Simulation Theory of Mind Reading

Simulation theory of mind reading is attributing mental states to peers or 'mentalising' mental state attributions to others to predict outcome behaviours, a concept often described within folk psychology (Goldman, 2009; Goldman & Shanton, 2010). This allows individuals to understand others and requires imagination (Spaulding, 2016). Simulation for mind reading capabilities can be influenced by the social world and external factors (Woo & Mitchell, 2020).

Simulation theory is encapsulated within the Theory of Mind concept which underlies an individual's ability to understand and predict peer's feelings, behaviours, and thoughts. To impute and attribute mental states and mentalise them, low-level mind reading occurs (Röska-Hardy, 2009, p.464).

Robert Gordon and Jane Heal are credited as the first theorists to propose simulation of mind reading in 1986. Robert Gordon introduced the terminology of simulation in his article titled 'Folk Psychology as Simulation.' Jane Heal proposed simulation theory in her published works called 'Replication and Functionalism' 1986 (Barlassina & Gordon, 2017).

Social Cognition and Mind Reading

Theoretical levels of mind reading suggest individuals can understand peers’ mind states by having pre-established beliefs about their behaviours and mental states. When Theory of mind is applied, conclusions are reached about peers’ mental states and behaviours (Roush, 2016). By simulating peers’ mental states, a replica of their mental states can be established in our own mental state (Roush, 2016). This is through imagination and embodied simulation from body-coded fired neurons that are fired when individuals feel what they witnessed others enacting previously (Roush, 2016).

Simulation can be a justified belief that results from a perceived reliable process to form belief assumptions about other minds (Roush, 2016). We know each other’s minds primarily by having beliefs about others’ behaviour and mental states to which we apply a theory of mind and reason to conclusions about other mental states and behaviour (Roush, 2016). Theoretical mind reading and simulation achieved to understand which is the ownership of states that differ from the individual's belief or disbelief in the same states relevant to the truth's value (Roush, 2016).

Simulation can be efficiently compared to conceptualising and theorising the mental states of others as it ignores some of the reasoning processes required that utilise greater cognitive efforts. This reduces the computational load and allows individuals to judge and respond to social situations promptly in simple mentalising cases (Roush, 2016). Simulation theory regarding painful and suffering mental states may be worth the computational cost and loss of speed when accounting for the sensation of simulating another's pain and the vulnerability or exploitation that can be inferred (Roush, 2016). Simulating pain can increase vulnerability with an increased tendency to behave altruistically instead of a fleeing response and the decision to help can depend on how strongly influenced the individual becomes by the simulated pain level (Roush, 2016). Those who fake pain expressions can exploit the individual's simulation tendencies and gain what they want.

Simulation strategies for mind-reading

Simulation engagement usually occurs when individuals perceive the person, they are simulating as similar to themselves, drawing on assumptions that their self-concept is identical to that person with attitudes and group membership (Woo & Mitchell, 2020).

The research consisted of three study groups, both novel and real, to evaluate this strategy of similarity and simulation. People simulated when reasoning about similar groups of people and similar attitudes, even when group membership was non-consequential (Woo & Mitchell, 2020). Individuals who felt more identical to the target were more correct about assumed attitudes in the target group through mentalising and simulating (Woo & Mitchell, 2020).

People may simulate more with those perceived as similar than dissimilar, but mentalised assumptions about the similarity with the self-concept may have inaccuracies (Woo & Mitchell, 2020). Simulation occurs stronger when reasoning and mentalising involve ingroup members perceived as high similarity than when reasoning occurs for outgroup members (Robbins & Krueger, 2005; Woo & Mitchell, 2020). This can create overall limitations of selective simulating strategies when gauging peers’ similarities and understanding the minds of peers for simulation (Woo & Mitchell, 2020).

Simulation and social relationships

The neuronal basis for observational learning was studied within two monkeys in which they observed and learned from each other with their choices and different visual cues (Grabenhorst et al., 2019). Changing reward probabilities were tracked for object choices between the two monkeys (Grabenhorst et al., 2019). In the partner trials, the monkeys observed the object their partner was anticipating choosing for longer, therefore anticipating their partner’s choices and demonstrating simulation and mentalising of their behaviours and states (Grabenhorst et al., 2019).

The monkeys appeared to learn object values from paired observations and utilised them for improved decision-making and partner behavioural predictions (Grabenhorst et al., 2019). This facilitates reward learning and provides inputs for decision-making and social simulations. Learning rate improved within accurately coded values and object-centric values, suggesting that the ‘mind reading’ neurons facilitate a physiological basis for personal integration, decision-making, and social experiences (Grabenhorst et al., 2019). The implicated ‘mind reading’ neurons involved allowed primates to reconstruct their social partners’ mental states and simulate corresponding behaviour (Grabenhorst et al., 2019).

Theory of Mind processing and social groups

Theory of mind and mentalisation aids comprehension of personal and peers’ mental states, aiding state attribution and simulation for mind reading capabilities. Perceptions of ingroups and outgroups can influence both affective and cognitive theory of mind capabilities, with processing time for mentalising differing based on the group identity preconceptions and views (Zhu et al., 2023).

Ingroup members had an advantage in lower reaction times of affective theory of mind processing (Zhu et al., 2023). However, this was subjective in differing ethnic groups and how deep the cognitive processing effect was. Increased interrace contact will aid communication, the ability to read and process facial expressions, and increase the accuracy of evaluations made about in-groups compared to outgroups (Bjornsdottir & Rule, 2016). Interethnic communication could improve familiarity and comprehension of the psychological state of out-group members, decreasing input errors created from previously established misconceptions of out-group members (Zhu et al., 2023).

Mind Reading and Mirror Neurons

Simulation theory of mind reading has been linked to mirror neurons in primates' premotor cortex. This new class of visuomotor neurons is responsible when monkeys perform a particular action and when another monkey performs the same observed action. Mirror neurons within the cortical system match observation and behaviour execution with goal-related motor actions. This function might pre-empt general mind-reading abilities and two different accounts of mind-reading are theorised (Gallese & Goldman, 1998).

Theory -theory suggests mental states are represented as posits of inference of a naïve approach. Simulation theory refers to the mental states of peers represented by adopting that peer’s perspective, through tracking and matching your state to their state (Gallese & Goldman, 1998). Mirror neurons appear in the same muscular group as target agents which links to simulation theory and motor facilitation. Theory-theory ideas did not predict this (Gallese & Goldman, 1998).

Error Inputs and Simulation Theory

Observers will never have the same perspective or information as the person they are observing and mentalising from, leading to differences between the real and simulated mentalised states conceptualised (Saxe, 2005). This also can result in differing outputs of decision-making and reasoning from differing conceptualisations (Birch & Bloom, 2004). Errors in these inputs result from naïve psychological reasoning and an over-attribution of own knowledge to peers, creating inferior manipulations of the inputs to mental state simulations (Saxe, 2005). This can be prominent in children and adults of varying ages (Saxe, 2005).

Simulation theory lacks accountability for children’s actual systematic error when mentalising and assimilating. Adult simulators can be over-generous or cynical when attributing rationality and simulation theory cannot suggest that observers experienced this from using incorrect inputs only (Saxe, 2005; Saxe, 2009). It is important to note why the inputs were wrong for this specific pattern with simulation and attribution (Saxe, 2005). Simulation theory models account for such patterns of error inputs within attribution, such as influenced by prior beliefs and beliefs about naïve theory (Saxe, 2005). Theorists may conclude that simulation theory is a hybrid model for attributing mental states, accounting for systematic input errors potentially made but sacrificing the parsimony of pure simulation theory (Saxe, 2005).

Mind Reading and The Shared Circuits Model

Socio-cognitive skills that enable behavioural or state simulation may be characterised as imitation, deliberation, and mind reading (Hurley, 2007, p.1-2). Imitation, mind reading, and deliberation can be fostered with the sub-personal control mechanisms, described in the shared circuits model, contributing to simulating and mirroring capabilities (Hurley, 2007, p1. The shared circuits model links shared informational dynamics related to action and perceptions to perceptions with the self and peers, and with action and possible distinctions shared on these informational dynamics for behavioural mirroring (Hurley, 2007, p.36). This contributes to situated cognition and indicates how perceiving action can result in the active perception of individuals (Hurley, 2007, p.36). The shared processes of action and perception of peers' actions are retained as a self or other distinction, allowing overt copying and deliberation of mind reading from a structured agency (Hurley, 2007, p.37).

Weak neural evidence for simulation theory

Simulation theory dictates that mind-reading depends on two mechanisms which are when a person mainly experiences varying mental states and when outputs of simulation are transformed into mental state attributions. Goldman’s (2009) ideas emphasise the activation of neural mechanisms in simulation theory for experiencing mental states and attributing a similar state to a peer. However, this support for simulation theory does not necessarily identify a causal pathway that links one mental state to a matching observer state, suggesting missing explanations (Saxe, 2009). The observer requires using personal mental states as the foundation for inputting the mental state framework to that target peer or individual (Saxe, 2009). This would suggest a criterion for simulation theory in which evidence is required for a co-opted mechanism and the mechanism outputs to form the basis for mental state attribution or attribution mechanism. This allows for optimistic and reliable simulation beyond simple mind-reading (Saxe, 2009).

Therefore, neural evidence for a co-opted mechanism of mental state matches the target and attribution of a similar state with the target (Saxe, 2009). It is argued that there is evidence for co-opted mechanisms resulting from the individual’s mental state that matches the observer’s state, but there is negligible evidence for the output with co-opted mechanisms and mental state attribution formation (Saxe, 2009). This suggests a weak linkage for these mechanisms to receive input from co-opted mechanisms and subsequent simulation for pure mind-reading (Saxe, 2009).

Eye tracking and mental simulation typologies

The process responsible for vivid imagination when reading literature or stories can be described as mental simulation, with perceptual, motor, and introspective states acquired from experiences about the world, the body, and the mind (Barsalou, 2008). Language users are capable of utilising perceptual and motor simulation and the mental processes of others (Mak & Willems, 2018). This aids the simulation of mental states to appropriately read individuals in given contexts and make internal assessments based on what information has been perceived for simulation and mentalisation (Jackson, 2022; Mak & Willems, 2018).

Mak and Willems (2018) investigated by using narratives as stimuli for richer story construction for simulation theory investigation. Eye tracking data displayed associations between motor, mental, and perceptual descriptions with gaze duration. Motor simulation and mentalising linked to action content noted in fMRI research (Mak & Willems, 2018; Nijhof & Willems, 2015). Motor simulation was correlated to shorter gaze duration which indicated faster narrative reading, and perceptual simulation for mentalising correlated to longer gaze duration at a slower reading pace. This can be associated with mentalising processes relying on different cognitive systems, indicating how internal processes such as mentalising and mind reading are different from motor and perceptual simulation. Therefore, reading speed indicates informational processing, language, state attribution, and engagement and mentalising can be affected by perception and simulation (Mak & Willems, 2018; Tamir et al., 2016).

References

Barlassina, L. & Gordon, R. M. (2017). Folk psychology as mental simulation. The Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy.

Barsalou, L. W. (2008). Grounded cognition. Annual Review of Psychology, 59(1), 617–645. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.psych.59.103006.093639

Birch, S. A., & Bloom, P. (2004). Understanding children's and adults' limitations in mental state reasoning. Trends in cognitive sciences, 8(6), 255–260. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2004.04.011

Bjornsdottir, R. T., & Rule, N. O. (2016). On the relationship between acculturation and intercultural understanding: Insight from the reading the mind in the eyes test. International Journal of Intercultural Relations, 52, 39–48. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijintrel.2016.03.003

Goldman A. I. (2009). Mirroring, Simulating and Mindreading. Mind and Language, 24(2), 235-252. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0017.2008.01361.x

Goldman, A. I., & Shanton, K. (2010). Simulation theory. Wiley interdisciplinary reviews. Cognitive Science, 1(4), 527-528.https://doi.org/10.1002/wcs.33

Grabenhorst, F., Báez-Mendoza, R., Genest, W., Deco, G., & Schultz, W. (2019). Primate Amygdala Neurons Simulate Decision Processes of Social Partners. Cell, 177(4), 986-998. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cell.2019.02.042

Hurley, S. (2007). The Shared Circuits Model: How Control, Mirroring and Simulation Can Enable Imitation, Deliberation, and Mindreading. Behavioural and Brain Sciences. Cambridge University Press.

Jackson, S. (2022). Exploring the mutually reinforcing relationship between theory of mind and reading in adult readers. Journal of Research in Reading, 45(2), 189-203. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9817.12393

Robbins, J. M., & Krueger, J. I. (2005). Social Projection to Ingroups and Outgroups: A Review and Meta-Analysis. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 9(1), 32–47. https://doi.org/10.1207/s15327957pspr0901_3

Roush, S. (2016). Simulation and Understanding Other Minds. Philosophical Issues, 26(1), 351-373. https://doi.org/10.1111/phis.12079

Röska-Hardy, L. (2009). Theory Theory (Simulation Theory, Theory of Mind). In Binder, M.D., Hirokawa, N., Windhorst, U. (eds) Encyclopaedia of Neuroscience. Springer.

Mak, M., & Willems, R. M. (2018). Mental simulation during literary reading: Individual differences revealed with eye-tracking. Language, Cognition and Neuroscience, 34(4), 511–535. https://doi.org/10.1080/23273798.2018.1552007

Saxe, R. (2005). Against simulation: The argument from error. Trends in cognitive sciences, 9(4), 1364-6613. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2005.01.012

Saxe, R. (2009). The neural evidence for simulation is weaker than I think you think it is. Philosophical studies, 144(3), 447–456. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-009-9353-2

Spaulding, S. (2016). Mind misreading. Philosophical Issues, 26(1), 422-440. https://doi.org/10.1111/phis.12070

Svetlognev. (2015). Goal attribution and mirror neurons [Diagram]. Wikimedia Commons. https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Goal_attribution_and_mirror_neurons.JPG

Tamir, D. I., Bricker, A. B., Dodell-Feder, D., & Mitchell, J. P. (2016). Reading fiction and reading minds: The role of simulation in the default network. Social cognitive and affective neuroscience, 11(2), 215–224. https://doi.org/10.1093/scan/nsv114

Woo, B. M., & Mitchell, J. P. (2020). Simulation: A strategy for mindreading similar but not dissimilar others? Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 90, 104000. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2020.104000

Zhu, T., Zhang, L., Wang, P., Xiang, M., & Wu, X. (2023). The influence of in-groups and out-groups on the theory-of-mind processing: Evidence from different ethnic college students. Cognitive Research: Principles and Implications, 8(5). https://doi.org/10.1186/s41235-023-00461-6

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