He invaded because he believed that NATO was weak, that his efforts to regain control of Ukraine by other means had failed, and that installing a pro-Russian government in Kyiv would be safe and easy. His aim was not to defend Russia against some non-existent threat but rather to expand Russia's power, eradicate Ukraine's statehood, and destroy NATO, goals he still pursues".105" YBSOne (talk) 12:05, 13 August 2024 (UTC)

It is interesting that now quoting a source that quotes a beligerent (Russia, Putin) is a reliable source, but when a source quoted an Ukrainian official it was not reliable. Interesting. YBSOne (talk) 14:01, 13 August 2024 (UTC)

So think tanks which form part of the "reliable sources" as you put it Goszei have provided above are reliable when providing reasoning for Russia invading Ukraine, but not when questioning Russia's great power status.

Hopefully whoever closes this RfC will take such editor inconsistencies into account when evalutating the input of said editor. TylerBurden (talk) 18:13, 14 August 2024 (UTC)

This is a bizarre personal argument, especially in an RfC . Address the content, not what I may or may not have said in an unrelated discussion. To address what you wrote, note that Goszei provided a number of sources including standard newspapers, which no one disputes are reliable, in addition to scholars like Mearsheimer and Nye. The CfR source was just among many. On the issue of think tanks, the most important thing for me is consistency. If we're going to accept think tanks are reliable for anti-Russia material, then to be consistent it makes sense to accept them for anti-NATO material. JDiala (talk) 20:08, 14 August 2024 (UTC)

You speak about consistency? You've proven to be anything but, which is exactly why I added this analysis so that the closer knows how you present sources differently based on motive. TylerBurden (talk) 20:25, 19 August 2024 (UTC)

No, but in case of inclusion it needs to be stated that it was just a pretext to feed the zombified masses ie disinformation, and real reasons were different ie Russian imperialism. YBSOne (talk) 14:08, 13 August 2024 (UTC)

~~No, its a blank cheque, what is it we intend to say? Slatersteven (talk) 14:11, 13 August 2024 (UTC)~~

I had asked Goszei to place their proposed wording with the question. They want to introduce a sentence to the lede approximating: In late 2021, Russia massed troops near Ukraine's borders and issued demands including a ban on future expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to Ukraine. Mr rnddude (talk) 14:28, 13 August 2024 (UTC)

I answer the question as it is still asked. Slatersteven (talk) 14:32, 13 August 2024 (UTC)

I have moved the proposed wording to the RfC text. The mention should certainly be no longer than a sentence clause. — Goszei (talk) 14:54, 13 August 2024 (UTC)

"vote" now struck. Slatersteven (talk) 14:59, 13 August 2024 (UTC)

Yes, this is part of the war's background. See the well-developed article World War II, where there's a dedicated section on the developments up to several years prior to the war's outbreak, including German demands. — kashmīrī ^TALK 14:17, 13 August 2024 (UTC)

Our WWII articles do not give dues to Nazi Germany's pro-war propaganda, as is being proposed here with Russia's pro-invasion propaganda. Unless most RS view Putin's demands on Ukraine's NATO bid as legitimate, we shouldn't treat them differently from Hitler's violations of the Versailles and Locarno treaties. IntrepidContributor (talk) 05:28, 19 August 2024 (UTC)

Yes. A significant number of high-quality sources, as detailed by Goszei and JDiala, suggest that Russian fears over NATO's eastward expansion may have contributed to the origin and (with the 2022 invasion) to the escalation of the conflict with Ukraine.. Gitz (talk) (contribs) 00:14, 14 August 2024 (UTC)

lol. The "conflict" as you call it led to the fact that Russia recieved +750 miles border with Nato Devlet Geray (talk) 19:03, 3 September 2024 (UTC)

Yes, if supported by reliable sources. No matter whether Russia meant their demands or not, including them is notable and encyclopedic. If reliable sources say that the demands were disinformation, of course that should be added, but I don't see that as a reason to remove the demands entirely. JSwift49 00:41, 14 August 2024 (UTC)

Yes To me, it is irrelevant whether Russia actually considered this to be a cause of the invasion or not. If we mention that Russia massed forces in late 2021, we should also mention the demands Russia made accompanying that buildup. Gödel2200 (talk) 02:02, 14 August 2024 (UTC)

No because this claim by Putin was pure propaganda and disinformation. It had nothing to do with the actual reasons he decided to attack Ukraine. As the Institute for the Study of War frames it [18]:

Russian President Vladimir Putin didn’t invade Ukraine in 2022 because he feared NATO. He invaded because he believed that NATO was weak, that his efforts to regain control of Ukraine by other means had failed, and that installing a pro-Russian government in Kyiv would be safe and easy. His aim was not to defend Russia against some non-existent threat but rather to expand Russia’s power, eradicate Ukraine’s statehood, and destroy NATO, goals he still pursues.

My very best wishes (talk) 23:42, 16 August 2024 (UTC)

Which statement are you claiming is disinformation? That [i]n late 2021, Russia massed troops near Ukraine's border ... or that it ... issued demands including a ban on future expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to Ukraine? Mr rnddude (talk) 00:18, 17 August 2024 (UTC)

Russia ... issued demands including a ban on future expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to Ukraine.. The demand for a ban on the future expansion of NATO was disinformation/propaganda by Russia/Putin because it was framed as a reason to attack Ukraine. It was not a reason at all (see quote from the ISW above). Now, we uncritically repeat the same in the lead without saying it was disinformation/propaganda, thus giving it some legitimacy, which misinforms a reader. This is not a good summary of content on the page, but rather placing an irrelevant propaganda claim to the lead. Yes, such claim was made by Putin, but it does not belong in the lead, especially in such context. My very best wishes (talk) 01:02, 17 August 2024 (UTC)

That's ISW's opinion only. The hard fact is that such a demand has been put forward and has been widely publicised in the sources as well as responded to by governments. We're an encyclopaedia, mind you. — kashmīrī ^TALK 11:43, 18 August 2024 (UTC)

Yes, Putin publicly demanded a ban on the future expansion of NATO. He did it long before the invasion. It was merely a demand, not an ultimatum, because Russian government publicly asserted they have no intention to attack Ukraine. But why on the Earth this should be included to the lead? That would make sense if it were an actual reason for the invasion. But it was not - according to many RS, including ISW, which probably one of the best sources for such claim. My very best wishes (talk) 15:58, 18 August 2024 (UTC)

Quotes from the ISW source you have cited: "Putin then issued an ultimatum to the US and NATO in December 2021 that aimed to force the West into surrendering Ukraine’s sovereignty on its behalf and abandoning partnerships on NATO’s eastern flank. [...] Putin's 2021 ultimatum to NATO and the West was an actual ultimatum, not the basis for a negotiation." — Goszei (talk) 18:20, 18 August 2024 (UTC)

Yes, it uses such wording, in the most general meaning of the word, i.e. demands with threats, rather than a specific demand with a specified timeline for specified consequences. More exactly, as this source says, Putin published an essay saying that Ukraine has no right to exist unless it will be a puppet state of Russia, etc. Yes, true, that is what Putin said and what he meant. But it was all about subordinating Ukraine to Russia, not about membership of Ukraine in NATO (which would never happen as Putin was well aware about). Why include NATO to the lead? My very best wishes (talk) 19:28, 18 August 2024 (UTC)

We should mention NATO in the lead because it has been conclusively demonstrated that the subject dominates discussion of the war's causes in reliable sources (newspapers, think tanks). We can argue back-and-forth and present sources which disagree on the degree to which it was pretext or propaganda, but the truth is that reliable sources do not simply dismiss the topic out-of-hand. Reliable sources, including the ISW article, instead fully engage with and examine the topic from a historical and scholarly perspective, which is all that is required to mention it here. — Goszei (talk) 18:13, 19 August 2024 (UTC)

Comment. Where exactly this wording should be included in the lead? Without saying it, this is basically not a valid RfC. At the first glance, it is out of context everywhere. My very best wishes (talk) 01:08, 17 August 2024 (UTC)

I see: it probably suppose to replace the phrase In late 2021, Russia massed troops near Ukraine's borders but denied any plan to attack. That sounds good and true. Indeed, they denied any plan to attack. But it means there was no any ultimatum by Putin as the proposed change about his demands misleadingly implies. My very best wishes (talk) 22:42, 17 August 2024 (UTC)

Yes but qualify it as a claim by the Russian side, balancing it with our reliable sources indicating that the real intentions were primarily Russia's revanchism and imperialist ambitions. IntrepidContributor (talk) 05:16, 19 August 2024 (UTC)
If so, then it should be "no" because the suggested text does not include any such clarifications and therefore partly misleading. My very best wishes (talk) 16:41, 21 August 2024 (UTC)
I am qualifying the nuance to help the closer. IntrepidContributor (talk) 11:19, 10 September 2024 (UTC)
I disagree with the wording "expansion of NATO to Ukraine". That's the wording used in Russian propaganda. It implies that NATO is engaged in expansionism into countries against their will, when actually Ukraine willingly applied to join. Better wording would be "a ban on Ukraine ever joining NATO" or "barring Ukraine from ever joining NATO", with a link to Russian opposition to Ukrainian NATO membership. – Asarlaí ^(talk) 10:28, 19 August 2024 (UTC)
Agreed, if we have this we must make it clear this was a demand that Ukraine not be allowed to if it asked join NATO. Slatersteven (talk) 11:11, 19 August 2024 (UTC)
Yes, but it should be also noted that his demands included some unrealistic requests such as removal of NATO troops and bases from certain NATO members. BeŻet (talk) 10:53, 20 August 2024 (UTC)
If so, then it should be "no" because the suggested text does not include it. Yes, of course it included a lot of unrealistic claims, and no one on the Russian side expected that other countries will satisfy such demands. That was pure propaganda. My very best wishes (talk) 16:41, 21 August 2024 (UTC)
Yes - Regardless of the opinions of journalists on the veracity or intent of the demand, it occurred, and the invasion then followed. It's notable enough to be in the lead as a precursor to the invasion. I read both arguments and the arguments against inclusion appear to me to be more political in nature (i.e. the real intent was to annex all of Ukraine, the demand was used as a pretext, it's a lie and shouldnt be included). So long as the demand is atrributed to Russia and documented as a statement rather than fact, this argument holds no weight to me. DarmaniLink (talk) 00:48, 31 August 2024 (UTC)
maybe we should also write that "Ukraine exploded an old empty UAZ" and that's why Russia as an act of self-defence attacked Ukraine attributing it to Russia? It's just funny, but not for the encyclopedia Devlet Geray (talk) 18:59, 3 September 2024 (UTC)
If you want to stick that into the body of the article, I wouldn't revert you. I would be against putting that in the lead though, because the NATO demand has far more notable coverage, DarmaniLink (talk) 03:45, 5 September 2024 (UTC)

Question: Why the lead, according to OP's proposal, should mention only Putin's NATO demand, without its assessment by secondary RSs, and without other, maybe more notable, reasons for the invasion? ManyAreasExpert (talk) 12:49, 2 September 2024 (UTC)

IMO this would fall under WP:NOTINDISCRIMINATE and would risk throwing the lead off balance to add too much context to an overview of the article. To the best of my knowledge, that is the most notable demand that was made. Those should absolutely be (and I believe they are adequately) articulated in their appropriate sections in the article. Adding secondary analysis of a statement or saying something like "Although Professors of political science John Smith and Jane Doe dispute the veracity of the demand and state that the demand was to create pretext for invasion" may be useful as an addition, but I would be careful with how much is added given it's for the lead. DarmaniLink (talk) 11:21, 3 September 2024 (UTC)

To the best of my knowledge, that is the most notable demand that was made.
It may be, or it may be not. Sources need to be analysed and a summary should be made to reach such a conclusion.

Now, why is the desire to include demands, but not the reasons for the invasion, into the lead? ManyAreasExpert (talk) 19:06, 3 September 2024 (UTC)

Ask the proposer.

We do not know, nor can we be certain of the true reasons.

All we have is what russia said (which is possibly false) and speculation (which are effectively opinions, and you know what they say).

I think the proposed change is a net positive. DarmaniLink (talk) 03:35, 5 September 2024 (UTC)

Strong NO. No, this is just a propaganda trick, not a real demand. And you are substituting concepts. Russia has put forward a deliberately impossible demand for NATO to return to the 1997 borders, and not at all about further non-expansion. Including those funny "demands" neither encyclopedic, nor notable - Wikipedia is not the place for any-country propaganda. Devlet Geray (talk) 18:39, 3 September 2024 (UTC)

Yes-The proposed content is factually correct and critical in understanding the Russian position. Of course mention should be made of it in the lead. Display name 99 (talk) 23:13, 6 September 2024 (UTC)
Strong no to "expansion". Russia expands by invading other countries. NATO enlarges by letting in countries voluntarily applying for membership. "NATO expansion" is a Russian propaganda syntagma. Super Ψ Dro 10:36, 8 September 2024 (UTC)
@Super Dromaeosaurus: This point was previously raised by Asarlaí and Slatersteven as well. Would you all support the addition if it was instead "...issued demands including a ban on Ukraine ever joining the NATO military alliance"? — Goszei (talk) 18:43, 8 September 2024 (UTC)
I am (frankly) ambivalent. Slatersteven (talk) 10:15, 9 September 2024 (UTC)

The counter view is that is the "voluntary" is not so "voluntary" when there is e.g., CIA involvement (colour revolution). JDiala (talk) 16:54, 11 September 2024 (UTC)

So-called "CIA involvement" is WP:FRINGE, see Orange_Revolution#Outside_Ukraine In Russian nationalist circles the Orange Revolution has been linked with fascism because, albeit marginally, Ukrainian nationalist extreme right-wing groups and Ukrainian Americans (including Viktor Yushchenko's wife, Kateryna Yushchenko, who was born in the United States) were involved in the demonstrations; Russian nationalist groups see both as branches of the same tree of fascism.[85] The involvement of Ukrainian Americans lead them to believe the Orange Revolution was steered by the CIA.[85] You are spreading misinformation and conspiracy theories jumping to far-reaching conclusions based on rumors. Ukraine was not under USA nor CIA occupation and their voluntary willingness to be part of NATO/EU was and still is voluntary. YBSOne (talk) 12:15, 12 September 2024 (UTC)

Comment Russia has security concerns with regard to NATO expansion but I don't think they are directly tied to its military escalation, so they can be mentioned in a way that does not imply NATO is officially expanding to include Ukraine. The specific demand probably should not be. CurryCity (talk) 17:00, 9 September 2024 (UTC)
No- Suggested wording comes too close to parroting Russian propaganda, given the complexity of the NATO situation and the discussion surronding it, it is something that is far better covered in the article body. Just shoehorning Russian demands into the lead without further expansion is not a good nor WP:DUE solution. TylerBurden (talk) 18:38, 11 September 2024 (UTC)
Yes per above points by various others. RadioactiveBoulevardier (talk) 23:47, 17 September 2024 (UTC)

The discussion above is closed. Please do not modify it. Subsequent comments should be made on the appropriate discussion page. No further edits should be made to this discussion.

Add A Fact: "Adoption surge in Ukraine post-invasion"

I found a fact that might belong in this article. See the quote below

The number of Ukrainian citizens seeking to adopt children has increased dramatically since Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.

The fact comes from the following source:

https://www.voanews.com/a/adoption-applications-in-ukraine-soar-since-russian-invasion-/7802068.html

This post was generated using the Add A Fact browser extension.

Rc2barrington (talk) 02:10, 1 October 2024 (UTC)

Why aren't Ukraine's supporters listed?

Ukraine has so many nations which support it directly in the war trough arm deliveryes. Why are those not listed? For example Germany the US the UK and so on. These arm and also munition deliveryies are vital for the AFU i think these should definitly be listed. Waranalyst (talk) 11:45, 5 September 2024 (UTC)

They are listed - see the Ukraine support section. If you mean being listed in the infobox, there have been many discussions on that, but they were not in support of including them in the infobox. Gödel2200 (talk) 11:53, 5 September 2024 (UTC)

see FAQ. Slatersteven (talk) 12:50, 5 September 2024 (UTC)

Listing all of Ukraine's supporters on the infobox will make it unnecessarily long and difficult to navigate -- 00101984hjw (talk) 03:47, 10 September 2024 (UTC)

Collapsible show/hide button? Adonnus (talk) 10:07, 6 October 2024 (UTC)

We already have two entire pages for that as well foreign aid to Ukraine and a link to those pages on Russo-Ukrainian War. I think anything else would be repetitive. -- 00101984hjw (talk) 13:39, 6 October 2024 (UTC)

700,000 Russian personnel

I'm pretty sure this number should be updated to a more recent estimate anyway, but the source for the 700,000 Russian personnel in the strength category says that there is "almost 700,000 Russian personnel". While I do think that this is a minor problem that doesn't matter much, I would personally add "~" or "almost" before "700,000 active personnel in the area" since it doesn't say that that amount of personnel has actually been reached as far as i've read. Minewit (talk) 20:20, 11 October 2024 (UTC)

Strength over a protracted war varies with time. We should be treating this the same way that we treat casualties. Cinderella157 (talk) 00:35, 12 October 2024 (UTC)

Civilian casualties

As of 31 August 2024, the UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine (HRMMU) had verified that conflict-related violence had killed 11,743 civilians and injured 24,614 in Ukraine since 24 February 2022. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 139.47.121.25 (talk) 07:56, 12 October 2024 (UTC)

Extended-confirmed-protected edit request on 17 October 2024

This edit request to Russian invasion of Ukraine has been answered. Set the |answered= or |ans= parameter to no to reactivate your request.

Recent information about deployment of a few thousands Korean People's Army soldiers shall be added AxeDeodorant123 (talk) 08:55, 17 October 2024 (UTC)

Being discussed. Check the talk page before requesting an edit. Mr rnddude (talk) 08:57, 17 October 2024 (UTC)

The word "expansion" and the recent RfC

The recent RfC on NATO expansion in the lead proved a success for the yes side. Thus, discussion of NATO is now in the lead, but interestingly the specific word "expansion" is not used. This is odd. The RfC opener, Goszei made express use of the word "expansion" both in the title of the RfC and the RfC phrasing, which I remind everyone was specifically the following: " Should the lead mention Russia's pre-invasion demand for a ban on future expansion of NATO to Ukraine?". Most of his sources (Mearsheimer, CfR, various reputable news outlets) make use of the specific word "expansion." The RfC closer, Maddy_from_Celeste, also made express use of the word "expansion" in their closing.

I attempted to include the word but I was reverted. The rationale given for the reversion is that this amounts to a stylistic disagreement not affecting the substance of what is said. There are two responses to this. First, this is false. Don't take my word for it. Some of the no voters, like Super Dromaeosaurus specifically and strongly objected to the word "expansion", indicating the substantive importance of the word. The word "expansion", after all, connotes aggression. It is important to understand the context here; the mere "ban on membership" wording (as it currently is) misses the point that this Russian concern pertains to a decades-long physical, geographically expanding encroachment by a belligerent alliance. A mere "ban on membership", on the other hand, which is the current phrasing, connotes Russia as making a frivolous demand, almost as if it is a mean parent not letting their daughter join a sorority. To summarize, the RfC discussion, the sources provided, voters on the other side, and common sense makes it clear that the word "expansion" is significant. It's not a stylistic issue. But even if I steelman this and assume for sake of argument that it is not significant, why would a stylistic variation not in concert with the vocabulary used extensively in the RfC be preferred to the variation that is? Why should the unsuccessful no voters have a veto on the style used?

Pinging TylerBurden, Cinderella157 (those reverting my edits) and Maddy_from_Celeste, Goszei (RfC closer and opener). JDiala (talk) 21:52, 18 October 2024 (UTC)

So much attention being given to this by the editors. Those interested welcome improve and expand and sharpen the corresponding December 2021 Russian ultimatum to NATO and the section in this article. There are news sources being used currently, and there are plenty of academic sources already. With that done, those interested will have solid ground to argue their point.
Do you need help with the sources?
nato ukraine russia ultimatum - Google Scholar
nato ukraine russia ultimatum - Google Search ManyAreasExpert (talk) 22:25, 18 October 2024 (UTC)

In particular, overview paragraphs from these might be useful to determine the weight of what should be included into the lead.
Ukraine's Unnamed War - Google Books The treaty was an ultimatum of maximalist demands including the complete withdrawal of NATO military personnel and infrastructure in former Soviet Bloc states and a return to the situation that prevailed in 1997 before NATO expanded eastward (Meduza 2021). As became clearer in subsequent statements by Russian officials, what was desired, first and foremost, was a binding legal guarantee that Ukraine would never become a member of NATO and that the NATO presence in Ukraine (training soldiers, providing weapons) would end. While the demands expressed in the draft treaty were unexpectedly extreme, Russian demands regarding the resolution of the Donbas war fell essentially within the bounds of the Minsk pro cess talking points from the past six years. But now Russia was overtly threatening war if the West did not respond. ManyAreasExpert (talk) 22:33, 18 October 2024 (UTC)

It is important to understand the context here; the mere "ban on membership" wording (as it currently is) misses the point that this Russian concern pertains to a decades-long physical, geographically expanding encroachment by a belligerent alliance. sounds awfully similar to Kremlin talking points. If we are to be careful regarding the article's wording and its relation to the conflict's context, I suggest we try not to sound similar to Russian propaganda which presents the voluntary accession of Eastern European countries into NATO as a malicious expansion imposed onto them by NATO towards the backyard Russia is entitled to have.

If necessary, I'd propose we use "enlargement". It means the same as "expansion" without any negative connotation. It is also used in the title of Enlargement of NATO. Though I don't really see any problem with the current wording. That it connotes Russia as making a frivolous demand, almost as if it is a mean parent not letting their daughter join a sorority means that it is an accurate representation of reality. Russia should have no say in whatever thing another country wants to do, but that's exactly what it is intending. Super Ψ Dro 22:30, 18 October 2024 (UTC)

I can see that the RfC's closer focused in their closing comment on the addition of the mention of this information, rather than on the specific wording we should use. The opener of the RfC also expressed openness to changing the wording to exclude the word "expansion", leading me to think they did not specifically seek this wording [19] (by the way, the ping didn't work, otherwise I'd have replied that I supported Goszei's proposal). I don't see much evidence that the RfC led to a definite decision on the specific wording we should use.

By the way, I also want to highlight one comment from OP: The counter view is that is the "voluntary" [accession into NATO] is not so "voluntary" when there is e.g., CIA involvement (colour revolution). This "counter view" is completely excluded from any Wikipedia article on the conflict, at least without its due attribution to Russian propaganda. I'd expect neutral editors in this topic area to refrain from seeking the inclusion of similarly-sounding points in the project. Because they don't belong here. Super Ψ Dro 22:43, 18 October 2024 (UTC)

Some history

Proposed wording by Goszei per RfC: In late 2021, Russia massed troops near Ukraine's borders and issued demands including a ban on future expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to Ukraine. [the substantive wording]
Late in the RfC, Goszei makes this edit proposing an alternative wording: ...issued demands including a ban on Ukraine ever joining the NATO military alliance. Note, there is no significant discussion regarding this alternative. [the alternative wording]
Maddy from Celeste closes the RfC and adds the substantive wording to the article (here). ... including a ban on future expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to Ukraine.
Goszei changes this to the alternative wording (here). ... including a ban on Ukraine ever joining the NATO military alliance.
JDiala amends the alternative wording (here with the edit summary: The RfC clearly posits the usage of the word "expansion.") ... including a ban on the future expansion of NATO to Ukraine. Note, this is the substantive wording except that NATO is used without the name in full.
Cinderella reverts (here with the edit summary: Things change. The present wording is better but retains the spirit and intent of the RfC. Note, my reversion was not because of inclusion of the word expansion but the overall construction of the sentence. ... including a ban on Ukraine ever joining the NATO military alliance.
JDiala edits (here with the edit summary: Your opinion doesn’t negate an RfC result. The RfC clearly used the word expansion, both in title in body. It affects the spirit as “expansion” connotes aggression, which is precisely the Russian concern. Mere “ban on membership” lacks this connotation so it’s a subtle pro-Ukr bias.) ... including a ban on the future expansion of NATO to Ukraine.
Cinderella157 amends the wording (here - adding the word include). ... including a ban on the future expansion of NATO to include Ukraine. Note, this is a minor copy-edit.
TylerBurden reverts to the alternative wording (here with the edit summary: Rv bad faith assumption edit warring, there is nothing wrong with this text and it's inline with the relevant article body, I can just as easily say insisting on usage of ″NATO expansion″ is subtle pro-Russia pov since it's a favorite term of Russia supporters, no consensus was achieved for that specific wording). ... including a ban on Ukraine ever joining the NATO military alliance.
JDiala reverts this (here with the edit summary: Consensus was reached for that. It was the RfC. Whether or not you think it's biased is irrelevant, that was the RfC). ... including a ban on the future expansion of NATO to include Ukraine. Note, this is the most recent version by Cinderella157 that added the word include.
TylerBurden reverts again (here with the edit summary: No it wasn't, stop edit warring in a contentious topic). ... including a ban on Ukraine ever joining the NATO military alliance. Note, this is a direct undo of the version above.

Cinderella157 (talk) 02:19, 19 October 2024 (UTC)

Consensus doesn't override sourcing. The lead paragraph is supposed to reflect the body. The body uses a Reuters sources, and that source in turn does not use the term "expansion" in its own voice, and just a single time citing NATO diplomats. That's not sufficient to diverge from the body. Cortador (talk) 14:07, 20 October 2024 (UTC)

The RfC was closed in support of the substantive wording of the RfC. Clearly, there is some contention over the use of the term expansion but the consensus was to include that term. Whether NATO should be used in full is not a point of contention (certainly not at this point) nor is the addition of the word include, which is reasonably justifiable grammatically (IMHO). Consequently, there are essentially two main versions on the table:

... including a ban on the future expansion of NATO to include Ukraine. - effectively the substantive wording from the RfC
... including a ban on Ukraine ever joining the NATO military alliance. - the alternative wording from the RfC

There is a strong consensus for the actual substantive wording from the RfC. There is no consensus at the moment to instate the alternative wording. Cinderella157 (talk) 02:34, 19 October 2024 (UTC)

So let's look at where this lead content comes from.

"In December 2021, Russia issued an ultimatum to the West, which included demands that NATO end all activity in its Eastern European member states and ban Ukraine or any former Soviet state from ever joining the alliance"

This is the actual wording used in the body which the lead is meant to reflect, per WP:LEAD, the term "expansion" does not exist in the section.

Now in the Reuters article being cited for this content the actual wording is: "The demands contain elements - such as an effective Russian veto on future NATO membership for Ukraine - that the West has already ruled out."

In other words, both suggestions are basically WP:SYNTH.

A solution could be to simply follow the source we are citing as we are meant to and write that the demand included an effective Russian veto on future membership for Ukraine. TylerBurden (talk) 04:05, 19 October 2024 (UTC)

Not only SYNTH but more worringly pushing WP:POV and WP:SOAPBOX, despite being obvious and proven russian propaganda and mere pretext, as I have already pointed out. YBSOne (talk) 07:21, 19 October 2024 (UTC)

For this search of news articles prior to 31 March 2022, eight out of nine articles on the first page refer to the expansion of NATO using some variation of the word expand. the tenth article was from December 2017. While the actual article cited may not use the word expansion, there are many articles related to this which do use this and which could also be cited. Cinderella157 (talk) 08:20, 19 October 2024 (UTC)
Apparently, my invitation to use academic sources instead of news went unheard. ManyAreasExpert (talk) 09:43, 19 October 2024 (UTC)
In fairness, the Cambridge UP source you quoted also uses the word expand. Mr rnddude (talk) 12:29, 19 October 2024 (UTC)
I'm not against that, but against news sources. Also note the accent which Arel and Driscoll are pointing out: maximalist demands ... unexpectedly extreme. ManyAreasExpert (talk) 12:37, 19 October 2024 (UTC)

I would prefer an unbiased survey of academic sources too (as opposed to cherry-picking sources that support one argument). However, an argument has been made on the basis of the current sourcing in the body of the article - which is a news source. There is clearly no substance to that argument. Cinderella157 (talk) 13:05, 19 October 2024 (UTC)

For the record, I implemented the alternate wording after the RfC closed because I figured that it was closer to consensus, as some editors raised an objection to the word "expansion". I don't think the two versions are substantially very different, and that the current version is a little more semantically clear and less wordy. — Goszei (talk) 16:11, 21 October 2024 (UTC)

Foreign support should be updated and clarified

The foreign support section only mentions Belarus and China, but the two biggest supporters of Russia aren't mentioned at all, Iran and North Korea. Also, the map that shows nations sending aid to Ukraine should be changed to add Russia's supporters as well, which would also more clearly illustrate the global situation and balance of power. I can do this if you don't mind (thinking just a lighter shade of red for Russia's allies). Adonnus (talk) 10:09, 6 October 2024 (UTC)

They are mentioned. Slatersteven (talk) 10:24, 6 October 2024 (UTC)

The image in this article conflicts substantially with image in the list article despite them supposedly showing the same information. Both images are also ultimately sourced to a Wikipedia article: List of military aid to Ukraine during the Russo-Ukrainian War. Mr rnddude (talk) 10:30, 6 October 2024 (UTC)

Не хватает справа : Германия, Франция, США, Литва, Чехия, Канада, Нидерланды, Англия, Австралия, Турция , Латвия , Исландия, Румыния ,Хорватия ,Норвегия , Польша ,Эстония , Греция, Италия 176.59.72.139 (talk) 19:42, 19 October 2024 (UTC)

Yes, the anti-totalitarian coalition YBSOne (talk) 12:37, 23 October 2024 (UTC)

Extended-confirmed-protected edit request on 23 October 2024 (2)

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North Korea be included as a belligerent in the conflict. 2001:56B:FFE5:381D:6DAB:BB16:8CCC:387E (talk) 13:21, 23 October 2024 (UTC)

already being discussed above. Slatersteven (talk) 13:24, 23 October 2024 (UTC)

Not done for now: please establish a consensus for this alteration before using the {{Edit extended-protected}} template. M.Bitton (talk) 14:12, 23 October 2024 (UTC)

Extended-confirmed-protected edit request on 23 October 2024

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The Russian Ukraine war did NOT start in 2014. This a false 173.54.54.247 (talk) 12:56, 23 October 2024 (UTC)

RS say otherwise. Slatersteven (talk) 12:59, 23 October 2024 (UTC)

They did, when they invaded and annexed Crimea, per reliable sources. — Czello ^(music) 13:04, 23 October 2024 (UTC)

Not done for now: lmao, lmfao even. not only is the request nonsensical, but it doesn't follow the "Change X to Y" format for requests. Scuba 14:57, 23 October 2024 (UTC)

October 2024: New battles

New battles are taking place, without any articles being made for them.

Articles I would recommend creating are:

- Battle of Hirnyk/Kurakhiva

- Battle of Selydove

Both are currently taking place in Donetsk, however have no mention despite these engagements having gone on for several days. NMEGG (talk) 13:55, 22 October 2024 (UTC)

We need RS to discuss them. Slatersteven (talk) 13:59, 22 October 2024 (UTC)

Under the current structure Hirnyk/Kurakhivka, until an article on the battle for Kurakhove is made, falls under Eastern Ukraine campaign, while Selydove is covered in Pokrovsk offensive. Flemmish Nietzsche (talk) 20:28, 22 October 2024 (UTC)

We need sources to flesh it out, but I agree both battles are highly likely to be independently notable. Cheers, RadioactiveBoulevardier (talk) 00:17, 24 October 2024 (UTC)

Grammar error

I came across a small error in the #Support for Russia section. It says this "In October 2024, Ukraine and South Korea claimed that North Koreans engineers had been deployed to the battlefield to help with the launch of these missiles, and had suffered some casualties."

Could someone fix it so it reads "North Korean engineers" or a similar phrase? Lazesusdasiru (talk) 02:31, 24 October 2024 (UTC)

Done as requested. Mr rnddude (talk) 02:54, 24 October 2024 (UTC)

Thank you Lazesusdasiru (talk) 03:54, 24 October 2024 (UTC)

Add North Korea to Support Section

North Korea has sent ~3,000 soldiers out of a promised 10,000 to be deployed by December to Russia where they are being trained and re-equipped in Russian Far Eastern and Siberian military bases (Ussuriysk was mentioned a lot). Also, North Korea has sent roughly 8 million artillery shells to Russia to support their invasion, and has supplied short range ballistic missiles and rockets to Russia too. Why then, is North Korea not shown in the section with Russia's closest supporters? Belarus is there, so why not North Korea? Yes I have read the discussion that took place to decide whether countries supplying arms should be listed in the infobox, and that would have applied to this situation were it not for the numerous news reports and factual evidence showing that North Korea is not only continuing to supply arms to Russia, they are now sending manpower support in the form of several thousand soldiers OF the North Korean army TO Russia where they will participate in the war very soon. Please consider adding North Korea next to Belarus in this section and maybe adding a new section about the new North Korean support.

I understand, however, that this is a developing situation, and I also consider the fact that it is unclear whether North Korean soldiers will be incorporated into already existing Russian units. However, that would spark a whole other debate. This is intended to open up discourse. Thank you

Sources: https://edition.cnn.com/2024/01/05/europe/russia-north-korean-missiles-ukraine-asia-intl-hnk-ml/index.html#:~:text=Russia%20has%20fired%20North%20Korean-supplied%20short-range%20ballistic%20missiles,the%20Korean%20Peninsula%2C%20the%20White%20House%20said%20Thursday.

https://www.independent.co.uk/asia/east-asia/south-korea-north-korea-ukraine-russia-war-b2634063.html

https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/ukraine-russia-war-live-maps-north-korean-south-korea-putin-b2633894.html

https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/c4g5vwxgyx3o

https://www.nytimes.com/2024/10/23/us/politics/north-korea-russia-military-ukraine.html

https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/what-we-know-about-north-korean-troops-joining-russias-war-ukraine-2024-10-21/

There is also satellite imagery and alleged footage on youtube and other video services of alleged North Korean troops. CrazyFruitBat911 (talk) 20:05, 23 October 2024 (UTC)

This is already being discussed under the section titled "north korea should be listed as an ally of russia" --haha169 (talk) 21:31, 23 October 2024 (UTC)

why go through so much effort and not even check if it's already being discussed. youre the fifth person to do this NotQualified (talk) 08:28, 25 October 2024 (UTC)

yeah sorry about that i didnt check because i had no time

i needed to get a piece of work done CrazyFruitBat911 (talk) 20:00, 25 October 2024 (UTC)

Should we update the map of foreign support to include Russian allies too?

This has bugged me for a while. Ukraine's supporters are all highlighted on the map, but not Russia's supporters, when they've sent millions of artillery rounds, drones and now personnel too. Said map is this one:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russian_invasion_of_Ukraine#/media/File:Countries_supplying_military_equipment_to_Ukraine_during_the_2022_Russian_invasion.svg

Seen in the "international aspects" category. Adonnus (talk) 10:26, 25 October 2024 (UTC)

Seems valid, and I have been wondering that too. Slatersteven (talk) 10:27, 25 October 2024 (UTC)

I agree, it not only creates a better picture of the conflict but can serve to possibly settle the dispute of North Korea V. L. Mastikosa (talk) 22:30, 28 October 2024 (UTC)

Donetsk and Luhansk status in belligerents

I propose removing the increased indentation of PR's of Donetsk and Luhansk from the infobox and instead adding an efn to Russia in the same section explaining their illegitimate but small recognition as annexed republics of the Russian Federation. DeadlyRampage26 (talk) 09:25, 29 October 2024 (UTC)

Oppose Donetsk and Luhansk were break away states that maintained their own military forces involved in the conflict up until they acceded to Russia. They are listed as bulleted entities under Russia because even when they were defacto independent, they were dominated by Russia, but their forces still fought as soldiers of Donetsk / Lunhansk as opposed to being members of the Russian military.XavierGreen (talk) 13:54, 29 October 2024 (UTC)

To update belligerents

May I suggest adding Iran and North Korea as countries which are supporting Russia? Furthermore, can the majority of NATO countries (those verified who have sent military support) be added as supporting Ukraine? Benzekre (talk) 17:36, 29 October 2024 (UTC)

We are discussing North Korea above, and supplying arms does not make you a belligerent. Slatersteven (talk) 17:40, 29 October 2024 (UTC)

Fair point .... but supplying arms would definitely make you a supporter. Iran and North have been supplying Russia, while most of NATO has been supplying Ukraine. Benzekre (talk) 17:46, 29 October 2024 (UTC)

And supported is generally deprecated, Belarus is a unique case. Slatersteven (talk) 17:57, 29 October 2024 (UTC)

Extended-confirmed-protected edit request on 29 October 2024

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Showing North Korea as a belligerent country along with Russian camp

The involvement of North Korean forces have been confirmed by both sides as a participant in the war and deployed alongside the Russian force, it should be added as a belligerent group in the info box, or at least a supporting role in the war similar to the Belarus.Sheherherhers (talk) 17:39, 29 October 2024 (UTC) Sheherherhers (talk) 17:39, 29 October 2024 (UTC)

We are discussing North Korea above. Slatersteven (talk) 17:40, 29 October 2024 (UTC)

Why isn't added North Korea as Co-Belligerent it has been confirmed by Nato also Ukraine section should have a "supported by" list of western countries that has given military aid to ukraine (i.e usa, uk, france, germany, poland etc) Amanahmad111000 (talk) 10:29, 30 October 2024 (UTC)

We are still discussing North Korea in a thread above. and read the FAQ. Slatersteven (talk) 10:33, 30 October 2024 (UTC)

Extended-confirmed-protected edit request on 1 November 2024

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In the first paragraph, change "largest conflict since World War II" to "largest armed conflict since World War II", as the height of the Cold War would be larger than the invasion, but no direct fighting took place. ArtemisDay (talk) 14:56, 1 November 2024 (UTC)

Partly done: I have added "armed" as you proposed (but be mindful this edit is subject to reversion); however the pdf file has not been sourced. 𝚈𝚘𝚟𝚝 (𝚝𝚊𝚕𝚔𝚟𝚝) 15:17, 1 November 2024 (UTC)

Incorrect caption to map of Donbas

The map of Donbas in the "Fall of Sievierodonetsk and Lysychansk" sub-subsection is described as "Military control around Donbas as of 24 March 2023", but the map shows the situation as of mid 2024. WikiEnjoyer123 (talk) 20:23, 4 November 2024 (UTC)

(Edit Request) Iran is indirectly involved in supporting Russia

Iran supplies Russia with weapons and missiles but Iran denied that, so could you put Iran into alleged supporters on infobox?

Sources: (CNBC), (Kyiv Independent), (Al Jazeera) 178.81.55.110 (talk) 06:58, 1 November 2024 (UTC)

No, see FAQ Q4. We do not list arms suppliers in the infobox. Mr rnddude (talk) 09:17, 1 November 2024 (UTC)

But north Korea also denied sending troops 178.81.55.110 (talk) 03:02, 4 November 2024 (UTC)

And Russia denied for a long time that this was even a war, authoritarian state lies don't hold much WP:WEIGHT. TylerBurden (talk) 20:41, 4 November 2024 (UTC)

Maybe, but lots of nations are supplying weapons, that does not mean they should be included. Slatersteven (talk) 20:46, 4 November 2024 (UTC)

Russia is not an authoritarian state. GreatLeader1945 ^TALK 14:10, 5 November 2024 (UTC)

It is even according to Wikipedia's own article on it, Russia, but I suppose that is also all made-up fake news like everything else you don't like. TylerBurden (talk) 20:00, 5 November 2024 (UTC)

What North Korea states doesn't matter - what sources state does. Cortador (talk) 11:24, 5 November 2024 (UTC)

These are fake, made-up sources and you know that: Kursk is not even part of the Republic of Ukraine lol GreatLeader1945 ^TALK 14:11, 5 November 2024 (UTC)

with all the ANI warnings on your user page, why are you continuing to be non-prodcutive/disruptive? Either bring a Reliable Source for comment for the betterment of the article, or stop! 2603:6080:21F0:AB60:2850:5700:1526:2FCD (talk) 17:10, 5 November 2024 (UTC)

They are asking for a block at this point, if a sensible administrator could step in so that no one needs to waste time on them creating an WP:AN/I report that'd be great. TylerBurden (talk) 19:58, 5 November 2024 (UTC)

We are not discussing Russia. Slatersteven (talk) 15:44, 5 November 2024 (UTC)

Rename?

I've been thinking if the current "Russian invasion of Ukraine" remains adequate to describe the article since Ukraine occupied a few Russian territory since 2024. Maybe something like Russia-Ukraine War (2022-Present) or Second phase of Russia-Ukraine War would be more adequate? MaGioZal (talk) 05:06, 7 November 2024 (UTC)

There's already an article called Russo-Ukraine War which describes the broader conflict between the countries since 2014. While it is true that part of the war takes place on Russian territory now, the majority of the fighting has been on Ukrainian territory. Also, the name doesn't have to be fully descriptive e.g. large parts of the Battle of France took place in the Low Countries, but sources settled on "Battle of France" nevertheless. Cortador (talk) 08:49, 7 November 2024 (UTC)

(Edit Request) Gennady Zhidko died over a year ago

Gennady Zhidko died over a year ago. It should be acknowledged with a cross or other mark symbolizing death next to his name in infobox. Yutyo77764 (talk) 08:53, 6 November 2024 (UTC)

The cross is for people were KIA. Zhidko died in Moscow. While he is dead, there's other conflicts that list leaders that died before the war concluded, e.g. the WWII article lists FDR as a main leader.

I wouldn't be opposed to removing him if we want to keep it to leaders which are actually alive and/or active, but I'd like some input from other editors. Cortador (talk) 12:47, 6 November 2024 (UTC)

@Cortador If so, then I opt for removing Zhidko's name from infobox altogether and have a name of someone acting in his place today Yutyo77764 (talk) 09:51, 8 November 2024 (UTC)

Extended-confirmed-protected edit request on 7 November 2024

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Cite error: There are <ref> tags on this page without content in them (see the help page).

Addition to the belligerents by moving North Korea from the 'Supported By' to an active combatant following the inclusion of North Korean troops into Ukraine.<https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c3vkqwe9wwdo></https://apnews.com/article/south-korea-north-korea-troops-russia-ukraine-9ee96dc1d4f07ac0813c698e6873f96b><//https://www.nytimes.com/2024/11/05/world/europe/north-korea-russia-ukraine-kursk.html) Augerthefurry (talk) 23:29, 7 November 2024 (UTC)

Do any of these say they are in combat? Slatersteven (talk) 11:13, 8 November 2024 (UTC)

Not done: please provide reliable sources that support the change you want to be made. TylerBurden (talk) 16:00, 8 November 2024 (UTC)

To add this this, we would need the sources actually confirming their participation in combat, from what I can see, this is not the case with these sources. TylerBurden (talk) 16:02, 8 November 2024 (UTC)

Suggest creating new articles (Military aid to Russia during the Russo-Ukrainian War, etc.)

I was surprised that we have no article on Military aid to Russia during the Russo-Ukrainian War. Here, the relevant section in the article is also longer than that on aid for Ukraine, which does not seem balanced correctly - aid to Russia may be more controversial, but aid to Ukraine is more common. We also need an article on Military aid to Ukraine during the Russo-Ukrainian War (right now it just redirects to a list; there is no such list for Russia - that entry just redirects here). Of course, whether we realistically need both articles and lists is debatable, BUT we certainly could use a subarticle discussing aid to Russia. _{Piotr Konieczny aka Prokonsul Piotrus| reply here} 05:32, 10 November 2024 (UTC)

November 2024 Moscow drone attack

I just created November 2024 Moscow drone attack. Thriley (talk) 22:15, 10 November 2024 (UTC)

The article as written now violates wiki-policy Neutral Point of View

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Neutral_point_of_view It is one-sided, completely ignores the viewpoint (and more importantly PREDICTIONS) of Realism (international relations) experts, such as John Mearsheimer. When I read this article, I get an impression, that it implies that Putin has schizophrenia, the demons told him to "conquer Ukraine", and he is doomed to fail. When I read Mearsheimer, I get an impression, that this invasion was a rational choice, and that Russia is going to win this war= which is exactly, what is happening now. Please do not call Mearsheimer a "fringe theorist" = he is the only ONE , who predicted the inevitability of this invasion and Russian victory. Regardless, whether you believe Mearsheimer or not, wiki-policy requires a 'neutral point of view" and alternative views. — Preceding unsigned comment added by Walter Tau (talk • contribs) 00:27, 28 October 2024 (UTC)

Talk pages are for actionable proposals to improve the article (what wording should be changed to what?). Give reliable sourcs. Johnuniq (talk) 01:13, 28 October 2024 (UTC)

On February 25, 2022 (on the 2nd day of the War) I wrote in article Russo-Ukrainian_relations a paragraph about John Mearsheimer, who predicted no later than September 27, 2015 (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JrMiSQAGOS4), that Russia will have no other choice , but to "wreck Ukraine", if Ukraine tries to join NATO. That paragraph was deleted 2 days later. My writing about the realist theory of Russian invasion survived, and it was expanded by others here https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=John_Mearsheimer&action=edit&section=23 . Walter Tau (talk) 08:45, 28 October 2024 (UTC)

you can't cite some guy's blog, or youtube channel, see WP:SPS. Do you have an actual reliable source? Scuba 18:20, 11 November 2024 (UTC)

Not only did Mearsheimer not predict a Russian invasion (he said Putin wasn't stupid enough to invade), plenty of people did warn that Russia was planning to invade. BeŻet (talk) 14:51, 30 October 2024 (UTC)

Here is what I wrote originally:

https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Russo-Ukrainian_War&action=edit&section=42

United States

As early as 2014 American political science professor John Mearsheimer predicted, that eastward NATO expansion will lead to an inevitable confrontation with Russia. In fact, Mearsheimer stated, Russia had only one option to prevent Ukraine from joining NATO: it is by "wrecking Ukraine".^[1] The main security threat to Russia in such scenario is, that if the NATO launches cruise missiles with nuclear warheads from Shostka area in Northern Ukraine toward Moscow, it will be technically impossible for Russia to shut down most of such missiles. In his 2014 article Mearsheimer pointed out a similarity between Russia's concerns about Ukraine joining NATO and the US concern over deployment of Soviet nuclear weapons in Cuba during the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962:^[2]

Did Cuba have the right to form a military alliance with the Soviet Union during the Cold War? The United States certainly did not think so, and the Russians think the same way about Ukraine joining the West.^[3]

I want to restore this edit, perhaps with some updates/modification to reflect what happens now.

That was 12 years ago. (In that time Ukraine has not entered into a military alliance with NATO, nor was it about to in 2020. Slatersteven (talk) 10:42, 28 October 2024 (UTC)

In reply to Slatersteven previous comment, I post the following:

I think all the trouble in this case really started in April 2008, at the NATO Summit in Bucharest, where afterward NATO issued a statement that said Ukraine and Georgia would become part of NATO.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Mearsheimer#2022_Russian_invasion_of_Ukraine Walter Tau (talk) 11:11, 28 October 2024 (UTC)

So even further back in time, and still not acted upon. So why now? Slatersteven (talk) 11:34, 28 October 2024 (UTC)

It seems, that Slatersteven did not watch the youtube video I referred to above. I understand that. I prefer to read also. For this reason I quote this: https://leiterreports.typepad.com/files/causes-and-consequences-of-the-ukraine-crisis.national-interest.pdf The short answer is, that Ukrainian presidents before Volodymyr Zelenskyy did not push hard for Ukrainian membership in NATO, because they were getting cheap/discounted gas and oil +other perks from Russia. Zelenskyy clearly stated, that joining NATO is a goal of his presidency.

Is my writing here a revelation for some folks? Could it be because mainstream media in the USA (where I live) suppress alternative views on this war? One can, perhaps, call Douglas Macgregor and Scott Ritter trumpists and their comments about this war biased, but they still deserve to be mentioned as alternative viewpoints. On the other hand, John Mearsheimer is heads above those two parrots: he is a respected (possibly the most accoladed in the World) political scientist, his works on this subject have been published in peer-reviewed journals. Thus, one cannot in good faith call John Mearsheimer (and Gilbert Doctorow) "fringe theorists". Also, you can watch this video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_aNMOEQ0248 (I know it is too long) and decide for yourself which of the two panelists only repeats slogans and which speaks facts and logic. — Preceding unsigned comment added by Walter Tau (talk • contribs)

In the case of Macgregor, I’ve actually met the guy once at an event so I might as well go on the record with my impression of him. Let me tell you he is a bitter SOB. While of his criticisms may be valid, he’s undoubtedly carrying a massive chip on his shoulder toward the defense and foreign policy establishment as a result of never getting a star, which happened because it’s not the 19th century. He comes off as very single-minded about whichever issue that comes up and seems to believe that we would do better to straight up cooperate with Russia (obviously a decade plus too late bro, although in the 50+ year timescale he’s not entirely wrong). Naturally, he has spoken extensively about Ukraine but his comments, from what I recall, were actually quite boring inasmuch as the points he was proposing could have been argued much more cogently by a normal person (something his segment of the right wing is short on at the top level).

I will say he seems much smarter than Tucker and the other Fox dudes, but he clearly has massive cognitive biases which he leans into in order to get his bread. I used to think characters like him only existed in books. Feel free to quote me on all this. RadioactiveBoulevardier (talk) 21:02, 28 October 2024 (UTC)

Walter Tau (talk) 21:35, 28 October 2024 (UTC)RadioactiveBoulevardier Thank you for your note. You noticed, that I did not put Macgregor and Ritter into the same category, where I put Mearsheimer. Forget about the parrots (there are many more anti-Putin parrots than pro-Putin parrots), and focus on Mearsheimer. OK? Do you have any problem with putting a sentence about his views into the first paragraph of the article, and a paragraph or two somewhere downstream? Walter Tau (talk) 21:38, 28 October 2024 (UTC)

Well honestly I’d prefer to let time pass to allow the actualité to clarify, but given that even now many people still believe contemporaneous propaganda vis-à-vis WW1… well anyway, WP’s content is nominally governed by certain policies and guidelines and if enough editors believe due weight means that an opinion piece by the wife of the Polish foreign minister in The Atlantic is a dozen times more weighty than an editorial in a “peripheral” country’s newspaper of record, they’re going to carry the day using mass.

My own opinions on the specific issues frequently discussed here are well known. Unless there is a potentially productive RfC, I’m a busy man.

RadioactiveBoulevardier (talk) 04:33, 29 October 2024 (UTC)

No, we shouldn't include views of incredibly controversial people such as Mearsheimer into the first paragraph of the article. In fact, we don't need to include anyone's opinion in the first paragraph at all. You could potentially make a case to include his opinion somewhere in the article, but I believe that's still WP:UNDUE. BeŻet (talk) 15:07, 30 October 2024 (UTC)

Fatuous argument - sub-launched nuclear missiles from off Murmansk are impossible to stop and would hit St. Petersburg and Moscow long before a cruise missle would, and Russia is very aware of that. Anyway, this is getting very WP:FORUM'sh ... 2603:6080:21F0:AB60:58AE:75C2:C2FE:EFC1 (talk) 01:44, 29 October 2024 (UTC)

What do you say about Mearsheimer's analogy between Cuban Missile Crisis and potential deployment of US nuclear missiles in Ukraine? Putin's propaganda?

— Preceding unsigned comment added by Walter Tau (talk • contribs) 16:48, 29 October 2024 (UTC)

Lets see, the Russians did deploy nuclear missiles to Cuba, but the USA had not deployed nuclear missiles to Ukraine. Also (as far as I know) they are yet to deploy them to the Baltic State or Poland. In fact the only places that have American nuclear missiles are the UK, Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Turkey. So, no its not the same thing at all. Slatersteven (talk) 17:03, 29 October 2024 (UTC)

The word "potential deployment" does a lot of work here, because, guess what, they weren't deployed. So his analogy is incredibly silly. Meanwhile, Russia is believed to have nukes in Kaliningrad. BeŻet (talk) 14:56, 30 October 2024 (UTC)

References

^ https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JrMiSQAGOS4
^ Mearsheimer, John J. (2014). "Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West's Fault: The Liberal Delusions That Provoked Putin". Foreign Affairs. 93 (5): 77–89. ISSN 0015-7120.
^ Mearsheimer JJ. Why the Ukraine crisis is the west's fault. Foreign Aff. 2014;93(5):77-89 ; https://www.jstor.org/stable/24483306 .

To Slatersteven. 4 points:

1) I quote Mearsheimer: "it does not matter what you think. The only thing that matters is what Vladimir Putin thinks". 2) Do you know how much diarrhea (both verbal and literal) was produced in the Pentagon and the White House, when they discovered, that the Russkiys deployed nukes in Cuba? Kennedy agreed to pull out American nukes from Turkey just to get Khrushchev to withdraw his from Cuba. And, BTW, Americans violated that agreement- there are American nukes in Turkey today, but there are no Russian nukes in Cuba. This is another proof of Mearsheimer's statement: "Americans cannot be trusted". 3) I would like to know YOUR REASONING behind Putin's invasion of Ukraine. But please read/watch Mearsheimer and others first

https://nationalinterest.org/feature/causes-and-consequences-ukraine-crisis-203182
https://link.springer.com/article/10.1057/s41311-020-00235-7  ,

and tell me which explanation they did not rebuke properly. 4) Poland is not as close to Moscow as Ukraine is. But if Americans try to install nukes in Latvia, Putin will nuke Latvia before it happens.Walter Tau (talk) 22:32, 29 October 2024 (UTC)

@Walter Tau To bring this somewhat back onto discussing NPOV and value of including Mearsheimer, it's worth noting that the fact someone predicted a war does not automatically make that person notable in the scope of that war. Thousands of people make wrong predictions every day, and it's undue weight to give relatively unknown people who happen to guess something correctly a spotlight. Even people who are extremely well-known don't get spotlights when it's not useful for the article— even Otto von Bismarck's prediction of the risk of European war coming from something in the Balkans is not mentioned in either the World War I article or the Causes of World War I article, though it's mentioned in his own article. It's definitely worth covering Mearsheimer's views on his own article, but probably not worth including here Placeholderer (talk) 14:27, 30 October 2024 (UTC)

@Placeholderer My suggestion is not about Mearsheimer's views specifically. I claim, that the article as written violates Wikipedia:Neutral point of view policy= means representing fairly, proportionately, and, as far as possible, without editorial bias, ALL the significant views that have been published by reliable sources on a topic. Please note, that I do not insist on adding anything about Douglas Macgregor's and Scott Ritter's views (although I support others, if they want to write about them), but I cannot disregard John Mearsheimer, Stephen Walt and other political scientists (e.g. in China). Also, can someone explain to stupide moi IN ONE SENTENCE, what is the reason for Putin's invasion, that is stated in the current version of the article, besides Putin's schizophrenia?

@Slatersteven Walter Tau (talk) 15:14, 30 October 2024 (UTC)

There is no authoritative answer as to why, as no one can know what is in his mind, only what he has said his reasons are (and people's reactions to those claims). So we do not offer any real judgment in the lede. Slatersteven (talk) 15:31, 30 October 2024 (UTC)

We already give Putin's excuses, this is not about what he says, but what someone else says. But it does not alter two facts, A. The USA did not in fact invade Cuba over the missiles, and B there were no plans to place missiles in Ukraine. So the Cuba comparison is fundamentally flawed, they are not the same. Slatersteven (talk) 14:37, 30 October 2024 (UTC)

@Slatersteven Walter Tau (talk) 15:14, 30 October 2024 (UTC)

Please note, that I do not insist on expanding the section about Putin's speeches, au contraire I think it is too long now. And to answer your points:

1) US did invade Cuba and by the time Khruschev placed nukes in Cuba Uncle Sam learned his lesson, that another invasion may fail as well. US did not invade Cuba with regular troops, because Cuban missile crisis was resolved by diplomacy, but as you know, John F. Kennedy's generals seriously considered nuking Cuba. So, your statement "The USA did not in fact invade Cuba over the missiles" is an example of WP:STRAWMAN.

2) I shall quote Mearsheimer again: "it does not matter what you think. The only thing, that matters, is what Vladimir Putin thinks".

3) Your statement "So the Cuba comparison is fundamentally flawed, they are not the same" violates WP:APR. You need to provide reliable, independent references to support it.

Respectably, Walter Tau (talk) 15:33, 30 October 2024 (UTC)

We say what Putin thinks. Slatersteven (talk) 15:42, 30 October 2024 (UTC)

So as (literally) we already include what Putin's excuses are this really seems to be going nowhere, so will drop out with a firm NO. Slatersteven (talk) 15:44, 30 October 2024 (UTC)

You do not know, what Putin thinks. You only know, what he says. And what he says does not make any sense. I have not seen an answer to my request from above:

Can someone explain to stupide moi IN ONE SENTENCE, what is the reason for Putin's invasion, that is stated in the current version of the article, besides Putin's schizophrenia?

As I said, I would like to see the section about "Putin's excuses" significantly reduced in size, and have a section about Measheimer added. Walter Tau (talk) 21:05, 30 October 2024 (UTC)

This is my personal analysis of the situation based on what I know about Putin, Ukraine, and history.

Ukraine hates Russia's guts. It used to be a part of Russia for a long time, but Ukraine became independent in 1991 after the Soviet Union dissolved. A good chunk of the enmity between Ukraine and Russia can be attributed to the Holodomor, where Stalin engineered a man-made famine. While the actual goals of the Holodomor are still debated, most Ukrainians would be heavily on the side that believes "the famine was deliberately engineered by Joseph Stalin to eliminate a Ukrainian independence movement", to quote from the article.

As for Putin, he's basically got Soviet Union nostalgic. He sees Ukraine as land that rightfully belongs to Russia, but he also sees this as an opportunity to test the West's willingness to interfere with a hostile nuclear superpower. When you have complete control of national media, it's very easy for Putin to justify the invasion to his own people by saying "we're invading this country because there are neo-Nazis there and they are a threat to Russia."

If Putin didn't have nuclear weapons, I would say that the West is making the same mistake they did after WW2 by adopting a policy of appeasement. However, because of Putin's mental state and position of power, we cannot predict his tipping point. While the West is not willing to risk mutually assured destruction, Putin has nuclear weapons and the desire to show off Russia's strength. As it stands right now, that's why the West is mostly acting indirectly: economic sanctions on Russia, military supplies and relief aid for Ukraine, etc. Boots on the ground means officially declaring war with Russia, and war with Russia means risking the big red button. Sirocco745 (talk) 02:17, 31 October 2024 (UTC)

What's this "schizophrenia" you're talking about? This is not discussed in the article, it's something you came up with, so please explain what you mean by that. BeŻet (talk) 09:28, 31 October 2024 (UTC)

To [[User:BeŻet|BeŻet]: My term schizophrenia is a synonym of what Sirocco745 calls "Putin's mental state".

— Preceding unsigned comment added by Walter Tau (talk • contribs) 13:41, 31 October 2024 (UTC)

I want to tank Sirocco745 for joining the discussion. Let me try to rebuke their arguments:

Ukraine hates Russia's guts.

>> This statement is not quite accurate. I am 25% Russian and 25% Ukrainian, I have relatives in both countries, and I can understand both languages. Plus, I have several Ukrainian and Russian friends/coworkers in Boston, MA where I live. My conclusion is that there are 2 Ukraines: West+Central- which was historically under a long Lithuanian -Austrian -Polish rule- is more bitter toward Russia, and East+South- which did not have many Ukrainians until it was annexed from the Ottoman Empire by Catherine the Great- is more friendly toward Russia. For this reason, it makes sense for Putin to annex Novorossiya and to [[|wreck|https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JrMiSQAGOS4]] the rest. Also, more Ukrainian refugees go to Russia, than to any other country.[[ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ukrainian_refugee_crisis#:~:text=The%20countries%20receiving%20the%20largest,refugees%20from%20Ukraine%20%22phenomenal%22.]] This does not sound like a lot of hate, does it?

It used to be a part of Russia for a long time, but Ukraine became independent in 1991 after the Soviet Union dissolved. A good chunk of the enmity between Ukraine and Russia can be attributed to the Holodomor, where Stalin engineered a man-made famine. While the actual goals of the Holodomor are still debated, most Ukrainians would be heavily on the side that believes "the famine was deliberately engineered by Joseph Stalin to eliminate a Ukrainian independence movement", to quote from the article.

>> I agree with you here.

As for Putin, he's basically got Soviet Union nostalgic. He sees Ukraine as land that rightfully belongs to Russia, but he also sees this as an opportunity to test the West's willingness to interfere with a hostile nuclear superpower.

>>This is where we disagree: Mearsheimer rebuked every one of these arguments here: https://leiterreports.typepad.com/files/causes-and-consequences-of-the-ukraine-crisis.national-interest.pdf . Please let me know, if there are any arguments, that you presented, which have not been rebuked by Mearhsheimer in that article. The summary of his view is:

“Did Cuba have the right to form a military alliance with the Soviet Union during the Cold War? The United States certainly did not think so, and the Russians think the same way about Ukraine joining the West.” ^[1]

I also disagree with a phrase “incredibly controversial people such as Mearsheimer” by USER:BeŻet . According to Scopus on 2024-10-31 John Mearsheimer (Scopus ID=6603187263) has a Hirsch index of 21, which makes him #1 political scientist in the World. His 2014 article “Why the ukraine crisis is the west's fault” alone has received 622 citations, which places it into the top 1% of ALL (areas of science, engineering and humanities) publications in Scopus for that year.[[ https://www.scopus.com/record/display.uri?eid=2-s2.0-84906821111&origin=AuthorEval&zone=hIndex-DocumentList]]

I want to spell out my position clearly:  Mearsheimer’s prediction-turned-into-reality is the only logical explanation for the Russian invasion of Ukraine, that I have heard. Even if you disagree with it, he is not some marginal like Scott Ritter and Douglas Macgregor, and his views MUST BE DESCRIBED in the main body of article according to Wikipedia:Neutral point of view.

Also, I would be most grateful, if someone can explain to me the difference between US-lead 2003 invasion of Iraq and Russian Invasion of Ukraine, as well as between Putin’s lies about Neonazis in Ukraine and Collin Powell’s lies about weapons of mass destruction in Iraq? Walter Tau (talk) 16:22, 31 October 2024 (UTC)

Some comments: This article about the invasion itself doesn't need to cover anyone's perspective on why the war started. It should, and I think currently does, focus on the war instead of political science. There's no section in the article about "reasons for the war" apart from where it's key to the subject, for example, the announcement of the "Special Military Operation". While analysts are mentioned, like "Analyst Vladimir Socor called Putin's 2014 speech following the annexation a 'manifesto of Greater-Russia irredentism'", it's within the context of specific topics.

However, the Russo-Ukrainian War article which you had edited is a different situation. There, there's much more talk about perspectives on stuff (though I'm not sure that I agree it should be that way), and I think it would be appropriate to consider including Mearsheimer's views there. As such I propose moving this discussion over to the Russo-Ukrainian War article. I think that article does have some problems worth addressing (there are some tags I'd put in myself but don't have clearance yet).

We should also heed IP's warning that this is heading into WP:FORUM, and if we do move over try to talk about specific proposed additions/removals. Placeholderer (talk) 17:13, 31 October 2024 (UTC)

Thank you, Placeholderer. This is the first good idea in this discussion chain. I will do, what you suggested. Also, I want to note that the current version of this article Russian invasion of Ukraine seems unnecessary long. It can benefit from a short 1-paragraph summary at the top, followed by a more extended (4-5 paragraphs) summary, and then the main body text.Walter Tau (talk) 18:09, 31 October 2024 (UTC)

So for those who don't want to read this wall of text, Walter Tau does not like that Wikipedia has described Putin's actually stated reasons for invading Ukraine as covered in WP:RS, wants to reduce content that makes him look "schizophrenic", and replace it with "rational" reasons for the invasion outlined by John Mearsheimer. I think you have said your piece, and several people have disagreed with you, so there is no need to WP:BLUDGEON the page.

Wikipedia follows a neutrality policy of WP:DUE weight, you don't seem to take this into account in your arguments, you're going off on personal opinion and a single (controversial) source. So if there are any neutrality issues here, you should probably look in the mirror. TylerBurden (talk) 18:42, 31 October 2024 (UTC)

Thank you for the unexpected but greatly appreciated response, @Placeholderer! It's a quite interesting read. I myself am no expert on Ukraine and Russia and the history between the two countries, I'm Australian and only just finished school recently, so I'm pretty inexperienced but still very interested in world history. My original response was me synthesising the knowledge I had passively gained over the course of the conflict from the news here in Australia. The "two Ukraines" idea you mention in your response honestly makes sense, and I understand it. As for "more Ukrainian refugees go to Russia, than to any other country", that could be largely due to their physical closeness making it that much easier to get to Russia.

The part which you responded to by citing that article by Mearsheimer? I was reading through the article, and it's genuinely interesting to read the message that mainstream media hasn't been broadcasting. I myself am undecided as to which side is the most correct, but it is incredibly important to hear other opinions and theories that don't align with popular consensus. If mainstream thought was the be all and end all, then we'd still believe the Earth was at the center of the universe and that the four humours were the answer to why we got sick.

Mearsheimer makes some logically sound arguments, especially with the West's involvement and provocation. We should keep in mind that while it might feel like centuries ago, the Cold War actually ended only 33 years ago with the collapse of the USSR at the very end of 1991, and they were a legitimate threat to world safety. While I disagree with Putin's political methods, I understand his fear of the West and that things are not as black and white as we would like to think. I personally never stopped to consider the position Putin is in, and now that I'm remembering my Modern History course, I understand his motives more and more.

The main reason the USSR signed the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Act in 1939 with Nazi Germany is because they didn't want to fight a war on two fronts. It gave them their only powerful "ally" during a time when the world was against them, and it kept Russia secure from a two front war. With Ukraine readying itself to join the EU or NATO, the West could then certainly use it as a platform to wreak havoc on Russia if they so chose to do so. I guess for Australia, the equivalent would be if China forged an alliance with Tasmania or New Zealand, which would be catastrophic for national security here.

With this in mind, I can certainly understand Putin's reasons for military action from a national security point of view. I definitely disagree with the methods he's used to stay in power and the ways he's used his power to control Russian media and freedom of speech, but I can't fully disagree with the national security train of thought presented here. Sirocco745 (talk) 05:05, 1 November 2024 (UTC)

Can we please close this discussion? WP:FORUM 2603:6080:21F0:AB60:44A5:7676:9720:9047 (talk) 08:11, 4 November 2024 (UTC)

References

^ https://www.mearsheimer.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/Why-the-Ukraine-Crisis-Is.pdf

[1] ttps://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JrMiSQAGOS4

[2] Mearsheimer, John J. (2014). "Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West's Fault: The Liberal Delusions That Provoked Putin". Foreign Affairs. 93 (5): 77–89. ISSN 0015-7120.

[3] Mearsheimer JJ. Why the Ukraine crisis is the west's fault. Foreign Aff. 2014;93(5):77-89 ; https://www.jstor.org/stable/24483306 .

[4] ttps://www.mearsheimer.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/Why-the-Ukraine-Crisis-Is.pdf

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