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Hwasong-11S

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Hwasong-11S
TypeSubmarine-launched ballistic missile
Place of originNorth Korea
Service history
Used byNorth Korea
Production history
Designed2021
Specifications
Length6.8 m (22 ft)[1] or 8.45 m (27.7 ft)[2]
Diameter1 m (3 ft 3 in)[1]
WarheadLikely nuclear-capable[3]

EngineSolid-propelled engine
Operational
range
Reported: About 600 km (370 mi)[1]
Launch
platform
Submarine, submerged barge, underwater silo

The Hwasong-11S[a] (Korean《화성포-11ㅅ》형; lit. Mars Artillery Type 11S) is a North Korean solid-fueled submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM).

It is the underwater-launched variant of the Hwasong-11A (KN-23) missile.[5]

The missile's official name was revealed in the KCNA's report on the new Hwasan-31 nuclear warhead in late March 2023.[6][7]

Design and development

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North Korea first displayed Hwasong-11S in October 2021, during the "Self-Defence 2021" military exhibition without revealing its official name. In the exhibition, the missile was displayed beside two SLBMs: Pukguksong-1 and Pukguksong-5.[8]

It is a single-stage, solid-fueled missile with four bumps around the tail section. Four grid fins, which folded before launch, are located between the four bumps. After its maiden launch, it was determined that the bumps and grid fins were a part of the gas generator.[9] The new missile also features improved control, such as "flank" and "gliding skip" mobilities.[10]

German analyst Norbert Brügge claimed the missile to be a modified version of Pukguksong-1 with two stages, a longer body and a longer warhead.[2]

Informations from the 19 October 2021 launch suggest that the missile is fitted with a gas generator to cold launch out of the submarine's missile tube into the air, before the main engine ignites. Compared to previous North Korean SLBMs like the Pukguksong-1 and its larger derivatives, it retains the Hwasong-11A (KN-23)'s depressed trajectory and manoeuvring flight characteristics to try to evade missile defence systems. Since it is based on a missile with a shorter range than the Pukguksong-series, the submarine would need to get closer to its target in order to launch, leaving it more vulnerable to detection and destruction before it can fire. Its development may be more of a political statement than an effort to create a viable weapon, as the test occurred weeks after South Korea tested their own Hyunmoo-2B's SLBM version, Hyunmoo 4-4, both of which are derived from the same Iskander design base.[9][11]

Some Hwasong-11S (then unnamed) missiles were displayed in the 25 April 2022 military parade.[3]

Based on informations and photos on the 25 September 2022 launch, it was determined that the missile was launched from a silo under a reservoir.[12] However, it is likely the missile was fired from a submersible barge containing launch silos. It is unknown whether such a system will be pursued as a serious launch method, or if it was a demonstration of another capability to deter South Korean preemption strategies by adding another potential deployment method.[13]

Tests

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On 19 October 2021, a Hwasong-11S (then unnamed) was first launched from Sinpo-class submarine. The missile reportedly traveled 590 km (370 mi) or 600 km (370 mi) and reached an altitude of 60 km.[8][11] Japanese data showed the launch of two missiles, despite the North Korean's claim of one missile launch.[14]

On 25 September 2022, another Hwasong-11S (also unnamed at the time of launch) was launched from an underwater silo, under an inland reservoir. North Korea referred to the launch as "the simulation of loading tactical nuclear warheads". Kim Jong Un oversaw the launch.[12] The launch location was geolocated to Taechon Reservoir.[15]

See also

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Notes

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  1. ^ Also alternatively known as Hwasong-11ㅅ (mixing Latin and Korean characters).[4][5]

References

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  1. ^ a b c "S/2022/132" (PDF). United Nations Security Council. 2022-03-01. Retrieved 2025-01-02.
  2. ^ a b "PS-1 mod". b14643.eu. Retrieved 2025-01-02.
  3. ^ a b "Overview of the DPRK's 25 April 2022 Military Parade" (PDF). Open Nuclear Network. 2 May 2022. Retrieved 2025-01-02.
  4. ^ "North Korea threat: Existing and potential ballistic weapons in the Russian arsenal". Miltarnyi. Retrieved 2025-01-02.
  5. ^ a b "Brief on 27 July 2023 Parade of the DPRK" (PDF). Open Nuclear Network. Retrieved 2025-01-02.
  6. ^ "North Korea reveals internal names for several missile systems: Analysis". NK Pro. 3 April 2023. Retrieved 2025-01-02.
  7. ^ "Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un Guides Work for Mounting Nuclear Warheads on Ballistic Missiles". Korean Central News Agency. 28 March 2023. Retrieved 2025-01-02.
  8. ^ a b "Brief on the Defence Development Exhibition of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea" (PDF). Open Nuclear Network. Retrieved 2025-01-02.
  9. ^ a b "Brief on the 19 October 2021 Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile Test of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea" (PDF). Open Nuclear Network. 20 October 2021. Retrieved 2025-01-02.
  10. ^ "Academy of Defence Science Succeeds in Test-Launch of New Type SLBM". Korean Central News Agency. 20 October 2021. Retrieved 2025-01-03.
  11. ^ a b "North Korea's "New Type Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile": More Political Than Military Significance". 38 North. 22 October 2021. Retrieved 2025-01-02.
  12. ^ a b "Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un Guides Military Drills of KPA Units for Operation of Tactical Nukes". Korean Central News Agency. 10 October 2022. Retrieved 2025-01-02. For images, see 1, 2, 3 and 4.
  13. ^ ""A Strong Military Warning:" Four Key Implications of North Korea's October 10 Missile Statement: More Political Than Military Significance". 38 North. 14 October 2022. Retrieved 2025-01-02.
  14. ^ NEWS, KYODO. "Japan maintains North Korea fired 2 ballistic missiles, not 1". Kyodo News+. Retrieved 2021-10-24.
  15. ^ "The CNS North Korea Missile Test Database". Nuclear Threat Initiative. Retrieved 2025-01-03.