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User:Nishadhi/Battle of Puthukkudiyiruppu (February 2009)

Coordinates: 9°17′19″N 80°42′47″E / 9.288667°N 80.7131195°E / 9.288667; 80.7131195
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Battle of Puthukkudiyiruppu (February 2009)
Part of the Sri Lankan civil war
Eelam War IV
DateJanuary 31, 2009 – February 7, 2009
Location
9°17′19″N 80°42′47″E / 9.288667°N 80.7131195°E / 9.288667; 80.7131195 Sri Lankan civil war
Operation Unceasing Waves III
Result Sri Lanka army victory
Belligerents
Sri Lanka Military of Sri Lanka Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
Commanders and leaders
Sarath Fonseka Velupillai Prabhakaran
Pottu Amman
Soosai
Bhanu
Swarnam
Units involved
59 Division
Task Force IV
Elements of 53 Division		 Charles Anthony brigade
Black Tigers
LTTE's women's wing
Kittu artillery brigade
Sea Tigers
Strength
Exact figures not known Total: ~ 700 - 1000 cadres (SLA estimate)[1]
Casualties and losses
  • ~ 400 killed (LTTE estimate)[2]
  • more than 1000 soldiers killed (Pro LTTE website claim)[3]
 Heavy

The Battle of Puthukkudiyiruppu (February 2009) was fought from 31 January 2009 to 7 February 2009, during the Sri Lankan civil war between Sri Lanka Armed Forces and Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). It is known as the fiercest of all LTTE counter offensives during the final phase of Eelam War IV.[4] By January 2009 Sri Lankan army managed to limit the LTTE territory to an area less than 300 square kilometers along A35 road around Puthukkudiyiruppu, in the eastern coast of the island. Sri Lankan army units had surrounded the area and were advancing towards Puthukkudiyiruppu town. On 31 January 2009 LTTE mounted a counter offensive along the front lines of 59 Division and Task Force IV. Brigade 593 was defeated and pushed back up to 5 km threatening the entire defense line.[5] Timely induction of Air mobile brigade, Special Forces and Commandos stabilized the line and prevented the LTTE units from advancing further. Both Sri Lankan army and LTTE suffered heavy casualties during the battle.

Background

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Main article: Northern Theater of Eelam War IV
Important locations of Northern theater of Sri Lankan Civil War

The Sri Lankan Civil War began in 1983 with the eruption of fighting between Sri Lanka Armed Forces and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, also known as the LTTE. After several cycles of hostilities and ceasefires, by the end of Eelam War III in 2001, LTTE has managed to consolidate territory over Northern part and most of the Eastern part of the Sri Lanka.[6] A ceasefire agreement was signed in 2001. It lasted five years but in July 2006 the fourth and final Eelam War began when LTTE cut off water supply to the rice fields in the Mavil aru area in the eastern Trincomalee district.[7][8]

With the intent of clearing East first, government began their Eastern campaign in 2006. In July 2007 Sri Lankan army captured the Thoppigala (Baron's Cap), the last stronghold of LTTE in the east.[9] The campaign for the Northern theater began in March 2007, even before the end of Eastern campaign.[10] Overall strategy of military was to create a wider battlefront in order to prevent LTTE from concentrating their defenses along a single axis.[11][10] In March 2007, 57 Division began advancing 15 km to the west of the A9 road. From July 2007, 58 Division (also known as the Task Force I) began advancing along A32 in the western coast.[10] In January 2008, 59 Division was launched from Welioya, which advanced along the the eastern coast towards Alampil and Kumulamunai.[11] As these units advanced in to LTTE territory three more task forces (Task Forces II, III and IV) were introduced in support.[12] In January 2009, 53 and 55 Divisions advanced from Muhamalai-Nagarkovil front towards Elephant pass, and linked with the other Divisions advancing from South, fully regaining control over the Jaffna peninsula.[12][13] By the end of January 2009, LTTE territory was confined to an area extending along the A35 road around Puthukkudiyiruppu town, while seven army Divisions were converging on them.

Opposing forces

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Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam

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LTTE cadres in 2004

The LTTE began as an insurgent group which employed irregular warfare, but evolved over the time to adopt both irregular and conventional tactics.[14] By the time of Eelam war IV, LTTE had acquired a diverse array of small arms, heavy weapons including artillery and multi barrel rocket launchers, a Sea tiger wing with fast attack crafts and suicide boats, limited air capabilities using light air crafts.[14][15]

According to the Sri Lankan army, by 2008, LTTE had a strength of 30,000 cadres. Additional 10,000 cadres functioned as auxiliary units. LTTE units consisted of battle hardened, experienced cadres who had a intimate knowledge of terrain. They often fought in civilian clothes allowing them to penetrate close to army positions, blending with the civilians.[16] They also had specialized units which included a Special Reconnaissance Group, Assault pioneers and a mining group, snipers, a tank regiment and anti tank regiment.[16] LTTE units were armed with IGLA - I (SA 16) surface to air missiles to counter the Sri Lanka Air Force. The Black Tiger wing consisted of elite cadres specialized in suicide operations. They were utilized in offensive operations and sometimes attached to infiltration units to conduct sabotage missions.[16]

During the Eelam War III (1995-2001), LTTE managed to break through the army defenses in multiple occasions.[17] During one such incident in 1997, which is considered as an example of such a successful attack,[17] LTTE had small special teams infiltrated the army defense lines. Then they concentrated their direct and indirect fire power to several selected breach points. The also used armored vehicles and explosive laden vehicles driven by suicide cadres. Once they breached the line, groups of LTTE units headed towards their designated targets to the rear. Whole attack was a well coordinated series of raids which conducted simultaneously. The infiltrated small teams helped to guide the raiding parties and to direct artillery fire to neutralize army gun positions and command posts.[17]

Sri Lankan Army

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Sri Lanka army Commandos

Sri Lankan army shared the British Military legacy, and as a result, based on British Doctrine and force design. However the traditional doctrines were proven inadequate to counter the guerrilla tactics in jungle warfare.[6] Large number of casualties and set backs suffered during the Eelam war III (1995-2001), gave rise to a new concept called Special Infantry Operations Teams (SIOTs).[6] Traditional practice of fixed forward lines were abandoned. Instead, Infantry battalions were organized in to small units[6](four man and eight man teams)[18] to operate 1-2 km ahead of the forward line.[10] They would make contact with the LTTE units and press the attack on a broad front.[6] During Eelam war III, most of the casualties were resulted from LTTE indirect fire and by operating in small teams, army reduced the target signature for their effective use.[10] Soon the concept was adopted by entire army.[10] Such skill level provided the battalion commanders the luxury of maintaining dominance over a broad front, that extended 4-5 km in depth.[6]

Prelude

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Preparations by the LTTE

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Map showing the situation in the Northern theater of Eelam war IV by 17th January 2009.

By January 2009, LTTE's fighting capabilities had drastically reduced. Despite the availability of large stocks of ammunition and weapons, LTTE was unable to mount an effective defense. Units lacked trained cadres. Fighting formations often consisted of three experienced cadres and 15 newer conscripts, most trained only for a week. The morale was low and unit cohesion was minimum.[19] However, as revealed later, LTTE had kept their well trained cadres as an reserve force to use in a dire situation.[20]

After the loss of Killinochchi, LTTE territory was divided in to three zones and allocated to three leaders. Visuamadu, the area to the farthest west was allocated to the "Ratnam Master". The area around Udayarkattu which was situated in the middle, was allocated to the Soosai. The Puthukkudiyiruppu area and a ring of defenses around it were placed under the Pottu Amman. Their objective was to stall the Sri Lankan army, so LTTE could appeal to the international community to force the Sri Lankan government to halt the fighting.[19][2] This hope led them to keep on fighting, despite uneven odds.[2] During this period, LTTE's method of operation was to cut off advancing army units from their supply lines and then to concentrate attacks on these isolated units. They avoided attacking head on.[2]

By 19 January 2009, LTTE had successfully halted the army advance on all three fronts. In the north, LTTE cadres prevented the 55 Division from crossing the Chundikkulam estuary and entering the Chalai area. Initial attempt to cross it by the commandos was repulsed causing multiple casualties.[13] In the west, 58 Division's advance towards Visuamadu along the A35 road was halted at Nethali Aru (a small river flowing north from Kalmadu Tank) causing many casualties.[2] They also blew up the bridge over it delaying army advance.[21] In the south, 591 brigade of 59 Division, were attempting to overcome the ditch cum bund fortifications covering the southern approaches to Mullaitivu. They made several attempts since 26 December in 2008, but had to abandon due to heavy casualties suffered.[22]

From 19 January to 29 January

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However, over the next 10 days, army managed to overcome the LTTE defenses and resume advance. On 22 January 2009, divers of the army Special Forces and commandos attached to 55 Division managed to cross the Chundikkulam estuary under the cover of darkness, while Sri Lanka army engineers built a make shift bridge using over 60 catamarans. Following morning army captured the the LTTE defenses with the assistance of a multi barrel rocket launcher used in direct fire role.[23][24]

Meanwhile, realizing that they are unable to reach Visuamadu directly, 58 Division deployed its reserve brigade (584 brigade) in a flanking maneuver. They bypassed the LTTE defenses to the south and were approaching Visuamadu from the south of the A35 road.[25][2] On 24 January 2009, LTTE blasted the Kalmadukulam tank bund, flooding Visuamadu and Tharmapuram areas where 57 and 58 Divisions were operating.[26] Due to a warning given by a small team unit, elements of 57 Division managed to withdraw to a higher ground but 58 Division got trapped in the water which suddenly rose up to several feets.[13] The 11 battalion of the Sri Lanka Light Infantry (11 SLLI) of 582 brigade, who had crossed the Nethali Aru, got isolated due to the waters. LTTE concentrated their attacks on them but the troops managed to defend for 8 hours till the main units linked up with them.[21] After an intense fight, led by eight man assault sections, 58 division captured Visuamadu on 29 January.[25][2]

While the battle for Visuamadu was in progress, 59 Division made preparations for the assault on Mullativu. As the 591 brigade was held at south of Mullaitivu, 593 brigade advanced north, along the western bank of the Nanthikadal lagoon.[22] On 25 january, 7 battalion of Gemunu Watch of 593 brigade infiltrated Mullaitivu by crossing the lagoon in small teams.[27] Once they were in place, 591 brigade and elements of 593 brigade attacked the LTTE defenses from south. Soon LTTE defenders found themselves trapped between the two assaults.[27][22] After a fierce fight, the remaining cadres made a hasty retreat from the town.[27][22]

Preparations by Sri Lankan army

[edit]
Map showing the situation in the Northern theater of Eelam war IV by 31st January 2009.

By late January 2009, Sri Lankan army's morale was very high.[1] They managed to regain control of Mullaitivu, Chundikkulam, Visuamadu and were converging on Puthukkudiyiruppu. Eight offensive Divisions were involved in the battle; seven in offensive[4] and one (Division 53) in reserve.[28] Division 55 was advancing from north along the beach and preparing to attack the sea tiger base at Chalai. Divisions 58 and 57 were advancing from west to east along the A35 road. While 58 division advance along the northern side of the road, fighting a series of delaying positions, Division 57 conducted a containing role south of the A35 road.[21][22] However the main offensive was building up from South.[29] Task forces II, III and IV were clearing through the jungles south of A35. Meanwhile, Division 59 was advancing north towards Puthukkudiyiruppu, threatening to isolate the LTTE cadres defending against Divisions 57 and 58.[10][25]

According to Gotabhaya Rajapaksa, then Secretary to Ministry of Defence, the possibility of infiltration and break out of the besieged LTTE units were always a concern to the military command.[30] There were small teams of LTTE units (consisting of 3 to 5 men) operating behind the army lines with caches of supplies. On several occasions they were encountered and neutralized by the special forces and commando teams.[30] Army expected the LTTE to concentrate their fire power on one point on the defense line and break into the jungles to the South by linking up with already infiltrated units.[4][30] To counter this threat, multiple counter penetration lines were formed.[30] The 53 Division, which had a air mobile brigade and mechanized brigade was redeployed to Mankulam as an reserve force.[28] Additionally, elite forces were placed in strategically important positions behind the army lines.[4]

31 January, eve of the battle

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Map showing Troop disposition on 31 January 2009 around Puthukkudiyiruppu South.

Puthukkudiyiruppu, which is located along the A35 road, was a well fortified stronghold and considered as the nerve center of LTTE military operations in the Mullaitivu district.[31] Stratergically importanat Puthukkudiyiruppu junction[32] linked Paranthan, Mullaitivu, Oddusuddan, Puthumattalan. It was estimated that around 6000 cadres were deployed to counter the army advance into the area.[33] In addition, LTTE had built a ditch cum bund surrounding the town, and placed land mines and improvised explosive devices in defense.[31]

By this time two army formations were converging on Puthukkudiyiruppu. Elements of 59 Division advanced along the west bank of Nanthikadal lagoon while Task force IV advanced along the Oddusudan-Puthukudiyiruppu road.[1]

7 GW battalion attached to the 593 Brigade had just been deployed[1]

truce ended on 31st [34]

After a 48 hour truce declared on 29 January, on 31, 9 battalion of Sinha Regiment (9 SR), 4 battalion of Vijayaba Infantry (4 VIR), and 7 battalion of Gemunu Watch (7GW) breached the southern defenses of Puthukkudiyiruppu town and established their defenses just 1.5 km to the south of the town.[35]

afternoon of January 31, gap opening up[34]

just captured territory was targeted[1]

The LTTE’s plan, forces back to Oddusudan, re-capture A-34, to regain Mullaitivu and cut off the forces there.[34]

Battle of Puthukkudiyiruppu South

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Map of Mullaitivu front depicting events of Battle of Puthukkudiyiruppu (February 2009). Green line shows the original battle line and the red arrows mark the main LTTE attacks. While the battle in progress LTTE infiltration teams attacked the supply and communication lines of the defending troops.

morning of February 1, 30 Black Tiger cadres, muddy stretch[1] mostly female [2]

7 Gemunu watch battalion, dara point[1] Rekkie Jeyam , 15th Infantry and 9th Sinha Regiments too, suicide attacks using lorries [34]

Cpl Pushpakumara[36][37][38]

infiltrated, Watrappalai Amman Kovil, obstructed roads from Mulliyawali to A-34 Highway, on a bus and a tractor, 592 Brigade from Mulliyawali[1] commenced with RPG fire on a bus[34]

forward observers, Artillery and mortar, more cadres crossed the lagoon, Soosai [1]

Air Mobile Brigade two Special Force units, and 13 eight-man Commando teams, Jagath Dias, Kamal Gunaratne, Nandana Task Force IV HQ - Oddusuddan [1] Special Forces Squadron Maj. Kosala Wijeratne[36]

artillery and multi-barrel fire from SLA [1]

wounded to oddu then Vavuniya, Some missing[1]

heavy loss of men and weapons[2]


February 2, 2009

strengthen 59 Division and Task Force IV, 1st Vijayaba, 6th Gajaba, the Special Forces, and the Commando Brigade [1] 2nd defence line [36]

Commando Regiment, Special Forces under Colonel Athula Kodippili, counter attack with air support[1] Army outflanked him [2]

isolated incidents, Oddusudan North and Puthukudiyiruppu South, continuous search and clear operations [1]

explosive laden cabs and trucks[1]



February 3, 2009

four explosive laden vehicles, columns of guerrillas,artillery Operational Headquarters, the armouries, and the helipad [1] even field operational HQ at Oddu[34]

Sugath Chandrasiri Bandara[39]

close air support, targeting reinforcement artillery and mortar positions [1]

Gopith and Velavan blamed [1]


February 4, 2009

instructed to take Chalai[34]


February 5, 2009

attack on TF4, four waves, [1]


February 7, 2009

armoured plated bus [1] Pudukudyiruppu-Oddusudan road, 1st VIR [36]

Casualties

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33 personnel , Maj. Kamal Nanayakkara from 7GW. [36]

Impact on civilians

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Tractors. Jan 2009 displacement in the Vanni

Shelling of Puthukkudiyiruppu Hospital

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Allegations on bombing of Ponnambalam memorial Hospital

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Aftermath

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See also

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Notes

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References

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  1. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t u "Security Forces consolidate power after fierce fighting". The Sunday Observer. 17 January 2010. Retrieved 27 June 2015.
  2. ^ a b c d e f g h i j "From Kilinochchi to Puthukkudiyiruppu". UNIVERSITY TEACHERS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS (JAFFNA). 13 December 2009. Retrieved 28 June 2015.
  3. ^ "Tigers seize SLA arms storage in PTK". TamilNet. 6 February 2009. Retrieved 28 June 2015.
  4. ^ a b c d "Force Multipliers In Counter Terrorism". N A Dharmaratne. Business Today. July 2011. Retrieved 27 June 2015.
  5. ^ "How Elite Forces throttled LTTE". Nirmal Dharmaratne. The SundayTimes. 5 June 2011. Retrieved 27 June 2015.
  6. ^ a b c d e f Welch I (May 2013). "Infantry innovations in insurgencies: Sri Lanka's experience". Infantry. 102 (2). U.S. Army Infantry School: 28–31.
  7. ^ "LTTE in move to destabilize east". Iqbal Athas. The SundayTimes. 30 July 2006. Retrieved 28 June 2015.
  8. ^ Destradi, Sandra (2011). Indian Foreign and Security Policy in South Asia: Regional Power Strategies. Routledge. ISBN 9781136520037.
  9. ^ "Sri Lanka declares fall of rebel east, Tigers defiant". Reuters. 11 July 2007. Retrieved 28 June 2015.
  10. ^ a b c d e f g Chadraprema, C.A. (2012). Gōta's war : the crushing of Tamil Tiger Terrorism in Sri Lanka. Colombo: Ranjan Wijeratne Foundation. pp. 393–401. OCLC 811840400.
  11. ^ a b "The 59 Division's solo battle in the thick jungles of Mullaitivu". The Sunday Observer. 29 November 2009. Retrieved 28 June 2015.
  12. ^ a b "Mahinda liberated only a corner east of A9 - CBK". Shamindra Ferdinando. Defence Ministry, Sri Lanka. 29 December 2014. Retrieved 28 June 2015.
  13. ^ a b c Chadraprema, C.A. (2012). Gōta's war : the crushing of Tamil Tiger Terrorism in Sri Lanka. Colombo: Ranjan Wijeratne Foundation. pp. 443–449. OCLC 811840400.
  14. ^ a b Perera, Udaya (2012). Defeating Terrorism Through a Politico-military Strategy: The Sri Lankan Experience. U.S. Army War College. p. 38.
  15. ^ Chadraprema, C.A. (2012). Gōta's war : the crushing of Tamil Tiger Terrorism in Sri Lanka. Colombo: Ranjan Wijeratne Foundation. pp. 278–288. OCLC 811840400.
  16. ^ a b c Humanitarian Operation Factual Analysis (PDF). Ministry of Defence,Sri Lanka. July 2011. pp. 14–25.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: year (link)
  17. ^ a b c Vijayasiri, Raj (1999). A Critical Analysis of the Sri Lankan Government's Counterinsurgency Campaign. U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. p. 51.
  18. ^ Hashim, Ahmed (2013). When Counterinsurgency Wins: Sri Lanka's Defeat of the Tamil Tigers. University of Pennsylvania Press. p. 188. ISBN 9780812244526.
  19. ^ a b Hashim, Ahmed (2013). When Counterinsurgency Wins: Sri Lanka's Defeat of the Tamil Tigers. University of Pennsylvania Press. pp. 150–151. ISBN 9780812244526.
  20. ^ "Troops marching on to LTTE's last terrain". The Sunday Observer. 8 March 2009. Retrieved 28 June 2015.
  21. ^ a b c "Tigers trapped east of A-9". The Island. 2 December 2012. Retrieved 7 July 2015.
  22. ^ a b c d e "Tiger stronghold Mullaitivu falls". The Sunday Observer. 3 January 2010. Retrieved 27 June 2015.
  23. ^ "UN-LTTE standoff in Wanni". The Nation. 25 January 2009. Retrieved 28 June 2015.
  24. ^ "Sri Lanka –The Last Phase in the Eelam War IV". SinhaRaja Tammita. The Island. 13 September 2009. Retrieved 28 June 2015.
  25. ^ a b c "Parama Weera: What it takes, and what it means". Policy Research & Information Unit of the Presidential Secretariat of Sri Lanka. 30 May 2012. Retrieved 28 June 2015.
  26. ^ "Troops foil Tigers' bid to cause human tragedy". The Sunday Observer. 10 January 2010. Retrieved 28 June 2015.
  27. ^ a b c Hashim, Ahmed (2013). When Counterinsurgency Wins: Sri Lanka's Defeat of the Tamil Tigers. University of Pennsylvania Press. p. 160. ISBN 9780812244526.
  28. ^ a b "Final thrust to totally annihilate LTTE". Daily News. 16 January 2009. Retrieved 7 July 2015.
  29. ^ "Looks like Prabakaran's last battle". The Island. 23 January 2009. Retrieved 7 July 2015.
  30. ^ a b c d Chadraprema, C.A. (2012). Gōta's war : the crushing of Tamil Tiger Terrorism in Sri Lanka. Colombo: Ranjan Wijeratne Foundation. pp. 483–489. OCLC 811840400.
  31. ^ a b "Final battle in the midst of civilians". The Sunday Times. 12 April 2009. Retrieved 7 July 2015.
  32. ^ "PUTHUKKUDIYIRUPPU JUNCTION FALLS IN ARMY HANDS". Defence Ministry, Sri Lanka. 3 March 2009. Retrieved 28 June 2015.
  33. ^ "Wining on War Front and Losing on Other Fronts". Col R Hariharan. The Island. 13 January 2009. Retrieved 7 July 2015.
  34. ^ a b c d e f g "LTTE plays its final trump". The Nation. 8 February 2009. Retrieved 7 July 2015.
  35. ^ "Army 59 Division breaches LTTE strongholds south of Puthukkudiyiruppu". Defence Ministry, Sri Lanka. 1 February 2009. Retrieved 28 June 2015.
  36. ^ a b c d e "UAVs show frantic Tiger attempts to bury weapons". The Nation. 15 February 2009. Retrieved 7 July 2015.
  37. ^ "S/410053 Cpl Pushpa Kumara PMN 7 GW (Posthumous)" (PDF). Defence Ministry, Sri Lanka. 25 January 2014. Retrieved 28 June 2015.
  38. ^ "New house gifted to War Hero's Mother". Defence Ministry, Sri Lanka. 25 January 2014. Retrieved 28 June 2015.
  39. ^ "S/462696 Cpl Chandrasiri Bandara DMS 2 SF (Posthumous)" (PDF). Defence Ministry, Sri Lanka. 25 January 2014. Retrieved 28 June 2015.
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