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Georgian March

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Georgian March
ქართული მარში
LeaderSandro Bregadze
Secretary-GeneralIrakli Shikhiashvili
Founded2 July 2020
HeadquartersTbilisi
Membership2,000–5,500
Ideology
Political positionFar-right[10]
ReligionGeorgian Orthodox Church
Colors  Black and   Red
SloganFight for the Georgian identity and for Georgia
Seats in Parliament
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Georgian March (Georgian: ქართული მარში, romanized: kartuli marshi, GM) is a far-right political party and social movement in Georgia. It was founded as an NGO in 2017 following the protests of the same name and transformed into a political party in 2020 ahead of the parliamentary election in the same year.[2] The party is led by Sandro Bregadze.[6]

Georgian March is primarily known for its rallies which have been described as violent and aggressive.[4][9][11] It's protests mainly center around opposition to LGBT rights and immigration as well as defending traditional Christian values.[4][12][13] The group has been described as racist, xenophobic, Islamophobic, and homophobic and has been accused of hate speech and sparking ethnic tensions in the country.[1][4][7][11] The movement's foreign policy is generally placed as being Eurosceptic and pro-Russian.[1][4][5][7]

History

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Foundation

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Georgian March was founded in April 2017 as a public movement.[1] It was formed as a response to the highly publicized child abuse case by an Iranian citizen.[11][14] It started as an informal union of several loosely-aligned groups united to rally for anti-immigration legislation.[11] The head of the "Nationalists" movement Sandro Bregadze, who had previously served in the government of the ruling Georgian Dream Party as Deputy Minister of Diaspora Issues from 2014 to 2016, became the movement's leader.[15]

Early years as a protest movement

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The movement organized its first "March of Georgians" demonstration on 14 July on the Tbilisi's David Agmashenebeli Avenue and it was attended by several thousands of people. The rally received support from the Alliance of Patriots party, with its MP Emzar Kvitsiani taking part in the demonstration. It was also joined by young people not associated with any political party or movement, as well as the neo-fascist Georgian National Unity group.[16] The rally has been described as a "turning point for Georgian neo-nationalism" and the biggest anti-immigration demonstration in the country's history. Georgian March demanded Georgian Dream government restrict the issuance of residence permits to foreign nationals and ban foreign-funded organizations, in particular, George Soros's Open Society Foundations. They also condemned the "popularisation of drugs" and "LGBT propaganda".[17]

In response to Georgian March's large anti-immigration rally in July 2017, the liberal European Georgia party branded the rally as "pro-Russian" and organised a counter-demonstration under the slogan "No to Russian Fascism".[17] Georgian March responded by initiating a counter-protest of their own where the group physically assaulted the protestors and threw various objects such as eggs, bottles, and brooms at them, injuring several people.[11]

On July 16, 2017, some of the Georgian March leaders were accused of making rape threats towards Tatia Dolidze, former Georgian Youth Delegate to the United Nations. The comments came after Dolidze criticized the movement.[11][18] Gia Korkotashvili, one of the leaders involved in the scandal, responded by downplaying the seriousness of the comments, stating that they were just profane expressions and not threats.[19]

In October 2017, Georgian March organized protests against the Georgia national football team captain Guram Kashia for wearing an LGBT armband during his match in Dutch club Vitesse Arnhem, calling the Georgian Football Federation to cut him off the national team. Additionally, the group stormed the football match between Georgian and Belarus in Kutaisi in further protest of the matter and burned the LGBT flags, demanding the expulsion of Kashia from the Georgian football team.[11][20]

In February 2018, Georgian March announced the creation of the "citizen patrol". The purpose of the patrol was to identify breaches of the law by foreigners and hand them over to the police, with the movement justifying their actions by stating that the "Ministry of Internal Affairs is unable to prevent foreign criminals and terrorists from entering the country".[11][21] In December 2018, following the decision by the Georgian Constitutional Court to lift a ban on foreign citizens buying agricultural land in Georgia, a protest was held by Georgian March and other nationalist groups in front of the Justice House building, where the protestors blocked the entrances.[4][11][22]

Georgian March, along with other radical right-wing groups, organized a protest in March 2018 against a journalist Giorgi Gabunia for insulting the sanctity of Jesus Christ. The protests culminated in the demonstrators attacking Gabunia and injuring Rustavi 2 journalist Davit Eradze, which was then followed by the arrest of several members of the said groups.[4][23][24]

Further protests were initiated by Georgian March against Tbilisi Pride and the screening of an LGBT film And Then We Danced in November 2019. The group said that they would protest the screening of the movie by making a "corridor of shame" for those intending to attend the film premiere.[25] The group blocked the entrances to the movie theaters screening the film with them insulting and scaring off viewers interested in the showing.[4] 27 demonstrators were detained for the assault of a gay rights activist and the injuries of two policers.[7]

In March 2020, Georgian March and their allies demanded the removal of a monument depicting a prominent Azerbaijani Bolshevik Nariman Narimanov in the Azerbaijani-majority town of Marneuli located in the southern Georgian region of Kvemo Kartli. An additional protest was held on 4 June 2020 at the disputed Georgian-Azerbaijani territory near the David Gareji monastery complex, with Azerbaijan promising strong repercussions for any border violations. The protests resulted in Bregadze being interviewed by the Georgian Security Service for enflaming "racial discrimination and [the] kindling of ethnic strife".[7]

Enterance into politics

[edit]

In February 2018, Korkotashvili and his Georgian Mission organization, announced that they were leaving Georgian March, citing the disagreements over plans to turn Georgian March into a political party.[26] The defection came a month after Bregadze showed interest in running in the 2018 presidential election.[27] In September 2018, another key figure of Georgian March, Lado Sadghobelashvili announced about his departure from the movement, citing disagreement on "personal and political views".[28] Although the Georgian March ultimately decided not to take part in the election and stayed neutral in the race refusing to endorse either candidate in the second round, they did refer to Salome Zourabichvili as the "lesser evil" compared to that of Grigol Vashadze from the United National Movement. In November 2019, Georgian March joined the protests in Tbilisi following the Georgian Dream's failure to pass the electoral reforms. However, it refused to cooperate with pro-Western parties, instead opting to join rallies held by the Alliance of Patriots.[29]

Georgian March was transformed into a political party on 2 July 2020.[7] Subsequently, Bregadze was elected as the chairman of the party and Irakli Shikhiashvili, former Head of the State Veterans Office and former Chairman of the Tbilisi City Assembly (2013-2014), as the Political Secretary. Giorgi Gigauri, a journalist for the Asaval-Dasavali newspaper, which is known for its homophobic and xenophobic discourse, was appointed Deputy Chairman of the party.[1][2] Konstantine Morgoshia, a key figure in the movement who according to Bregadze provided half of the finances of Georgian March, left the party prior to the 2020 Georgian parliamentary election and co-founded Alternative for Georgia, which was the predecessor to Conservative Movement.[30][31]

Georgian March took part in the 2020 parliamentary election and was endorsed by Asaval-Dasavali, one of the largest printed periodicals in Georgia.[9] It received 0.25% of the vote and failed to cross the 1% barrier to be granted representation in the parliament. The party declared the results illegitimate and organized a protest outside the Georgian Dream office, which was reelected to its third term.[7][32] The party subsequently did not run in 2021 local elections.[1]

Post-elections

[edit]

Following the elections, the activities of Georgian March decreased and it soon faded from the public eye. It continued with its protests over Davit-Gareji, with the leader of the party Irakli Shikhiashvili flying a drone over the disputed territory to film it, claiming that the Georgian Dream government did not care about the Davit-Gareji complex and that it had effectively ceded the territory to Azerbaijan.[33]

Georgian March did not join the protests against Tbilisi Pride held in Tbilisi in July 2021. Bregadze denounced the "violence against journalists" during the protests and stated that Georgian March distanced itself from the protests for this reason.[34] This added to the growing list of differences between Georgian March and the Conservative Movement, which was the main organizer of the demonstrations.[31]

In January 2022, Georgian March deepened its ties with the Alliance of Patriots (APG), signing the United Front of Georgian Patriots.[35]

Ideology

[edit]

Analysts view Georgian March as a radical far-right populist and ethno-nationalist movement.[1][4][7][9] Other labels used to describe the group are extreme-right, radical or ultra-conservative, ultra-nationalist, national conservative, traditionalist, nativist, and anti-liberal.[1][4][7][9] The party is further labeled as fascist or neo-Nazi, however, some analysts disagree with the latter categorization.[7][11][36] The group’s social views are widely seen as homophobic, xenophobic, Islamophobic, and racist.[1][4][7][11] In addition, party’s foreign policy is generally viewed as being anti-Western and "loyal to Russia".[1][4][7] The movements stance on the European Union has been described as hard Euroscepticism.[4][5]

Since its creation, the movement has rallied around the topics of immigration, elite corruption, anti-establishment sentiment, anti-foreign influence, national identity, family values, anti-multiculturalism, and anti-liberalism.[37] Bregadze's election program of 2018 focused on topics such as banning homosexuality and "propaganda of perversion", strict immigration laws, banning the sale of Georgian land to foreigners, political-military neutrality, restoration of Georgia's territorial integrity, stopping "bank terror", and strengthning the role of Church in the public life. Bregadze claimed similarity between his program and that of Marine Le Pen.[38][39]

Social policy

[edit]

Georgian March considers the restoration of "the traditional Georgian values" in the face of encroaching liberal ideals an urgent issue. The party has portrayed itself as a protector of the Georgian Orthodox Church and has frequently referred to Muslims as the enemies of the country's Christian identity. Georgian March often protests what they see as the denigration of traditional Georgian values and the Orthodox Church. Georgian March and the Georgian Orthodox Church frequently collaborate for the reason of spreading homophobic and xenophobic statements. The party rails against "perversion" and "degradation" whose two main causes are immigration and the LGBT community. Additionally, the movement is known for using derogatory homophobic titles on their political opponents including "gay revolutionaries", "LGBT coalition", and "Liberast" (a combination of 'liberal' and 'pederast').[4][7]

The central goal of Georgian March is the creation of an ethnically homogeneous state.[1] The party expresses fear over the notion of Georgians becoming an ethnic minority in their own state and has positioned itself to be saviors of the Georgian ethnicity.[4] Its nativist rhetoric is highlighted by their in goal to protect "the interests of native-born inhabitants of a state against immigrants".[7] The movement has called for the deportation of illegal immigrants from the country.[11] It has also opposed the visa liberalization with China in 2023, expressing concerns over possible Chinese mass migration to the country.[40]

Georgian March holds a hatred of the Jewish billionaire philanthropist George Soros and considers him and his institution to be among the main perpetrators of the spread of what they describe as "perversion".[4][7] The movement has accused the Soros Foundation of financing pride events as well as allocating $220 million for the sabotage the Georgian Orthodox Church. The group believes that Soros dreams about "Georgia without Georgians". In a protest held on 30 July 2020, the group burned an effigy of Soros, calling for the closing of the foundation.[7][11] Georgian March has rallied against the "political elite, journalistic elite, university elite", considering them to be "privileged" and the mediators of foreign influence alleging links to Soros. Georgian March movement has called for banning the "activities of Soros and other NGOs". It has condemned the foreign-funded NGOs for "pursuing a foreign interest within the state, intervening in sovereign governance, and hindering the democratic development of Georgia".[37]

Foreign policy

[edit]

Georgian March is regularly described as anti-Western.[1][4][7] The group believes that only through political-military neutrality and "careful" policy towards Russia can Georgia's separatist conflicts be solved.[12][41][38] The party is against both Georgia's European Union and NATO aspirations and considers it the biggest threat to the country's Christian values and ethnic homogeneity. It does believe in the superiority of European civilization, but that the political liberalism and politics of equality implemented by the EU go against the traditional values of the said civilization.[4] The movement labels itself pro-Georgian in contrast to the traditional pro-Russian and pro-European labels used to describe parties.[37] The party accuses the West of “imposing” liberal values and legislation upon Georgia, such as laws against discrimination and family violence.[7]

Additionally, Georgian March is frequently categorized as pro-Russian and reports such as by Estonian Security Services claimed to have uncovered financial connections between the movement and Russia.[4][7][42] Some analysts disagree with the pro-Russian labeling and see it as being based on liberal rights groups equating every kind of illiberalism with Russophilia.[17] The group distances itself from the accusation and insists that they see ideological partners not in Russia, but with recent Western right-wing populist movement including Marine Le Pen’s National Rally, the Freedom Party of Austria, and leaders like Matteo Salvini, Trump, and Orban.[4][9] Bregadze considers this movement as the "real West" that has "awoken" and started to protect "its culture and national identity against liberalism, multiculturalism and foreign influence". Some analysts have questioned the "anti-Western" labeling of the party as it has not applied traditional discourses of Georgian anti-Western groups which see the West as the "biggest evil" and align with Russia to protect Christianity. Moreover, they consider the party to be similar to Western right-wing populist movements rather than Russian political parties.[37]

Conspiracy theories

[edit]

In addition to spreading George Soros conspiracy theories, organizations affiliated with Georgian March also engaged in perpetrating disinformation during the COVID-19 Pandemic. The groups spread 5G conspiracy theories, linking it to the pandemic, and appealed to people attending Easter liturgies to switch off their phones in order to prevent cancer-inducing radiation caused by 5G aerials. The groups have argued that the outbreak is related to Wuhan being one of the first cities in the world to test 5G and that 5G frequencies are to blame for the deaths in the pandemic instead of the virus.[7]

Electoral performance

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Election Leader Votes % Seats +/– Government
2020 Sandro Bregadze 4,753 0.25
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 new Extra-parliamentary

References

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  1. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l "Prevention of Far-Right Extremism in Georgia" (PDF). Democracy Research Institute. September 2021.
  2. ^ a b c "Nativist 'Georgian March' Movement Becomes Political Party". Civil Georgia. 3 July 2020. Archived from the original on 14 December 2020. Retrieved 9 June 2021.
  3. ^ ""საქართველო ნეიტრალური ქვეყანაა!" – 11 პარტია პატრიოტთა ერთიან ფრონტს ქმნის" (in Georgian). 25 January 2022.
  4. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t u Salome Kandelaki (May 2021). "Euroscepticism and Religion in Georgian Far-right Groups' Political Agenda". Georgian Institute of Politics.
  5. ^ a b c Givi Silagadze (May 2020). "Is Georgian Populism Eurosceptic?" (PDF). Georgian Institute of Politics.
  6. ^ a b "Far right group has patrolled Tbilisi streets for the last week". 6 March 2018.
  7. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t Francis Desatge (2021). "The Rise of the Georgian March". Georgian Foundation for Strategic and International Studies.
  8. ^ "Far Right Georgian March Announces Hunger Strike". Georgia Today on the Web. Archived from the original on 6 May 2018. Retrieved 6 May 2018.
  9. ^ a b c d e f Shota Kincha (3 November 2020). "Were the far-right the biggest losers in Georgia's election?". OC Media.
  10. ^ [4][6][7][8][9]
  11. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m Mariam Gogiashvili; Salome Tsetskhladze; Mamuka Andguladze (18 May 2018). "Anatomy of Georgian Neo-Nazism". Transparency International Georgia.
  12. ^ a b "The Georgian March against migrants and NATO". JAMnews. 2 May 2018. Retrieved 6 May 2018.[permanent dead link‍]
  13. ^ Pertaia, Luka. "Who was in and who was out in Tbilisi's far-right March of Georgians [Analysis]". OC Media. Retrieved 6 May 2018.
  14. ^ "„ჩვენი ქუჩები უცხო ქვეყნის კრიმინალებისგან გაიწმინდება" - 14 ივლისს „ქართველთა მარში" გაიმართება". Expressnews. 30 June 2017.
  15. ^ "The Georgian March against migrants and NATO". JAM News. 2 May 2018.
  16. ^ "Who was in and who was out in Tbilisi's far-right March of Georgians [Analysis]". OC Media. 17 July 2018.
  17. ^ a b c "Opinion: Labelling Georgia's far right 'pro-Russian' is reductionist and counterproductive". OC Media. 13 August 2018.
  18. ^ ""ქართველთა მარშის" ორგანიზატორები თათია დოლიძეს ჯგუფური გაუპატიურებით ემუქრებიან". Tabula. 17 July 2017.
  19. ^ "კორკოტაშვილი ამბობს, რომ გაუპატიურების მუქარის კომენტარები "სლენგის" მნიშვნელობით დაწერა". Netgazeti. 19 July 2017.
  20. ^ "Georgian footballer meets backlash after wearing rainbow armband". OC Media. 1 November 2017.
  21. ^ "Georgian ultranationalists form national patrol". Jam News. 11 February 2018.
  22. ^ "Georgian nationalists 'block foreigners from public service hall'". OC Media. 11 December 2018.
  23. ^ "The Georgian March against migrants and NATO". JAMnews. 2 May 2018. Retrieved 6 December 2019.
  24. ^ "პოლიციამ რუსთავი 2-თან მომხდარი ინციდენტის გამო ქართული მარშის კიდევ 4 წევრი დააკავა". imedinews.ge. 21 March 2018.
  25. ^ "Georgian March threatens those, who plan to attend film premiere, will have to walk through 'corridor of shame'". imedinews.ge. 11 November 2019.
  26. ^ "რატომ დატოვა „ქართული მარში" – გია კორკოტაშვილის პირველი კომენტარი". Alia.ge. 13 February 2018.
  27. ^ "სანდრო ბრეგაძე საპრეზიდენტო არჩევნებში მიიღებს მონაწილეობას". Fortuna.ge. 16 April 2018.
  28. ^ "ლადო სადღობელაშვილმა ქართული მარში დატოვა". Tabula. 5 September 2018.
  29. ^ "„ქართული მარში" „პატრიოტთა ალიანსის" აქციას შეუერთდება". 1tv. 16 November 2019.
  30. ^ "ალტერნატივა მორგოშიასთვის – ვის სახელზე ფორმდება მისი ქონება?". Ifact. 29 June 2021.
  31. ^ a b "ვიყავით და ისევ წავალთ რუსეთში - "ალტ-ინფოს" პარტია პოლიტიკაში მოვიდა". Radio Freedom. 8 December 2021.
  32. ^ "Georgian March holds rally near central office of Georgian Dream". 1tv.ge. 2 November 2020.
  33. ^ "Georgian March visits Davit Gareji, kicks off protest". 1tv.ge. 3 February 2021.
  34. ^ "სანდრო ბრეგაძე: "ქართული მარში" არ მონაწილეობდა 5-6 ივლისის აქციებში და არც მის ორგანიზებაში". Ipress. 16 July 2021. Archived from the original on 21 July 2022. Retrieved 23 July 2021.
  35. ^ "Political parties and organizations and their representatives who signed the United Front of Georgian Patriots declarations" (PDF). Civil Georgia. January 2022.
  36. ^ Nata Dzvelishvili (18 July 2018). "From a Pro-Russian to a Pro-Georgian Narrative". The Foreign Policy Centre.
  37. ^ a b c d Nino Gozalishvili (June 2021). ""Europe is Awakening": Diffusion of National-Populism in an Eastern Partnership Country – The Case of "Georgian March" in Georgia". Nationalities Papers.
  38. ^ a b ""მე ვიქნები ეროვნულ-ნაციონალისტური ორგანიზაციების საპრეზიდენტო კანდიდატი. ჩემი წინასაარჩევნო პროგრამა იქნება დაახლოებით ისეთი, როგორიც იყო მარინ ლე პენის, საპრეზიდენტო არჩევნების დროს. ჩემი პროგრამის პირველი პუნქტია სამხედრო-პოლიტიკური ნეიტრალიტეტი და ამაზე დაყრდნობით საქართველოს ტერიტორიული მთლიანობის აღდგენა.", ამის შესახებ ბრეგაძე On.ge-ს ესაუბრა". On.ge. 16 April 2024.
  39. ^ "ჰომოსექსუალობის აკრძალვა და სხვა დისკრიმინაციული წინასაარჩევნო დაპირებები სანდრო ბრეგაძისგან". On.ge. 16 April 2018.
  40. ^ ""თავისუფლად შესაძლებელია, რომ რამდენიმე წელში საქართველოში დასახლდეს მილიონზე მეტი ჩინელი" – სანდრო ბრეგაძე". Alia.ge. 9 November 2023.
  41. ^ "„რას ვზეიმობთ?.. ის დეპუტატები, დამარცხებულს რომ ეძახიან, საკუთარ, სამსართულიან ვილებში, შავ ხიზილალას მიირთმევენ" – სანდრო ბრეგაძე". Alia.ge. 4 May 2024.
  42. ^ Beka Chedia (17 August 2021). "Russian Interference in Georgian Politics: The Activation of Ultra-Right Forces". The Jamestown Foundation.
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