Talk:Joseph Stalin/Archive 25

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Semi-protected edit request on 12 July 2023

Hello! I am new here so I apologize if this is the wrong procedure for doing this. I would like to make an edit to the lead.

The sentence I would like to change is this: “Initially governing the country as part of a collective leadership, he consolidated power to become a dictator.”

I would like to change it to this: "Stalin governed the country as part of a collective leadership, and was given a leading role."

The reason for this change is to acknowledge the existence of varying interpretations regarding the extent to which Stalin consolidated his power. This proposed edit aims to present a more cautious perspective. The following is a collection of both primary and secondary source evidence that challenges the traditional notion of dictatorship. It is crucial to present a balanced view by considering diverse interpretations and engaging with counterarguments. This proposed edit aims to provide a nuanced understanding of Stalin's leadership position alongside the concept of collective leadership.

1. This report was published by the CIA in 1955. This report asserts that Stalin was a powerful leader, but doesn't actually call him a dictator. However, it's important to note that the information the CIA based this report on is not present in the report itself. The CIA could have made an error in this report and Soviet archives have since been opened since 1955, creating more available evidence to examine. The CIA said this about Stalin: "Even in Stalin's time there was collective leadership. The Western idea of a dictator within the Communist setup is exaggerated. Misunderstandings on that subject are caused by lack of comprehension of the real nature and organization of the Communist power structure. Stalin, although holding wide powers, was merely the captain of a team..."

2. This excerpt is taken from Georgy Zhukov's Memories, published in 1969. In this source, Marshal Zhukov offers a perspective that challenges the widely held belief that Stalin single-handedly made all military and strategic decisions. Zhukov recalls how Stalin did not make decisions in isolation, but rather made decisions collectively. While this account offers an alternative viewpoint, it is essential to examine multiple sources and perspectives to gain a comprehensive understanding of Stalin's decision-making during his leadership. Marshal Zhukov states: "After J. V. Stalin's death appeared the tale about how he used to take military and strategic decisions unilaterally. This was not the case at all. I have already said above that if you reported questions to the Supreme Commander with a knowledge of your business, he took them into account. And I know of cases when he turned against his own previous opinion and changed decisions he had taken previously."

3. Vospominaniia I Razmyshleniia was published by Georgy Zhukov in 1969 in Moscow. It highlights an environment where individuals felt relatively comfortable expressing their opinions. This suggests a certain degree of openness within the leadership structure. This greatly reflects a collective leadership, not a dictatorship. However, one thing that's important to note is the broader context with democratic centralism and how it can silence people's voices. It's also important to understand that this quote doesn't discredit other evidence that exists, it merely provides nuance. Marshal Zhukov said this: "His style of work, as a rule, was businesslike. Everyone could express his own opinion without being nervous. The Supreme Commander treated everyone the same way - strict and officially. He knew how to listen attentively when you reported to him with knowledge of your topic. He himself was laconic, and did not like verbosity in others."

4. This is another quote from Zhukov's memories. It offers insight into Stalin's leadership style. Marshal Zhukov shares his observations during the war, stating that Stalin was open to discussing difficult questions and engaging in debates. Rather than imposing his own thinking on others, Stalin fostered an environment where diverse viewpoints could be defended and discussed. Marshal Zhukov said: "By the way, as I was convinced during the war, J. V. Stalin was not at all the kind of person before whom it was impossible to raise sharp questions and with whom it would be impossible to argue and even firmly defend his point of view.

If anyone claims the opposite, I will say frankly that their statements are not true."

5. Sergei Shtemenko was a general who had close contact with Stalin during the war years. He presents insights suggesting that the Soviet Union maintained a collective decision-making process rather than a dictatorship. Shtemenko writes: "I must say that Stalin did not decide and did not like to solve important issues of the war alone. He was well aware of the need for collective work in this complex area, recognized the authorities on a particular military problem, took into account their opinion and paid tribute to everyone. In December 1943, after the Tehran Conference, when it was necessary to outline action plans for the future, a report at a joint meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), the State Defense Committee and the Stavka regarding the course of the struggle at the front and its prospects was made by A. M. Vasilevsky and A. I. Antonov, N. A. Voznesensky reported on the war economy, and I. V. Stalin took over the analysis of international problems "

6. This source, Tak Bylo, was published in Moscow 1999. According to the book, there are accounts suggesting that Stalin demonstrated attentiveness and an ability to change his mind when engaging in discussions with people. This perspective challenges some of the allegations against him, providing a different viewpoint on his character and decision-making process. Anastas Mikoyan writes: "He was also attentive to the proposals by the generals. Stalin listened carefully to what was said to him and to counsel, listened to disagreements with interest, extracting intelligently from them that bit of truth that helped him later to formulate his final, most appropriate decisions which were born in this way, as a result of collective discussion. More than this: it commonly happened that, convinced by our evidence, Stalin changed his own preliminary viewpoint on one or another question.”

7. This is a speech from Stalin at the plenum of the central committee on October 16, 1952. It sheds light on Stalin's leadership position and his expressed desire to be relieved of his duties. Stalin highlights the need for fresh perspectives and vigor within the Communist Party by emphasizing the importance of bringing in new individuals with energy, dedication, and political leadership qualities. The sincerity of Stalin's request is a matter open to interpretation, as conclusive evidence supporting or refuting its seriousness remains elusive. Stalin says: "They say, why do we need an enlarged Central Committee. But isn’t it self-evident that we need to get new blood and new strength into the CC CPSU? We arc getting older and shall sooner or later die, but we must think into whose hands we shall give this torch of our great undertaking, who will carry it onward and reach the goal of communism? For this we need younger people with more energy, dedicated comrades and political leaders. And what does it mean to bring up a dedicated, devoted political leader of the State?... I am asking that you relieve me of the two posts! [General Secretary of the CC CPSU and Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR.]"

8. This book was published by historian Sebag Montefiore. It presents evidence suggesting that Stalin faced open criticism. It's important to note that dictators can sometimes tolerate criticism. However, when considering the notion of collective leadership alongside this evidence, the label of "dictator" may not fully capture the complexity of the situation. It is crucial to understand the context of democratic centralism during that period and its impact on the extent of permissible criticism. Montefiore wrote: "Molotov admired Koba but did not worship him. He often disagreed with him, and criticized, Stalin right up until the end… Voroshilov, Mikoyan and a Molotov frequently disagreed with Stalin…"

9. This book was published in 1995. It contains Stalin's letters to Molotov by various scholars and provides insights into Stalin's leadership style and decision making process. The evidence suggests that Stalin adopted a collective leadership approach, as he faced challenges in achieving his desired outcomes.. They write: “In a September 1930 letter to Molotov, Stalin stated “I propose Kaganovich from the Worker-Peasant Inspection as the candidate for head of civil aviation” [Footnote] On October 15, 1930, Goltsman was confirmed by the Politburo as head of the Civil Aviation Association”

10. This quote comes from the book Stalinist Terror by Arch Getty and Roberta Manning, published in 1993. It provides nuance to how the decision making process allowed for different viewpoints. They write: "In the fall of 1938, when the question arose of removing Yezhov from his position at NKVD, Stalin proposed the candidacy of G. M. Malenkov as the new Commissar of Internal Affairs. But a majority of the Politburo recommended L. P. Beria for the post."

11. This quote is from Pat Sloan about his time in the Soviet Union in the 30s. He describes his experiences in the country with Soviet democracy. It's important to note that this account represents just one perspective and focuses primarily on grassroots democracy rather than higher levels of Soviet government. In his description, Sloan highlights that his participation in an election was open to all working members of the community, regardless of nationality or citizenship. He writes: "I have, while working in the Soviet Union, participated in an election. I, too, had a right to vote, as I was a working member of the community, and nationality and citizenship are no bar to electoral rights. The procedure was extremely simple. A general meeting of all the workers in our organisation was called. by the trade union committee, candidates were discussed, and a vote was taken by show of hands. Anybody present had the right to propose a candidate, and the one who was elected was not personally a member of the Party. In considering the claims of the candidates their past activities were discussed, they themselves had to answer questions as to their qualifications, anybody could express an opinion, for or against them, and the basis of all the discussion was: What justification had the candidates to represent their comrades on the local Soviet?"

12. This quote is from Sidney Webb's book: The Truth About Soviet Russia in 1942. Webb discusses how the Soviet Union allows and even encourages criticism of various aspects of the USSR: "...free criticism, however hostile it may be, is permitted, even encouraged, in the USSR, of the directors of all forms of enterprise, by the workers employed, or by the consumers of the commodities or services concerned."

13. This book was published in 1998 by Robert Thurston. Thurston provides additional information regarding the criticism of Soviet officials: "Of course, criticism had been strongly encouraged during the purges, and local records contain plenty of it.152 The press strongly endorsed criticism from below at the end of 1938. Pravda denounced "haughty answers to critical questions by the Secretary of the Sverdlovsk Party district committee. . . .Such a statement by a party leader does not facilitate healthy Bolshevik criticism and self-criticism. On the contrary, it leads to stopping up, to tying up the initiative of the masses, to putting brakes on uncovering enemies."

14. Stephen Wheatcroft published this in 2007. He suggests how Yefim Georgievich Evdokimov guided Stalin and even calling him the Evdokimov "architect of the Shakhty trial": "Evdokimov had a demonstrable influence on Stalin in guiding him to adopt certain policies at certain times."

15. J. Arch Getty wrote this book in 1985 analyzing the history of power in the Soviet Union. He suggests that Soviet Russia exhibited more characteristics of a traditional society rather than a highly organized totalitarian regime. "According to most Western views, power was transmitted from the top to the bottom, from the center to the localities... Theoretically, every committee was completely subordinate to the one above it, and individual members had no power or control at all. The political reality was much different. In fact, the chain of command collapsed more often than it functioned. The Communist Party, far from having penetrated every quarter of Russian life, was more an undiciplined and disorganized force with little influence outside the cities. Soviet Russia in the '30s resembled a backward, traditional society far more than it did the sophisticated order of totalitarianism."

16. Sidney and Beatrice Webb write in 1938 about Soviet government structure. The suggest that the Soviet Union had democratic institutions and explicitly write about Stalin's allegations of dictator: "...the Communist Party in the USSR is unlike the religious order in not being subject to any chief imposed upon it from without, and being democratically governed by its own membership, dispersed in. some 130,000 Primary Party organs, which elect a pyramid of tiers of committees, rising up to an All-Union Conference, with its central committee and sub-committees; Stalin, whom foreigners are apt to think of as a dictator, being merely the principal secretary to the organisation, a post from which he could at any moment be dismissed by the highest committee."

17. Sidney and Beatrice Webb also published a book in October of 1936 called "Soviet Communism: Dictatorship or Democracy?". They draw a comparison to other dictators such as Mussolini and Hitler, highlighting that Stalin does not possess the same level of authority over his fellow citizens or even the members of his own party: "Sometimes it is asserted that, whereas the form may be otherwise, the fact is that, whilst the Communist Party controls the whole administration, the Party itself, and thus indirectly the whole state, is governed by the will of a single person, Josef Stalin. First let it be noted that, unlike Mussolini, Hitler and other modern dictators, Stalin is not invested by law with any authority over his fellow-citizens and not even over the members of the Party to which he belongs. He has not even the extensive power which the Congress of the United States has temporarily conferred upon President Roosevelt, or that which the American Constitution entrusts for four years to every successive president... He is, in fact, only the General Secretary of the Party, receiving his salary from the Party funds and holding his office by appointment by the Party Central Committee, and, as such, also a member (one among nine) of its most important sub-committee, the Politbureau."

While the sources presented above offer evidence that challenges the theory of Stalin consolidating power and suggest a collective decision-making process, it is essential to recognize that there are alternative interpretations. Some historians argue that while collective decision-making existed, Stalin still held significant influence and authority within the Soviet system. It is important to consider a range of viewpoints to form a comprehensive understanding of Stalin's governance. Atinoua (talk) 19:57, 12 July 2023 (UTC)

There's a bunch of problems with this mass of quotations:

1. Most of them aren't relevant to the question of whether Stalin can be considered a dictator. That Stalin during the Great Patriotic War took into account the military advice of others and was willing to reverse decisions he had previously made are good traits for a leader to have, whether an elected official or an absolute monarch. That doesn't answer whether such decisions could be made and unmade against his will.

Likewise Getty writing that the 1930s USSR "resembled a backward, traditional society far more than it did the sophisticated order of totalitarianism" has nothing to do with whether Stalin was a dictator or not. After all, Russia before 1917 was surely even more of "a backward, traditional society" yet at the head stood a notorious autocracy.

Stalin desiring "fresh perspectives and vigor within the Communist Party by emphasizing the importance of bringing in new individuals" would, again, be a salutary trait. but it implies that dictators must be opposed to the replacement of subordinates and must adhere to ideological dogmatism. It's also worth noting that around the time Stalin made his speech, the Politburo was replaced by a far larger Presidium which I've seen historians generally regard as a way for Stalin to swamp earlier supporters he had now regarded as untrustworthy (Molotov, Mikoyan, etc.) with newcomers who owed their positions to him and could thus be expected to have 100% loyalty.

As for Evdokimov, leaving aside that he could only have influenced Stalin for a limited period (given he was shot during the Great Purges), I don't see how having "a demonstrable influence on Stalin in guiding him to adopt certain policies at certain times" challenges Stalin being a dictator, given that plenty of wielders of dictatorial power have had influential advisers. To give an infamous Russian example, Rasputin's influence over the Tsar.

Thurston's remarks about criticism of lower-level officials in the USSR during the Great Purges are, again, not relevant to Joseph Stalin, who was evidently exempt from any such criticism. Ditto for Webbs' remarks about the functioning of lower rungs of the state and Communist Party apparatuses and criticism of enterprise managers and the like.

2. The CIA report was addressed on this talk page less than a year ago. See Archive 23.

3. The Webbs' books on the Soviet Union aren't considered reliable sources by any historians I'm aware of. When said books are mentioned it's almost invariably either to mock or denounce them as prime examples of uncritical texts by Western "fellow travelers" of the USSR. This doesn't mean everything they write is erroneous, but what they do write should be checked against better sources (especially given that the Webbs had no special knowledge of the inner workings of the Soviet leadership whereas nowadays there's the Soviet archives and memoirs by Soviet officials.)

4. Pat Sloan was a lifelong member of the Communist Party of Great Britain, writing his book at a time when the CPGB was not known for tolerating any significant criticism of the USSR let alone Stalin. In later decades Sloan seemed to have no problem regarding Stalin as a man who had consolidated power in his own hands. Thus he complained that Soviet authors who claim the USSR is democratic were downplaying and obfuscating "the whole Stalin phenomenon, an emanation of the Soviet system" (see Labour Monthly, December 1971, p. 567) and in his last book Sloan wrote that "during the last years of Stalin, there was an internal dogmatism such that nobody apart from Stalin dared to voice a new idea, even on the basis of Marx's own original exploratory work." (Marx and the Orthodox Economists, 1973, p. 7) Sloan further states in that book, "Nobody today, for example, would dispute the fact that in the last years of Stalin centralisation was carried to fantastic extremes, supported by the illegal activities of the state security services." (p. 152)

5. The sincerity of Stalin's offers to resign, as you note, are "open to interpretation." I'm not aware of any historian who attaches much weight to them. I've already noted above the less-than-democratic context of Stalin's speech. It's also worth adding, since you've quoted the Webbs, that they themselves believed Stalin "may be thought to have become irremovable from his position of supreme leadership of the Party, and therefore of the government" given "the emotion of hero-worship, of the traditional reverence of the Russian people for a personal autocrat." In consequence, "He will therefore remain in his great position of leadership so long as he wishes to do so." (Webbs, Soviet Communism: A New Civilisation? Vol. I, 1936, pp. 438, 440) The Webbs' argument alone would be enough to indicate that Stalin could scarcely have expected his "request" to be accepted by those present, and instead that he desired merely to have his colleagues reaffirm their support for him.

Finally, it's important to note that the degree of power Stalin wielded wasn't static, so that he may very well have been faced with limitations on that power in 1930 or 1938 that were not necessarily still in place by the time of his death. Books like The Nature of Stalin's Dictatorship (edited by E.A. Rees) go into this, notably Stephen Wheatcroft's contribution to that book titled "From Team-Stalin to Degenerate Tyranny" which does support the notion that Stalin "consolidated power to become a dictator." --Ismail (talk) 10:40, 13 July 2023 (UTC)

I agree.Jack Upland (talk) 01:06, 14 July 2023 (UTC)

Hello! Thank you very much for your feedback. I appreciate your thorough response regarding my proposed edit, and how quickly you responded too! You make really valid points and after reading them all, I now realize that some of the sources I provided do not directly address the central question of whether or not Stalin was actually a dictator. Accuracy and relevancy is very important and I respect your commitment to these high standards. I would like to reiterate the intention behind my proposed edit. My aim was to introduce a more cautious perspective, acknowledging the existence of varying interpretations regarding the extent to which Stalin consolidated his power. By presenting a nuanced understanding of his leadership position alongside the concept of collective leadership, I believe we can provide readers with a more balanced view and encourage critical thinking.

As you mentioned, just because Stalin took into account the military advice of others and was willing to reverse decisions he had previously made, it doesn’t automatically mean decisions could be made and unmade against his will. And I agree with that. I believe the evidence presented in sources 5 and 6 should be explored more, which highlight instances of collective work and discussions within the leadership structure. These sources provide nuance of the decision-making process of Stalin’s time, suggesting a more complex leadership dynamic than a straightforward dictatorship.

You also made a point about how Russia before the revolution was even more backward yet it was also an autocracy and you’re right that evidence 15 does not mention Stalin being a dictator. This evidence does suggest that the western understanding of Soviet history, of Stalin being a dictator, as it existed in 1985, was not entirely accurate. It provides a greater context of the extent of power consolidation. I believe a more nuanced position regarding his leadership position can be created to avoid oversimplifying it, and I would be interested in your thoughts on that.

Regarding evidence 7, you raised a point regarding Stalin's desire for fresh perspectives and new individuals within the Communist Party. It is true that this trait, in isolation, does not necessarily contradict the concept of dictatorship if the reasoning was to have an army of yes-men. When examining Stalin's actions in the broader context, it becomes essential to consider the motives and implications behind his emphasis on bringing in new members. While it is true that the replacement of the Politburo with a larger Presidium could be viewed as a means for Stalin to ensure loyalty and control, it is also important to consider the potential benefits of introducing new individuals into the decision-making process. Stalin said “We are getting older and shall sooner or later die, but we must think into whose hands we shall give this torch of our great undertaking, who will carry it onward and reach the goal of communism? For this we need younger people with more energy, dedicated comrades and political leaders.” And followed by requesting to be replaced as General Secretary. It is possible that this is not a sincere request, but if it is sincere then it suggests that Stalin continued to operate with collective leadership despite playing a bigger role. And even if it wasn’t sincere, it indicates an acknowledgement of needing a collective approach. If there is evidence that Stalin rejected the cult of personality around him, then we may be able to conclude his resignation was sincere. And if there are more instances of Stalin offering to resign that may also indicate that he was more sincere in his request.

The point you made about evidence 14 is a fair point as well. It is true that dictators can have influential advisors and this evidence alone does not change that fact. At the minimum, this evidence suggests that Stalin was receptive to input, but Stephen Wheatcroft goes further and places responsibility for the Shakhty trial on Evdokimov. This does suggest that Stalin was not alone in the decision making process.

While it is true that Thurston’s and Webbs’ remarks (evidence 13 & 12) may not be directly relevant to Stalin, they do contribute to a broader context. Thurston’s remarks are significant because it highlights a degree of openness and flexibility at least at certain levels. They indicate that the Soviet system encompassed various levels of decision-making and internal debate and supports the argument for collective leadership. Criticism also suggests a certain level of accountability that existed within the system. This kind of checks and balances is not something typically associated with dictatorships. With regards to whether Stalin himself could be criticized, evidence 8 suggests that certain members were able to criticize Stalin. Voroshilov, Mikoyan and Molotov were named. Evidence 4 also suggests that others were able to question and even argue with Stalin. This is not to say that criticism by all people, at all times, for all actions was tolerated by Stalin, but this evidence does not reflect characteristics of a dictatorship.

I wasn’t aware of the discussion regarding the CIA report (evidence 1), but I have now read it and the discussion that occurred about it. The first point I took from that conversation was that the idea of collective leadership was common at the time. If this is true then I agree that it makes sense that this report may not accurately represent history. There was also a point about how this document may not have been the consensus of the time, and even if it was, it’s an older document and there are newer perspectives, including newer perspectives from the CIA. I agree with this. Especially with Soviet archives being accessed, there is new evidence that can be examined. The final point that I saw being made was about these archives, including letters between Stalin and Molotov. Robert Conquest explains how we now know Stalin was very critical of Molotov with his lack of hostility to the west. (Feel free to add or correct me if my analysis is incomplete.) Overall this evidence is important because it shows how, at some point, at least some within the CIA believed Stalin was not a dictator.

With regards to the reliability of The Webbs’ books (Evidence 12, 16, and 17), I agree that if they are unreliable then they should not have priority over more reliable work. I haven’t looked into this yet so I appreciate you bringing it to my attention. Relying solely on their writings may not provide a comprehensive and accurate portrayal of Stalin's leadership and the nature of the Soviet system. I agree that multiple perspectives must be analyzed and considered, and I am very interested to hearing what you think!

You made a really good point about Pat Sloan (evidence 11) with his criticism of the Stalin-era. The quote you shared from Labour Monthly continues: “... is but touched upon, and that confusingly: 'The ideology of the cult of the leader is incompatible with Marxism-Leninism”. There were definitely huge problems within the Soviet system. His criticism of Stalin’s cult of personality are justified and should be taken into consideration when analyzing Stalin as a whole. As you pointed out, the CPGB did not tolerate significant criticism of the USSR which means that it's possible Pat Sloan was not telling the whole truth in this passage. The lack of criticism within his book may indicate a lack of free speech within the CPGB. This evidence cannot be taken alone and other evidence must also be analyzed before a conclusion can be made about just how accurate (or inaccurate) his claims are. You also mentioned his book Marx and the Orthodox Economists where Sloan talks about criticism within the USSR. This book was written in 1973 and could be reflecting the Soviet Union’s positions at the time (critical of Stalin). Like the original document I quoted from, this evidence could just be reflective of the time period instead. Sloan’s later works contradict some of the other evidence I have here which suggests one source isn’t telling the truth or the reality of whether Stalin consolidated power and became a dictator is complex. This is why we need to be more cautious when dealing with this question.

You also mentioned how the Webbs viewed Stalin as being irremovable against his will, but it wasn’t because he consolidated power and became a dictator. They write that it was because of the cult of personality around him, and even write it was “against his will”. On page 439: “It seems to us that a national leader so persistently boosted, and so generally admired, has, in fact, become irremovable against his will, so long as his health lasts, without a catastrophic break-up of the whole administration.” The full context of the quote you provided on page 438 reiterates this: “At this point it is necessary to observe that, although Stalin is, by the constitution, not in the least a dictator, having no power of command, and although he appears to be free from any desire to act as a dictator, and does not do so, he may be thought to have become irremovable from his position of supreme leadership of the Party, and therefore of the government.” It’s very clear that there was a strong cult of personality around Stalin which is something to be very critical of. This cult of personality does not imply in one way or the other whether Stalin was part of a collective or a dictator.

I also wanted to reiterate that evidence 9 and 10 suggest that not everything Stalin wanted, he received. Stalin wanted Kaganovich to take the position of head of civil aviation, but Goltsman ended up being picked instead. Stalin wanted Malenkov to be the new head of NKVD, but Beria ended up being picked instead. This evidence supports the idea that Stalin did not have absolute power in the government at the time.

The last thing that I wanted to say is that I agree with you that the degree of power Stalin wielded wasn't static and that we can work together to create a more cautious and more balanced perspective on this topic. If my original suggestion does not do justice for the complexities of the available evidence regarding collective decision making and dictatorship, I would be open to working together towards creating a more cautious and balanced page. You made many good points, so I am more than willing to revise the proposed edit. Thank you again for your reply! Atinoua (talk) 03:55, 14 July 2023 (UTC)

I agree it's important to remember that "not everything Stalin wanted, he received," but I don't think this is incompatible with being considered a dictator. Nicholas II evidently didn't get everything he wanted, and I'm sure even Hitler had occasions where Führerprinzip wasn't enough to get his way (in fact there was a lot of debate among German historians as to whether he was a "weak dictator" or not.) For a leader to get literally everything he or she wants would require extraordinary powers unknown to mere mortals.

As for my thoughts on whether "evidence 15" provides "a greater context of the extent of power consolidation," the answer is no, since it's talking about the efficiency of the Communist Party apparatus in regard to Soviet society rather than Stalin's role as leader of the party and country, and even here it's specifically talking about the 1930s and not covering the post-WWII period. The Kuomintang surely had an even less efficient administration of China during the years Getty covers, yet I don't think anyone would argue this means Chiang Kai-shek wasn't a dictator.

I do not see how Stalin's speech "suggests that Stalin continued to operate with collective leadership despite playing a bigger role." You haven't actually demonstrated that Stalin operated on the basis of a collective leadership during the final years of his life, whereas there are historians who argue he very much did not, such as Yoram Gorlizki (see his article "Stalin's Cabinet: The Politburo and Decision Making in the Post-War Years.") Stalin's verbal "acknowledgement of needing a collective approach" means very little in that context.

The Shakhty Trial was held in 1928, at a time when Stalin evidently still had to reckon with Bukharin and others in the Politburo and Central Committee. If you want to argue that Stalin in the 1920s was to some extent beholden to a collective leadership, I don't think you'll find many historians disagreeing.

I don't see how "various levels of decision-making and internal debate" at different rungs of the Soviet state and party apparatus meant there must have existed collective leadership at the level of the Politburo. If collective leadership at Stalin's level existed, we can simply focus on evidence for that rather than bringing up disputes in particular regions or cities or villages.

As for disagreements and arguments by certain of Stalin's colleagues in the Politburo, during the discussion of the CIA document last year I noted that, in regard to the post-WWII period, Molotov practically begged Stalin for forgiveness over a minor political incident and decades later said that if Stalin had lived for another year or two, he (Molotov) would most likely have been killed. I also think it would be worth looking into Mikoyan's memoirs on the postwar period (rather than just his words on Stalin's handling of military affairs during the Great Patriotic War), since I suspect he concurs with other sources that in Stalin's last years any collective leadership had withered.

As for Pat Sloan, I do not think it is accurate to say that in the 1970s he was merely "reflecting the Soviet Union's positions [toward Stalin] at the time," given that as noted he explicitly criticizes Soviet authors for their insufficient treatment of what he terms the "Stalin phenomena" among other things. Furthermore the CPGB itself was among the more "liberal" (so to speak) communist parties by the early 1970s, not always being in line with the CPSU on foreign or domestic affairs. Pat Sloan seems to have supported this "liberal" attitude.

When citing the Webbs on Stalin having become irremovable, I did not claim it was because the Webbs thought he had "consolidated power and became a dictator." I brought up the Webbs' quote in the context of Stalin "requesting" to resign in 1952 to show that if the Webbs thought no one could remove Stalin, then it isn't unreasonable to assume Stalin himself must have known this when making his "request." I also brought it up because you had quoted the Webbs writing that Stalin was "merely the principal secretary to the organisation, a post from which he could at any moment be dismissed by the highest committee," without bringing up the important qualification that the Webbs also thought he could not, in actual practice, be dismissed.

As for the cult of personality, there are historians and recollections by Soviet officials who hold he was not so opposed to it as the Webbs would have liked to think (and again, the Webbs had no special knowledge on this subject.) Molotov for instance claimed that at first Stalin "resisted the cult of personality, but then he came to like it a bit." (Molotov Remembers, p. 220) In any case, not all dictators have had personality cults around them, and I don't think we need to discuss this subject to establish whether or not he ever held dictatorial control.

As for the appointments of A.Z. Goltsman in 1930 and Beria in 1938, two comments:

1. As I said at the start of this reply, a dictator need not always get what he wants, and two instances of a clash of opinions in an eight year period isn't exactly an impressive display of Stalin being regularly opposed, let alone having to genuinely argue for his positions to get his colleagues to vote with him as, say, Lenin often had to do.

2. I don't actually see any indication that the appointments of Goltsman or Beria were opposed by Stalin. The source for Goltsman merely indicates that in September Stalin had written to Molotov proposing Kaganovich for head of civil aviation, and that a month later the Politburo (which, after all, Stalin was part of) decided on Goltsman. Isn't it possible that Stalin had changed his mind, either on his own accord or at the suggestion of others? Likewise the source for the appointment of Beria only mentions Stalin having proposed Malenkov and a majority of other Politburo members recommending Beria instead, with seemingly no rival voting having taken place or other sign of Stalin trying to convince his colleagues and failing.

I'm sure this article can be improved upon, but I do think that the statement you took issue with (“Initially governing the country as part of a collective leadership, he consolidated power to become a dictator") remains valid on the basis of what Wikipedia considers reliable sources. --Ismail (talk) 02:10, 15 July 2023 (UTC)

Hello again! Thank you for your reply.

You’re right when you say that Stalin not receiving everything he wants automatically means he isn’t a dictator. And if Stalin wanted Malenkov, but the majority of the Politburo wanted Beria, then Stalin did not have the final word, at least for this example. That is why it’s important to be more cautious, especially when it comes to the extent that Stalin consolidated power.

For your point on evidence 15, you’re right that the evidence is talking about the level of efficiency the Communist Party has to exert control over the country. And this control is very weak. The reason this provides a greater context to power consolidation is because Stalin did not (and I think your point is that maybe he was not able to) exert control over the country.

The reasoning for why various levels of decision-making and internal debate supports the argument for collective leadership is because it reflects a broader tradition within the country of a collective democracy (which I will go into more later). Having independence and debate at lower levels of state apparatus (as well as in the military) also shows that Stalin was not dictating these sections of government.

Regarding your comments about evidence 8, I do agree that it is worth considering what Stalin may have done. I also think that it's important to look at what Stalin did (or did not) do. These disagreements and arguments that continued throughout Stalin’s life do not add to the idea that Stalin was a dictator. It suggests that Stalin was not exempt from criticism and had, at least some level of a collective approach to decision making. That being said, I do agree with you that Molotov speculating he would have been killed carries significance.

Pat Sloan’s perspective and criticism of the “Stalin phenomena” (and his alignment with a more liberal position) provide an alternative viewpoint that should be weighed alongside other evidence. Here, Sloan is writing criticism of the Stalin era writers, specifically on his cult of personality. Criticism of Stalin’s cult of personality is something that reflects the Soviet Union’s perspective as they denounced this cult of personality after his death. This is what I am referring to when I say his perspective may be reflecting the Soviet Union's positions at the time. It’s important to look at all of Sloan’s analysis of the Soviet Union including both when he writes about collective democracy, and when he criticized the Stalin phenomena and his cult of personality.

I apologize for misrepresenting your view regarding the Webbs and thank you for correcting me. I agree with you that if Stalin was aware that he was so “persistently boosted” and “generally admired” that he became irremovable, then it may have influenced his attempts to resign. There may be evidence which suggests Stalin denounced this cult of personality, and if so, then it suggests Stalin not only did not have total control over this cult of personality, but also that Stalin wanted to distance himself from this cult. Resignation is one way that could be achieved. Also, you write about how the “Webbs also thought he could not, in actual practice, be dismissed.” This may suggest dictatorship, but their view is that he cannot be dismissed because of how loved he is, not because he had total control. This means it is true that “he could at any moment be dismissed by the highest committee” had he not been extremely popular and thus suggests more collective leadership instead of dictatorship.

I agree with you that 2 instances in an 8 year period does not prove that Stalin was regularly opposed. As you pointed out, this was in 1930, and 1938 and there were many more years that Stalin may have changed his mind. Evidence 9 and 10 merely suggests that different viewpoints within the country had different amounts of power. You also mentioned how it’s possible that Stalin had changed his mind and you’re right. With regards to your point on Beria being recommended, it suggests that the decision making process, at least in 1938, was not entirely Stalin being at the head and everyone else following.

I also want to clarify that my perspective is not that Stalin operated on the basis of collective leadership during the final years of his life. My perspective is that Stalin was given a leading role, and I hope that we can work together to create a cautious and more balanced view. We can add more nuance to our article and reduce the risk of oversimplification. The evidence that I have shared so far aims to question whether or not Stalin consolidated power and became a dictator.

It is important to note how Yoram Gorlizki’s perspective in Stalin's Cabinet: The Politburo and Decision Making in the Post-War Years is already one which presupposes Stalin consolidated power and became a dictator. Despite this, Gorlizki mentions: “...rather than one Politburo there were in fact a variety of distinct 'politburos' in the late Stalin period. Despite this diversity, each 'politburo' was deployed by Stalin to lock his colleagues into a system of collective responsibility; each offered a flexible yet reliable system by which the dictator could bind his peers.” Gorlizki is arguing that despite Stalin’s power consolidation, there remained a degree of independence.

He continues “Despite Stalin's importance, even at the height of his dictatorship the Soviet system never freed itself entirely from a deep-seated Bolshevik tradition of party 'democracy'.” According to Gorlizki, there were not just one, but several distinct 'politburos' in the Soviet system. Despite Stalin's centralization of power, these 'politburos' represented a degree of independence and diversity in decision-making. This suggests that the tradition of collective decision making we have been discussing continued even into the “height of Stalin’s dictatorship” although Gorlizki does say that the ultimate goal was to maintain control and loyalty to Stalin's leadership.

He also writes: “... a 'third' politburo, one without Stalin, acquired sufficient momentum and coherence to negotiate the gulf represented by Stalin's death with minimum disruption.” By expressing the cohesiveness of this politburo after Stalin’s death, it implies that the ruling group, with their shared understanding and experience gained from working together, was prepared to continue decision-making in a relatively smooth manner. This further reinforces the notion that, despite the concentration of power under Stalin, the Soviet system retained, to some degree, collective decision-making capacity that could endure beyond an individual leader's rule.

Continuing: “The Politburo thus served as an important counterweight to an energetic Council of Ministers apparatus.” This suggests how there were differing factions within the Soviet government. It suggests that the Politburo’s role wasn’t to rubber-stamp the decisions made, but to be a counterbalancing force to ensure power was not concentrated in one institution.

Continuing: “On 13 April the Politburo adopted a resolution on the Orgburo and secretariat which assigned responsibilities among the new secretaries and attempted to define the relative powers of Orgburo and secretariat, something the leadership had never found it easy to do.” The fact that the leadership found it difficult to define the powers of the Orgburo and Secretariat suggests that there were competing interests and tensions among the individuals involved which adds to the complex power dynamics at the time. This further shows why we need to approach this with more caution to maintain a high quality and accurate article.

Continuing: “By the end of Stalin's reign the discrepancy between a Politburo which, in reality, had become jaded and undisciplined, and the considerable leadership functions which this body was expected to exercise, had become accentuated. It may have been for this reason that Stalin decided to modernise the Politburo. Thus at the XIX Congress the name, membership and operations of the Politburo were all fundamentally changed. This reorganisation of the  Politburo was more than a simple 'rationalisation', however. The reforms of October 1952 underlined the cabinet's role as an agency of bolshevik leadership. In fact, the creation of the new presidium resonated closely with the calls for 'party democracy' and the demands for increased accountability and collective decision making which were raised in the run-up to the party." This increased accountability and calls for party democracy reflects tendencies associated with collective democracy, not dictatorship. It signaled a recognition of the need to avoid excessive concentration of power in a single individual, like a dictator.

Continuing: “The XIX congress stimulated efforts to 'democratise' the party at all levels. Steps to promote 'internal democracy' within the party included more frequent meetings of the party rank and file, mandatory reports of the apparatus to full party committees and a host of protest votes against sitting party officials. Such moves to reactivate party 'democracy' were twinned with steps to regularise the party's decision-making processes at all levels. At the very highest tier, the Politburo and Orgburo were merged into the Presidium, with an enlarged full membership of 25 and 11 candidate members. In contrast to its narrowly constituted predecessor, the new larger Presidium appeared to be more representative of the different sectors of the Soviet party-state and thus more open to outside influences.” This continues to add to the idea that it was not Stalin did not have absolute power. There was more diversity and more representation within the government, and therefore more power.

Continuing: “The evolution of the cabinet in Stalin's last months reflected broader developments within the Soviet party-state. Prime among these was the holding of the XIX Congress, which had direct consequences for the Politburo. Apart from its new name, the regular sessions of the Presidium Buro accorded with the new post-congress emphasis on 'collective decision making'.” This suggests that the Soviet leadership, under Stalin's last months, shifted towards a more collective decision making process rather than relying solely on the directives of a single leader.

Continuing: “At the same time the oncoming succession also left its mark on the cabinet, which became less dependent on Stalin than it had been in earlier years and which, in line with Stalin's own wishes, accommodated a new generation of younger leaders, many of whom were from the provinces.” With the cabinet becoming less dependent on Stalin, it means they were more open to embracing a new generation of leaders. This shift signaled a more collaborative leadership style.

Even in the conclusion, Gorlizki says: “The system of rule, however, never descended into a pure dictatorship where Stalin pursued policies in his own name, bypassing the Politburo altogether. In fact, Stalin approached the Politburo with a measure of caution and reserve… Despite frequently being excluded and manipulated by the leader, members of the Politburo under Stalin were treated relatively leniently…” This suggests that despite holding immense power and authority, Stalin was not inclined to govern as an outright dictator, imposing his policies without any consideration for the Politburo. Instead, he demonstrated a certain level of caution and reserve when dealing with this key decision-making body. While there were instances where he excluded and manipulated its members, they were, on the whole, treated relatively leniently.

He also mentions: “Even at its height, Stalinism had never become an unalloyed personal dictatorship, for it always contained a strong trace of Bolshevik ideology. At times, such as the XIX Congress, this ideology became more robust and the practices of internal 'party democracy' were revived. This had direct consequences for the organisation of the party and its ruling committees. It was because of its claim to be more 'democratic' than any other institution that, at the time of the XIX Congress, party committees were elevated over institutions of the state. This, however, came at a price: the rise of party institutions was conditional on the resuscitation of 'collective decision making' within the party, a commitment that reached to the nerve-centre of the party's power. To the extent that three politburos had co-existed under Stalin-the expanded sessions of the de jure Politburo, the closed meetings of the inner circle, and the Politburo without Stalin-it was to be a combination of this drive for collective decision making and the fact of Stalin's death itself that would allow the last of these politburos-the Politburo without Stalin-finally to come into its own.” He ends this article by writing Stalinims never became a personal dictatorship, and highlighted the collective decision making within the party. Although Gorlizki continues to call Stalin a dictator despite also writing about the collective decision making that remained, I believe we should continue to take a more cautious approach in our article to prevent oversimplification.

I also want to clarify that Stalin’s resignation is not simply a verbal acknowledgement of a need for collective democracy. It demonstrates, if sincere, a lack of dictatorship of Stalin through his initiative towards growing collective democracy. However there is more evidence which suggests that Stalin’s reasoning for his resignation in October 1952 was genuine. The question of how Stalin’s resignation in 1952 (evidence 7) actually suggests that Stalin continued to operate with collective leadership is a fair question. The answer is that by resigning, and by bringing in newer, younger members, Stalin would no longer be a part of the decision making process. There would be new leadership and collective decision making would continue. This evidence was taken from Leonid Nikolaevich Efremov’s notes, a young man, on the October 1952 Central Committee Plenum. It adds to the idea that Stalin was genuine when he said that older people (including himself) should be replaced with younger people. This suggests that Stalin wanted new voices and leaders within the party:

“Yes, we did hold the Congress of our party. It went very well, and many of you might think that amongst us there exists full harmony and unity. But we have not this harmony and unity of thought. Some people disagree with our decisions.

They say, why did we significantly enlarge the membership of the Central Committee? But isn't it self-evident that we need to get new forces into the CC? We old people will die out, but we must think to whom, into whose hands we shall pass the baton of our great undertaking. Who will carry it forward? For this, we need younger, dedicated people and political leaders. And what does it mean to bring up a dedicated, devoted political leader of the State? It takes ten, no, fifteen years to educate a state leader.

But just wishing for this is not enough. To educate ideologically firm state activists can only be done through practice, in the daily work of carrying out the general line of the party, of overcoming all sorts of opposition from hostile opportunist elements who are striving to slow down and interrupt the task of the building of socialism. And we must have political activists of Leninist experience, educated by our Party, in the struggle to defeat these hostile attempts and to achieve complete success in the realization of our great goals.

Is it not clear that we must lift up the role of our party and its party committees? Can we forget about improving the Party's work among the masses, as Lenin taught us? All this needs a flow of young, fresh forces into the CC, the general staff of our Party. This is what we have done, following Lenin's instructions. This is why we have expanded the membership of the CC. And the Party itself has grown a little.

The question is asked as to why we relieved some prominent Party and state figures from their important posts as ministers. What can be said on this account? We replaced comrades Molotov, Kaganovich, Voroshilov, and others and replaced them with new workers. Why? On what basis? The work of a minister - this is hard, peasant labor. It demands great strength, concrete knowledge, and good health. This is why we have relieved some deserving comrades from the posts they occupied and appointed in their places new, more qualified workers who take initiative. They are young people, full of strength and energy. We must support them in their important work.”

Additionally, it’s important to understand that there may be other perspectives of post-war Stalin. Stalin’s centralization of power does not necessarily mean consolidation into a dictatorship. By acknowledging different perspectives and interpretations, we can have a more accurate understanding of the complexities of Stalin’s role as a leader. The original suggestion of “Stalin governed the country as part of a collective leadership, and was given a leading role.” may not be the best way to ensure a cautious and balanced perspective on this. I would much prefer if the solution were a collective process but I can also add suggestions. What are your thoughts on “Stalin governed the country as part of a collective leadership, but centralized his power in later years.” This way, it acknowledges how collective leadership shifted over time and there is acknowledgement of his power centralization without the oversimplified assertion of dictator. I appreciate your feedback. Thank you! Atinoua (talk) 20:40, 18 July 2023 (UTC)

I don't hold that Stalin didn't or was not able to "exert control over the country." I hold that it makes little sense to argue that Stalin could not have been a dictator because of bureaucratic inefficiency. For example, Getty writes that the Communist Party in the 1930s had little influence outside the cities. This is true in the sense that rural membership was lower than that of urban membership. But during collectivization all sorts of personnel were sent from urban areas to the countryside to carry out the program, frequently resorting to force and violence. The fact that there were relatively few Communist Party members in rural areas in this period can help explain things about Soviet society and the countryside in particular, but I fail to see how it has any bearing on whether Stalin himself was a dictator or not.

Where do you get that "Stalin was not dictating these sections of government"? If you mean in the sense that party and state officials at lower rungs of the ladder *weren't* being tasked with implementing measures originating in the center (a center increasingly dominated by Stalin) and that they could easily risk their jobs if not their lives if they failed to carry out said tasks, then I think you'd have to find more sources than Getty for that. If you mean that Stalin wasn't an omnipresent deity who could simultaneously serve as the dictatorial head of every party and state entity in the country from Moscow to the smallest village, then sure, but by that silly criteria nobody has or ever could be a dictator.

Again, if there was indeed "a broader tradition within the country of a collective democracy," and this touched the Politburo, then you should be able to demonstrate this in regard to the Politburo.

To write that, "There may be evidence which suggests Stalin denounced this cult of personality, and if so, then it suggests Stalin not only did not have total control over this cult of personality, but also that Stalin wanted to distance himself from this cult." There is, in fact, evidence that "Stalin denounced this cult of personality." It *can* suggest that he wanted to distance himself from any responsibility for it, and of course Stalin could not have been personally responsible for every single manifestation of the cult across the entire country. But there are also authors who write that Stalin's public "denunciations" were in themselves part of his cult, reflecting a desire to glorify his "modesty."

As for the Webbs, again I've noted they aren't a reliable source and had no special insight into how the leadership of the party actually functioned, so that their mere assertion that Stalin could "at any moment be dismissed by the highest committee" carries no value. It was doubtless true in a purely "legal" sense, that Stalin could be removed in accordance with party statutes, but then he could just be another example of a dictator who ruled under a system which was democratic on paper but not in practice.

"I also want to clarify that my perspective is not that Stalin operated on the basis of collective leadership during the final years of his life. My perspective is that Stalin was given a leading role. . ." Who "gave" him this "leading role"? On what basis do you distinguish this "leading role" from that of a dictator? Why do you not accept the label of "dictator" but do accept that of "leading role"? (Besides, it would certainly be silly to argue that Stalin had no "leading role" in the 1930s or even the latter half of the 1920s, even if he could not be called a dictator at the time.)

The existence of unofficial "factions" (factions being, of course, illegal according to the party's own statutes) and "competing interests" once again have nothing to do with whether Stalin (or any other leader) could be considered a dictator or not. There have been plenty of dictators who have had to either reckon with such groups or manipulated them to keep control.

Writing that "Stalin was not inclined to govern as an outright dictator" is irrelevant. No one claimed that Stalin wanted to crown himself emperor or otherwise assume an openly dictatorial posture. Pretty much any academic work on Stalin will argue that he ruled via manipulative methods while giving the appearance of collective leadership (such as Gorlizki writing on how Stalin would circumvent the Politburo by "elevating" individuals to private meetings where Politburo-tier subjects would be discussed with certain actual Politburo members deliberately excluded.)

Again, I don't see how Stalin's own words at the 1952 plenum are "proof" that his request to resign was sincere, and I've already noted there are multiple authors who point out that the actual effect of "bringing in newer, younger members" to the leadership was to dilute the power of Molotov, Mikoyan, and other older members by bringing in personnel dependent on Stalin for their sudden promotion.

At the end of the day the overwhelming majority of reliable sources consider Stalin a dictator, including historians who (like Getty in his Practicing Stalinism and Gorlizki in his aforementioned article) note that at times Stalin was frustrated at how inept, corrupt, or otherwise inefficient the state and party organs could be. If you want to argue that the nature of Stalin's leadership was more complex than is usually presented in pop culture or whatever, I certainly won't object. But I see no reason, on the basis of Wikipedia's own standards, to adopt your suggestion of replacing the term "dictator" with "leading role." --Ismail (talk) 02:07, 22 July 2023 (UTC)

Indeed, most reliable sources agree that Stalin succesful established a dictatorship within a [party] dictatorship. And some say that he was possibly the most succesful dictator in modern history if measured by total power only. As Stephen Kotkin asked rhetorically, what other leader succesfully purged his entire army leadership and remained in power thereafter? (and this doesn't even address the purging of the secret service and communist party leadership) Machinarium (talk) 17:22, 22 July 2023 (UTC)

Thank you again for your reply! In order for our article to have a more cautious, balanced, and a neutral point of view, it’s important to acknowledge the complexities of Stalin’s role as a leader. Looking over my original suggestion, I do agree with you that the suggestion does not cover the extent of power consolidation. I propose this edit suggestion instead: “Stalin governed the country as part of a collective leadership, but centralized his power in later years.” This prevents the problem of oversimplification of Stalin’s role as a leader, but it also acknowledges that Stalin centralized power in later years. What are your thoughts on this?

I need to clarify that I am not saying that Stalin could not have been a dictator because of bureaucratic inefficiency. What I am saying is that evidence 15 suggests that Stalin did not have absolute power. Instead of “a sophisticated order of totalitarianism”, Russia resembled “a backwards, traditional society”. This lack of absolute power, adds nuance to the question of whether Stalin was a dictator and it is important to address this nuance in our article. There is evidence which suggests the extent that force and violence used in the 1930s was not frequent. Mark Tauger writes in Soviet Peasants and Collectivization, 1930-39: Resistance and Adaptation (pp 71-75) about an OGPU report from March 1931. This report lists 13,754 protests which had occurred in 1930. According to their data, there were around 2.5 million people who protested these changes, and Tauger estimates 3.3 million total protested. He then writes how the rural population at the time was 120 million, and the population of people over 15 was 70 million. This means that 5% of peasants protested the collectivization. Tauger then analyzes the evidence regarding the extent that violence was used against the protests that did occur. The majority of these protests were resolved peacefully with 10.0% of protests suppressed violently in February, 12.4% in March, and 2.8% in April. Tauger writes that the reason the majority of protests that occurred were resolved peacefully, was a result of explanation of local policies.

To answer your question about what I mean when I wrote that Stalin was not dictating the government is this. By allowing criticism of government, criticism of directors of enterprise, and even criticism of Stalin himself, it suggests that there were various perspectives within the Soviet government. It’s not simply the idea that Stalin was omnipresent, which is obviously not true. And it’s also not simply implementing tasks that the center created. While it’s true that they did enact the decisions made by higher levels of government, the evidence that I have presented, as well as some of the evidence you have presented suggests that collective decision making remained to some degree.

The idea of a broader tradition within the country of a collective democracy was touched on by Yoram Gorlizki. (I’ll number this so that it’s easier to reference.) Gorlizki writes: “Despite Stalin's importance, even at the height of his dictatorship the Soviet system never freed itself entirely from a deep-seated Bolshevik tradition of party 'democracy'.” This is also reflected in the other quotes from Gorlizki although that was the quote that directly referenced their tradition within the Politburo.

The next point you made was on the question of the sincerity of Stalin’s denunciation of his cult of personality. I recognize that historians interpret his denunciation as being part of his cult, which is a good point.

The Webbs spent months in the Soviet Union so I don’t think it’s fair to write off their writings as unreliable. I do think their writings should be taken into consideration in their proper context. We’ve already discussed how Stalin’s centralization of power came after these books were published in the 30s. You’re right when you say that it’s possible that he could be a dictator in a system that’s democratic on paper. That is why we should look at the other existing evidence which supports his aim for collective leadership.

Your next question is very important and is something which contributed to me wanting to change my original suggestion. My new suggestion provides more context, is more cautious, while also acknowledging Stalin’s centralization of power. This does create a new question: Why centralization of power and not dictator? The evidence that we have gone over suggests that collective leadership remained influential to some extent in the upper echelons of their government in Stalin’s years. The complex situation at the time combined with the importance of caution when making broad statements (such as the word dictator) is why I believe we should use “centralization of power” instead of “dictatorship”.

The next point you make is about how the existence of competing interests does not necessarily mean Stalin is not a dictator. You go on to explain how some dictators reconciled with dissenters. I agree with you, and there would need to be more examination of the extent that these competing interests had in the decision making process.

When it comes to Stalin’s lack of inclination to govern as an outright dictator, the reason it’s important is that his “caution” and “reserve” suggest that others were involved in the decision making process.

I need to clarify that the evidence I presented was not Stalin’s words, it was Leonid Nikolaevich Efremov’s notes. He had attended the plenum and did not feel as though Stalin was being deceptive, manipulative, or insincere. The primary source that suggests that Stalin’s actual desire was to bring in younger, newer members comes from Khruschev’s Secret Speech in 1956. Khruschev says: “Stalin evidently had plans to finish off the old members of the political bureau. He often stated that political bureau members should be replaced by new ones. His proposal, after the 19th Congress, concerning the election of 25 persons to the Central Committee Presidium, was aimed at the removal of the old Political Bureau members and the bringing in of less experienced persons so that these would extol him in all sorts of ways.” Khrushchev as a source should not be dismissed immediately as unreliable (despite his obvious bias), but rather it should be analyzed and understood within the context. There may be other primary source evidence that I am unaware of, but Khruschev’s word alone is not enough. We would also need to reconcile with Efremov’s document. Was he duped by Stalin? Was he writing to “extol” him? These questions add to the necessity to be more cautious on whether Stalin’s centralization of power means he was a dictator. I hope that my edited suggestion is more balanced than my initial suggestion, and that we can come to an agreement on the extent of Stalin’s centralization of power. Please let me know what you think. Thank you! Atinoua (talk) 05:19, 3 August 2023 (UTC)

I don't agree with changing Stalin gradually becoming a dictator to Stalin having "centralized his power in later years." The latter just sounds like a polite euphemism. It reminds me of post-1956 Soviet works that referred to "violations of socialist legality" under Stalin instead of directly mentioning such things as the groundless execution of hundreds of thousands of people during the Great Purges.

I've repeatedly addressed your attempts to conflate being a dictator with being an omnipotent and omnipresent being. We both concur that "Stalin did not have absolute power." The difference is you seem to think that means he couldn't have become a dictator, whereas that certainly isn't the view of Getty, Sheila Fitzpatrick, and other historians who have emphasized the limits to Stalin's dictatorial power.

I fail to see how the shifting degree of violence amid the campaign for forced collectivization (of which there's plenty of books, e.g. Lynne Viola's Peasant Rebels Under Stalin) indicates whether Stalin was a dictator or not. Tauger himself states that "most of the protests took place after Stalin’s article ['Dizzy with Success'] was published" and that it "stimulated many of the protests in the same way that it led peasants to leave kolkhozy. It is also at least conceivable that if the article had not been published, some of the peasants who protested or left farms would have simply acquiesced in the kolkhoz." In other words, a more lenient line was taken in the months following Stalin's own decision to permit a temporary slowing-down (and to some extent rolling-back) of the collectivization drive. None of this has any bearing on him not being a dictator at the time (let alone in later years), and if anything it shows that already in 1930 the mere issuing of his words (if I am not mistaken, at the time of its publication in Pravda the article was attributed solely to him) was evidently intended as orders which every rung of the Soviet state and Party apparatus involved with collectivization were supposed to heed.

If you have evidence that there was criticism of Stalin in, say, the Soviet press or at meetings of local soviets or what have you, go ahead and show it. I continue to hold that workers criticizing an enterprise director by accusing him of failing to implement the latest directives of the Five-Year Plan or whatever has nothing to do with whether Stalin himself had dictatorial power.

The Webbs spending months in the USSR is irrelevant unless you can demonstrate that they acquired insight into the inner workings of the Politburo and Central Committee. Furthermore, as Michael David-Fox notes in his Showcasing the Great Experiment (p. 217), while visiting the USSR they were given guided tours of two collective farms explicitly designed to impress foreigners, whereupon Sidney Webb told the tour guide, "How vile appear the legends spread about famine and poverty in the USSR after this!" Such appear to be the kind of "insights" the Webbs were capable of taking in during their time on Soviet soil. This does not mean that every single line of the Webbs' book is utterly useless, but, again, Soviet Communism: A New Civilisation? has acquired a well-deserved reputation for unreliability and I've never seen any historian cite it as an authority for the nature of Stalin's leadership.

To claim that "the evidence I presented was not Stalin’s words, it was Leonid Nikolaevich Efremov’s notes" is rather silly given that Efremov was, after all, jotting down Stalin's words, which are what you presented as evidence. What is your source for Efremov not feeling "as though Stalin was being deceptive, manipulative, or insincere"? More importantly, where are the historians who concur with such an assessment? By Wikipedia's standards we need not to rely either on Efremov or Khrushchev; historian Oleg Khlevniuk for instance writes that Stalin's proposal "would add younger and relatively unknown party leaders, giving Stalin an even freer hand in regard to his older comrades." (Stalin: New Biography of a Dictator, pp. 305-306) --Ismail (talk) 13:27, 8 August 2023 (UTC)

The change to “Stalin governed the country as part of a collective leadership, but centralized his power in later years.” is change is not a euphemism. It prevents the oversimplification of labeling him a dictator (and I don't mean an omnipotent leader) while still acknowledging changes in power. I am not, and have never tried to conflate dictator with omnipotence, This is one quote from me which shows this: "It is true that dictators can have influential advisors." You write this: "The difference is you seem to think that means he couldn't have become a dictator." But this misrepresents my intended argument. To clarify, my point is that the available evidence suggests that Stalin's consolidation of power does not reflect that of a dictatorship. All of the evidence I have presented (and some of the evidence you have presented) suggest a desire for democracy and collective decision making. Your argument is that the consolidation of power could be viewed as a fight against party bureaucracy, especially considering how many of the old guard had died in WW2.

The point I made about the majority peaceful collectivization of power was because you had written: "during collectivization all sorts of personnel were sent from urban areas to the countryside to carry out the program, frequently resorting to force and violence." This is important because if resistance to collectivization were infrequent, then the argument that violence from collectivization is proof of dictatorship comes up short.

The goalpost is set to whether or not people would be punished on the basis of criticizing Stalin. I have presented evidence which shows that people have criticized Stalin and were not executed. The conclusion that comes from this is that criticism of Stalin alone is not the reason for punishment and that other factors would have to be considered. For example, Trotsky was critical of Stalin, and there is also evidence that him and his followers had plotted and attempted to assassinate Stalin on multiple occasions.

The Webbs spending months in the USSR is not irrelevant because they directly experienced the Soviet system. Michael David-Fox criticism here is that its obvious famines did occur. In hindsight, we now know they did but at the time it was less certain. It could be interpreted as criticism of lack of access to information. Regardless, the evidence I presented from the Webbs should be examined as is, not on the merit of what Sidney Webb mistakenly said to a tour guide.

Leonid Nikolaevich Efremov was not just jotting down Stalin's words, he was also writing his own interpretations of the speech. There is nothing in the primary source document which suggests that Stalin was insincere but it's possible that other primary source or secondary analysis of primary sources exists. Oleg Khlevniuk's point is not that Stalin's resignation was insincere or that it doesn't reflect Stalin's democratic tendencies. His point is that other leaders were to be kept in check. And rightfully so. Leaders like Khrushchev were very bureaucratic and by limiting their power and bringing in newer members, it could help to preserve a collective democracy. It's important to look at all the available evidence and draw a conclusion that's balanced. This is why it's so important to not oversimplify Stalin's role to be a dictator. Let me know if there's more that needs to be clarified. Atinoua (talk) 13:44, 19 August 2023 (UTC)

You say you "never tried to conflate dictator with omnipotence," but most of the examples you've given of Stalin supposedly not being a dictator are merely examples of Stalin not having unlimited power to do anything at any moment and to automatically transform his wishes into effective commands like a genie. Hence for instance you citing Getty that the 1930s USSR "resembled a backward, traditional society far more than it did the sophisticated order of totalitarianism," a statement that by itself has no bearing on whether an individual could wield autocratic power in such a society (as the Tsars demonstrated.)

I did not claim that "violence from collectivization is proof of dictatorship." I was making the point that the center was capable of imposing itself on the countryside in important ways despite the paucity of party members in rural areas, and even added that I failed to see how the subject "has any bearing on whether Stalin himself was a dictator or not."

The goalpost is whether Stalin ever became a dictator, not whether everyone who ever criticized him was executed for doing so. You've presented evidence (which no one denies) that the Soviet press and party/state/etc. meetings could criticize real or perceived shortcomings and personal defects in regard to, say, the manager of an enterprise failing to fulfill the directives of a Five-Year Plan. This has nothing to do with Stalin. As I wrote, "If you have evidence that there was criticism of Stalin in, say, the Soviet press or at meetings of local soviets or what have you, go ahead and show it."

Where is your evidence that "[Trotsky] and his followers had plotted and attempted to assassinate Stalin on multiple occasions"? The only "evidence" I can recall of actual plotting, let alone claims of assassination attempts, come from the infamous Moscow Trials which no historian considers remotely credible in this (or virtually any other) regard. Not to mention that criticism of Stalin obviously isn't monopolized by Trotskyists either now or then. Rather than bring up the "other factors" that led to numerous critics of Stalin being arrested and/or shot on real and/or imaginary charges, you should just bring up those open and unpunished criticisms of Stalin which you purport exist.

What does the Webbs "directly experienc[ing] the Soviet system" mean? Did they attend meetings of the Politburo? Did they interview persons who divulged special knowledge of the deliberations of the leadership? The answer in both cases is no. I bring up Michael David-Fox's criticism because it shows how uncritical the Webbs were of Soviet reality. The Ukrainian famine is a great example of this, since the Webbs, upon hearing information of the famine from Malcolm Muggeridge and other sources in good positions to know what happened, decided to trust Soviet ambassador Ivan Maisky for information on the subject, and Beatrice wrote in her diary that Maisky "comforted us about the food shortage." And as David-Fox notes, Maisky helped in the making of the Webbs' book.

The bit I quoted from Khlevniuk isn't even about the sincerity of Stalin's "request" to resign, it's the fact that his replacement of the Politburo with a much larger Presidium would have enhanced his personal power. Whether you think Stalin was justified in doing this and whether Khrushchev was "very bureaucratic" is irrelevant (though Gorlizki in his article "Party Revivalism and the Death of Stalin" notes that Stalin entrusted none other than Khrushchev to head an "anti-bureaucratic" campaign for more active and regular party meetings at lower levels of the CPSU apparatus in Stalin's last months.) And again, if there are historians who consider Efremov's interpretations credible, you ought to be able to cite them. --Ismail (talk) 23:22, 31 August 2023 (UTC)

The evidence that I gave shows that Stalin was not only not in control of every decision made, but also that Stalin was criticized and there was some level of collective decision making that existed. My argument is that the available evidence suggests that Stalin's centralization of power may not have been a consolidation into a dictatorship, and we should approach this more cautiously to have a balanced article. That is also something that some of the sources you provided say as well. For example, this is one of the pieces of evidence I provided: "Molotov admired Koba but did not worship him. He often disagreed with him, and criticized, Stalin right up until the end… Voroshilov, Mikoyan and a Molotov frequently disagreed with Stalin…"

I had brought up the statistics of violence imposed on the countryside because there was a comment saying that violence was frequently used. The lack of resistance to collectivization, and in the resistance that did exist, the lack of violence used to resolve those conflicts, may indicate a healthy (at the very least, not oppressive) relationship between the population and the government. You’re right that the center was capable of imposing itself onto the peasants, and that imposition reflects one of cooperation, not oppression.

You’re right that the goalpost is set to whether Stalin became a dictator and it’s also true that dictator isn’t quantifiable. There is no melting point for a leader becoming a dictator. A dictator is a label for someone who meets enough specific characteristics. For example, if people were able to criticize Stalin and face no penalties, it would help to suggest that Stalin was not a dictator. If the CIA were to say that Stalin was not a dictator, but a captain of a team, it would help to suggest that Stalin was not a dictator. If there were different viewpoints in the Soviet government, it would help to suggest that Stalin was not a dictator. Each piece of evidence could be mentioned here.

The evidence that proves Trotsky had plotted to overthrow the government isn’t relevant to the point I am making and would only distract from the point. The point is that criticizing Stalin alone would not lead you to be punished.

Michael David-Fox’s criticism could be interpreted as criticism of lack of access to information and my main point is that each piece of evidence is not irreconcilably tied to one another. What this means is that you would need evidence of historians showing how the evidence I presented is incorrect. It’s important to avoid committing the fallacy of composition.

Oleg Khlevniuk’s point of Stalin enhancing his personal power does not mention whether this power centralization is consolidation into a dictatorship. It doesn't speak on Stalin's democratic tendencies. There would need to be more evidence to support this claim if this is a claim you’re making. The evidence regarding Efremov's words is a primary source but I would be interested if there were any historians who question the credibility of it. Atinoua (talk) 02:51, 1 September 2023 (UTC)

Once again you're conflating dictatorship with omnipotence or, at least, perfect efficiency in the state apparatus (for Stalin not being "in control of every decision made" apparently is proof he couldn't be a dictator.) As for criticism of Stalin by his colleagues, you yourself acknowledged that "dictators can sometimes tolerate criticism" and I've already noted in a past discussion on this page that however critical Molotov may have occasionally been in private conversations with Stalin, he himself later said "I think that if [Stalin] had remained alive another year, I would not have survived." (Molotov Remembers, p. 237.) Likewise it seems generally agreed among historians that Stalin also intended to target Mikoyan in his last months.

Plenty of historians will point out the use of violence in carrying out collectivization, and that much of the campaign was forced onto peasants who would otherwise not collectivize voluntarily. Moshe Lewin, Alec Nove (in his Economic History of the USSR), and the aforementioned Lynne Viola are three examples of such authors. But again, this has little to do with whether Stalin himself wielded dictatorial power.

The three "examples" you provide "to suggest that Stalin was not a dictator" are silly for reasons I've gone into before, both in this discussion and in a previous one on this talk page archived. Any criticism of Stalin you've been able to uncover was either clandestine (hence the "other factors" you bring up) or confined to inner circle figures like Molotov who, as noted, historians generally argue Stalin was moving against in his last months. "The CIA" did not say that Stalin wasn't a dictator, a single CIA document written not long after Stalin's death speculated that he was beholden to a collective leadership in his last years, a notion that is not accepted by modern historians, none of whom seem to attach any importance to that solitary document.

For the record, the point about Trotsky isn't whether he "plotted to overthrow the government" (his avowed aim after all, expressed publicly, was for a workers' revolution in the USSR.) The point was your charge that Trotsky "and his followers plotted and attempted to assassinate Stalin on multiple occasions," which has next to zero evidence in support of it. But you're right, this could be better addressed on some other talk page of an article you wish to make more "balanced," such as the Moscow Trials, or Trotsky's own page.

As for your claim that "criticizing Stalin alone would not lead you to be punished," where is your evidence for this outside an incredibly narrow circle of individuals at the highest ring of power? You still haven't answered my point which I will again reiterate: "If you have evidence that there was criticism of Stalin in, say, the Soviet press or at meetings of local soviets or what have you, go ahead and show it."

I'm not aware of any historian arguing that Webbs had a lack of access to information on the famine. From what I've read it seems they did have access to a reasonable amount of such information (such as the aforementioned Muggeridge) and preferred to place greater stock in Soviet sources which were denying a famine took place. But if you're going to argue they couldn't help but deny a famine occurred due to "lack of access to information," why should anyone trust that they had access to knowledge on the inner workings of the Politburo and Central Committee? Historians certainly don't seem to do so.

If Khlevniuk "does not mention whether this power centralization [in Stalin's last months] is consolidation into a dictatorship," there's a really simple reason for that, namely his view that "by late 1934, Stalin was already a dictator." (p. 137) --Ismail (talk) 22:08, 11 September 2023 (UTC)

Thanks for your reply. I need to reiterate that the change to “Stalin governed the country as part of a collective leadership, but centralized his power in later years.” is not a euphemism. It prevents the oversimplification of labeling him a dictator (and I don't mean an omnipotent leader) while still acknowledging changes in power. I am not, and have never tried to conflate dictator with omnipotence, This is one quote from me which shows this: "It is true that dictators can have influential advisors." Dictators sometimes acknowledging criticism does not mean that Stalin was a dictator. The point that I am trying to make with the fact that there was criticism of Stalin is that a collective democracy reflects this. There were various perspectives within their government that carried differing levels of weight and I even pointed out a few instances where Stalin’s perspective wasn’t carried out. If your standards are this high, I would like to know how exactly you would be able to tell the difference between a dictatorship and a democracy? If there are characteristics of each of these forms of government that we can find in a particular country, then that points towards that particular country having that form of government. For example, allowing other people to speak their opinion is a characteristic of a collective democracy. It’s not the deciding factor, but it is one factor.

I never argued that violence was not used, I was simply giving you the information in Tauger’s research. The lack of resistance to collectivization, and in the resistance that did exist, the lack of violence used to resolve those conflicts, may indicate a healthy (at the very least, not oppressive) relationship between the population and the government. This healthy relationship between people and the government is another characteristic of a democracy rather than a dictatorship.

Can you please explain further on why the evidence I presented is silly? Does it not prove these things? And the CIA document does say that the idea that Stalin was a dictator is exaggerated. Molotov’s speculations don’t mean much in this context unless there is evidence that Molotov believing Stalin was turning against him was a result of his criticism of Stalin and that criticism alone.

You write: “As for your claim that "criticizing Stalin alone would not lead you to be punished," where is your evidence for this outside an incredibly narrow circle of individuals at the highest ring of power?” I believe that the label of dictator is an oversimplification. It may be that there was little criticism of Stalin outside of the leaders, but that could easily be a result of his cult of personality and the extent to which the people loved him. It’s a bit like how you probably wouldn’t find criticism of Jesus in a church. My point though is that this criticism did exist, and that this nuance should be included.

Regarding the Webbs’, you’re right that they were deceived into denying the famine existed, and you need to remember that the source for this is a memory of someone else. As far as I’m aware, their writings were not primarily about the famine. Is there any evidence of historians arguing that the evidence I presented is false or uncritical, I would be interested in looking at that.

If Khlevniuk has provided any analysis of Efremov’s words, I would appreciate the opportunity to incorporate it into our discussion. If not, then I believe we should include the nuance of the situation, specifically the differing perspectives between the primary and secondary source evidence presented. I am willing to work on improving the suggestion and am looking forward to hearing your thoughts. Atinoua (talk) 23:12, 11 September 2023 (UTC)

You say it "is not a euphemism," yet if the bulk of sources on Stalin from academics and other materials Wikipedia considers reliable do consider him as having become a dictator at some point, to say he merely "centralized his power" is tantamount to euphemism, because it's saying indiscreetly what ought to be made explicit to the reader. The fact you don't think Stalin was ever a dictator is irrelevant unless you admit you want this article to reflect your personal views rather than what Wikipedia considers reliable sources. Likewise a discussion on "the difference between a dictatorship and a democracy" is out of place here, and would better be discussed on my (or your) talk page or even outside Wikipedia altogether.

I pointed out you were selectively quoting Tauger's article, and as I've mentioned before the bulk of authors on the USSR who have written on Soviet collectivization emphasize how a great deal was based on coercion rather than persuasion, so that even if Tauger thought collectivization was a largely voluntary process (which, as far as I'm aware, he doesn't) he'd still be easily outflanked by tons of other authorities. Aside from those I've already named, I could name plenty more, such as Maurice Hindus who was in the countryside during the process and whose books are widely quoted. "In all [Stalin's] pronouncements on the subject and in all the accounts that have been published in [Soviet] textbooks on ideology and history, the myth is maintained that peasants joined the collectives voluntarily and gladly, and that only kulaks battled against it. . . Collectivizers—many of them young Komsomols—didn't argue [with the peasants], but acted at Stalin's command." (Hindus, House Without A Roof: Russia After Forty-Three Years of Revolution, 1961, p. 219)

I think I've sufficiently explained why your "examples" are silly in the way you employ them. Molotov's "speculations" are important for this discussion because they seem to be backed up by most historians, in the sense that these historians concur Stalin was seemingly turning against him (and if Stalin could have his subordinates arrested or killed on nonsense charges, that certainly isn't the mark of someone beholden to a collective leadership, no matter how much Molotov may have dissented from Stalin in private conversations.) And your use of a solitary CIA document is silly because it's torn from all context and used in the face of subsequent authors who have access to far more information on the internal workings of the Soviet leadership than the CIA employee(s) in question had. The fact you dismiss Molotov's words as "speculations" but have not the slightest reservation about citing the CIA document in question is telling.

Even if you want to argue that there was "little criticism" because Stalin was so beloved among the people (which, to be sure, isn't entirely unfounded; plenty of citizens blamed underlings for policies Stalin himself was responsible for), we weren't talking about how much public criticism of Stalin existed among the mass of the population. We were talking about whether public criticism of Stalin would be punished by the authorities. If there was indeed "little criticism of Stalin outside of the leaders," then you ought to bring examples of this "little criticism."

If you affirm that the Webbs were "deceived" (I'd say the evidence suggests they preferred to deceive themselves, but anyway...), why immediately try to walk back on it by claiming "that the source for this is a memory of someone else"? Muggeridge's memory of talking to the Webbs isn't the only source we have, hence for instance their own diaries as mentioned by subsequent authors. In any case, the Webbs' Soviet Communism is presented as a sort of compendium of information on Soviet society from its political and economic systems to its health services, educational facilities, etc., all seeking to demonstrate the "new civilization" being born on Soviet soil. I fail to see how the two volumes not being "primarily about the famine" is relevant given that we were discussing how the Webbs' book is seen as almost comically uncritical, and a failure to acknowledge there was a famine in the Ukraine is a telling sign of that, nor is it the only sign.

It is not up to you (or me, of course) to have the article changed based on our personal opinions. If you think Efremov's interpretation is legitimate, you ought to find historians who agree with you so that you can cite them, or alternatively turn yourself into what Wikipedia considers a reliable source (e.g. getting your arguments published in an academic journal.) --Ismail (talk) 14:12, 29 September 2023 (UTC)

The suggestion explicitly says that Stalin centralized his power. I agree that in order for our article to be balanced, we must include all reliable evidence. This also includes the evidence that Stalin merely centralized his power, not transitioned into a dictatorship. The next point you made was that “the fact that I don't think Stalin was a dictator is irrelevant” and I agree and am not arguing from my personal perspective. Personal bias should be put to the side and our article should reflect what the sources say. Instead of a suggestion being on the basis of personal beliefs, the suggestions should be on the basis of evidence presented. A discussion on dictatorship and democracy is important in this context because the question is directly related to dictatorship. My perspective is that to avoid an oversimplification of history, which hurts the balance of our article, we need to take a cautious approach to this question.

With regards to Tauger's article, the only thing that I had quoted was the relevant information regarding the extent that collectivization was resisted. It was because you had said that the Soviet government “frequently resorted to force and violence” and according to Tauger, they didn’t. You write that “even if Tauger thought collectivization was a largely voluntary process he'd still be easily outflanked by tons of other authorities.” However, this is not the process for resolving this kind of conflict through Wikipedia. Instead of dismissing Tauger because he is “easily outflanked by tons of other authorities”, we should “...describe both points of view and work for balance.”.

You say “I think I've sufficiently explained why your "examples" are silly in the way you employ them.” but the points that you make are abstracting the sources to what they are not and then arguing against that faulty abstraction. This is what I have explained throughout my replies to your comments. Abstract criticism is okay, but it runs the risk of being fallacious. If there is more concrete criticism, I would greatly appreciate hearing it so we can work together towards improving our article. You also write that “Molotov's "speculations" are important for this discussion because they seem to be backed up by most historians” but this is not a correct analysis of my perspective. My perspective is that there needs to be evidence that Molotov’s speculations are a result of his criticism of Stalin in order for his speculations to be proof that Molotov had not freely criticized Stalin without punishment from Stalin. However, you are right to say that the CIA document is “torn from all context” which means that we must analyze this more cautiously. You write that I have “not the slightest reservation about citing the CIA document” but this is incorrect. For example, I previously had written “If the CIA were to say that Stalin was not a dictator, but a captain of a team, it would help to suggest that Stalin was not a dictator.” I am not directly saying that it’s undeniable. To clarify my view: The document itself says that Stalin is not a dictator, and the context is unknown. The context is unknown. Does it make sense that there would be such an error that the evidence explicitly saying Stalin was not a dictator but the context means that he is?

You also write: “If there was indeed "little criticism of Stalin outside of the leaders," then you ought to bring examples of this "little criticism.” However, the question was based on the assumption that there were not many people criticizing Stalin. Whether it was out of fear or not, it doesn’t matter here. The better question is whether the criticism that did exist would be punished, as you pointed out. Like I mentioned earlier, you probably wouldn’t find criticism of Jesus in a church. We do see evidence that, at the least, there were officials who actively criticized Stalin and were not punished for it. To be fair though, you can make the point that despite this explicit criticism of Stalin that existed within the party, this fact does not necessarily apply to the mass population and therefore more evidence would have to be presented.

You write that “If you affirm that the Webbs were "deceived", why immediately try to walk back on it by claiming "that the source for this is a memory of someone else"?” Can you please explain how I am walking back? To clarify, I am not saying that there is only a source for the Webbs being deceived. I am saying that the primary source for Sidney Webb having made this statement: “How vile appear the legends spread about famine and poverty in the USSR after this!” is from the memory of the tour guide. You say: “I fail to see how the two volumes not being "primarily about the famine" is relevant given that we were discussing how the Webbs' book is seen as almost comically uncritical, and a failure to acknowledge there was a famine in the Ukraine is a telling sign of that, nor is it the only sign.” The reason this is relevant is because the explanation for why the Webbs is unreliable is because Sidney Webb allegedly said that there was no famine. That is the extent that the evidence presented thus far has analyzed the reliability of the Webbs. You did mention that there is other evidence as well so please share the documents proving that the evidence I presented is unreliable.

Lastly, I agree with you that our article should not be changed based on our personal opinions. It’s important that our article is backed by reliable sources. Efremov's interpretation is a primary source, and it should be taken with caution as I have yet to find any reliable secondary sources publish analysis of it. Nevertheless, Wikipedia’s standards say that “All analyses and interpretive or synthetic claims about primary sources must be referenced to a secondary or tertiary source” which is why my explanation for this change is based on various secondary and primary source pieces of evidence. If there are other sources from other members who attended this meeting, it might help build a better picture. Interested in hearing your response! Thank you! Atinoua (talk) 22:00, 30 September 2023 (UTC)

And again, to say Stalin merely "centralized his power" is insufficient. The bulk of sources identify him as having become a dictator. You are trying to replace mentions of him having become a dictator with mentions of him having just "centralized his power." If the intention is for more "neutral" wording then it just ends up being a politer-sounding euphemism for dictator. If it's actually meant to suggest he did not become a dictator, then it constitutes you trying to make the article adopt a fringe position.

The sources you cite either do not address this question (and therefore you put your personal interpretation on them) or are considered unreliable at best (such as the Webbs' book.)

I am not "dismissing" Tauger, I am taking issue with your idiosyncratic and selective interpetation of an article he wrote, and making the point that even if he did not think that force and violence were frequently employed in collectivization, it would make no sense to "balance" his singular position (if he actually held it) with the vast majority of works on collectivization.

Whether "Molotov’s speculations are a result of his criticism of Stalin" is irrelevant. You are the one claiming that disagreement in Stalin's inner circle must be evidence that Stalin wasn't a dictator, a view that seems to be your own, as you've given no authorities who are willing to back you up on this. My point in citing Molotov is that you were claiming Stalin was merely part of a collective leadership (at most admitting some "centralization" in his last years), yet Molotov thought that if Stalin had not died, Molotov himself would likely have been killed. That doesn't sound like the mark of a collective leadership, given that the other members of said leadership weren't exactly eager to seek Molotov's demise as far as I can recall from books written by Sheila Fitzpatrick and others.

As for the CIA document, again, you showed no hesitation in citing it. Personally I'd say whoever wrote that document had no way of knowing the internal workings of the Soviet leadership. It certainly doesn't indicate any source for its information, nor as far as I know is its conclusion backed up by subsequent CIA materials. It could very well be yet another instance of faulty analysis from an intelligence agency. That no historians of the USSR attach any weight to it is instructive.

If you want to conflate lack of criticism of Jesus Christ in a church with lack of public criticism of Stalin in a country of over 150 million people beset with all sorts of problems originating from policies enacted by Stalin and friends, you can do so, but I will continue to rely on innumerable authors who write to the effect that such criticism was uttered in hushed tones lest those making it be arrested. Writing that "there were officials who actively criticized Stalin and were not punished for it" also seems misleading, because practically any such criticism was in a purely private setting among Stalin's close associates, which is different from "explicit criticism of Stalin [existing] within the party" (unless "the party" just means a handful of individuals at its top.)

Again, the evidence for the Webbs being deceived (or self-deceived) isn't dependent on Muggeridge nor "the memory of the tour guide." To write that "the explanation for why the Webbs is unreliable is because Sidney Webb allegedly said that there was no famine" shows you haven't even read one of the books you've previously cited. In the first volume of Soviet Communism there is a section titled "Was there a Famine in the USSR in 1931-32?" in which Sidney and Beatrice Webb conclude the answer is no, based in part due to what "soviet officials on the spot" told them during their two visits to the USSR. There is no "allegation" here. --Ismail (talk) 20:15, 12 October 2023 (UTC)

You make the argument that "The bulk of sources identify him as having become a dictator." as a reason for why Stalin's democratic tendencies should not be included in our article. The goes against a suggestion found in WP:CONFLICTING which says "Do not choose which [source] is "true" and discard the others as incorrect, except in the unusual instance that one source can be demonstrated to be factually erroneous". The problem is that you're taking instances outside of the evidence I am sharing and abstracting them to try and dismiss the evidence entirely.

The intention is to have a more balanced and neutral perspective, and we should include all reliable evidence, even if it doesn't fit nicely with the "bulk of sources". If the evidence is there, so should our article.

Regarding Tauger, you wrote earlier that Tauger is "outflanked by tons of other authorities" which is the same mistake being made above. You now write "it would make no sense to "balance" his singular position with the vast majority of works on collectivization." which again makes the same mistake.

You then write that "Whether "Molotov’s speculations are a result of his criticism of Stalin" is irrelevant." Followed almost immediately by "Molotov thought that if Stalin had not died, Molotov himself would likely have been killed." This is another error because Molotov's speculations would only be relevant if the basis of these speculations is his criticism of Stalin.

I agree that the CIA document alone is not conclusive evidence that Stalin was not a dictator, but the fact that the document put so much emphasis into saying that Stalin was not a dictator despite the commonly held belief that he is leads me to ask the question: Does it make sense that there would be such an error that the author would explicitly say Stalin was not a dictator but the context is that he is? How many secret informants and spies did the CIA have in the USSR at the time? This might help to contextualize the document more. But ultimately, I would be interested in what historians have to say about it.

The next point you make was "Writing that "there were officials who actively criticized Stalin and were not punished for it" also seems misleading, because practically any such criticism was in a purely private setting among Stalin's close associates, which is different from "explicit criticism of Stalin [existing] within the party" (unless "the party" just means a handful of individuals at its top.)" I get your point here, and I think it's important to clarify the nuance. Different pieces of evidence I listed reflect that it's not only those at the top who criticized Stalin although the one referring to Molotov happens to be his closest allies.

The evidence for Webb saying that there's no way a famine could exist is sources to the memory of a tour guide. I was referring to your evidence presented here when making that statement: “How vile appear the legends spread about famine and poverty in the USSR after this!” If you are going to say the evidence that I had presented in evidence 12, 16, and 17 is inaccurate, please show directly why it's inaccurate. To put this in context, I cannot dismiss everything Robert Conquest has ever written on the basis of an error. We need to look at historians' analysis of this error specifically before making the decision to add/remove something from the article.

I also want to reiterate that our article should not be changed based on our personal opinions. It’s important that our article is backed by reliable sources. Efremov's notes are a primary source, and I believe this source, and other primary and secondary sources demand that our article, at the least, reflects this evidence and analyses. If my revised suggestion continues to be something you disagree with, I am open to continue to revise it until we can agree on a solution. Atinoua (talk) 21:16, 12 October 2023 (UTC)

I waited for over a month to see if anyone else wanted to chime in defending your notion that Stalin never acquired dictatorial power. Evidently the answer is no.

WP:CONFLICTING does not apply in this discussion since the "conflict" involves one user trying to put forward his or her notion that Stalin never became a dictator. For example, you cite materials from a book by Getty and use this to argue that Stalin was not a dictator, even though Getty himself has described Stalin as a dictator numerous times in his works. You can certainly argue Getty is wrong if you'd like, but Getty is considered a reliable source by Wikipedia standards, whereas you and I are not. Hiding behind "reliable evidence" won't do you any good when you are the one assembling the evidence and reaching the conclusions. It's why WP:OR exists.

To insert the claim that Stalin never became a dictator is not a "balanced or neutral perspective." It is a WP:FRINGE perspective. To claim that Stalin was capable of listening to his associates and of being occasionally frustrated in attempting to impose his will is perfectly reasonable and well within the historiographical literature, but this wasn't your goal as anyone can see who reads your original post.

I reiterate that I am not "dismissing" Tauger. I am taking issue with how you are using him.

I have already noted that if Stalin had the power to have Molotov murdered, that would suggest a quite imbalanced relationship between him and a collective leadership he was ostensibly beholden to. That is the relevance of me citing Molotov, because I'd assume that matters more (in terms of estimating Stalin's personal power) than if Molotov was able to privately disagree with Stalin on some issue.

Wikipedia's pages aren't for asking questions about the subject of an article. You should be able to receive help for your homework ("How many secret informants and spies did the CIA have in the USSR at the time?") elsewhere. Not to mention your reply is all but admitting your primary source could be utterly worthless in light of what historians now know, but you put it forward anyway because of your overriding interest in dredging up whatever impressive-sounding sources you can to push through a fringe position.

You write "it's not only those at the top who criticized Stalin" but I'm still waiting for examples.

I've already explained why the Webbs are an unreliable source when it comes to the inner workings of Stalin's circle, and how historians have a low opinion of the Webbs' book on the USSR. I brought up their attitude toward the Ukrainian famine as an oft-cited example of how utterly unreliable they can be as sources of information on Soviet life. If you had actually read the Webbs' book, you would know full well that the sources for Sidney Webb denying a famine occurred aren't limited to a remark recalled by a tour guide. That you singled out this remark can easily imply that you either had no idea the Webbs' wrote at some length denying the famine in their book, or deliberately ignored that they did so because it was inconvenient for your attempt to argue the book is a reliable source. --Ismail (talk) 06:20, 22 November 2023 (UTC)

You should be polite and respectful, instead of acting condescending and foolish. It only diminishes your credibility, and makes it seem like your arguments are based on emotions rather than facts. 46.214.153.138 (talk) 18:30, 10 January 2024 (UTC)

I would say Atinoua is the one acting foolish in this discussion, hiding behind a "just-asking-questions" veneer to push clumsy Stalin apologetics and cherrypicking sources toward that end, as I'd say I have demonstrated tolerably well. --Ismail (talk) 02:31, 11 January 2024 (UTC)

You can carefully select evidence challenging the mainstream view, expressed in the Encyclopedia Britannica, that "dictator Joseph Stalin probably exercised greater political power than any other figure in history." But it is my understanding that the widespread scholarly consensus is that Stalin became a dictator at some point during his leadership. I think Wikipedia, like other encyclopedias, should probably reflect that consensus. I don't think it's wrong to refer to him as a dictator when that's what sources also call him. Correct me if I'm mistaken in my assumptions. 1101 (talk) 02:52, 11 January 2024 (UTC)

References

Semi-protected edit request on 27 February 2024

This phrase in the introduction can be a little unclear:

To eradicate accused "enemies of the working class"

Please replace it with:

To eradicate those deemed "enemies of the working class"

"Accused" means people who were accused of this, but it can be misread as a verb (garden-path sentence) and confuse the reader. 123.51.107.94 (talk) 22:28, 27 February 2024 (UTC)

 Done Jamedeus (talk) 23:03, 27 February 2024 (UTC)

Semi-protected edit request on 27 February 2024 (2)

Please remove this sentence:

In April, Stalin came third in the Bolshevik elections for the party's Central Committee; Lenin came first and Zinoviev came second.

and replace it with this:

In April, Stalin came third in the Bolshevik elections for the party's Central Committee, after Lenin and Zinoviev.

It's simpler, and Lenin's and Zinoviev's places are obvious from the structure. 123.51.107.94 (talk) 00:32, 28 February 2024 (UTC)

I'm not sure about this one - it creates slight ambiguity about who won, which is an important detail. I agree that it's fairly obvious, but I could see readers approaching the topic for the first time being confused. There is no linked page where they could confirm the answer, and all the citations are books, so it may be best to state this explicitly. Jamedeus (talk) 01:09, 28 February 2024 (UTC)

 Not done for now: please establish a consensus for this alteration before using the {{Edit semi-protected}} template. —TechnoSquirrel69 (sigh) 05:51, 29 February 2024 (UTC)

Edit request on March 3, 2024

Hello! In this article Josef Vissarionovich Stalin's name is spelled with a "ph" instead of an "f" at the end. I understand this is the translation of the name, but it is important to know that, and it is not mentioned in this article. It is a popular error, but important to note. I would change the title from "Joseph Stalin" to "Josef (Joseph) Vissarionovich Stalin" -middle name optional. Thank you so much! Oli&Dove (talk) 16:30, 3 March 2024 (UTC)

"Joseph" is used much more commonly in English-language works, and English-translated material published in the Soviet Union likewise tended to use Joseph rather than Josef, Iosif, or other variations. --Ismail (talk) 16:49, 3 March 2024 (UTC)

Wikipedia:Be bold - Wikipedia 2600:1700:1150:41B0:F810:8FAA:661A:9542 (talk) 01:56, 25 April 2024 (UTC)

Georgian-born in the lede

Why should “Georgian-born” not be included in the lede? “Soviet” was not his nationality by birth. Other leaders of the WW2 era all have their nationalities in the lede of their articles such as Adolf Hitler, Winston Churchill, Franklin D. Roosevelt, Benito Mussolini and so on. Why should Joseph Stalin’s nationality be excluded from the lede? “Soviet” included way more than just Georgians. Erroneously people think that Soviet equals Russian which was not the case at all. Stalin was proud of his Georgian roots and there’s no reason to exclude his nationality from the lede of the article about him. QueenCoatsie (talk) 15:48, 21 May 2024 (UTC)

I agree, but look at the archives: this has been discussed many times.--Jack Upland (talk) 03:49, 22 May 2024 (UTC)

A clear consensus for "Soviet" was reached in the last discussion at Talk:Joseph Stalin/Archive 24#RfC on nationality in lead, where editors correctly cited MOS:ETHNICITY as a reason that his Georgian origin should only be introduced in the second paragraph of the lead. — Goszei (talk) 17:03, 23 May 2024 (UTC)

Warfarin poisoning

I know this topic was already broached a few years ago on the TP. Currently the article states that "According to a report published in The New York Times, Stalin was poisoned with warfarin by his own Politburo members." While this story is supported by some medical sources (https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4524003/), another more recent medical analysis published in 2023 claims that "It appears highly unlikely that Stalin was poisoned by warfarin or a similar class of anti-coagulant." (https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10105823/) It might be worth pointing out that the Warfarin theory is at least disputed, although perhaps this is best left to the "Death and state funeral of Joseph Stalin" page. 2A00:23C7:9992:E701:8814:AAAD:270:C5D8 (talk) 21:33, 19 March 2024 (UTC)

I think this should all be moved to the Death article.--Jack Upland (talk) 03:10, 21 March 2024 (UTC)

The NYT report actually only teasers the book Stalin's Last Crime by Brent and Naumov. So at least the thesis should be correctly attributed to those two authors. Assayer (talk) 09:17, 11 April 2024 (UTC)

Support a move to the Death article. Firefangledfeathers (talk / contribs) 13:20, 11 April 2024 (UTC)

Should the "death cause" in the infobox be kept? It seems worth mentioning. SavagePanda845 (talk) 22:48, 6 June 2024 (UTC)

Typo found, June 2024

"he rarely left Moscow unless to go a dacha for holiday" to go to a dacha, right?

Under personal life and characteristics. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 2A02:8388:1740:E80:11C7:C175:A889:26E5 (talk) 17:45, 12 June 2024 (UTC)

Fixed; thank you. Antandrus (talk) 17:52, 12 June 2024 (UTC)

Edit warring about nicknames

@Mouchkjhh: You've been edit warring with others for several days over Stalin's nicknames. Can you please invite the several others who have reverted your repeated changes to discuss this here?

Someone should look for relevant guidance in, e.g., Wikipedia:Manual of Style, regarding whether the nicknames should be in quotes.

In addition, do you have a reference that lists "The Man of Steel" as a nickname? If yes, that needs to be cited HERE as well as with any further introductions of that term into this article.

Thanks for your contributions to Wikipedia:Prime objective, to build "a world in which every single person on the planet is given free access to the sum of all human knowledge." DavidMCEddy (talk) 07:17, 28 August 2024 (UTC)

This editor is being discussed at Wikipedia:Administrators' noticeboard/Incidents#Disruptive edits in politics-related articles. GA-RT-22 (talk) 00:29, 31 August 2024 (UTC)

Linking subdivisions

Hi @Nikkimaria, does linking "Tiflis Governorate" and "Russian SFSR" really violate MOS:GEOLINK? Tbh, I find the links useful because both subdivisions no longer exist. I mean, I'd argue that none of the examples in MOS:GEOLINK include a subdivision that no longer exists. Thedarkknightli (talk) 03:05, 19 September 2024 (UTC)

I'd argue it would be better to simply give city and country, particularly in the case of Moscow. Nikkimaria (talk) 03:08, 19 September 2024 (UTC)

Thanks for your timely reply, @Nikkimaria! Tbh, I agree with your opinion (as MOS:INFOBOXPURPOSE states, "... information should be presented in a short format, wherever possible, and exclude unnecessary content"). Thedarkknightli (talk) 03:26, 19 September 2024 (UTC)

Hi Thedarkknightli, I would like to remove Soviet republics from the infobox, this will affect Russians, Ukrainians, and other former Soviet entities, including Vladimir Putin, Mikhail Mishustin, Volodymyr Zelenskyy and Alexander Lukashenko. 38.137.203.10 (talk) 22:47, 23 September 2024 (UTC)

Well no. Changing them to ie. Russia, would be factually wrong as Russia did not exist at the time in a form that we know it as of today. A09|(talk) 14:52, 24 September 2024 (UTC)