Talk:Cyprus/Archive 3
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Education section cleanup?
I find that the "Education in Cyprus" section is in need for some cleanup, maybe even a rewrite. Some things quoted there (for example, that the Greek education system is being followed by GC schools) are simply wrong, while the language used could use some cleanup. I don't feel capable of doing this myself, not only because of my not-so-good English. Could someone with sufficient knowledge in the subject please volunteer?
Also, a final request: Please stop the vandalism! I just spent 10 minutes removing several irrelevant mentions of the term "Northern Cyprus" from the text. I know the political problem can cause many people loose their cool headedness, but this is getting ridiculous. It also eventually turns the article into a mess. --Respiridus 14:36, 28 October 2006 (UTC)
I think this is an important issue and would like it to be included in the main text of the article
Politics of the EU and the exclusion of the Northern Turkish Cypriots Since Cyprus entered the EU, the Republic of Cyprus government has spoken for both sides of the Island (even though EU acquis has been suspened in the North). Northern Turkish Cypriots are classed as EU citizens.
Unfortunatly the Turkish Cypriots living in the North do not get to vote, they can partipate in EU educational programmes, but without Republic of Cyprus validation of northern Cyprus universities then Turkish Cypriots cannot in fact participate, Turkish is not an officail EU lanaguage, which is a barrier to them passing concours (Exams to become a EU officails).
The Republic of Cyprus government would argue that the Turkish Cypriots exclude themselves, but they voted for the Annan plan. It was the vote against by the Greek Cypriots which lead to this situation and the exclusion of the people of the North from the democratic institutions of the EU. As the EU is commited to democracy then there is a wider problem beyond that of the politics of the Island
The following is an extract from a paper published by Friends of Europe, a EU thinktank.
"It is the Cypriot 'catch-22'. Without a comprehensive settlement – for which the Turkish Cypriots voted two years ago – they have no democratic voice. They cannot force the Greek Cypriot side to come seriously back to the negotiating table. Meanwhile, the Greek Cypriots say they (the Turkish Cypriots) cannot have democratic representation within the EU today unless they give in totally to Greek Cypriot demands and become a minority within the Republic of Cyprus without a settlement."
What do people think?
--SolDrury 12:57, 8 September 2006 (UTC)
Two references
Under the section under general information, there are two links to Cyprus-conflict.net Good though the site is, I don't think it warrentees two links. --SolDrury 12:35, 8 September 2006 (UTC)
State/Island split
This may have been discussed numerous times before... if it has, slap me, and I apologise... but why is this article not split into one about the island and one about the Republic of Cyprus? At the moment, it feels a little confused when trying to be both at once. --Robdurbar 10:35, 16 May 2006 (UTC)
- No shooting necessary. Quote from the article:
- "The Republic of Cyprus is the internationally-recognised government of the Republic of Cyprus, that controls the southern two-thirds of the island. Turkey aside, all foreign governments and the United Nations recognise the sovereignty of the Republic of Cyprus over the whole island of Cyprus."
- Covered? NikoSilver (T) @ (C) 10:46, 16 May 2006 (UTC)
Oh, I understand that and I can see how it could be interpreted as making a political statement if we split the articles, so I'm not wanting to force this. But at the same time, if the articles were split, it would leave the state one free to discuss its internal politics, demographics etc. without the constant reference to the political conflict which could then be mentioned on the page for the island. --Robdurbar 11:04, 16 May 2006 (UTC)
- Ok, but I imagine it would do more harm than good. I don't know what you may have in mind, but I can't think of many serious issues that would substantiate the existance of an Island article. If there are any, they can all still be included in this one in different sections, without any special political conflict references all the time. See the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia precedent (poll) on how the name dispute was handled: There's a mentioning in the intro (like here) and a separate Name dispute section (like here too). NikoSilver (T) @ (C) 11:20, 16 May 2006 (UTC)
K, was just wondering. --Robdurbar 13:00, 16 May 2006 (UTC)
- No problem, I may be wrong, anyway. That was just my first non-elaborated opinion. NikoSilver (T) @ (C) 14:11, 16 May 2006 (UTC)
Short paragraph in the Geography section
I was just reading through the article and came across this two-sentence paragraph in the Geography section: "The central plain (Mesaoria) with the Kyrenia and Pentadactylos mountains to the north and the Troodos mountain range to the south and west. There are also scattered but significant plains along the southern coast." I don't really feel qualified to edit it myself, but that just sounds like its missing some link to explain why that it is just thrown out there. Blinutne 04:02, 30 May 2006 (UTC)
Political Division
"In July 1974, after a coup, Turkey invaded Cyprus and has ever since occupied the northern part."
The coup is mentioned almost as a passing afterthought - why are important details being brushed over? Are you creating an encyclopaedia page or a campaign brochure?
Who carried out the coup, the Smurfs? Now I am sure you will say that has been covered in other sections, but the attempt to minimalise unpalatable truths while repeating the aspects that suit you superfluously makes a mockery of the entire page;.
It would be very useful if people making comments on objectivity vs. non objectivity could voice a specific recommendation. The coup in Cyprus was initiated by the Greek dictatorship (Junta) present in Greece at the time, in co-ordination with the Turkish generals and supported by the UK Foreign Office and Henry Kissinger. The operation of the Turkish army has been labeled by the International Community through numerous UN Resolutions as an invasion that is illegal so it is hardly under dispute (except by Turkey). This is well documented elsewhere and doesn't change at all the content of the document. Please be specific if you have real edits, together with some real information documenting what change you would like to see and exactly why.
- I'm a bit confused by your reference to the coup. Are you saying it was legal or acceptable? Clearly it was not and the fact that it was supported by other outside forces further suggests it was an attempted interference by these forces in to Cyprus. Furthermore, it is a fact, that even though the invasion may not have been justified, it was in fact proceded end this coup and restoration of democracy (of course, maybe this would have happeneded anyway). While this does not excuse the Turkish later actions, this does not change that fact. Also I can find not reference to your claim that the Turkish generals were involved in the planning of the coup on wikipedia. Nil Einne 09:04, 1 August 2006 (UTC)
Hello all, I have just add some lines about Turkey's military intervention and subsequent occupation in the introductory description. Sentences was also shaped similiarly in what by BBC and CIA The World factbook says and Cyprus government present in the MFA webpage. --mcyp 17:25, 2 August 2006 (UTC)
Regional variation of Greek language
The island was under Venetian control for four and a half centuries (1204 to 1669), far longer than it was ruled by the Ottoman Empire. Does anyone know of whether the Greek language spoken there shows influence of Venetian-dialect Italian? Dogru144 13:41 28 July 2006 (UTC)
Cypriots, like Cretans, throw around the word "Che" constantly when they speak, which is not Greek and is presumably Italian. They also have some phonemes in their dialects, such as "j" which do not exist in Greek but do exist in Italians, so there is definetely an Italian influence in these dialects. -Kwstis
Turkish Cypriots also has a distinct dialect which is quite original. But introduction of many sattlers from mainland this distict dialect is endangered.
--mcyp 19:33, 1 August 2006 (UTC)
Emotive Language
Even the briefest of glances through the article is sufficient to see this page is being used as an opportunity to campaign. For examples sake, this is hardly encyclopaedic language:
"but they are widely resented by Turkish Cypriots who regard them as Anatolian undesireables."
In its present form, this page fails to adhere to even the loosest standards of objectivity.
== Worth a re-write by someone in the know ? No it is not worth a re-write.
It's clear that there are nuances in the history of the island of Cyprus that lead an article such as this to be better written by someone who understands those nuances.
However, I do suggest a re-write, not only to get the political balance right (which is fairly self-evidently needed anyway), but also to try to get a proper balance between the geography and the political. What I mean is that the word "Cyprus" is the name of an island. However, the majority of this article deals with a country called the "Republic of Cyprus", which is different. It's fine to try to merge things together (it might be difficult otherwise!), but the way things stand, there is too much fudging of language going on, when more clarity would be good.
A specific: the opening paragraph of this article stated that Cyprus is a member of the EU. I changed this to read that the Republic of Cyprus is a member (because, never mind the "TRNC" issue, Cyprus is an island and not a country, and they are not the same thing as the UK SBAs are not a part of the EU).
This may be hugely pedantic of me, but I thought I'd jot it down here, just in the hope that other pedants can agree with me. Alas, I am not one in the know if the nuances of the history, and whilst I could make a bash at getting the balance right, as I have described above, I am not in a good place to start I think. Thoughts from others ? --Phillip Fung 11:49, 18 July 2006 (UTC)
This is rather pedantic of you; but the bottom line is Cyprus the island falls under one category in the international arena and that is the Republic of Cyprus. Nearly all nations recognise that the Republic of Cyprus has jurisdiction over the enitre island therefore there is no need to refer to the article as anything else but Cyprus; as the Republic of Cyprus is representitive of the whole island; and as a matter of fact the english bases are LEASED to the United kingdom.
Referendum
- In considering the outcome it is interesting to note that whilst the Turkish settlers (who make up the majority in the occupied north) were allowed to vote, the refugees who had fled Cyprus had no right to vote in a referendum which would ultimately determine their future (their right to return and right to their property).
I changed colonists to settlers but still feel this line, which is not even referenced is not NPOV. Nil Einne 08:37, 1 August 2006 (UTC)
Addendum to read.
THE CYPRUS CONFLICT AND THE QUESTION OF IDENTITY By Muzaffer YILMAZ
ABSTRACT: This article examines the ongoing conflict on Cyprus between Greek and Turkish ethnic groups in the context of identity problem and ties the essence of the issue to the absence of Cypriot identity. The reasons inhibiting the development of distinct Cypriot identity are discussed through a historic lens and future peace efforts that may be helpful to overcome this problem are addressed. In this respect, the UN and other third-parties are suggested to act to be responsive to the identity problem on the island; instead of being “pushy” to make the parties reach a quick solution not fit the realities of Cyprus.
First Published by Review of International Law and Politics (RILP-UHP), Vol. 1, No. 4, 2005
INTRODUCTION
Since the negotiated accession to independence in 1960, the Mediterranean island of Cyprus, also known as the birthplace of Aphrodite, the goddess of love, has ironically turned into a battle ground between the Greek and Turkish ethnic groups. Although the physical separation of the two communities by the 1974 Turkish intervention has reduced inter-communal violence to a great extent, the conflict has continued to date.
The actions of the Turkish military are correctly described as an INVASION which resulted in the forcible displacement of 200,000 refugees, the killing of 20,000 Cypriots, as well as over 1,500 who are still missing. The pretext was to restore the Republic of Cyprus of 1960, the governemnt of which was toppled by a coup supported by the Junta of Greece. This restoration never happened. Inter-communal violence has been 'reduced' because all inter-communal relations were impossible due to the forced exchange of populations.
From an international perspective, the Cyprus conflict needs to be resolved, for in its over forty-year stalemate, the conflict not only weakens the credibility of the international community to deal with intra-state conflicts, which have gradually replaced the Cold War’s ideological clashes as the principal sources of post-Cold War conflicts, but also intensifies the pessimistic belief that two ethnic communities cannot co-exist under a single state. Certainly, this does not fit the optimistic agenda of the “new world order” of the 21st century.
The ongoing conflict on Cyprus can be said to offer a “laboratory” to the international community for the new world order. If a resolution succeeds, the new Cypriot state would a model to which many other nations and peoples will look to guide the resolution of their own conflicts and ethnic tensions. For this reason, acting on behalf of the international community, the United Nations (UN) has always given a special importance to the Cyprus problem and UN Secretary Generals put great efforts to resolve the issue. The latest, and perhaps the most popular, example is Kofi Annan’s peace plan, which, indeed, generated great hopes for the international community as it received a certain degree of support from some Cypriots, as well as Athens and Ankara. It also succeeded in arranging a referendum on April 24, 2004 between the parties for the first time. But the result of the referendum was not positive as the majority of the Greek Cypriots rejected the plan.
Albeit well-intended mostly, the general UN efforts, however, have failed to grasp the identity problem on Cyprus, specifically the lack of Cypriot identity; hence the utility of peace efforts remained limited. This article specifically draws attention to this essential problem and alerts that a durable solution to the prolonged Cyprus problem can be feasible only if a Cypriot identity is successfully generated. The Cypriot identity under question does not necessarily erase, or clash with, Greek or Turkish identities of the communities, but must be understood as an overarching definition of ethnicity fostered by sharing a common land and history of togetherness.
Of course, the special emphasis on the issue of identity is not to argue that the conflict is free of other problems. Differing legal and political opinions, concern for losing or gaining power, outside interventions related to the need to keep a balance of power and similar other “real world” issues are certainly present in the conflict. But it is also true that the dictates of such issues do not actually explain the emotional refusal of the Cypriot Greeks and Turks to utilize the benefits of togetherness. It is the assumption of this works that as long as a state, or a political organization, is supported by the majority, neither domestic power struggles nor external influences, which, in fact, are inherent in politics everywhere, can harm the political structure to the extent of failure. On Cyprus, the real problem has been, and still is, the lack of majority identifying themselves as Cypriots. In the absence of such support, the Cypriot state did not survive and perhaps will not survive in the future unless this identity issue is successfully overcome. This article discusses the reasons inhibiting the development of Cypriot identity and addresses several strategies that might be helpful in generating it. The latter focus of the article, thus, intends to show the direction that future peace efforts on the island should follow.
THE REASONS AND CONDITIONS BEHIND THE LACK OF CYPRIOT IDENTITY:
A HISTORIC OVERVIEW
The history of Cyprus reveals that the Turks came to the island as early as 1571, when the island was taken from the Venetians by the Ottomans. The Ottomans abolished feudalism and serfdom, terminating the Latin persecution of the Greek-speaking Christians as well. They officially recognized the Greek Orthodox Church as an autocephalous, self governing Archbishopric. Under the millet system, Greek Cypriots enjoyed self-government, mainly through the church, which regulated their social, educational, and religious affairs.
This article attempts to examine the issue of identity in Cyprus IN THE PAST. It is all very well to consider the roots of the Cypriot people, but the writer conveniently starts at 1571 when Turks 'came to the island.' Why not start earlier and consider the Phoenicians, Egyptians and Greeks who settled on Cyprus, also? Today there are minorities of Armenians, Maronites and Latins on the island, as well as many other Europeans.
Under the Venetians, from whom the Ottoman Turks took over the island, the island’s population had dwindled to little more than 200,000, consisting almost entirely of Greek-speaking people. After the Ottomans’ triumph, the original Turkish settlers were drawn from among the soldiers; they were given fiefs (timars) on the island by Sultan Selim II. The sultan also issued an imperial order for certain towns in Anatolia to send one family out of each ten engaged there in any given trade. Tailors, cobblers, cooks, carpenters, stone masons, etc., were relocated. The settlers were guaranteed protection and forgiven their taxes for two years.[1] By the end of the seventeenth century, approximately 30,000 Turks settled on Cyprus, and a sizable Turkish community was formed, eventually composing about 20 percent of the total population.
In the beginning of togetherness, there was no sign of overt troubled relations, but differences over ethnic origin, religion, language, and customs inevitably led to a low level of interaction.[2] Both communities preferred to live in separate quarters in towns and mixed villages, and most villages were either completely Greek or completely Turkish. Each community also set up its own system of education conducted in its own language. Cypriot children attended these separate schools where they learned a strong sense of patriotism.
The political system in the Ottoman Empire also encouraged the existing tendency towards separation. Under the millet system, the Greek and Turkish communities were institutionalized as distinct cemaats (communities), electing their own judicial and administrative officials, such as muhtars (village headmen). This exclusive political socialization over a long period of time contributed to the crystallization of separate ethnic identities and aspirations.
But such separation was mainly reinforced by the traditional tendency of both communities to identify themselves with the larger Greek and Turkish nations. This meant that the two communities’ perceptions of each other, and their relations with each other, were greatly influenced by the historically adversarial relations between the Greek and Turkish nations. Although not all disputes between the motherland Greeks and Turks were replicated in inter-communal violence on Cyprus, they had the impact of perpetuating separate self-views and inhibiting any disposition to Cypriot national identity.
As a consequence, throughout the Ottoman period, it was hardly possible, even impossible, to talk about a distinct Cypriot identity. But nonetheless, although the origin of larger Greco-Turkish hostility goes back to the fall of Constantinople in 1453, most historical accounts indicate that the Greeks and Turks of Cyprus co-existed relatively peacefully during three centuries of Turkish rule. On several occasions, they even collaborated to help oust governors or other high officials who were accused of excessive taxation.[3]
The event with the greatest consequence for both communities was the Greek war of independence. This event heightened the national feelings of Greek Cypriots, while widening the existing gap between the two communities further. The Greek Cypriots sympathized with the Greek war of independence, which started in the Greek mainland in 1821. Some volunteers participated in the mainland uprising, some others donated money and provisions. Evidence of links between the Greek Cypriots and the mainland insurgents, though tenuous, prompted the Ottoman governor to execute the Archbishop, other clergy, and various leading members of the Greek community in 1832. These executions became a major trauma for the Greek Cypriots, initiating an overt hostility, perhaps for the first time, against their Turkish compatriots. In the 19th century, the idea of uniting Cyprus with Greece was also implanted, but the island Greeks had no power to initiate a military process. Increased demands and agitation for enosis would wait for British rule over the island.
Cyprus under British Rule
British rule on Cyprus started in 1878. At the Congress of Berlin of 1878, the Great European Powers endorsed an agreement between Great Britain and the Ottoman Empire, whereby Cyprus was put under British control, to be used as a base from which to protect the Ottoman Empire against the ambitions of Russia. The control of Cyprus at that time was regarded as vital by the British, for the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 had made the eastern Mediterranean an area of great strategic importance. Under the agreement of 1878, Cyprus remained legally a part of the Ottoman territory, to which a tribute was paid. Yet when the Ottoman Empire joined the Central Powers in World War I, the British unilaterally annexed the island (1914).
The replacement of Ottoman rule with British one encouraged those Greeks Cypriots who looked to Greece as the motherland. In welcoming the first British High Commissioner, the Archbishop of Cyprus declared in 1878 that “we trust that Great Britain will help Cyprus, as it did the Ionian Islands, to be united with mother Greece, to which it is naturally connected”.[4] Under British rule, the Turkish community not only lost their Ottoman legal privileges but also faced the possibility of a real domination by the Greek Cypriots, even becoming a subject of Greece, namely enosis.
The Greek word enosis refers to a political ideology aimed at union with Greece. But it contains a greater dynamism than it seems. It can be well interpreted as part of a wider movement of the megali idea, the desire to re-create the Greek Empire. The Greeks’ inability to mourn over the lost Byzantine Empire and the transmission of this past trauma from one generation to the next, combined with the irredentist nationalism of the 19th century, found its expression in the term of enosis on Cyprus. The Greek megali idea failed to recover Istanbul and western Anatolia, but it did not necessarily die with the Anatolian defeat in 1922. It continued to stir Greek passions, and at least some Greeks saw the prospect of Cyprus’ union with Greece as partial fulfillment of the national dream. Thus, Greece, not surprisingly, supported the Greek Cypriot demand for enosis, but it was also careful to avoid any overt confrontation with the British. Notwithstanding periodic statements of support for enosis, Greek governments waited for more favorable conditions before pressing for the island’s union with Greece.
Parallel to the Greek’s inability to mourn and their idealization of the past was the Turkish Cypriot’s inability to mourn over losing power on the island. The fact that they had come to the island as the ruling party, combined with shared longing to be part of the “total body” of the motherland, caused the Turkish Cypriots to reject enosis. The pattern of confrontation emerging over enosis and the increasing alienation of the Turkish community led both peoples to grow further apart. Hundreds, and sometimes thousands, of Cypriots demonstrated for or against enosis. In one of the worst communal clashes in 1912, 5 people died and 134 were injured.[5] Accordingly, much before the intensification of the enosis struggle in mid-1950s, it was evident that the Greek and Turkish Cypriots were already on a collision course.
In view of the continuing strategic value of Cyprus, the British, too, opposed enosis, although they once offered the island to Greece in 1915 in an unsuccessful bid for its support in the war. Hence, the British authorities and the Turkish Cypriot representatives formed an invisible alliance against the enosist claims of Greek Cypriots, which inevitably caused Greek Cypriot resentment.
The Involvement of Greece and Turkey into the Issue
Following the Greek-Turkish war of 1919-1922, both Greece and Turkey also developed closer ties with their respective communities on Cyprus. During the Lausanne peace negotiations (1923), Turkey sought, and received, the right for the Turks of Cyprus to opt for Turkish nationality and emigrate to Turkey. But because Turkey’s primary concern, after the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire, was domestic economic and social reconstruction, Ankara was careful to avoid any interference in Cyprus under British rule. Nevertheless, Turkey’s relations with the Turkish Cypriot community had far-reaching consequences, both for that community and ultimately for Cyprus as a whole. For the Turkish Cypriots, the new Turkish Republic replaced the world of Islam as a source of their collective identity. By identifying with Atatürk’s vision of Turkish nationalism, the Turks of Cyprus were also asserting their sense of separate identity from their Greek Cypriot neighbors. They voluntarily accepted most of the reforms introduced by the sanction of the state in Turkey. For instance, when Atatürk replaced the Arabic script with the Latin alphabet for the Turkish language in 1928, the new alphabet was speedily adopted by the Turkish Cypriots. Similarly, European dress was adopted voluntarily. Soon after the establishment of the Turkish Republic, the Turkish Cypriots began celebrating the same national holidays of the new state, including those recalled Turkish victories against the Greek invasion. Turkey also started to extend assistance to Turkish Cypriot education, albeit on a modest scale. It sent teachers and provided easy access to Turkish universities for Turkish Cypriot students. All this helped inculcate Turkish nationalist ideas among Turkish Cypriot youth. Further, Ankara constantly monitored developments on the island through its consulate and gave discreet support to the Kemalist elements.[6]
The concerns which the British had regarding the growth of Kemalism and Turkey’s stake on Cyprus were mild compared with the challenge posed to their rule by the enosis movement on the island and the prospects of Greece’s involvement in the struggle for union. While Turkey accepted British rule as a reality, Greek policy was aimed at eventual enosis. On the other hand, Hellenic nationalism was spread through education. Diplomatically, Greece adopted a “low-keyed campaign aimed at persuading the British to surrender their predominant position on the island in exchange for strategic guarantees and base rights. The strategy was to keep Cyprus alive as a diplomatic issue without needlessly antagonizing the British”.[7] But the Greek policy was not entirely risk-free. It could spill into open violence. As a matter of fact, anti-British riots by the Greek Cypriots took place throughout the island in 1931. Afterwards, harsh measures were taken designed both to strengthen British control and to curb Greek nationalism among the Greek Cypriots.
Although political activity was severely restricted on the island after 1931, the enosist activity and propaganda flourished in mainland Greece. In Athens, former president Admiral Koundouritist founded the Cyprus Central Committee, whose motto was “long live Greek Cyprus” and had most of the prominent Greek politicians and academics as members. Also active were the Cypriot Students Brotherhood, the Society of Friends of Cyprus, and the Cyprus National Bureau.[8] These groups kept Cyprus alive as an issue in Greece and garnered growing popular support for enosis.
In short, three decades of involvement by Greece and Turkey in the Cyprus issue after Lausanne may be summed up as follow: Greece strengthened its existing ties with the Greek Cypriot community and, encouraged by the persistence the enosis movement, increasingly viewed Cyprus’ ultimate union with Greece as a realizable national goal. Though Turkey renounced its sovereignty over Cyprus in favor of Great Britain at Lausanne, and even sought to encourage the bulk of Turkish Cypriots to emigrate to the mainland, its interest in the island’s affair and future destiny grew as it developed closer ties with an increasingly secular and nationalist community on the island.
The Post-World War II Campaigns for Enosis and Counter Reactions
The post-war Greek demand for enosis coincided with the period of accelerating de-colonization. The argument made by Greece and the Greek Cypriots was that Cyprus deserved her freedom as much as any other Afro-Asian colony attaining its independence from British rules. The British and Turkish opponents of enosis, on the other hand, asserted that the Greek aspirations differed from those of other colonial peoples: rather than independence as such, the Greeks envisaged the transfer of sovereignty from one state to another, from Great Britain to Greece. In any case, British governments believed that their possession of Cyprus served important strategic interests and were unwilling to yield. Therefore, in the period after World War II, the desire to achieve enosis began gradually turning into a violent campaign.
The very intensification of the enosis campaign came in the wake of the election of Makarios III as Archbishop in 1950. In that year, Makarios, who would later become the first president of the Republic of Cyprus, organized an island-wide plebiscite in Greek Cypriot churches. This action would serve two purposes: it would harass the legitimacy of British rule, and it would help publicize the Greek Cypriot case to the world. The result of the plebiscite was amazing: 96 percent of eligible Greek Cypriots voted for enosis.[9]
Encouraged by this result, Greece’s UN representative formally requested that the subject of self-determination pertaining to the people of Cyprus be included on the agenda of the General Assembly’s next meeting. Archbishop Makarios later seconded this formal request by a petition to the UN. Contrary to the expectations of the Greeks, however, the UN General Assembly decided that it did not appear appropriate to adopt a resolution on the question of Cyprus. Thereupon, the Greek Cypriot leaders called for a general strike and massive violence broke out. Makarios returned from New York, where he attended UN meetings, and founded an underground guerrilla organization, with the acronym EOKA (Ethnici Organosis Kyprion Agoniston- National Organization of Cypriot Combatants). George Grivas, an extreme nationalist Greek army colonel who was Cypriot by birth, also accompanied him.
In the mid-1950s, terrorism prevailed on Cyprus as the EOKA started its campaign of violence against the British (Cypriots?) and Turkish Cypriots. Initially, the Turkish Cypriots reacted to the new enosis campaign with anti-union pronouncements and demonstrations. They lodged the usual appeals to Britain and Turkey to stand firm against enosis, hoping that the campaign would run its course. However, by the end of 1956, when large-scale intercommunal killings began and the Greek intercommunal campaign to present the issue as a colonial struggle for liberation registered some successes, they changed their position and began urging taksim that is the division of the island between the two communities. They argued that since Cyprus was made up of two national groups, each with its distinct language, religion, and national identification, the Turkish community was entitled to exercise the right of self-determination as much as the Greek Cypriot community. At the same time, as a reaction to the EOKA activities, they founded their counter underground organization called Volkan, which would later be replaced by the better-led TMT (Türk Mukavement Teşkilatı-Turkish Resistance Organization).
-The paragraph above does not mention the British strategy to employ more Turks in the local police force, which expanded the Greek anger on Turkish community.-
Meanwhile, Turkey also intensified its involvement in the issue. Turkish leaders began to express themselves in stronger terms, particularly after Greece put Cyprus on the agenda of the UN and the EOKA began its violent campaign on the island. Turkey was certainly concerned about the fate of the Turkish community. If enosis happened, the Turkish community would be treated poorly, much as the Thrace Turks had been in Greece. But her concern was also strategic. Already feeling hemmed in by Greek islands in the Aegean Sea, the mainland Turks felt that Greece’s sovereignty over Cyprus would enable it to control access to its southern ports of Mersin and Iskenderun, thereby completing Turkey’s encirclement. Accordingly, Turkey also adopted the policy of taksim and supported, overt or covert, the Turkish Cypriot underground organization working for that purpose.
-If there were no killings of Turkish Cypriots by Greek Cypriots, will Turkey interfere for the sake of strategic reasons-?
The Question of Identity before the Birth of the Republic of Cyprus
Previously, it was mentioned that under Ottoman rule the Cypriots had an underlying tendency of identifying themselves with the motherland Greeks or Turks due to ethnic, religious, linguistic ties, as well as separate administrative and educational systems. In other words, there was no Cypriot identity other than Greek or Turkish identities on the island. This tendency grew even further under British rule. First of all, the motherland countries fought each other in four full-fledged wars during the British period- 1880, 1897, 1912, and 1919-1922. Volunteers from both communities participated in these wars and inevitably brought their psychological effects to the island. At the same time, the growing political and cultural ties of Greece and Turkey with their respective communities enhanced the interests of the mainland governments on the island. These links played a major role in the subsequent re-appraisal of policy by the two countries towards Cyprus and provided the bases of their deeper involvement on the island from the 1950s onwards.
But more importantly, it was the Greek Cypriot agitation for union with Greece, and Turkish Cypriot opposition to it, which gradually turned into a violent fight in the 1950s, what really widened the psychological distance between the two Cypriot communities. Had the Greek Cypriots not started a nationalist move towards union with Greece, co-existence on the island would have been possible to some degree. But that move destroyed any possibilities. As Markides astutely noted in his book, “the national consciousness of Turkish Cypriots grew in direct proportion to the rise of enosis. As the Greek Cypriots intensified the struggle for union with Greece, the Turks began feeling more nationalistic and declared their own ethnic interests and aspirations”.[10] As long as the Turkish Cypriots were confident that the British were determined to remain on the island indefinitely, they might have limited their political activism to reminding the governor of their loyalty to the colonial status quo and their opposition to enosis. But when the enosis movement took a more activist turn beginning in the late 1940s, and there were signs that enosis could become reality, the Turks launched their own militant opposition through clandestine operations, such as the creation of Volkan and TMT. Once inter-communal fighting started, the old hatred and mistrust that had characterized Greco-Turkish relations since the fall of Constantinople were revived with increasing intensity. As a result, at the time of the creation of the Republic of Cyprus, there were two psychologically-separate communities deeply mistrusting each other, and perhaps hating each other.
The Birth of the “Reluctant Republic” and Afterwards
When Xydis Stephen called the Republic of Cyprus “the reluctant Republic” in his study, perhaps he was not wrong.[11] The Republic was born in the midst of inter-communal violence and rather against the real wishes of the Cypriots. Indeed, Cyprus was the only post-colonial country that was forced into independence, representing a compromise between the Greek demand for union with Greece and the Turkish counter-demand for partition between two communities. Here is how it happened.
In 1959, the British decided to leave the island. By that time, it was clear that both Greece and Turkey were pursuing their own goals with respect to Cyprus, enosis and taksim, respectively, with increasing intensity. Yet both countries eventually understood that neither could succeed in achieving its preferred goal. Enosis was not feasible given the determination of Turkish opposition, nor was taksim in the face of adamant Greek resistance.
That aside, there were other incentives at that time as well, which played a role in encouraging the Greeks and Turks towards a compromise. As Robert H. Stephen explained:
The outlook was black not only on the island but internationally. Khrushchev, flushed
with the success of Russia’s first sputnik, was putting pressure on the Western powers
over Berlin. There was a call from Washington for a closing of the ranks in NATO to
meet the new Soviet threat. Cyprus was drifting into a civil war which threatened to
involve Britain, Greece, and Turkey- all NATO members- in deepening conflict. All of the
parties concerned found they had reasons for considering a compromise.[12]
Ultimately, the representatives of the British, Greek, and Turkish governments came together to negotiate the Cyprus problem in Zurich in February 1959. They rejected enosis or taksim, and instead found another formula. That was to create an independent Cyprus. The constitution of Cyprus was designed by these three powers. It was decided that the president would be a Greek Cypriot and the vice-president a Turkish Cypriot, and that there would be a Council of Ministers (7 Greeks, 3 Turks) and a House of Representatives (70 percent Greek, 30 percent Turkish) elected by a universal suffrage for a term of five years. Zurich agreements were later confirmed by the London Conference in 1960 and the Republic of Cyprus eventually came into existence on 16 August 1960, with Makarios its first president.
Although the birth of the Republic brought about a temporary halt in intercommunal violence, “there were no festivals, no ringing of church bells, no parades, no dancing people in the streets of Cyprus celebrating independence”, as Markides observed.[13] The mood of both communities was somber, almost depressed. For the Greek Cypriots, the Republic meant, at least temporarily, the abandonment of enosis. After decades of struggle, this dream could not come true. Also, very few Greek Cypriots viewed the constitution as legitimate. Most Greeks felt that the imposed constitution by foreign powers discriminated against them- the majority, composing 76 percent of the population- in favor of the Turkish minority, which composed 20 percent of the population. Further, since Great Britain, Greece, and Turkey guaranteed the preservation of status quo, as the signatories of the agreements, the Greek Cypriots complained that the Cypriot parliament was denied the right to amend its own constitution without prior consent from the guarantor powers.
The Turkish Cypriots, too, remained intransigent, suspicious, unaccommodating, and predisposed to adopt, in regard to constitutional and governmental issues, a rigid posture that divided them even further from their Greek compatriots. They were convinced that the Greeks would never give up their ultimate aim to unite the island with Greece. As the Greek Cypriots made inflammatory speeches referring to the continuity of the enosis struggle, the Turkish Cypriots similarly urged the partition of the island, enforcing Greek Cypriot suspicions that their compatriots had not abandoned the idea of taksim either.
Consequently, the new state could not erase old hostilities. Mutual suspicions remained and continued, perhaps with increasing intensity. The Republic could have evolved towards a nation-state if the two communities had embraced the new state and seen the advantages of becoming a nation. But things evolved the other way and from the very beginning of independence, at least one of the sides, and perhaps both, did not desire a partnership.
Nor was the creation of the Republic able to produce a distinct Cypriot identity. “Greekness” and “Turkishness”, with strong total body identification with the mainland nations, remained. This is perhaps best exemplified by the attitudes of the Cypriots towards the official Cypriot flag that Vamik Volkan, a professor of psychiatry with Turkish Cypriot origin, describes as follows:
When my artist brother-in-law was asked to design a flag for the newly-constituted Republic of Cyprus, he was told that he could use white, which appears on both the Greek and Turkish flags, but that he had to avoid using red, which appears on the Turkish flag, and blue, which is used on the Greek flag. Accordingly, he used yellow with some green, these relating to no country in question. This yellow-green-and-white banner is still the official flag of Cyprus. When the Republic was established, however, Cypriot Turks raised the red-and-white flag of Turkey, and the Greeks flaunted the blue-and-white one of Greece. The official yellow-green-white one appeared only at certain locations, such as Makarios’ presidential palace as an ornament. The story of a Cypriot flag, designed for an imaginary Cypriot nation, and the population’s response to it, indicates that Realpolitik found no echo in the psyche of either Cypriot Turk or Cypriot Greek.[14]
Under these circumstances, a keen observer could fairly predict the fall of the Republic and this actually happened so with the constitutional breakdown in 1963. In the same year, large-scale violence broke out again and the Cypriot state de facto collapsed. A buffer zone marked by “the green line” was drawn between the opposing groups, and in 1964, UN peacekeeping forces (UNFICYP) were sent in, most of which still remain there.
The period between 1963 and 1974 can be described as the period of Turkish suffering. The Turkish Cypriots were forced to live enclaves on their own and during that period, they controlled no more than 5 percent of the island’s territory, whereas they had owned 35 percent at the time of the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus.[15]
In July 1974, the National Guard of Greek Cypriots, with the support of Greek military regime governing Greece since 1967, staged a successful coup. The common plan was to realize enosis. President Makarios fled to London and Nikos Sampson, a former EOKA member, pro-claimed himself new President. Fearing of enosis, Turkey militarily intervened immediately and justified its action based on its guarantor-state status, which was – and still is- actually the case according to Zurich and London agreements of 1959-1960. The Turkish forces seized about 38 percent of the island’s territory, dividing the island into two as well: southern section is Greek, northern section is Turkish, a status that has been continuing to date.
Following the Turkish intervention, there were numerous efforts to negotiate a new state structure between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots with the assistance of Dr. Kurt Waldheim, former UN Secretary General, but none succeeded. The Turkish side demanded a Greek-Turkish bi-regional federation with strong regional governments, whereas the Greek side favored a multi-regional or cantonal federation with a strong federal government.
With the talks ended without solution, on February 13, 1975, a “Turkish Federated State of Cyprus” (TFSC) was proclaimed in the northern part of the island. Greece protested this move and denounced it as a threat to peace, while Turkey recognized it. Afterwards, inter-communal talks were resumed and continued throughout the late 1970s and early 1980s, but as in the earlier efforts, no agreement was reached.
On November 15, 1983, the TFSC made a unilateral declaration of independence as the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” (TRNC). Like the TFSC, the TRNC was recognized only by Turkey and in April 1984, full diplomatic ties were established between Turkey and the TRNC. Since then, further efforts have been made, some of which with the help of third-parties. Especially important was former UN Secretary General Dr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s “set of ideas”, which, at least, motivated the parties to initiate more serious efforts to work on a solution, whereby several summit meetings were actually arranged between the Cypriot leaderships. The latest attempt has been made by Kofi Annan. Although his plan was rejected by the Greek Cypriots in April 2004, it kept the door open for future negotiations. At present, the stalemate continues despite intermittently-ongoing negotiations.[16]
CONTENDING VIEWS OF THE PARTIES AND IDENTITY FORMATION ON CYPRUS
Since the fall of the Republic, the conflict over re-unification has revolved mainly around the problems of state structure, displaced persons, territory, and security guarantees. Not considering the details, the Greek Cypriots traditionally argued that:
The unity of the country should be preserved, but the Republic would be federally organized, composing of two regions called provinces.
The president should be elected by voters of the Greek Cypriot community and the vice-president by voters of the Turkish Cypriot community. Participation in public services, including the government, should be proportional.
All non-Cypriot military forces should withdraw. The Republic of Cyprus, as a sovereign independent state and member of the UN, can only have security guarantees in accordance with the UN charter.
Displaced persons should be considered as a priority issue.
The Turkish Cypriots, on the other hand, argued that:
A federation should come about through the expression of the free will of the two equal peoples based on the right to self-determination, to be exercised through separate referenda. If there is going to be a federation, this federation should be bi-communal and bi-zonal, built on the political equality of the two constituent republics representing the Turkish Cypriots in the north and the Greek Cypriots in the south.
The presidency of the federal republic should rotate, and the federal government should contain equal members of Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot ministers.
The 1960 Treaty of Guarantee and of Alliance should be maintained and updated.
The issue of displaced people is not an urgent problem, since no agreement has yet been achieved on the whole integration.
Recently, some of these major differences, such as those on political equality, residual powers, rotating presidency, and security guarantees have been narrowed with Kofi Annan’s peace efforts.[17] Yet the real issue of deep mistrust continues to separate the two parties, like an invisible wall. When the Cypriot Greeks and Cypriot Turks get together for negotiations, inevitably the Turks refer to their major trauma- the period between 1963 and 1974 when they were physically restricted and felt imprisoned-, while the Greeks similarly refer to their own one, which has begun with the Turkish military intervention in 1974. The relatively long history of inter-communal violence, combined with larger Greco-Turkish enmities, has penetrated in the minds of the Cypriots to such an extent that each side, as a group, fears that it would become victim once again.
Accordingly, the conflict on Cyprus is not simply a conflict of substantive issues, such as territory, refugees, etc., but mostly a conflict of mistrust, fear and suspicions.[18] Because of that, a durable peace between the Greeks and Turks of Cyprus might not be achieved by “logical”, traditional approaches alone. If a Cypriot identity is to be generated, the first step towards that end should be overcoming the existing psychological barriers between the communities and developing a certain degree of inter-ethnic friendship.
How is That Possible?
Studies of stereotyping usually alert that distorted images are hard to be broken, since they are deeply embedded in group identities. Nevertheless, in conflict resolution literature, several strategies are offered to reduce hostilities between adversary groups. For example, in his classical study on prejudice, The Nature of Prejudice, Gordon W. Allport sets out several ways serving to that goal. The main strategies include acquaintance programmes (i.e., inter-communal festivals, conferences, etc.); group retraining methods; positive action by the mass media; and exhortation by community leaders, such as religious leaders, politicians, academics, and other opinion-makers.[19]
Charles E. Osgood also developed a strategy called “gradual reduction in tension” (GRIT) to reduce negative images and build up trust between rival groups. The key features of GRIT are as follows: One side unilaterally makes an unambiguous concession to the other side, which is, ideally, open to full verification. This action is accompanied by a clear signal that a reciprocal action is expected. If the other side responds positively, and also makes a concession, the process is continued through a series of bilateral efforts. If no reciprocal action is forthcoming, no one really loses anything because the initial concession is chosen; that is, it does not affect the security of the community making it. Osgood suggests that unilateral initiatives by one side should be continued over a period regardless of the unresponsiveness of the other side in an effort to change aggressive interpretations into conciliatory responses.[20] Dean G. Pruit and Jeffrey Z. Rubin agree that such action can build confidence, especially when the behavior is seen voluntary and involves some costs (material, psychological) for the gesturing party.[21]
However, at the governmental level on Cyprus, very few unilateral initiatives to promote inter-communal understanding have so far taken place. Although the Cypriot leaders and politicians occasionally come together to negotiate on certain issues, they are unwilling to make concession, particularly over a long time period, either because they do not want to lose “face” or because they fear that they will be criticized by hard-liners in their communities.
Due to these concerns, inter-ethnic friendship on Cyprus would better be developed through “bottom-up” approaches and one way of this would be the so-called “track-two diplomacy”. Joseph V. Montville, one of the pioneers of this approach, defines the term as an unofficial, informal interaction between members of adversary groups or nations aiming to develop strategies, influence public opinion, and organize human and material resources in ways that might help resolve their conflict.[22] Empirical evidence shows that if well-arranged and undertaken for a reasonably long time, people-to-people meetings and discussions, oftentimes working through problem-solving workshops mediated or facilitated by psychologically-sensitive third-parties, provide an opportunity for disputants to examine the root causes of their conflict, to explore possible solutions out of public view and to identify obstacles to better relationships. What is more, by allowing face-to-face communication, they help participants arrest dehumanization process, overcome psychological barriers, and focus on relation building.[23] Best of all, any success in informal meetings would spill over into formal ones because those who change their negative images about the other side would push the formal negotiation process with a new perspective or they may become formal negotiators in later life.[24]
Track-two diplomacy is an area where UN specialized agencies and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) would play a major role as third-parties. They would arrange and facilitate problem-solving workshops between Cypriot groups, working as intermediaries in the process as well. Although not necessary, third-party help is usually needed in organizing track-two diplomacy, since the parties in conflict cannot easily take unilateral action due to concern for appearing weak, as well as intense hostile feelings towards the other side.
After mutual hostilities are reduced and a certain degree of trust is built up between the communities, the next step towards the long journey of forming a Cypriot identity would be to bring the parties to work for common ends. The creation of supranational bodies that have the responsibility for fulfilling key economic and social needs would gradually bring about a transfer of loyalty from the narrow cultural group to the supranational bodies. Eventually, particularistic antagonisms would be dissolved and a new group identity can develop as the participants become caught up in a web of mutual dependence.
A scientific support to this idea comes from a series of experiments conducted by Muzaffer Sherif, a social psychologist, in an American school camp. In his experiment, Sherif divided a group of boys into two groups and conflict between them was then encouraged. He observed that as inter-group hostility increased, so did intra-group solidarity. The mutual hostility was overcome and a larger group consciousness developed when the two groups were brought together to engage in cooperative acts for common ends that they could not obtain on their own. This led Sherif to conclude that only the pursuit of superordinate goals, the goals that can only be achieved by cooperation of conflicting groups, can reduce hostility and lead to a new group identity.[25]
Of course, in real-life conflict settings, it is certainly advisable to avoid over-Optimism, for the differences separating the parties would be more complex and deeper than the differences created by artificially dividing up school-kids in a summer camp. But nonetheless, having and working on common goals would enhance bonds between the parties in conflict in a number of ways. One would be reducing the salience of group boundaries; that is, people who are working towards common goals are in some sense members of the same group and thus are not so likely to be antagonistic towards one another. Another would be by a reinforcement mechanism; as the two parties work together, each of them rewards the other and produces a sense of gratitude and warmth in the other. Pursuing common goals also means that each party sees itself as working on behalf of the other, a view that is likely to foster positive attitudes.[26]
At the macro level, the European Union offers such a good example, whereby historic enmities between France and Germany, as well as former ideological clashes among Western and Eastern European countries have been successfully overcome when the countries worked together and tasted the benefits of togetherness. It would be reasonable to assume that similar effects can be observed on Cyprus as well.
Comment: John Hume (I think Nobel Peace Prize Winner for Good Friday Agreement) has 3 steps for conflict resolution
- Respect for difference
- Institutions based on respect(like police force)
- Healing process (economical based on employment)
On Cyprus, there were actually few examples of micro-level superordinate projects. One was in the early 1970s. The Cyprus Resentment Project, made up of volunteers from the American Friends Service Committee and the Shanti Sena,[27] developed a project in collaboration with the International Peace Academy to rebuild villages destroyed by inter-communal warfare so as to allow refugees to return their homes. It was hoped that work camps involving Greek and Turkish Cypriot young people could be created to do the actual construction work. But unfortunately, this phase of the project started in July 1974 and had to be abandoned following the overthrow of President Makarios by the Athens-engineered junta and the subsequent Turkish intervention.
Another attempt was made in the early 1980. That was a joint sewerage scheme and municipal development plan for Nicosia sponsored by the UN Development Program (UNDP). This plan involved continuous cooperation between the city’s two civic administrations and ensured that Nicosia could be readily reintegrated following a settlement. Although George Vasiliou, former Greek Cypriot leader, strongly endorsed this attempt, the Turkish leadership was rather reluctant and hence, the plan was largely unsuccessful.
As a result, although creating superordinate goals would greatly contribute to the crystallization of Cypriot identity by easing ethnic antagonism and encouraging cooperation between the communities, there is no easy answer to the question of how to do that. Small-scale projects may be attained through the help of third-parties, for example with NGO helps, but their effects will be rather limited with certain individuals. What actually needed are large-scale attempts whose effects can be seen at the community level. This certainly requires more physical contact between the communities, as well as more sincere political will on both sides.
A final area that calls for special attention is the issue of education. Formal education is one way, perhaps the most important one, that national culture and historical enmities are transmitted. Indeed, on Cyprus, education has been a main vehicle of transferring inter-communal hostility, as well as separate identities, from generation to generation. As mentioned above, for centuries, Greek and Turkish Cypriot children have attended separate schools where each community had its own system of education conducted in its own language. The curricula and standards of Greek and Turkish Cypriot schools have been tailored to correspond respectively to the Greek and Turkish educational school systems. Also, teachers from the mainland usually infused a strong sense of patriotism in the schools where they taught.[28]
Similarly, at the university level, the great majority of Cypriot students attended Greek or Turkish universities. The Greek and Turkish governments provided Cypriot students with more generous scholarships and facilities than those made available to mainland students. The graduates returning to Cyprus were socialized into the historical self-images of the mainland communities, which barely encouraged cultural bridge-building between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot youth.
Accordingly, this feature of education needs to be changed, along with other measures, and this should be the duty of the Cypriot communities, as well as the international community. In dealing with educational area, first of all, inter-communal schools and colleges ought to be built up and they should increase in number over time. Besides, educational programs should make more emphasis on universal knowledge, critical thinking, skepticism, and respectful assimilation of differences. It is also vital that subjective historic knowledge be eliminated from the educational curricula. However, given the absence of an agreement and restricted physical contact between the communities at present, a more realistic starting point would be arranging student exchange programs so that the Cypriot youth at least get to know, and begin to learn from, each other. Other measures would be taken as formal negotiations start to produce an agreement on the island.
CONCLUSION
As the above discussions attest, creating a nation on Cyprus from the ashes of years of hostilities requires great time and multi-level efforts from many different directions. But it must be done somehow, or else peace efforts at the formal level only will remain superficial and their effects will hardly reach the public.
Frustrating in its efforts and being concerned more and more about the expenses of the UN peacekeeping forces on the island, the UN tends to push the Cypriot parties to reach a compromise as quick as possible, as also exemplified by the latest Annan Plan. But considering the existence of psychological barriers between the communities, it appears that a quick solution on Cyprus is neither feasible nor desirable. A Cypriot nation cannot be created through “outside pushes” but can only be derived from internal dynamics. Third-parties, including the UN, may be helpful in this process, however, working as communicators and facilitators, but not as decision makers in place of the parties themselves. What is actually needed is an infrastructure that sustains present and prospective peace efforts. Although the UN has been relatively successful in keeping the conflict calm by deploying peacekeeping forces for over four decades and keeping the door open for negotiations between the Cypriot leaderships, very few initiatives to promote inter-communal understanding and to create a Cypriot identity eventually have so far taken place. This should be the area in which future peace efforts must go.
"Greek and Turkish Cypriots had no problem living side by side until 1957. Language and religion were not a problem. Each village has a church and an adjacent mosque.
- A few years ago checkpoints were opened on the 'green line' which gave people on both 'sides' to cross over the line and visit. No violent incidents have occured. The younger generations have not participated in any conflicts."
[1] Vamik D. Volkan and Norman Itzkowitz, Turks and Greeks: Neighbours in Conflict, (Cambridgeshire, England: The Eothen Press, 1994), s. 133.
[2] It must be noted for the reader that Greek Cypriots are Orthodox Christians and speak Greek, while Turkish Cypriots are Muslims and speak Turkish.
[3] Tosun Bahçeli, Greek-Turkish Relations Since 1955, (Boulder, San Francisco: Westview Press, 1990), s. 23.
[4] Quoted from Charles W. J. Orr, Cyprus Under British Rule, (London: Robert Scott, 1953), s. 160.
[5] James A. McHenry, The Uneasy Partnership on Cyprus, 1919-1939: The Political and Diplomatic Interaction Between Great Britain, Turkey, and the Turkish Cypriot Community, (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Kansas, 1981), s. 29.
[6] Tosun Bahçeli, Greek-Turkish Relations Since 1955, (Boulder, San Francisco: Westview Press, 1990), s. 28.
[7] James A. McHenry, The Uneasy Partnership on Cyprus, 1919-1939: The Political and Diplomatic Interaction Between Great Britain, Turkey, and the Turkish Cypriot Community, (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Kansas, 1981), s. 24.
[8] Stavros Panteli, A New History of Cyprus: From the Earliest Times to the Present Day, (London: East-West Publications, 1984), ss. 156-157.
[9] Tosun Bahçeli, Greek-Turkish Relations Since 1955, (Boulder, San Francisco: Westview Press, 1990), s. 33.
[10] Kyroacos C. Markides, The Rise and Fall of the Cyprus Republic, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977), s. 23.
[11] Xydis, Stephen, Cyprus: Reluctant Republic, (Hague: Mouton, 1973).
[12] Robert H. Stephens, Cyprus: A Place of Arms, (London: Pall Mall Press, 1996), s. 175.
[13] Kyroacos C. Markides, The Rise and Fall of the Cyprus Republic, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977), s. 25.
[14] Vamik D. Volkan, “Cyprus: Ethnic Conflicts and Tensions”, International Journal of Group Tensions, Vol.19, No. 4, 1989, s. 308.
[15] Vamik D. Volkan and Norman Itzkowitz, Turks and Greeks: Neighbours in Conflict, (Cambridgeshire, England: The Eothen Press, 1994), s. 140.
[16] For the latest and more detailed information about the history of Cyprus, see Niyazi Kızılyürek, Birleşik Kıbrıs Cumhuriyeti: Doğmamış Bir Devletin Tarihi, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2005).
[17] For full text of the Annan Plan, visit http://www.cyprus-un-plan.org. On the subject, see also David Hannay, Cyprus: The Search for a Solution, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005).
[18] This can also be seen in TRNC former President Rauf Denktaş’s latest book. See Rauf Denktaş, Kıbrıs Girit Olmasın, (İstanbul: Remzi Yayınları, 2004).
[19] Gordon W. Allport, The Nature of Prejudice, (New York: Beacon Press, 1979), chp. 30.
[20] Charles E. Osgood, “The GRIT Strategy”, in Thinking About Nuclear Weapons, F. Holroyd (Ed.), (London: Croom Helm, 1985).
[21] Dean G. Pruitt and Jeffrey Z. Rubin, Social Conflict, (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1994), s. 39.
[22] Joseph V. Montville, “The Arrow and the Olive Branch: A Case for Track Two Diplomacy”, in The Psychodynamics of International Relationship, Vol. 2, Vamik D. Volkan et al. (Ed.), (London: Lexington Books, 1990), s. 162.
[23] See Edward E. Azar, The Management of Protracted Social Conflict, (Dartmouth: Aldershot, 1990). See also Herbert Kelman, “The Interactive Problem Solving Approach”, in Managing Global Chaos: Sources of and Responses to International Conflict, Chester A. Crocker, et al (Eds.), (Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1996).
[24] See John Davies and Edy Kaufman, Second Track/Citizen’s Diplomacy: Concepts and Techniques for Conflict, (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2002) and Michael Bavly, “Second Track Diplomacy”, http//: www. shalam.org/Second%20Track%20Diplomacy.htm (07.06.2005).
[25] Muzaffer Sherif, Group Conflict and Cooperation, (London: Routledge, 1967).
[26] Dean G. Pruitt, Sung H. Kim and Jeffrey Z. Rubin, Social Conflict: Escalation, Stalemate, and Settlement, (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2004), ss. 136-137.
[27] The Indian peace brigade inspired by Mahatma Gandhi.
[28] Tosun Bahçeli, Greek-Turkish Relations Since 1955, (Boulder, San Francisco: Westview Press, 1990), s. 20.
Enosis and the 1960 constitution
The comments made about 95% of the Island, including the Turkish voting to Enosis to Greece seems more like a passing comment and the author has not provided any proof. Proof please.
The sentence on the 1960 constitution seems to be deliberate too when it is written in a way that absolves Makarios from blame by using the words "unfairly balanced in the TCs favour" so it was legitimate to change by disregarding the original constitution. No changes were allowed by that constitution without a majority vote from both sides. Makarious' attempt at bypassing the constitution and therefore the TC vote was clearly illegal.Link http://www.crh.camelot.de/Cyprus-January-1964.htmltitle
Majority rule means war.
Constitution of Cyprus requires good will/London conference discusses reforms.
By Christian Heinze.
First published in „Deutsche Zeitung“ Nr. 15, January 18th/19th, 1964
(DZ) Under the chairmanship of the British Foreign Minister Butler, the Cyprus conference ist taking place in London since Wednesday with representatives of the Greek and Turkish communities of Cyprus and with the foreign ministers of Greece an Turkey. In this connection we are publishing the following article by Dr. jur. Christian Heinze, who, in 1962/63, has acted as assistant to the president of the Constitutional Court of Cyprus, the Heidelberg jurist, Ernst Forsthoff.
When Cyprus became independent from Great Britain, the cooporation between the Greek and the Turkish communities on the island was to be secured by the constitution of August 16th, 1960, and by a system of guarantees under international law. Cyprus, which was exposed for 5.000 years and to an extraordinary degree to the impact of all important cultures from the West and from the East, is presently becoming a testing ground for the capability of constitutional and international law to provide peace, cooporation, freedom, and justice.
Greek Arguments.
The Greek Cypriots, who contribute four fifth to the population, compete with the Turkish Cypriots for their respective rights on the island. The Greek Cypriots claim sovereignty by referring to their majority in number and to the age-old influence of Greek culture in Cyprus; the Turkish Cypriots point to the fact that Cyprus has been part of the Turkish empire between 1573 and 1914.
These claims are, of course, without legal significance for the present constitutional situation. Instead, the validity of the constitution of 1960 derives from its having been accepted by representatives of the Cypriots, and from the constitutional power of Great Britain as the mother-commonwealth to which the island had belonged as a crown-colony and which has conceded statehood to Cyprus under the terms of this constitution. Its legitimacy is supported by Greece and Turkey guaranteeing the constitution under international law. Some Greek Cypriot circles contend that the constitution is not valid because it has not been voted upon by the people and because it did not transfer sovereignty to the Greek majority, and also because the constitution was so badly drafted that is was „unworkable“ and that, in addition, it gave unjust preference to the Turkish Cypriots. The validity of the constitution, however, does not depend on a formal vote by the people. There ist no doubt that Archbishop Makarios as the representative of the Greek Cypriots and Dr. Kücük as the representative of the Turkish community were empowered to sign the constitution. Their authorization derived from general elections that had taken place in December, 1959.
Legal guarantees.
The claim made by the Greek Cypriots for being entitled by their democratic majority to rule the island misinterprets the meaning of the constitution and of democracy and trivialises the existing contrasts between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. The importance of these contrasts derives from the bloodshed that had taken place around Christmas 1963. It was exactly the objective of the constitution to pacify these contrasts and to provide freedom and justice for all Cypriots, and not rule of one community over the other. Pure majority government basically requires fundamental homogeneity of the body poilitic to be governed. But the specific feature of the political structure of Cyprus consists in the fact that the homogeneity in question does not exist here. The contrast between the communities can therefore not be overcome otherwise than by legal guarantees. The critisism of the constitution, although such criticism is widely supported in Cyprus, is certainly unwarranteed in its exaggeration. Thanks to the involvement of excellent Greek and Turkish constituional lawyers and considering other countries’ constitutional examples, the Cyprus constitution of 1960 is a fairly and clearly formulated law and not at all unworkably complicated. The rumor about the impossibility of its’ implementation is legally untenable and even less convincing because the originators of this rumor never left any doubt about the fact that they had no intention at all of implementing the constitution. The first president of the constitutional court, the Heidelberg professor for public law, Ernst Forsthoff, has always denied the allegation that an implementation of the constitution was impossible, and he has always stressed that it is a matter of good will to make it work.
The allegation of unworkability is mainly directed against two legal requirements contained in the Constitution. According to its article 78.2, certain laws (for example tax laws) can only be passed with a majority vote of all Greek and a majority vote of all Turkish representatives in parliament. If both communities desire a balanced legislation, this procedure obliges them to find a compromise. If they do not succeed in this, it must be considered to be the failure of the representatives and not of the constitution. According to article 173, a „seperate municipal administration“ must be established for both communities in five cities of the island. Some hold it impossible to divide physically cities that have developped in a natural process. Others say that only devided cities meet the requirements of the constitution. Such intransigence reveals either a lack of legal resourcefulness or a lack of cooperation and willingness to compromise, because the wording of the constitution is not compelling in the sense of requiring a territorial division of all administrative responsibilities into two completely seperated municipalities within the five cities. The conditions of the constitution would be sufficiently met by a double-tracked procedure for passing municipal statutes, similar to that prescribed for tax laws, or by a twofold organisation and a separation of certain administrative responsibilities on a personal basis. There is also no doubt that the establishment of some fully unified branches of the administration of the cities would be consistant with the constitutions.
Important reasons can surely be brought forth rendering questionable the justice and suitability of some legal requirements of the Cypriot constitution. But the main objection raised against the requirement of separate majorities for certain laws is definitely not justified. It is hard to conceive how the Turkish Cypriots can be legally protected against being outvoted without veto-rights against the passing of laws. Remaining doubts concerning the merits of some constitutional norms, for example concerning the allocation to the Turkish Cypriots of a higher share in public posts than would correspond to their population percentage, cannot be deemed to diminish the obligations stipulated in the constitution, because both communities have agreed to them. Therefore, no legal arguments can be recognized that could justify the disrespect for the constitution which has become the declared policy of the Greek part of the Cypriot government. This policy became evident when, in April 1963, the constitutional court of the Republic of Cyprus, chaired by professor Forsthoff, upheld several applications raised by the Turkish Cypriots against steps that had been taken in order to establish centralized and therefore unconstitutional municipal administrations. To consider the constitution as being unworkable because the required cooperation was not achieved would seem equivalent to claiming that criminal law was not valid because it was being violated anyway.
But how can the future of Cyprus be coped with? The constitution could of course be changed with the consent of all concerned. The share of the Turkish Cypriots in public posts could be reduced to an extent corresponding to their population share. Also, veto rights of the two communities could be made subject to restrictive preconditions. A change of the constitution could also be considered insofar as it concerns the municipal administration which is a main subject matter of contest between the Greek an the Turkish Cypriots. The constitution containing no more than a programme for the forming of separate municipalities. In this way the legislators of the constitution have not solved but have only delayed the solution of a delicate task and burdened it upon parliament. Parliament, however, was unable to reach agreement. If the constitution is to be improved in this point it would seem reasonable to establish by definite articles of the constitution itself the separate municipal administrations in question. It would also appear reasonable to incorporate into the constitution provisions that help to prevent a repetition of the violence of Christmas 1963. A safe basis for a peaceful future can however hardly be established by removing fundamental Turkish rights. For how could mistrust between Greek and Turkish Cypriots be expected to disappear if history taught that it was possible to compel a change of the constitution by declaring it unworkable and, referring to this alleged unworkability, by disregarding it, thus allowing the development of a civil war over the resulting dispute ?
Penal regulations are necessary.
The London negotiations about the future of Cyprus could consider removing the most obvious reasons for the conflict without touching the basic structure of the constitution. This would appear possible if the two communities could agree in London on tax legislation, on legislation concerning the municipal administration and on the distribution of public posts. Such an agreement would justify hope for improvement. But it should also be taken into consideration that a constitution must be protected against anti-constitutional activities by penal legislation. This applies especially to the constitution of Cyprus which is exposed to such activities to an extraordinary high degree. Such legislation is lacking and should therefore be introduced in Cyprus.
The Cypriots should also examine which of their members of parliament and government and of their administration may have to be blamed for having failed in making common self-government work in the past, be it because of a lack of good will or of the ability for cooperation and constructive engagement. It should, for example, not be overlooked that former active members of partisan organizations may be destined rather to destroy a government and administration than to produce the capability of establishing such a sensitive state structure as is required for Cyprus.
63 to 74
Any discussion about the Cyprus issue should include the anti Turkish Cypriot violence that occured during these years, this article convieniently skipped from 63 to 74 as if nothing had happened and the Turks invaded becuase they needed some exercise. I added neutral language, I corrected the number of GCs that were displaced (that number gets higher in every cyprus article) and I changed 'Murdered' to 'Killed'. Most of the GC dead were members of the military and militas...you dont muder a soldier in battle you kill him. Adam777 23:42, 25 September 2006 (UTC)
- Yes, only GCs militants died between 1963-74... And also only TCs civilians died... as if Denctas did not have an armed group...! lol... talking about neutrality... Hectorian 01:00, 26 September 2006 (UTC)
- Yawn.....go back and read the article prior to my edit. The years 63 to 74 were skipped over. Adam777 02:09, 26 September 2006 (UTC)
Geographic island article title
I would like to write an article about the island itself. How should it be titled, Cyprus (island) or Cyprus Island? - GilliamJF 12:05, 3 October 2006 (UTC)
- Cyprus (island) should be the title. However be careful not to replicate too much information that is already containted in the country article - otherwise someone will probably just propose to merge the two. --Mattarata 01:37, 5 October 2006 (UTC)
- Actually, I think that this should be the article for the island. Placing the Greek Cyprus as THE Cyprus is clearly POV. Anyone else have thoughts on the matter? -- Chef Ketone 03:42, 6 October 2006 (UTC)
- Just take a look at China and Ireland as precedence. -- Chef Ketone 03:43, 6 October 2006 (UTC)
- I think we should move this article to "Republic of Cyprus." Thoughts? -- Chef Ketone 03:45, 6 October 2006 (UTC)
- Island and state articles I recommend that Gillian simply edit the article Geography of Cyprus. As for splitting the article, I oppose because it is the POV of the international community that there is on Cypriot state. NPOV doesn't mean "no point of view," it means "neutral point of view," and neutral parties to the conflict don't recognize the Turkish puppet state. -Justin (koavf)·T·C·M 16:05, 6 October 2006 (UTC)
- Actually, isn't it POV to say Northern Cyprus is a puppet state? Turkey does recognize Northern Cyprus, and in my opinion that alone justifies making a neutral (geographic) article for Cyprus, and putting the entry on Greek Cyprus on a separate article (Republic of Cyprus). The vast majority of the world recognizes only the People's Republic of China, but Wikipedia has chosen to make China a neutral/geographic article. So, even if the vast majority of the world only recognizes the Republic of Cyprus, shouldn't we follow precedent? - Chef Ketone 19:00, 6 October 2006 (UTC)
- Island and state articles I recommend that Gillian simply edit the article Geography of Cyprus. As for splitting the article, I oppose because it is the POV of the international community that there is on Cypriot state. NPOV doesn't mean "no point of view," it means "neutral point of view," and neutral parties to the conflict don't recognize the Turkish puppet state. -Justin (koavf)·T·C·M 16:05, 6 October 2006 (UTC)
- I think we should move this article to "Republic of Cyprus." Thoughts? -- Chef Ketone 03:45, 6 October 2006 (UTC)
Requested move
I've actually posted a "Requested move" for this article on the WP page to start up a discussion and come to a consensus of sorts. My reason for requesting the move is pretty much stated above (the previous section). In my opinion, it's following precedent see Ireland and China to write a geographic article under the landmass/nation's name, and to title articles of the de jure or de facto divisions by their formal names (when the divions share a common name or claim to be the sole legitimate state).
I'm trying to set this discussion section up right (Husond's input definitely helps!) and if I did something wrong, please rearrange/correct this section. -Chef Ketone 20:05, 6 October 2006 (UTC)
Survey
Add "* Support" or "* Oppose" followed by a brief explanation, then sign your opinion with ~~~~
- Support. I'm the one who requested the move, so I guess I kind of have to support it, right? -Chef Ketone 20:05, 6 October 2006 (UTC)
- Oppose I don't think there's need for naming the article with the exact official name of the Republic of Cyprus. Many countries are best known by their non-official names (e.g. Portugal, rather than the "Portuguese Republic").--Húsönd 20:19, 6 October 2006 (UTC)
- Oppose There is only one legal state on Cyprus so no need to move it. -- Jordi·✆ 09:47, 7 October 2006 (UTC)
- Comment - the German Wikipedia has an interesting approach to this issue. When "Cyprus" is entered, it redirects to Cyprus (island) (comporable to our Geography of Cyprus), where there is a disambiguation header: Republic of Cyprus and Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. - GilliamJF 13:45, 7 October 2006 (UTC)
- Weak oppose I believe this sort of move would confuse the issue and topics at hand far more than the status quo. However, I'm mindful that the island is more than just the current polities that occupy it, i.e., the de jure republic and the island are not synonymous. If and when the TRNC becomes legitimate, the proposed move might be more appropriate. And, for what it's worth, Ireland -- island and eponymous state occupying most of it -- provides an interesting parallel: a proposed move harking of Gillian's comments (with various options) -- Ireland (DAB) > Ireland (island), Ireland (state/country) -- was unsuccessful and (to me) seems to have been hijacked by a few vocal opponents. Cogito ergo sumo 20:23, 7 October 2006 (UTC)
- Oppose Reasoning:
- The POV of the entire world but one country is NPOV.
- The other examples are not comparable since they have to do with self-identification, not POV.
- The island is covered 100% by the NPOV article Geography of Cyprus, since the word "island" is primarily a geographic (not a political) term. •NikoSilver• 20:40, 7 October 2006 (UTC)
- Oppose I understand your point and sympathise. However your point is covered by the article Geography of Cyprus. Anyway, a quick reading of the nationalist answers above (which fail to even address your actual question) will highlight that when it comes to Cyprus you cant be sensible on Wikipedia, you can just balance out Hellenic hatred. Adam777 22:25, 7 October 2006 (UTC)
- Oppose per above, and also, Republic of Cyprus is dubious IMO: Kypriaki Dhimokratia in the Greek language means "Cypriot Republic", not "Republic of Cyprus" (which would be Dhimokratia Kypru).--Tekleni 23:03, 7 October 2006 (UTC)
K, guys. Seems like the "Nays" have it. I'm going to go ahead and remove the requested move template up on top. Thanks for the input. - Chef Ketone 16:33, 8 October 2006 (UTC)
Discussion
Additional Comments
Attitudes
I remember when a Cypriot won a Gold Medal at the 1990 Commonwealth Games. At the Ceremony, the neutralist Cyprus flag was raised....to the strains of the GREEK National Anthem. More recently, at the Australian (Tennis) Open, there were numerous Greek supporters of a Cypriot tennis player waving Greek Flags emblazoned with anti-Turk slogans and place names that they claim as Greece (and not just Cyprus, but also CONSTANTINOPLE). Kind of makes a clear statement, doesn't it? Papadopoulos does not have my respect because I have never heard him (a) renouce Enosis as a goal for Cyprus, (b) push to change the National Anthem of Cyprus to show that his country is independent and not a puppet of Greece, (c) reduce the number of Greek Flags vis-a-vis the Cyprus flag, and (d) reach out to the Turkish Cypriots both at home and abroad - after all, if he says that he is the President of ALL of Cyprus, then those people are his fellow countrymen and he is supposed to be their cheif public servant. However, I don't think that it will happen. Expatkiwi
- What you fail to understand is that Turks in Cyprus are an ethnic minority and should be treated as such (in the same way the Albanians in the Republic of Macedonia, the Kurds in Turkey or the Hungarians in Romania are treated).--Tekleni 23:01, 7 October 2006 (UTC)
- And how exactly should ethnic minorities 'be treated'? As we are now all EU citizens perhaps we should do away with such concepts are ethnic minorities, or should cypriots in the UK be categorized as such. We can all remember how Cyprus treated its ethnic minorities in the past but I for one would prefer to see no more mass graves. Adam777 13:29, 8 October 2006 (UTC)
- See my reply to Expatkiwi's message on my talkpage here.--Tekleni 14:13, 8 October 2006 (UTC)
- To Adam777: I, for one, would prefer to never see things like these ever again... Hectorian 22:59, 8 October 2006 (UTC)
- I see Hectorian in your haste to label all that oppose any form of attoricity in Cyprus as 'Turkish' that you completely failed to read my comment. Did I specify 'WHOSE' mass graves,or individual graves for that matter, I was refering to? I've read through a lot of your edits and they are mostly common sense, so I'll assume you dont subscribe to Teklenis notion of minority rights for minoritys in this massive European state we all now inhabit? If so there are a lot of Cypriots (and Greeks, Turks, Germans, French, Icelanders etc etc) who will have to get the hell out of the UK and go home. It does help when we actually THINK about our statements first dont you agree. Adam777 00:40, 9 October 2006 (UTC)
- Sorry if i have misunderstoond your comment. The link i posted also has to do with minory issues in a state that wants to enter the EU... As for the 'mass graves' that u said above, there is nothing different to say than 'common sense': such things should never happene again, no matter to whom! But the reality in this section of this talk is about ethnic minorities and if the TCs are one, right? well, since both u and me live in the European state, i guess u will agree that if the TCs should be granted equal power with the GCs (though they only form 18% of the population), the Kurds in Turkey would also be granted equal powers with the Turks, right? Hectorian 02:36, 9 October 2006 (UTC)
Hector, the discussion here is not the kurds in Turkey (who are considered equal btw. Tho if u r referring to terrorists kurds that is a different story.) FYI we also treat armenians, greeks as equals as well (have greek, armenian neighbors). ProudTurk
As a neutral party reading about Cyprus, I have to say that the introduction to the article is not NPOV. ("Styles itself" is a very POV phrase.) The article on China refers to two modern states, despite the claims of both that there is but one such state. And both such "states" get articles, while "China" is a neutral article. The same should be the case for Cyprus. The Turkish half has existed for 32 years -- it is a functioning state regardless what other countries may say for political reasons. Recognition by Canada or the Bahamas does not mean that the Greeks can enforce laws on the Turkish side of the island. There is no civil war preventing the "rightful" government from exercising authority. And it looks like the Greeks may not even care about real reunification, as long as the world grants them de jure authority.
The existence of any real dispute is buried several paragraphs down in the article. If "Cyprus" is to be an all-inclusive article, then such a major division should be made clear and with due respect to the Turkish Cypriots going about their daily lives with no involvement from the Greek Cypriot government. The introduction really downplays the reality that those people live with -- and paints a very real and functioning government and nation as "self-styled" and illegitimate. Saraalan 03:38, 16 October 2006 (UTC)
POV Reminders
Please people, when we put a name in italics or quotes its POV, when we use weasel words its POV - its always the same few people trying to impose their highly biased viewpoints on Cypriot related articles. We can point out the TRNC is illegal without the theatrics (you know who you are). Adam777 16:48, 16 October 2006 (UTC)
- That was me and I honestly didn't notice. Personally, I have no problem with the normal font. However, kindly tone down, and read WP:AGF and ...WP:AAGF that is...) •NikoSilver• 20:43, 16 October 2006 (UTC)
- That's why I'm using italics. If I wanted to be POV, I'd use "scare quotes" (as in "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus").--Tekleni 20:45, 16 October 2006 (UTC)
Number of refugees
Neither the "Country studies" site, nor the cited U.S. Library of Congress are 'inaccurate' sources. I expect Aristovoul0s and Adam777 to find a way to add both inside the article. If it is not done by tomorrow, I'll do it myself. Thanks. •NikoSilver• 09:17, 24 October 2006 (UTC)
Well Nikosilver have a look at these citations and then; you tell me:
- Republic of Cyprus
- Republic of Cyprus
- Republic of Cyprus
- Republic of Cyprus
- Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
- Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights once again
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs Greece
- Even aljazeraah if it interests you
- Washington Post
- Guardian UK
- MIT
- Federal Research Division
- BBC
- Hellenic News
- US Embassy
- UN
- Milnet
- CNN
All of them state 200,000 displaced
Aristovoul0s 15:53, 24 October 2006 (UTC)
The end of the Venetian rule (1571).
In 1562 the Venetians sentenced to death Iakovos Diassorinos, a teacher who was leader of a patriotic movemement for independence. This violence didn`t postpone for long time the end of the Venetian colonial rule. The Turks, under Lala Mustapha Pasha landed on July 3, 1570, when Cyprus was under Governor Niccolò Dandolo. The capital Nicosia was defended by 300 Italians and 8,000 Greeks. The siege of the capital Nicosia lasted from July 25 until September 9 and ended with the full Turkish victory: Dandolo and 20,000 citizens were killed. So the Venetian resistance concentrated on Famagusta, defended by 3,700 Italians and 4,000 Greeks under commander Marcantonio Bragadino. About 200,000 Turks attacked the town which did surrender on August 7, 1571. After surrender Bragadino was killed with his last 350 soldiers. On March 7, 1573 -by the peace treaty- Venice lost Cyprus and the island became part of the Ottoman Empire.
Non-standard and potentially POV map should be reverted
The map for this country has recently been changed to a format which is not standard for Wikipedia. Each and every other country identifies that country alone on a contintental or global map; none of them highlight other members of relevant regional blocs or other states which which that country has political or constitutional links. The EU is no different in this respect unless and until it becomes a formal state and replaces all other states which are presently members; the progress and constitutional status of the EU can be properly debated and identified on the page for that organisation; to include other members of the EU on the infobox map for this country is both non-standard and potentially POV.
Please support me in maitaining Cyprus's proper map (in Wikipedia standard) until we here have debated and agreed this issue? Who is for changing the map and who against? The onus is on those who would seek to digress from Wiki standard to show why a non-standard and potentially POV map should be used. Cyprus deserves no less! JamesAVD 15:30, 2 November 2006 (UTC)
This user has decided to remove references to the EU from the page of every member state. See his talk page for more details. yandman 15:32, 2 November 2006 (UTC)
- Please do not discuss here, but at Wikipedia talk:WikiProject Countries so a uniform decision can be reached. Kusma (討論) 15:33, 2 November 2006 (UTC)
The users above are misrepresnting my actions. Certain non-standard items have been included in the infoboxes of the pages of some European states. I have removed the undiscussed and unsupported changes and started a discussion here on the best way forward. I have in no way 'removed references to the EU'! The EU is an important part of the activities of the governmenance of many European states, to the benefit of all. That does not mean that an encyclopedia should go around presenting potentially POV information of the constitutional status of the EU in the infoboxes of states which are supposed to be standardised across Wikipedia. I'm interested in what users here feel? Please feel free to comment at any of the various pages Yandman might suggest. JamesAVD 15:53, 2 November 2006 (UTC)
PLEASE DISCUSS THIS AT Wikipedia talk:WikiProject Countries#Location_Maps_for_European_countries--_discussion_continues as it involves more than just this country.
Thanks, —MJCdetroit 20:29, 2 November 2006 (UTC)
POV Politics Section
I've nominated this article to be checked on neutrality on the basis of the Politics section.
In particular it appears to me that the Politics section of this article repeats elements from the History section. The History section appears to be more balanced but an example of my concerns for POV include:
Turkey responded by launching a military operation on Cyprus in a move not approved by the other two international guarantor powers, Greece and the United Kingdom using as a pretext the protection of the Turkish minority from Greek militias. The invasion is called "Cyprus Peace Operation" by the Turkish side. Turkish forces captured the northern part of the island. Many thousands of others, from both sides, left the island entirely. In addition to many of the Greek Cypriot refugees (a third of the population), many Turkish Cypriots (on whose pretext Turkey invaded) also moved to the UK and other countries where for the past 30 years they have lived as neighbours with the Greek Cypriots. In the meantime Turkey illegally imported Turkish colonists to populate the occupied territories, thereby altering the ethnic make up of the occupied north. Under the Geneva Conventions of 1949, it is a war crime to transfer, directly or indirectly, the civilian population of a country power onto land under that country's military occupation.
The quotation of "Cyprus Peace Operation" as well as the cite of Geneva Conventions of 1949 appears to present the Turkish side as agressors. I think for a neutral based article this is a bit too inflamatory of language.
Would suggest a re-write to remove concrete references to allegations, however as I am not a subject matter expert I've merely flagged this article for review. —The preceding unsigned comment was added by 82.19.69.120 (talk)