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Coordinates: 48°34′42″N 3°49′36″W / 48.5783°N 3.8267°W / 48.5783; -3.8267
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Battle of Morlaix
Part of the Breton Civil War
A painted statue of a man armed and armoured as a late-Medieval knight
A statue of Charles of Blois, the French commander
Date30 September 1342
Location
Lanmeur, Brittany, France
48°34′42″N 3°49′36″W / 48.5783°N 3.8267°W / 48.5783; -3.8267
Result English victory
Belligerents
Kingdom of England Kingdom of France
House of Blois, Brittany
Commanders and leaders
William, Earl of Northampton
Strength
3,000–5,000 10,000–15,000
Casualties and losses
Light Heavy
Battle of Morlaix is located in France
Battle of Morlaix
Battle of Morlaix
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Location of the battle within modern France

The battle of Morlaix was fought near the village of Lanmeur in Brittany on 30 September 1342 between an Anglo-Breton army and a far larger Franco-Breton force. England, at war with France since 1337 in the Hundred Years' War, had sided with John of Montfort's faction in the Breton Civil War. A small Anglo-Breton army under William, Earl of Northampton, besieged the Breton port of Morlaix. The French were supporting Charles of Blois, a nephew of the French king.

Charles led a force several times larger than Northampton's from the town of Guingamp to relieve Morlaix. Warned of this, the English carried out a night march and prepared a defensive position just outside Lanmeur. When the French sighted them they deployed into three divisions, one behind the other. The first of these, probably made up of Breton levies, advanced and was shot to pieces by the English archers using longbows and broke without making contact. The second division, of French and Breton men-at-arms, attacked but their charge was halted when they fell into a camouflaged ditch in front of the English position. Presented with a large, close-range target the English archers inflicted many casualties. About 200 French cavalry made their way over the ditch and came to grips with the English men-at-arms, who were fighting on foot. This band was cut off and all were killed or captured.

Northampton was concerned that the English archers were running out of arrows and the ditch was so full of dead and wounded men and horses as to be ineffective as an obstacle. So when the third French division was seen to be preparing to attack the English withdrew into a wood to their rear. The French were unable to force their way in but surrounded it and besieged the English, possibly for several days. Northampton broke out with a night attack and returned to Morlaix. Charles gave up his attempt to relieve the town. This was the first major land battle of the Hundred Years War.

Background

[edit]
Further information: War of the Breton Succession

During the first half of the fourteenth century the Duchy of Brittany, while a part of the Kingdom of France for most purposes, was in many ways an independent principality.[1] Nevertheless, when the Hundred Years' War broke out in 1337 between France and England the Duke of Brittany, John III (r. 1312–1341), fought alongside his feudal lord the King of France, Philip VI (r. 1328–1350). John died on 30 April 1341, leaving a disputed succession, with both his niece, Joan of Penthièvre, and his younger half brother, John of Montfort, claiming the dukedom; Joan was married to Charles of Blois, a well connected and militarily orientated French nobleman who was also a nephew of the King of France.[2][3][4]

By the end of 1341 John's cause was being supported by Edward III, the English king, as an extension of the war with France.[5] The French declared Charles the rightful duke. Philip found the idea of bringing the traditionally semi-autonomous province more firmly under royal control by having a relative as the duke attractive; he was willing to commit considerable military resources and despatched an army to support him.[6] This army overran all of eastern Brittainy apart from Rennes and captured John.[7][note 1] John's wife, Jeanne of Flanders, was in Rennes when news of John's capture arrived. She acted rapidly, decisively and aggressively. She recalled the field army from western Brittany, took command[10][11] and moved to Hennebont. This was a small but strongly walled town with access to the sea and from there Jeanne retained control of most of western Brittany, setting up her two-year-old son, also John, as the faction's figurehead and heir to his father's claim to the duchy. She despatched her senior counsellor, Amaury de Clisson, to Edward III with the ducal treasury to encourage active English intervention and waited on events.[10][11]

English intervention

[edit]
Colour photograph of a small medieval-era single-masted sailing ship
In 1962 a well-preserved wreck of a cog dated to 1380 was found near Bremen, Germany. This is a full-size reproduction. Merchant vessels such as these formed the bulk of the English fleet.[12][13]

English reinforcements took a long time to arrive and the flow of events went against the Montfortists.[11] A small English force, 234 men, arrived under Sir Walter Mauny in May and relieved the siege of Hennebont.[14] By August little was left to Jeanne's forces, most of whom were besieged in the western port of Brest by a large army and blockaded from the sea by 14 mercenary Genoese galleys.[15] Brest was on the brink of surrender when the English arrived on 18 August. Their fleet of 140 converted merchantmen and an unknown number of galleys took the Genoese galleys by surprise and 11 were burnt.[16][17]

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A map of Brittany, with modern administrative boundaries, showing the locations of some of the places mentioned in the text

The English ships carried 1,350 men,[16] a force far inferior to that of the French besieging Brest. But, seeing so many English ships crowded into the Brest Roads and the English vanguard disembarking onto the beach, they anticipated an attack by a vast host. Charles promptly broke off the siege and withdrew, abandoning western Brittany, where the populace strongly favoured the Montfort cause.[18][19] Part of Charles' force retreated along the south coast of Brittany, but the bulk of the army accompanied him to Guingamp.[20] Here he concentrated his forces and called up local levies.[18] The English were commanded by William, Earl of Northampton who was reinforced by 800 men under Robert of Artois a few days after landing. He also absorbed several small English forces and an unknown number of John of Montfort's Breton partisans.[20] Edward III was planning to follow on with a further substantial force, so Northampton's first mission was to secure a port on the north coast of Brittany.[20]

Morlaix is approximately half way between Brest and Guingamp. It was a town with strong fortifications and a secure harbour 50 kilometres (30 mi) from Brest.[20] Charles left it well-provisioned and well-garrisoned[18] before withdrawing a further 60 kilometres (40 mi) along the north coast road. Northampton marched on Morlaix,[18] taking over the territory to the west of it.[21] Arriving on 3 September and finding the garrison well-prepared to stand a siege he assaulted the town. This lasted most of the day, was pressed hard, and was eventually repulsed with the English suffering many casualties. They then settled down for a regular siege.[18][22] It is possible Northampton was anticipating further reinforcement by Montfortist Bretons.[21] Charles' force greatly outnumbered the English, although not by as much as Charles had hoped. A further English contingent under Edward was still in England waiting for shipping to be assembled and the French mistakenly believed it would be used in northern France, probably disembarking in Calais. An army was gathered to confront this imagined threat. including many men transferred from Brittany.[22]

Opposing forces

[edit]

Northampton's 1,350 men are described by the historian Jonathan Sumption as being half men-at-arms and half archers. while Kelly DeVries says most were archers. They were joined by the survivors of the 234-strong advance party – of whom 34 were men-at-arms and 200 archers – which had arrived three months earlier and reinforced by a further 800 men from England. The division of the latter between men-at-arms and archers is not known.[23][24][25] The balance of the English army was made up of Bretons with variable levels of equipment, training and commitment.[26] The total under Northampton's command has been estimated to be between 3,000 and 5,000.[27] It is unclear how many of this force took part in the battle, as a detachment was left to contain the garrison of Morlaix.[28]

A colourful Medieval image of a man in armour on a horse
A contemporary image of a mounted man-at-arms, note the lack of armour on the horse.

There is disagreement among modern historians as to the size of the French army. Three contemporary chroniclers give 20,000; 3,000 cavalry, 1,500 mercenary infantry, and levy infantry "without number" (ie, very many); and just "a huge army".[21] The modern historian Alfred Burne says it "attained prodigious numbers" and mentions 15,000 while dismissing earlier estimates of 30,000.[29] Kelly DeVries writes "perhaps ... as many as 15,000", footnoting this to Burne and mentioning other estimates. He accepts that the English were heavily outnumbered, "perhaps by as many as four to one".[17] Marilyn Livingstone and Morgen Witzel suggest a total of between 10,000 and 15,000.[30] Sumption states that Charles of Blois had 3,000 cavalry, 1,500 professional infantry and an unspecified number of Breton levy infantry, he describes the last as "a motley force".[31] Matthew Bennett has "perhaps 3,000 men-at-arms and 1,500 Genoese mercenaries" as Charles' total force, which he opines was considerably more men than in the English army; a little later he also mentions lightly armoured Breton infantry leading the French attack.[32] The French army was "several times larger" than the English according to John Wagner.[33]

The men-at-arms of both armies wore a quilted gambeson under mail armour which covered the body and limbs. This was supplemented by varying amounts of plate armour on the body and limbs, more so for wealthier and more experienced men. Heads were protected by bascinets: open-faced iron or steel helmets, with mail attached to the lower edge of the helmet to protect the throat, neck and shoulders. A moveable visor (face guard) protected the face. Heater shields, typically made from thin wood overlaid with leather, were carried. The English men-at-arms were all dismounted. The weapons they used are not recorded, but in similar battles they used their lances as pikes, cut them down to use as short spears, or fought with swords and battle axes.[34][35][36][37][38] The men-at-arms in Charles' army were equipped similarly to the English.[35] They were mounted on entirely unarmoured horses and carried wooden lances, usually ash, tipped with iron and approximately 4 metres (13 ft) long.[39]

A photograph of an iron arrowhead
A modern replica of a bodkin point arrowhead used by English longbows to penetrate armour

The longbow, which all of the English archers used,[note 2] was unique to them; it took up to 10 years to master and an experienced archer could discharge up to ten arrows per minute well over 300 metres (980 ft).[note 3] Computer analysis by Warsaw University of Technology in 2017 demonstrated that heavy bodkin point arrows could penetrate typical plate armour of the time at 225 metres (738 ft). The depth of penetration would be slight at that range; predicted penetration increased as the range closed or against armour of less than the best quality available at the time.[42][note 4] Contemporary sources speak of arrows frequently piercing armour.[43] Archers carried one quiver of 24 arrows as standard. It was common for them to each be issued with an additional one or two quivers when a battle was expected, for a maximum total of 72 arrows per man. Even this was only sufficient for perhaps fifteen minutes continuous shooting, although as the battle wore on the rate of fire would slow. Regular resupply of ammunition would be required from the wagons to the rear; the archers would also venture forward during pauses in the fighting to retrieve arrows.[44][45][46]

The weapons used by either the mercenary infantry or the Breton levies deployed by the French are are not known. Marilyn Livingstone and Morgen Witzel comment that the French "did not have any archers"[47] while Alfred Burne takes at least some and possibly all of their mercenary infantry to be crossbowmen.[48] Bennett also mentions the presence of Genoese crossbowmen in the French army.[32]

Battle

[edit]

Prelude

[edit]

Charles, now more accurately informed as to the size of Northampton's army, decided to attempt to relieve Morlaix and marched his host back to the west.[21] Not wishing to become pinned between Charles and the garrison of Morlaix, Northampton took most of his troops on a night march on 29/30 September. The large village of Lanmeur was 11 kilometres (7 mi) north east of Morlaix and a little before reaching it the English found a suitable defensive position and dug in.[29] They positioned themselves in a line across the road with a gentle slope down to a stream which bent to cover their right flank.[32][49] A wood 100 metres (100 yd) behind them was too dense for cavalry to penetrate readily and the English positioned their baggage train there – it would act as a rallying point if the battle went against them.[33][48] Northampton decided to fight defensively and on foot,[50] and so the English horses were also left in the wood.[32] A ditch and pit traps were dug a little in front of the English line and camouflaged with branches and grass.[28][51][note 5] The English deployed in what had become their standard formation, with the dismounted men-at-arms in the centre flanked on each side by archers.[49]

Charles of Blois' army was advancing west along the coast road and it is possible his cavalry spent the night in the village of Lanmeur with the infantry bivouacked further east. Once the English position just to the south west was identified on the morning of 30 September Charles spent some time organising his army into battle formation. He divided it into three divisions, or battles, one behind the other, with wide gaps between. Several accounts state that the foremost division consisted largely of Breton levy infantry, the need to pass them through the cavalry in the village would explain why the French did not start their attack until about 3:00 pm.[54][32]

French attacks

[edit]
a woman holding a partly drawn longbow
A modern reenactor demonstrating a longbow draw

The first French division advanced against the English. Modern historians differ as to its composition. The majority state that it was made up of Breton levy infantry,[55][33][32] while Sumption writes that it was predominately Franco-Breton mounted men-at-arms,[28] and DeVries that it was a mix.[56] The attackers crossed a brook parallel to the English line and made their way up a gentle slope. The English archers loosed their arrows once this massed target was within long range and the advance dissolved into chaos. None of the attackers got as far as the concealed trench in front of the English line before fleeing back towards Lanmeur.[55][33]

There was a pause, and possibly some consultation among Charles' command group, then the second division advanced. This was made up entirely of mounted men-at-arms. They launched a determined but disordered charge at the English,[57] which collapsed as the leading horses fell into the concealed ditch and the following horses and riders stumbled over them. The English archers plied a deliberately aimed hail of arrows into this large, stationary, close-range target to great effect.[33] Sumption writes that "there were appalling casualties",[28] Wagner of "terrible execution".[33] A small group of French cavalry, perhaps 200 men, made their way over this obstacle and pressed home their charge. They closed with the English dismounted men-at-arms and broke into their position, but were so few and so disordered that they were cut off, surrounded and all either killed or captured. The prisoners were sent back to the baggage laager.[55]

There was another pause in the fighting, longer than the previous one, as Charles and his colleagues contemplated the situation. The remaining French division outnumbered the English army on its own; like the second division it consisted entirely of mounted men-at-arms. Eventually it was committed to a third attack. This may be attributable to the chivalric ideals held by knights of the time: nobles may have preferred to die in battle, rather than dishonourably decline to fight, especially against an outnumbered enemy.[58] Northampton was concerned that the English archers were running low on arrows and that the ditch was less of an obstacle, both because it was no longer a surprise and because it was bridged in many places by the dead and wounded bodies of men and horses. As a result, when he saw the French massing for a further assault he ordered a withdrawal into the wood to the rear. There the English took up a defensive position just inside the wood and facing in all directions.[55][59] As the English had anticipated, the French mounted men-at-arms had difficulty forcing their way through the forested area and many were shot by English archers, despite their shortage of ammunition.[30] Baffled, the French pulled back, ringed the wood with outposts and besieged the English army.[28] Bennett and Burne both comment that this part of the battle was made more difficult for the French by their mercenary crossbowmen having deserted.[32]

A cartoon-like coloured image of a person in medieval armour leaning on a shield
Geoffrey de Charny as depicted in the 14th century

The English were trapped in the wood with little food, possibly for several days. Eventually the English broke out at night and made their way back to Morlaix, where they continued the siege.[60][52] They took with them 150 captured French knights, one of them Geoffrey de Charny, who had led the first mounted division to attack.[56][note 6] The number killed or wounded on each side is not known, although total French losses were heavy.[28][33] English casualties were light; there is mention of one named man-at-arms being killed and one badly wounded.[62][63]

Aftermath

[edit]

The garrison of Morlaix held out and when Edward III arrived at Brest on 26 October the siege was abandoned and Northampton marched to join him.[64] Charles and the French survivors withdrew to the east after the battle.[60] Campaigning in Brittany was interrupted by the Truce of Malestroit, agreed on 19 January 1343. Hostilities did not recommence until June 1345.[65] The eastern and southern parts of Brittany were mostly held by Charles of Blois, who continued to be strongly supported by the French, while western and northern Brittany continued to be largely Montfort or English controlled.[23]

Northampton went on to have an outstanding military and diplomatic career. He campaigned with Edward III in 1359–1360 and was one of the negotiators of the Treaty of Brétigny in 1360 which ended the Edwardian phase of the war with a stunning English victory.[66][67] Charles of Blois continued to fight for control of Brittany. He was captured by the English in 1347, released in 1356 and killed in 1364 at the battle of Auray. The Treaty of Guérande ended the Breton Civil War the following year with a Montfortist victory.[68]

Wagner writes that Morlaix established a strong English presence in Brittany and restarted the Breton Civil War when it was thought nearly over.[69] Morlaix was the first major land battle of the Hundred Years War[23][33] and the first time the English tactic of deploying their men-at-arms on foot with massed longbowmen on either flank was used outside Britain.[70] Livingstone and Witzel examine the battle of Morlaix as the first time this approach had been used against mounted opponents, rather than infantry and conclude that when used correctly it was capable of defeating them. They state "the formation used at ... Morlaix became the orthodox English tactical formation for the rest of the century and beyond."[47] Bennett opines that in many ways the tactics of Morlaix were those which won the great English victories of Crécy and Poitiers.[52] Livingstone and Witzel suggest it is difficult to take lessons from the battle as "Charles ... was a military incompetent".[47] However, Sumption states that the French behaved in the same wrong-headed way they usually did in battles of the 1340s.[28]

Notes, citations and sources

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Notes

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  1. ^ John surrendered on the granting of a safe conduct to Paris and back by John, Duke of Normandy, King Philip's oldest son, who escorted him. He was released in 1943 on condition that he gave up the struggle. He stayed away from Brittany until his death in 1345.[8][9]
  2. ^ All of Northampton's troops are described as either English or Breton. It is known that in December the English army included many Welsh troops; but by then it had been heavily reinforced, with at least some of the reinforcements being Welsh.[40]
  3. ^ This range is given by material scientists and is supported by most modern historians. Some historians argue that the range of a longbow would not have exceeded 200 metres (660 ft). [41]
  4. ^ When computer modelling from 2006 was matched against the performance of replica bows, these were found to be "in good agreement with experimental measurements".Pratt 2010, p. 216
  5. ^ At the battle of Crecy four years later, where Northampton held a senior position and according to Bennett "may have influenced the tactics",[52] pit traps dug by English archers are described as being 30 centimetres (1 ft) deep and 30 cm wide.[53]
  6. ^ Which was either the first or the second attack overall, depending on the source. Charny was to go on to become a senior French commander, the author of several books on chivalry and the keeper of the Oriflamme, the French royal battle banner.[61].

Citations

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  1. ^ Sumption 1990, pp. 17, 34–35.
  2. ^ Sumption 1990, pp. 370–371.
  3. ^ Burne 1999, pp. 66–67.
  4. ^ Graham-Goering 2020, pp. 47–49.
  5. ^ Ormrod 1990, p. 17.
  6. ^ Allmand 2001, p. 14.
  7. ^ Sumption 1990, p. 389.
  8. ^ Sumption 1990, pp. 388–391, 432.
  9. ^ Mortimer 2007, pp. 204, 219.
  10. ^ a b Sumption 1990, pp. 389–390.
  11. ^ a b c Mortimer 2007, p. 204.
  12. ^ Rodger 2004, p. 120.
  13. ^ Rose 2007, p. 16.
  14. ^ Sumption 1990, p. 393.
  15. ^ Sumption 1990, pp. 393, 397–398.
  16. ^ a b Rodger 2004, p. 100.
  17. ^ a b DeVries 1998, p. 139.
  18. ^ a b c d e Burne 1999, p. 70.
  19. ^ Sumption 1990, pp. 399–400.
  20. ^ a b c d Sumption 1990, p. 400.
  21. ^ a b c d DeVries 1998, p. 141.
  22. ^ a b Sumption 1990, p. 401.
  23. ^ a b c Curry 2002, p. 37.
  24. ^ Sumption 1990, pp. 392, 399.
  25. ^ DeVries 1998, pp. 143–144.
  26. ^ Sumption 1990, pp. 400, 406.
  27. ^ DeVries 1998, p. 139 n. 13.
  28. ^ a b c d e f g Sumption 1990, p. 402.
  29. ^ a b Burne 1999, p. 71.
  30. ^ a b Livingstone & Witzel 2004, p. 13.
  31. ^ Sumption 1990, pp. 401–402.
  32. ^ a b c d e f g Bennett 1999, p. 5.
  33. ^ a b c d e f g h Wagner 2006, p. 222.
  34. ^ Edge & Paddock 1988, pp. 68–83.
  35. ^ a b Prestwich 2007, p. 155.
  36. ^ Rogers 2008, pp. 90–91.
  37. ^ Mallett 1974, p. 37.
  38. ^ Ayton 2007, p. 30, n. 128.
  39. ^ Edge & Paddock 1988, p. 88.
  40. ^ Sumption 1990, pp. 403, 406.
  41. ^ Mitchell 2008, p. 242.
  42. ^ Magier et al. 2017, pp. 73, 77, 81, 84.
  43. ^ Rogers 1998, p. 239.
  44. ^ Burne 1999, pp. 73–74.
  45. ^ Strickland & Hardy 2011, pp. 31, 278–279.
  46. ^ Waller & Waller 2010, pp. 169–170.
  47. ^ a b c Livingstone & Witzel 2004, p. 64.
  48. ^ a b Burne 1999, p. 74.
  49. ^ a b Burne 1999, p. 72.
  50. ^ Tout 1904, p. 714.
  51. ^ Ayton 2007c, p. 337.
  52. ^ a b c Bennett 1999, p. 6.
  53. ^ DeVries 1998, p. 164.
  54. ^ Burne 1999, pp. 72–73.
  55. ^ a b c d Burne 1999, p. 73.
  56. ^ a b DeVries 1998, p. 142.
  57. ^ DeVries 1998, pp. 142–143.
  58. ^ Ayton 2007, pp. 25–26.
  59. ^ Wagner 2006, pp. 222–223.
  60. ^ a b Burne 1999, p. 75.
  61. ^ Harari 2007, p. 112.
  62. ^ Ayton 2007b, pp. 208, 211.
  63. ^ Ayton & Preston 2007, p. 376 n. 76.
  64. ^ Sumption 1990, pp. 402–404.
  65. ^ Wagner 2006, p. 207.
  66. ^ Sumption 1999, p. 445.
  67. ^ Wagner 2006, pp. 55, 60.
  68. ^ Wagner 2006, pp. 92–93.
  69. ^ Wagner 2006, pp. 60, 223.
  70. ^ Tout 1904, pp. 711–712.

Sources

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  • Tout, T. F. (1904). "The Tactics of the Battles of Boroughbridge and Morlaix". The English Historical Review. 19 (76): 711–715.
  • Wagner, John A. (2006). Encyclopedia of the Hundred Years War. Woodbridge, Suffolk: Greenwood. ISBN 978-0-313-32736-0.
  • Waller, Jonathan & Waller, John (2010). "The Personal Carriage of Arrows from Hastings to the Mary Rose". Arms & Armour. 7 (2): 55–177. OCLC 4636564871.
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