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Taoguang Yanghui

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Taoguang Yanghui (Traditional Chinese: 韜光養晦; Simplified Chinese: 韬光养晦; English: Hide your strength, bide your time) refers to the People's Republic of China's approach toward the international community and is commonly attributed to a speech by Deng Xiaoping.[1]

Meaning of the yerm Taoguang Yanghui

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The term "Taoguang Yanghui" is not a commonly used phrase in Chinese, and prior to being used to describe China's foreign policy, it was unfamiliar to many people.[2] Some dictionaries define "taoguang" as concealing one's fame or talent, while "yanghui" originally means to retire from public life. The combined term, "taohui," has been recorded, but it is generally used to describe a tactic of hiding one's abilities, biding time, and waiting for the right moment.[2]

Internal and external situations surrounding China around 1989

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First, let's examine Deng Xiaoping's diplomatic policy around 1989. Deng Xiaoping promoted the Reform and Opening-up policy, prioritizing economic development, and shifted away from the previous foreign policy that focused on promoting the international communist movement and class struggle. He made securing a peaceful international environment the fundamental principle of China's foreign policy.[3] Especially from 1982 onward, he pursued an all-round diplomacy approach, promoting peaceful coexistence with various countries, although China sometimes found itself in conflict and tension with other nations.[3] However, this did not mean that Deng completely abandoned the diplomatic principles of the Mao Zedong era.[3] The memories of imperialist powers invading and semi-colonizing China had not faded, and on matters such as the return of Hong Kong, the reunification with Taiwan, or the ethnic movements of the Tibetan people and Uyghur people, Deng did not compromise.[3] In other words, Deng maintained a balance between two often conflicting and contradictory policies: conciliatory diplomacy to prioritize economic development, and a hardline stance to safeguard national sovereignty.[3] His all-round diplomacy played a significant role in China's economic development.[4] By mid-1989, China had also established generally favorable relations with the Soviet Union and India, which further contributed to the smooth development of economic exchanges.[4] However, what seemed like smooth sailing in China's diplomacy was soon thrown into its greatest crisis with the outbreak of the Tiananmen Square Incident.[4] At that time, Deng issued instructions to his successors on how to handle the ongoing sanctions from the West and possible future attacks. He directed them to "冷静観察、穏住陣脚、沈着応付" ("observe calmly, secure our position, respond with composure").[1][5]

To make matters worse, the pace of de-socialization in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe rapidly accelerated.[4] China found itself isolated, facing both criticism and sanctions from Western countries and the collapse of the Eastern Bloc.[4] By 1991, the Soviet Union had dissolved, and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union disbanded. The United States also adopted a tough stance toward China on issues such as human rights, arms exports, trade, and relations with Taiwan, causing significant difficulties for Deng's conciliatory diplomacy.[4] Faced with these internal and external crises, advocates of planned economy and left-wing ideologues regained momentum within China.[4] Criticism of the Reform and Opening-up policy resurfaced, and in the core of the Chinese Communist Party, the Politburo Standing Committee expressed serious doubts about the direction of market reforms.[4] During this challenging period, from the Tiananmen Incident to the collapse of the Soviet Union, Deng frequently repeated the phrase "冷静観察、穏住陣脚、沈着応付、有所作為" ("observe calmly, secure our position, respond with composure, and do what needs to be done").[6] Despite various pressures from the United States, Deng maintained the basic stance that China and the U.S. should "enhance mutual trust, reduce troubles, develop cooperation, and avoid confrontation," though he sometimes reacted strongly.[7] Maeda's aforementioned book interprets this conciliatory policy as the "Taoguang Yanghui" strategy.[7]

China's diplomacy under Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao's administrations

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Many researchers outside of China regard "Taoguang Yanghui" as a famous maxim attributed to Deng Xiaoping.[1] However, there is no evidence that Deng actually uttered these words.[1] Neither his speeches nor the Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping contain any such phrase.[1] The first time Deng is believed to have used a phrase similar to this was during his renowned 1992 "Southern Tour," where he stated, "If we work hard without drawing attention for a few years (Taoguang Yanghui), we will be able to have more influence in the international community. Only then can we become a great power in the global arena".[1] Although this expression is generally attributed to Deng, the first person to use the phrase "Taoguang Yanghui" in its current form was actually Deng's successor, Jiang Zemin, who was then the General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party.[1]

In the People's Republic of China, a diplomatic envoy conference is held every five years, gathering ambassadors from around the world, during which the fundamental guidelines for foreign policy are presented. At the 9th Diplomatic Envoy Conference held in 1999, Jiang Zemin set forth the basic principles of Chinese diplomacy as "冷静観察、穏住陣脚、沈着応対、韜光養晦、有所作為" (Observe calmly, secure our position, respond with composure, conceal capabilities and bide time, and do a little as appropriate).[8] In other countries, "Taoguang Yanghui" was sometimes perceived as a blueprint for China to quietly build up its national power. However, Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin were, in fact, advocating a grand strategy of "do not stand out in the international community" through these expressions.[9]

Nevertheless, during the subsequent administration of Hu Jintao, China's diplomacy began to change.[10] At the beginning of his tenure as General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party, Hu promoted a cooperative foreign policy. At the 10th Diplomatic Envoy Conference in 2004, he called for the establishment of the "Four Environments": an international environment of peace and stability, a surrounding environment of good neighborliness and friendship, an environment of cooperative equality and mutual benefit, and an environment of friendly public opinion.[10] However, as China's rise to great power status continued, Hu found it increasingly difficult to resist the growing voices advocating for a more assertive foreign policy. By the 11th Diplomatic Envoy Conference in 2009, Hu was calling for strengthening "the four forces": political influence, economic competitiveness, a friendly image, and moral suasion.[10] Moreover, Hu modified the previously restrained diplomatic approach of "Taoguang Yanghui, You Suo Zuo Wei" (conceal capabilities and bide time, and do a little as appropriate) to "坚持韜光養晦、積極有所作為" (continue to conceal capabilities and bide time, but take a more proactive stance and do more).[10]

Domestic Reception of "Taoguang Yanghui" in China

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Regardless of the debate over whether Deng Xiaoping actually used the phrase "Taoguang Yanghui" and, if so, when and where he might have said it, this diplomatic stance began to be recognized within China as the "Taoguang Yanghui" policy from the mid-1990s onward.[7] Today, the phrase "Taoguang Yanghui" is sparking intense debate in China.[9] Chinese domestic researchers and government officials have long grappled with the question of "how to specifically avoid standing out and what exactly China should do" on the international stage.[9] Professor Jin Canrong of Renmin University of China (Beijing) notes, "At the strategic level, everyone agrees that we should continue to follow the idea of 'Taoguang Yanghui,' but at the tactical level, opinions vary. Some say China is too passive, while others argue that China should take a more proactive approach".[9] However, some Chinese scholars criticize Deng's maxim as outdated and unsuited to China's new international standing.[9] These critics advocate for China to act more assertively and protect its national interests, a stance they call "Geng You Suo Wei" (do more).[9] Conversely, a minority of scholars argue that China should adopt a "Wu Suo Wei" (do nothing) approach to avoid getting entangled in international affairs.[9]

One of the advocates for a more assertive Chinese diplomacy, Professor Yan Xuetong of Tsinghua University, asserts that "China should not continue to hide its capabilities but instead pursue a more proactive diplomacy as a great, responsible power. The 'hide your strength' policy was appropriate for China's international standing and environment in the early 1990s, but now China's international status has fundamentally changed. The 'hide your strength' policy will only harm China now".[11]

Despite such debates, the majority still agree that given China's stage of development and limited power, "Taoguang Yanghui, You Suo Zuo Wei" remains an appropriate guideline for China's diplomacy.[11] At the annual meeting of the China International Relations Association held in Lanzhou in 2010, participants from across mainland China engaged in a heated debate over whether the "Taoguang Yanghui" paradigm was still effective. They ultimately concluded that it remains suitable as a guiding principle for Chinese diplomacy.[11] Based on this broad consensus, the participants also proposed nine key policy recommendations:[11]

  1. Do not confront the United States.
  2. Do not challenge the international system as a whole.
  3. Do not let ideology dictate foreign policy.
  4. Do not become the leader of an "anti-Western bloc."
  5. Do not oppose the majority of countries, even if we are in the right.
  6. Learn to compromise, concede, and negotiate mutual benefits.
  7. Do not compromise on China's core interests concerning national unity.
  8. Provide public goods where needed in the international community.
  9. Use major international events to improve China's global image.

Furthermore, by 2015, some began to see China's foreign policy as having undergone a significant shift from "Taoguang Yanghui" to "Fenfa Youwei" (actively striving to achieve).[12] In an interview with Asahi Shimbun, Associate Professor Zhao Kejin of Tsinghua University stated, "China's foreign policy underwent a major transformation around 2008, marked by the 2008 Beijing Olympics and the Lehman Shock".[12] He added, "China's stance on the Spratly Islands—'set aside disputes and pursue joint development'—remains unchanged. However, with the capacity to respond to unilateral development by countries like the Philippines and Vietnam, China's position has shifted to saying what needs to be said and doing what needs to be done. China's diplomacy has transformed to reflect its status as a major power that cannot be underestimated by its neighboring countries".[12]

Background of the shift in the "Taoguang Yanghui" policy

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Among Japanese researchers, several factors are cited as contributing to the perceived wavering or changes in the "Taoguang Yanghui" policy.[13][14] Shindou's later work emphasizes the need to focus on the dynamics between Deng Xiaoping's "Taoguang Yanghui" strategy and the bureaucratic political model of China.[13] Specifically, after the end of the Cold War, a latent conflict emerged within China's policy-making community between proponents of naval expansion and those favoring a more limited naval approach. This conflict was linked to global developments and affected diplomatic strategies post-"Taoguang Yanghui".[13]

In the mid-2000s, under the Jiang Zemin administration, there was a resurgence of assertive diplomacy through the "Peaceful Rise" doctrine, which advocated a proactive foreign policy befitting a major power.[13] However, this trend was reversed under the Hu Jintao administration in the late 2000s, with a renewed emphasis on peaceful development and cooperative diplomacy, referred to as the "Harmonious Diplomacy" line.[13] This reflects the constant fine-tuning of Chinese diplomacy.[13] These fluctuations aligned with China's transformation into a global trading power and were further bolstered by the bureaucratic interests of the People's Liberation Army (PLA), leading to the modernization of naval power and the globalization of military diplomacy.[15] This development, particularly in relation to foreign affairs and especially Sino-Japanese relations, has correlated with the rise of xenophobic nationalism, often triggered by external crises.[15]

Shimizu's subsequent article sees the hardline stance being led by the PLA.[14] A notable example is the March 2010 sinking of a South Korean navy corvette, attributed to a North Korean torpedo attack. When the United States and South Korea planned joint military exercises in the Yellow Sea near the incident, the Chinese military obstructed their efforts.[14] At that time, Chinese military personnel frequently appeared in domestic media ahead of any government statement, spreading the view that military exercises involving U.S. aircraft carriers at China's doorstep should be opposed. This stance garnered widespread support online.[14] Senior officials in the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs expressed concerns that the military should not interfere in diplomacy.[14] However, publicly voicing such opinions was taboo.[14] Wu Jianmin, a heavyweight in Chinese diplomacy, criticized the military's media appearances, but he was fiercely attacked online as a "traitor".[14]

Unlike the eras of Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping, when leaders had military experience, Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao lacked military backgrounds when they assumed the chairmanship of the Central Military Commission.[16] Since the Chinese Revolution, the Red Army had implemented a unique form of civilian control, in which both political commissars and commanders appointed by the Chinese Communist Party held shared command over the troops.[17] After the founding of the People's Republic, however, the military became composed entirely of professional soldiers, who shared common interests in areas such as salaries and equipment.[17]

Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao worked hard to maintain their positions as top leaders by accommodating the military's demands, such as increasing the defense budget by more than 10 percent annually for over 20 years and promoting generals at an accelerated rate.[17] As the leadership failed to enforce strict civilian control while simultaneously appeasing nationalist sentiments among the public, these factors have encouraged China's hardline foreign policy stance.[17] Notably, Hu Jintao's successor, Xi Jinping, was the only member of the 17th Politburo Standing Committee with experience as a defense bureaucrat.[18] From the outset, Xi appealed to nationalism by promoting the concept of the "great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation",[19] embedding the principle of a "strong military" into the Communist Party's constitution, and investing in military expansion, making China the world's second-largest military spender after the U.S.[20][21] Xi also chaired the Central Military-Civil Fusion Development Committee [zh], which he established as a strategy for national prosperity and military strength, modeled on the U.S. military-industrial complex, aimed at enhancing China's defense industry.[22] This has led to assessments that Xi overturned the "Taoguang Yanghui" policy.[23]

See also

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References

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Citations

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  1. ^ a b c d e f g ディビッド・シャンボー著、加藤祐子訳『中国グローバル化の深層　「未完の大国」世界を変える』（2015年）朝日選書, p. 36
  2. ^ a b 張清敏著、真水康樹・諸橋邦彦訳『「韜光養晦、有所作為」政策の含意とその意義－ポスト冷戦初期における鄧小平の対外政策』（2009年）法政理論第41巻3・4号, p. 187
  3. ^ a b c d e 高原明生・前田宏子著『開発主義の時代へ1972‐2014　シリーズ中国近現代史5』（2014年）岩波新書（第3章社会主義の中国的変質1992‐2002、執筆担当；前田宏子）, p. 102
  4. ^ a b c d e f g h 高原明生・前田宏子著『開発主義の時代へ1972‐2014　シリーズ中国近現代史5』（2014年）岩波新書（第3章社会主義の中国的変質1992‐2002、執筆担当；前田宏子, p. 103
  5. ^ エズラ・F・ヴォーゲル著、益尾知佐子・杉本孝訳『現代中国の父　鄧小平[下]』（2013年）日本経済新聞社 p. 358
  6. ^ エズラ・F・ヴォーゲル著、益尾知佐子・杉本孝訳『現代中国の父　鄧小平[下]』（2013年）日本経済新聞社, p. 375
  7. ^ a b c 高原明生・前田宏子著『開発主義の時代へ1972‐2014　シリーズ中国近現代史5』（2014年）岩波新書（第3章社会主義の中国的変質1992‐2002、執筆担当；前田宏子）, p. 104
  8. ^ 国分良成編『中国は、いま』（2011年）岩波新書（第1章対外外交姿勢の国内政治ー「中国人の夢」から「中国の夢」へ、執筆担当；清水美和, p. 7
  9. ^ a b c d e f g ディビッド・シャンボー著、加藤祐子訳『中国グローバル化の深層　「未完の大国」世界を変える』（2015年）朝日選書, p. 37
  10. ^ a b c d 国分良成編『中国は、いま』（2011年）岩波新書（第1章対外外交姿勢の国内政治ー「中国人の夢」から「中国の夢」へ、執筆担当；清水美和）, p. 8
  11. ^ a b c d ディビッド・シャンボー著、加藤祐子訳『中国グローバル化の深層　「未完の大国」世界を変える』（2015年）朝日選書, p. 38
  12. ^ a b c 朝日新聞2015年9月25日朝刊17面（オピニオン）「米中関係のいま」
  13. ^ a b c d e f 新藤榮一著『アジア力の世紀－どう生き抜くのか』（2013年）岩波新書, p. 139
  14. ^ a b c d e f g 国分良成編『中国は、いま』（2011年）岩波新書（第1章対外外交姿勢の国内政治ー「中国人の夢」から「中国の夢」へ、執筆担当；清水美和）, p. 13
  15. ^ a b 新藤榮一著『アジア力の世紀－どう生き抜くのか』（2013年）岩波新書, p. 140
  16. ^ 国分良成編『中国は、いま』（2011年）岩波新書（第1章対外外交姿勢の国内政治ー「中国人の夢」から「中国の夢」へ、執筆担当；清水美和）, p. 14
  17. ^ a b c d 国分良成編『中国は、いま』（2011年）岩波新書（第1章対外外交姿勢の国内政治ー「中国人の夢」から「中国の夢」へ、執筆担当；清水美和）, p. 15
  18. ^ "習近平の力量不足がもたらす新たな権力闘争". 中央公論. 23 August 2013. Retrieved 5 November 2019.
  19. ^ "第12期全国人民代表大会第1回会議における習近平氏の演説". 理論中国. 9 October 2013. Archived from the original on 1 November 2019. Retrieved 5 November 2019.
  20. ^ "中国共产党章程". 人民網. 28 October 2017. Retrieved 5 November 2019.
  21. ^ "中国国防費、7.5%増19.8兆円 強軍路線が鮮明に". 日本経済新聞. 5 March 2019. Retrieved 5 November 2019.
  22. ^ "中国、富国強兵へ秘策？ 「軍民融合委員会」設立 目指すは米の軍産複合体 軍国主義化の懸念も". 産経ニュース. 9 February 2017. Retrieved 5 November 2019.
  23. ^ "特別リポート：中国習近平の「強軍戦略」、米国の優位脅かす". ロイター. 24 April 2019. Retrieved 5 November 2019.
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