This is an archive of past discussions about Lion Air Flight 610. Do not edit the contents of this page. If you wish to start a new discussion or revive an old one, please do so on the current talk page.
The lead section says: "During the accident flight, the AoA sensor again fed erroneous data to the MCAS, which began pushing the nose of the aircraft down. However, in this flight, MCAS remained active because of pilot error." But what could the pilots have done to make the MCAS inactive? For the rest of the flight? When or how would MAS have become "inactive"? The pilots couldn't have disabled or deselected MCAS, it was running all the time. They did not know even know of it's existence. And yet we still call it "pilot error". Really? Martinevans123 (talk) 21:42, 28 February 2024 (UTC)
Following the RUNAWAY STABILIZER checklist won't have disabled MCAS? For the remainder of the flight? That's quite a long item on a checklist? Martinevans123 (talk) 22:37, 28 February 2024 (UTC)
The same procedures used to stop trim runaway (also, is it trim runaway or runaway stabilizer?) would also stop an MCAS activation (which would be commanding the stabilizer).
How about...
During the accident flight, the AoA sensor again fed erroneous data to the MCAS, which began pushing the nose of the aircraft down. However, in this flight, MCAS remained active and the pilots did not follow the trim runaway stabilizer checklist. The pilots were not informed by Boeing of the existence of MCAS and were not required to undergo simulator training on the difference between the 737 MAX, or to demonstrate an MCAS activation. RickyCourtney (talk) 22:44, 28 February 2024 (UTC)
That looks a lot better. But we need to clarify (perhaps in the body of the article?) whether or not the trim runaway would have eventually stopped or would have persisted for the remainder of the fight? Talk of a "checklist item" suggests that there's a simple action, or series of simple actions, that the pilot could make that would have remedied the anomalous situation? So, yes, I think that wording would be much better. Unless, of course we are determined to shoe-horn the phrase "pilot error" into the lead section for some reason. Martinevans123 (talk) 22:50, 28 February 2024 (UTC)
Actual sources we have, related specifically to the Indonesian final report:
The report, from its list of nine "contributing factors" said the many cockpit alerts and warnings were:
"not able to be effectively managed"
and it said these distractions led to:
"ineffective CRM application and workload management. These performances had previously been identified during training and reappeared during the accident flight."
That's the closest official Indonesian comes to pilot error.
The Guardian:
"...found that problems with Boeing’s design, the airline’s maintenance of the jet and pilot errors contributed to the disaster"....
"final report said the first officer onboard was unfamiliar with procedures and had shown issues handling the aircraft during training"
Runaway procedure should have been followed, but the sources listed above for the Lion accident do not make that specific assertion. Suggested wording based on these specific sources:
"Pilot error resulted in ineffective handling of the emergency."
I'd definitely support including that in the article. Something along the lines of "had the pilots followed the RUNAWAY STABILIZER checklist as the previous Lion Air crew had done, the MCAS activation and subsequent runaway trim would have been resolved."
The checklist itself is titled RUNAWAY STABILIZER, but the scenario is for a "runaway pitch trim". I'd recommend the latter for most of the article, except when specifically referring to the checklist.
I'm not itching to get into this discussion again, but the "...or to demonstrate an MCAS activation" isn't totally accurate in my mind, as the aircraft is always changing its pitch trim. So it didn't matter if it was the MCAS, autopilot trim, mach trim, or an act of god controlling the pitch trim, it presents itself in the same way. Hence why the RUNAWAY STABILIZER checklist doesn't distinguish between the actual cause of the malfunction.
My only thinking behind the "or to demonstrate an MCAS activation" addition is that part of the FAA recertification process was a requirement that pilots experience an erroneous MCAS activation in the simulator.
How about...
During the accident flight, the AoA sensor again fed erroneous data to the MCAS, which began pushing the nose of the aircraft down. However, in this flight, MCAS remained active and the subsequent investigation found the pilots ineffectively handled the emergency. They also did not follow the procedure for runaway pitch trim as the previous Lion Air crew had done. However, the pilots were not informed by Boeing of the existence of MCAS and were not required to undergo simulator training on the differences between the 737 MAX and the prior generation. RickyCourtney (talk) 23:23, 28 February 2024 (UTC)
I'm going to try my hand at these two paragraphs in the intro, as it's difficult to include everything in a logical order. I feel like if we're going to include the pilots lack of training on the MCAS, it should come after we reference what the MCAS actually does, instead of plugging it in at the end of the paragraph after the pilots inactions of the checklist.
Investigations revealed that the aircraft experienced serious flight control problems on the aircraft's previous flight, likely caused by a miscalibrated angle-of-attack (AoA) sensor recently replaced on the aircraft. The AoA sensor fed erroneous data to the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS), which attempted to correct for what it was being incorrectly told was a nose-up position of the aircraft. To avoid the stall, MCAS pushes the nose of the aircraft down by moving the horizontal stabilizer. Pilots were not informed of this MCAS system, nor were they required to undergo additional simulator training on the 737 MAX.
In the prior flight, the pilots were able to halt movement of the horizontal stabilizer by following the applicable runaway stabilizer checklist, ending the errant MCAS activation. Lion Air should have grounded the jet following the incident but failed to do so. Investigators also found pages missing from the airline's maintenance logs.
During the accident flight, the AoA sensor again fed erroneous data to the MCAS, which pushed the nose of the aircraft down. The pilots of this flight did not properly follow the runaway stabilizer checklist, which kept the MCAS active and led to the aircraft assuming an unsafe nose-down position until it collided with the ground.
I think that's a great improvement. As the main body of the article already says, it took three pilots to figure out what to do on the previous flight: ""Information later emerged that a third pilot was on the flight to Jakarta and told the crew to cut electrical power to the stabilizer trim motors." It might be wise to explicitly state cut electrical power to the stabilizer trim motors to clarify that you can't "turn off" the MCAS, you can only disable its effects (even though you don't know what's producing those effects). But the lead section is looking quite large now, with 8 paragraphs, so some other editors might want to trim it. I'm not sure how that could be done. Martinevans123 (talk) 08:52, 29 February 2024 (UTC)
First paragraph contains excessive statistics about:
the first major accident
highest death toll
deadliest accident
deadliest aircraft accident
All of that, except perhaps deadliest Indonesia accident, can be moved into the body.
2nd para:
Move all into body, except perhaps that a rescuer died.
In general, too much detail about AoA and horizontal elevator; those details can be put in body.
Can reduce text about prior flight; don't need info on its missing logs, or that it should have been grounded; all of that can go in body. Suffice to say it had an MCAS emergency and crew used a standard procedure to stop it.
I think all the explanatory information could be condensed as follows:
"Investigation revealed that a new software function in the flight control system forced the airplane to nose down repeatedly. That function [or feature], the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS), had been intentionally omitted by Boeing from airplane documentation for aircrews, so the Lion Air pilots did not know about it, or what it could do. Investigators concluded that an external device on the airplane, the angle of attack (AoA) sensor, sent an erroneous signal to MCAS, indicating the airplane was angled up too steeply. MCAS responded by repeatedly pushing down the nose, even though the airplane had not been at too steep an angle. The problem had occurred on the same airplane during its immediately preceding flight, and the pilots had recovered using a standard procedure for such a "runaway" condition."
Then, would follow the recently edited text, beginning, "During the accident flight...." I'm not recommending anything be deleted from the article, only that the lede can be shortened by moving details I've noted into the body. DonFB (talk) 10:15, 29 February 2024 (UTC)
No objections. ...although I'd always use "aircraft" instead of "airplane", as this article is marked EngvarB? Obviously, I've watched too many films... Thanks. Martinevans123 (talk) 11:38, 29 February 2024 (UTC)
Hi all, this is "IP 2603" from the previous 737 MAX discussions.
Again, I have to insist that the specific phrase "pilot error" appears in this article. Two of the sources cited even mention "pilot error", but it does not appear in the body of the article. Reading through, it gives the feeling that the phrase is intentionally being left out, which I feel is editorializing the information. If we've agreed to include the phrase in the MAX article, it should also appear here (and the article for the Ethiopian flight but I haven't checked there yet).
We have "human error", "captain error", "engineer error", "driver error", "operator error" etc. for all other situations involving human control over complex machines and systems, and those phrases are used regularly to describe how the humans in control of those systems failed to do something correctly and how that contributed to an accident. Leaving the phrase "pilot error" out of an article about a plane crash that has clear evidence of pilot error does a disservice to the countless pilots who dedicate their lives to understanding the machines they operate every day.
The phrase "pilot error" carries no more negative prejudice than the other "error" phrases I've mentioned; it is simply the best, most efficient way to express the concept of "the humans trained to be pilots who were in charge of properly operating the plane encountered difficulties and failed to follow pre-established standard procedures which would have allowed them to avoid a catastrophe". Rob Roilen (talk) 14:47, 13 March 2024 (UTC)
