User:AlexandreAssatiani/sandbox

2006-2008 Georgia-Russia diplomatic crisis
Clockwise from top left: Russian propaganda poster against Georgian wine; Georgians demonstrating against the Russian embassy in Tbilisi; scene from the 2007 Georgian demonstrations; Medvedev-Saakashvili summit in June 2008.
Date 27 March 2006 - 7 August 2008 Location Georgia (including Abkhazia and South Ossetia) Result Russo-Georgian War
Sides
Georgia	Russia Abkhazia South Ossetia

Background

Rose Revolution

GALEOTTI

• The presence of more than 3,000 Georgian troops in Iraq made Russia feel like Georgia was nothing more than an American puppet state (124)
• The National Military Strategy listed Russian peacekeepers as a threat (124)

SAAKASHVILI

• Saakashvili called the conflict between Geogia and Rusia a "generational clash" between the older Russian elites and the younger, post-revolutionary Georgian government (159-160)
• MS believes that Russia saw Georgia as a "West Berlin", a "window to the West" (162)

KAVADZE

• The death of Zhvania and the weakening of Burjanadze allowed Saakashvili's hawkish allies to consolidate their power (71)
• Kavadze believes that the August 2004 clashes were a turning point, starting a wave of hostilities (71)
• Putin did not trust Saakashvili as the latter promoted anti-Russian policies both in the South Caucasus and in the near abroad in general (72)
• The two leaders' mutual personal dislike defined the current state of play between Russia and Georgia and exacerbated the nature of the threat posed by Russia to Georgian statehood (72)
• Base withdrawal agreement happened on May 30, 2005 (73)

PANFILOV

• Already on December 19, 2005, Russia imposed sanctions on vegetable imports for sanitary reasons (116)

Energy crisis

ZOURABICHVILI

• On the day of the explosions, Merabishvili immediately pointed fingers at Russia, accusing Moscow of acts of sabotage. That version is reiterated by Saakashvili (259)
• Zourabichvili criticized the Georgian government for laying the blame on Russian sabotage without proper investigation, which would have been impossible (259)
• No evidence would be brought forward on Russia's role in the explosions (259)
• The incident is what started the crisis with Russia. (259)
• In February 2006, at the anniversary of the death of Zhvania, the Georgian MIA claimed having discovered an unexploded air-to-surface missile in Kareli (259-260)
  • The MIA claimed the presidential plane was a target as it often flew over Kareli (260)
  • Zourabichvili questions the veracity of the claims as the serial number of the missile was erased and the missile was control-exploded on the spot before any investigation (260)
• The energy crisis led to war of words between the two countries, with Saakashvili calling his counterpart "liliputin" (303)
  • Russia defended its innocence and it was this degradation in relations that led to the embargo (303)

IIFFMCG II

• The Georgian Parliament adopted a resolution on 15 February instructing the government to replace the Russian peacekeepers in South Ossetia with “an effective international peacekeeping operation”189 – this despite a warning on 9 February by the US Ambassador to the OSCE that the withdrawal of the Joint Peacekeeping Forces in South Ossetia “may be destabilizing.” (113)

Timeline

Russian embargo on Georgian imports

ZOURABICHVILI

• On March 28, Simon Baladze of the presidential administration was arrested for espionage on behalf of a foreign power (260)
  • Zourabichvili questions this event as well, claiming that Baladze's job - monitoring for the Presidential Administration online international coverage of Georgia - was not enough for him to be a spy (260-261)
• The embargo on wine and water was done over "sanitary" reasons (304)
• The embargo caused a serious damage to the Georgian economy (304)
• Irakli Okruashvili is promoted 'general of the vintage' (304)
  • In a media campaign, he sent via post grapes to his Russian colleagues (304)
  • He also said "even mixed with fecal matter, our wine is good enough for Russians" (304)
  • These comments were seen as a national insult by Russians, just like the embargo on wine for Georgians (304)

SAAKASHVILI

• Saakashvili met with Putin in St-Pete shortly after the embargo. He says the Putin of 2006 was "very different" from before. (157)
  • Putin was more cynical, always showing off his confidence. "He was a godfather and no longer a president" (157)
• The embargo's short-term consequences were described by MS as being "catastrophic" (158)
  • But the embargo was long-term beneficial, according to him, as it forced the Georgian export industry to focus on new markets (European and Middle-Eastern) and differentiate their assets (158)
  • MS later told Putin, "several members of my cabinet have told me to build you a statue because you are the cause of the unprecedented modernization of the Georgian economy!" (158)
• In an (undated) 2006 CIS summit, his Minister of the Economy who was 28 years old, called his Russian counterparts "dinosaurs" in private conversations with MS (159)

KAVADZE

• In February 2006, Russia stopped issuing visas to Georgian nationals (73)
• In July, Russia "temporarily" closed the Kazbegi-Upper Lars border checkpoint, disrupting the main transportation connection with Russia (73)
• At the June 2007 Malmo summit, Lavrov, who drank Georgian wine at the dinner, said he always enjoyed Georgian wine, "when available" (76)

PANFILOV

• Bendukidze did not believe the sanitary reasons of the embargo, arguing that Russia often politicized its sanitary standards (117)
• Some in the Russian media criticized the embargo as Russians had enjoyed for decades Georgian wine and Borjomi (internationally acclaimed) (119)
• In early 2007, as part of MS's "Georgia without Poverty" program, Georgia formally requested from the Russian Embassy and the Russian sanitary agency to send health experts to check on Georgian wine (119)
• Agriculture Minister Mikheil Simonishvili offered Russia to inspect Georgian wine in any laboratory of their choice (119)
• The Bolshoy Biznes newspaper affirmed that Russia was not interested in removing the embargo as it was a tool of political pressure and had nothing to do with the sanitary standards (119-120)
• Russia accused Georgian wine of including too many pesticides (120)
• Russian media believed that the purpose of the embargo was to cause unrest in Georgia (121)
• Novaya Gazeta on 17 April 2006 argued that Russia lacked the technology to even check pesticide levels (121)
• Some in Russia argued that a more sanitary approach would have been to restrict imports of some wines found to be in violation of Russian regulations in a black list (121)
• The sanitary agency never published which wines were tested (121)
• The embargo also increased the black market (123-125)

ASMUS

• The St Pete Summer 2006 meeting between Saakashvili and Putin was "candid, if not brutal". Putin made MS wait three hours before receiving him to udnerscore who needed whom the most. (71)
  • Putin told MS "You know what you need to do" when asked what Georgia had to do to convince Russia that it was a friend (71)

28 March: Simon Kiladze, comms staffer for the President, is arrested on espionage charges. He is accused of spying and passing information to the special services of an unnamed foreign country. (https://civil.ge/archives/110233)

• • In response, Saakashvili issues a public statement pledging amnesty to any russian spy cooperating with Georgian authorities by May 1 (https://civil.ge/archives/110237)
  • Kiladze pled guilty to the charges and requested a pardon from President Saakashvili. In a video testimony released by the Georgian Interior Ministry, he detailed his actions, stating He received an email in May 2004 offering remuneration for information. Due to his family's urgent financial needs, he accepted the offer and provided regular updates about the political situation, government officials, and decisions. Kiladze expressed his willingness to cooperate with the investigation and share all information he has. (https://civil.ge/archives/110362)
    • Following Kiladze’s arrest, President Saakashvili indicated that Georgian special services were aware of a spy network within the government.
• In a letter sent to the head of the Russian customs service Aleksandr Zherikhov on March 25, the chief Russian sanitary inspector says inspection has revealed that “60% of the examined wines imported from these countries [Georgia and Moldova] in Moscow alone fail to meet requirements set by sanitary-epidemiological rules and norms on safety conditions.” The letter also says that the Russia’s chief sanitary will stop issuing “sanitary-epidemiological conclusions” for Georgian and Moldovan wines starting from March 27. (https://civil.ge/archives/110236)
• 30 March: Speaking Parliament, MP Mikheil Machavariani said Georgian MPs and Russian counterparts were working on a bilateral cooperation agreement (https://civil.ge/archives/110256)
• embargo: PM Noghaideli called the embargo unfair on March 30 and said the government's first priority was to return to the Russian market (https://civil.ge/archives/110259)
• 31 March: On March 31, Georgian and Russian officials will sign two agreements in Sochi, Russia. The first agreement addresses the timeframe, rules, and withdrawal of Russian military bases from Georgia. The second agreement covers the transit of Russian military personnel and cargo through Georgia. The transit agreement allows Russia access to its military base in Gyumri, Armenia via Georgia. Russia is prohibited from transferring armament to a third country through Georgia. The amount of military cargo transited via Georgia will be agreed upon one year in advance. Russia is forbidden from transiting biological, nuclear, chemical substances, or weapons of mass destruction through Georgia. Georgia retains the right to refuse transit if it poses a threat to national security or if the cargo is destined for a conflict zone. (https://civil.ge/archives/110264)
  • The agreement related to the Russian bases regulates technical details of the withdrawal of the Akhalkalaki and Batumi military bases and other military facilities from the territory of Georgia. The agreement is based on a joint declaration signed between Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and ex-Georgian Foreign Minister Salome Zourabichvili in May, 2005 and envisages withdrawal of Russian bases in a course of 2008. According to the agreement on bases pullout, the Georgian and Russian sides agreed “at the earliest possible time” to finalize the Agreement on creation and functioning of the Georgian-Russian Antiterrorist Centre. “The agreed part of the personnel, material-technical resources and infrastructure of the Russian military base in Batumi shall be used for the benefit of the aforesaid Centre,” the agreement reads. (https://civil.ge/archives/110267)
  • “We have compromised while giving our consent to Russia to withdraw its military bases within three years, because in actuallity such a long term is not necessary, but we have accepted the arguments submitted by the Russian side,” the Georgian Defense Minister said at a news conference on March 31. Okruashvili said that during these three years the Russian side will preserve its Headquarters of Russian Military Forces in Tbilisi “in order to manage and organize the withdrawal process.” Okruashvili also said that although Russia has already formally transferred the communications relay facility in Kojori and firing ground in Gonio, Tbilisi agreed to use these facilities jointly with Russia until a complete withdrawal of the Russian bases from Georgia. A joint declaration signed by the Foreign Ministers last May did not envisage the joint use of these facilities (https://civil.ge/archives/110269)
• Saakashvili described the embargo as cynical. Bendukidze as purely politically motivated (https://civil.ge/archives/110265)
  • “Our relations with Russia can be explained by the following formula: good economic relations and bad political relations. Bad political and good economic relations can not last forever – they must turn either into good political and good economic relations, or into bad political and bad economic relations,” Bendukidze said.
  • He added that leaving the CIS could harm Georgia's trade and movement agreements with member states, recommending caution before any withdrawal.
• Before the embargo, up to 90% of Georgian wine exports went to Russia (https://civil.ge/archives/110246)
  • At the time, Moscow made it understood the embargo was linked with WTO talks
  • In a statement issued on March 29 the Georgian Wine Producers Union said that the Chief Russian Sanitary Inspector did not give any evidence proving that the Georgian wines fail to meet sanitary-epidemiological rules and norms, “which makes us think that the decision is purely politically-motivated.”
  • Georgian Agriculture Minister Mikheil Svimonishvili said on March 31 that Georgia will send samples of Georgian wines produced by 10 leading Georgian wine producers to labs in Switzerland, Great Britain and Germany for examination in an attempt to discredit Russia’s allegations that Georgian wine is not fit for consumption. (https://civil.ge/archives/110268)
• On April 2, Noghaideli and Bendukidze met with winemakers to discuss the embargo. Noghaideli called the decision illegal, unfair, and unfriendly (https://civil.ge/archives/110278)
  • Georgia emphasized that Georgian wine was allowed in Europe and the US, so Russia should not have had grounds to ban.
  • Bendukidze called on the wine industry to focus on new emerging markets, but winemakers emphasized that the process would take years
• 3 April: MS praises the base withdrawal treaty during a speech, but warns of "very serious forces and a lot of money" working intensively against Georgia. He said that "as soon as one problem is solved, another one is created, like the wine embargo and energy problems" (https://civil.ge/archives/110285)
  • Saakashvili added in another speech that the wine restrictions added up to an "economic embargo" and said that the "Georgian government is being punished for the fact that Georgia has an efficient government" (https://civil.ge/archives/110287)
    • Saakashvili said he would launch a wine-based diplomatic effort to expand the industry's reach, including in China and the Baltic States, and Ukraine
      • Noghaideli hinted at focusing on Central Asia (https://civil.ge/archives/110292)
• On April 4, Gennady Onishenko, Russia's chief sanitary inspector, sent a letter to Aleksandr Zherikhov, head of the Russian customs service, recommending a ban on importing spirits and sparkling wine from Georgia and Moldova. (https://civil.ge/archives/110298)
  • Onishenko cited "violations of sanitary-epidemiological rules and norms" as the reason for stopping the issuance of health certificates for Georgian and Moldovan wines on March 27.
  • The suspension of previously issued certificates for cognac, wine, and sparkling wine from Georgia and Moldova was set to take effect on April 5.
  • Russian wine importers, including companies importing Georgian and Moldovan wines, announced their intent to sue Onishenko for libel, questioning the legitimacy of his actions. Importers argued that Onishenko provided no evidence of poor quality in the wines and noted that even wines with valid certificates from Russian authorities were banned from sale.
• Tax Exemptions for Wine Producers: Georgian Prime Minister Zurab Nogaideli announced on April 5 that the government would grant temporary tax exemptions to wine producers in response to Russia's ban on Georgian wine imports. Wine producers' budgetary payments will be postponed for three months, allowing them to redirect funds towards accessing new markets. (https://civil.ge/archives/110302)
  • Nogaideli stated that the government's main focus in April would be addressing Russia’s wine import ban. Efforts are underway to increase exports to Ukraine and Kazakhstan to compensate for the Russian ban.
  • Nogaideli confirmed that Russian companies importing Georgian and Moldovan wines plan to sue Russia’s chief sanitary inspector to overturn the ban.
  • Niko Lekishvili, Chairman of the Parliamentary Committee on Sector Economy, suggested that the ban may be influenced by Russian companies importing wines from South America, particularly from Chile and Argentina. Lekishvili emphasized the political nature of the issue, calling for both political and economic solutions to protect Georgian wine producers from foreign competition.
• Saakashvili's Meeting with Winemakers: On April 5, President Mikheil Saakashvili met with leading Georgian winemakers in Kakheti, a key wine-producing region in Georgia, to discuss Russia’s ban on Georgian wine imports. (https://civil.ge/archives/110304)
  • Saakashvili acknowledged that the ban directly impacts the Kakheti region but emphasized the government’s commitment to protecting the wine export industry. Saakashvili urged Georgian winemakers to view the ban as an opportunity to explore new markets for Georgian wine.
  • The president expressed confidence that the ban is a temporary measure and could be beneficial by pushing Georgia to diversify its export markets. Prime Minister Zurab Nogaideli reiterated the government's decision to grant wine producers a three-month tax exemption to help them financially during the ban.
• Meeting with Russian Ambassador: Georgian Prime Minister Zurab Nogaideli met with Russian Ambassador Vladimir Chkhikvishvili on April 5 to discuss Russia's ban on Georgian wine imports. Nogaideli expressed protest over the decision by Russia's chief sanitary inspector, Gennady Onishenko, who not only banned Georgian wine imports but also suspended existing health certificates for wines already imported to Russia. (https://civil.ge/archives/110308)
  • The Georgian PM stated that a delegation from the Georgian Agriculture Ministry is ready to visit Russia to resolve the issue with Russian authorities. Georgian Agriculture Minister Mikheil Svimonishvili attempted unsuccessfully to contact the Russian chief sanitary inspector by phone.
• April 6 Meeting: Georgian Deputy Foreign Minister Merab Antadze met with Russian Ambassador Vladimir Chkhikvishvili to discuss Russia's ban on Georgian wine and spirits. The Georgian Foreign Ministry noted that despite efforts, Tbilisi has been unable to establish a dialogue with Russia on the issue. (https://civil.ge/archives/110313)
  • The Russian Ambassador indicated that Russia's Chief Sanitary Inspector, Gennady Onishenko, is open to meeting with Georgian representatives in the coming days. Georgian Parliament Vice Speaker Jemal Inaishvili, who chairs the Georgian Chamber of Commerce, proposed joint inspections with Russian officials to verify the quality of Georgian wines.
  • Leading Georgian wine companies (Tbilgvino, Teliani Valley, GWS) stated that while they have not yet suffered financial losses, the ban has already damaged the reputation of Georgian wine. Georgian winemakers plan to meet with Russian distributors on April 12-13 in Moscow, where Georgian Prime Minister Zurab Nogaideli is expected to attend.
• Visit to Russian-Owned Factory: On April 6, President Saakashvili visited the Russian-owned Azoti chemical factory in Rustavi, highlighting it as an example of "positive cooperation" between Russia and Georgia, despite the ongoing tensions related to the wine ban. Saakashvili praised the factory’s management, which is owned by Energy Invest, a company founded by Russia’s VneshTorgBank, calling it a successful model of privatization and a rare example of productive Georgian-Russian collaboration. (https://civil.ge/archives/110315)
  • Commitment to Georgian Interests: While emphasizing a desire for friendship with Russia, Saakashvili reiterated Georgia’s commitment to defending its national interests. Saakashvili condemned Russia’s ban on Georgian wine imports, calling it a "serious blow" to Georgia, despite significant progress in wine production and reduced falsification since the 2003 Rose Revolution.
• Reason for Wine Ban: On April 10, Russian Chief Sanitary Inspector Genady Onishchenko cited poor quality as the reason behind the "total ban" on the import of Georgian and Moldovan wines, claiming the products do not meet the standards indicated by their producers. (https://civil.ge/archives/110331)
• Georgian Delegation in Moscow: On April 11, representatives from Georgian wine producing companies traveled to Moscow to discuss the ban on imports of Georgian wine and spirits imposed by Russia. Levan Koberidze, Marketing and Sales Director of GWS, stated that the Georgian delegation aims to meet with their Russian partners involved in the distribution of Georgian wines to regain access to the Russian market. (https://civil.ge/archives/110339)
  • Georgian Foreign Ministry's Appeal: On April 7, the Georgian Foreign Ministry sent a note to Russia, requesting consultations regarding the export of wine, cognac, sparkling wine, and vegetable products, in accordance with Article 16 of the Free Trade Agreement between the two countries.
• Refusal of Talks: On April 11, Parliamentary Chairperson Nino Burjanadze stated that Russian officials are refusing to engage in talks with the Georgian side regarding the ban on imports of Georgian wine. She characterized Russia's ban on Georgian wines as “politically motivated,” emphasizing the need for dialogue to clarify the situation. Burjanadze noted that despite efforts, Georgian Agriculture Minister Mikheil Svimonishvili was denied a meeting with his Russian counterpart. She expressed the importance of discussing the reasons behind the ban, particularly if it relates to combating falsified wine. (https://civil.ge/archives/110341)
  • Criticism of Tajikistan: Burjanadze criticized Tajikistan for offering to replace Georgian wines in the Russian market, calling their actions "improper." She urged other CIS member states to consider the situation regarding Georgian wine and the implications of Russia's actions on the integrity of the organization.
  • CIS Membership Concerns: Burjanadze indicated that Russia's actions might prompt Georgia to reevaluate its membership in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). She pointed out the discrepancies in treatment, such as visa requirements and import bans, questioning the rationale for remaining in the organization.
    • Prime Minister's Response: Prime Minister Zurab Noghaideli countered that the issue of withdrawing from the CIS is not currently on the agenda, emphasizing that Georgia does not intend to leave the organization. Despite the criticism, Noghaideli acknowledged the criticisms of CIS inefficiency but reiterated that quitting the CIS is not a current priority. Economic concerns are paramount, as withdrawal could lead to serious challenges, including nullifying free trade agreements with other CIS member states. The debate around CIS membership is ongoing in Georgia, with the opposition advocating for withdrawal. However, the ruling National Movement party has been cautious due to the potential economic ramifications and the sensitivity of the issue among voters. Lawmakers from the ruling party emphasized that any decision regarding CIS withdrawal should involve collective responsibility among the parliamentary majority, opposition, and government, balancing pragmatism with popular sentiment. (https://civil.ge/archives/110347)
      • At thee April 21 CIS Foreign ministerial in Moscow, Georgia sent only a Deputy FM, Merab Antadze (https://civil.ge/archives/110402)
        • On April 21, during a meeting of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) Foreign Ministers in Moscow, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov addressed the ongoing tensions regarding Russia's ban on the import of Georgian wine. Lavrov accused the Georgian side of trying to politicize the wine import ban, suggesting that such actions would not contribute to resolving the matter. He emphasized the importance of handling the issue through professional dialogue, based on the facts presented by relevant Russian authorities to their Georgian and Moldovan counterparts. (https://civil.ge/archives/110421)
          • • Georgian Deputy Foreign Minister Merab Antadze, representing Georgia at the CIS summit, requested that the issue of the wine ban be addressed in the session. He condemned Russia’s actions as politically motivated and described them as an “unfriendly step” towards Georgia. Antadze articulated that Russia is employing economic leverage to exert political pressure on Georgia, but Russia vetoed efforts to put the issue on the agenda.
• Russian Delegation Arrival: A ten-member delegation from the Russian Federation, led by Deputy Commander of Russian Land Forces Valery Yevnevich, arrived in Tbilisi on April 10 to discuss the technical details of the withdrawal of Russian military bases from Georgia. (https://civil.ge/archives/110342)
  • According to the Georgian Defense Ministry, the withdrawal of military hardware from the Akhalkalaki military base will begin on May 15. Georgian Deputy Defense Minister Mamuka Kudava announced that all armaments and military equipment will be completely removed from the Akhalkalaki base by August 15, which includes over 700 tanks, armored vehicles, artillery systems, and other military equipment. The military equipment will be transported from Akhalkalaki via railway through Tsalka (Georgia) and Azerbaijan back to the Russian Federation.
    • Details of the Agreement: Under the terms of the agreement, Russia is set to complete the withdrawal of its military base in Akhalkalaki by 2007, with the military base in Batumi scheduled to be closed by 2008. (https://civil.ge/archives/110354)
    • A controversial aspect of the agreement is the potential establishment of a joint Russian-Georgian anti-terrorist center in Batumi, using resources from the Russian military base. Negotiations on this center are still pending, and Georgia insists that its creation is not guaranteed without further talks. (https://civil.ge/archives/110367)
      • Oppo parties are particularly concerned about the provision that proposes the creation of a joint Georgian-Russian anti-terrorist center using personnel and equipment from the Russian military base in Batumi. Opposition MPs questioned the necessity of a Russian intelligence unit (GRU) near NATO member Turkey, fearing negative impacts on Georgia's national interests. (https://civil.ge/archives/110372)
    • Parliament ratified the two agreements on April 13 (https://civil.ge/archives/110371)

• Visit Postponed: Georgian Prime Minister Zurab Noghaideli announced on April 11 that his planned visit to Moscow on April 12-13 has been postponed again by Russia. Noghaideli stated that the postponement is due to a lack of consultations and preparation for the visit. Despite the postponement, he expressed his intention to visit Moscow in the near future. This is not the first time; Russia had previously postponed Noghaideli's visit in February. (https://civil.ge/archives/110343)
• On April 12, President Mikheil Saakashvili announced that he has tasked Defense Minister Irakli Okruashvili with promoting Georgian wine in new foreign markets. Additionally, he assigned Prime Minister Zurab Noghaideli to focus on domestic and Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) markets until Russia lifts its embargo on Georgian wine imports. Saakashvili emphasized Okruashvili's background in business management as a key reason for this decision, indicating that his expertise will be beneficial in expanding the reach of Georgian wine internationally. (https://civil.ge/archives/110357)
• President Saakashvili instructed Defense Minister Irakli Okruashvili to promote Georgian wine in new foreign markets, particularly in Ukraine, Eastern Europe, and the Baltics. Prime Minister Zurab Noghaideli was tasked with promoting Georgian wine in the domestic and CIS markets. (https://civil.ge/archives/110360)
  • Okruashvili stated that he had a plan to address the wine issue and proposed closing down illegal wine factories in Georgia. He emphasized that many Georgian wine companies lack marketing and management skills, and the government should assist them.
• On April 13, Russian Ambassador Vladimir Chkhikishvili denied that Russia had imposed an economic embargo o Georgia (https://civil.ge/archives/110365)
• Svimonishvili finally visited Moscow on April 13 (https://civil.ge/archives/110366)
  • Georgian Agriculture Minister Mikheil Svimonishvili reported that despite a prior agreement for joint quality checks on Georgian wines, Russia's chief sanitary inspector, Gennadiy Onishchenko, refused to meet with Georgian officials during their visit to Moscow on April 14. This visit was aimed at addressing Russia’s ban on Georgian wine imports, which was imposed by Onishchenko’s agency due to claims of pesticide contamination. While Georgian Deputy Healthcare Minister Nikoloz Pruidze did meet with Russian experts from the Russian Consumer Protection Agency, Svimonishvili clarified that the discussions did not signal Russia’s intent to lift the ban. He expressed frustration that the Russian experts were unprepared for the meeting, contrasting with the Georgian delegation, which had presented certificates proving the quality of Georgian wines. Despite the setback, the lack of progress on lifting the ban remains a point of contention for Georgia. (https://civil.ge/archives/110378)
• On April 15, the Russian Consumer Protection Agency announced that it had found a significant amount of "falsified and low-quality" Borjomi Georgian mineral water on Russian markets. However, the agency has not yet moved to ban imports of Georgian mineral water. PM Zurab Noghaideli suggested on April 14 that if Russia bans Georgian mineral water, it would be a politically-motivated decision, similar to the ban on Georgian wine. (https://civil.ge/archives/110381)
• On April 17, Russian President Vladimir Putin addressed the ongoing issue regarding the ban on imports of Georgian and Moldovan wines during a government session. Minister Zurabov informed the President that the quality of wine being imported into Russia from Georgia and Moldova was deemed “rather unsatisfactory.” Zurabov emphasized the need for Georgian and Moldovan producers to use only permitted fertilizers and technologies in grape cultivation to ensure a satisfactory quality of wine. He highlighted a serious public health concern, stating that the consumption of low-quality alcohol results in approximately 35,000 deaths annually in Russia. (https://civil.ge/archives/110390)
• The Russian consumer protection agency has impounded over 9,000 bottles of “Nabeghlavi” Georgian mineral water in the Moscow region as of April 18. This action follows a previous announcement regarding the discovery of “falsified and low quality” Georgian mineral water, specifically Borjomi, in Russian markets. Despite findings about the low quality of certain Georgian mineral waters, the Russian consumer protection agency has not yet banned the import of these products. (https://civil.ge/archives/110399)
• 18 April: Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Grigory Karasin visited Tbilisi to discuss joint measures in the fight against terrorism with Georgian officials. The discussions focused on implementing the provisions of the agreements regarding the establishment of a Georgian-Russian anti-terrorist center. Georgian opposition parliamentarians have expressed concerns that this agreement could lead to the "legalization of Russian military intelligence" in Batumi. (https://civil.ge/archives/110405)
• On April 19, the Russian State Duma passed a resolution supporting the ban on imports of Georgian and Moldovan wines, brandy, and sparkling wine. Russian lawmakers stated that the ban was a necessary measure to protect the health of Russian consumers and aligned with international trade rules and norms. (https://civil.ge/archives/110408)
• April 25-26: A delegation from Russia, led by Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Yakovenko, will be in Tbilisi. The discussions will center around border delimitation issues. In March, Georgia established a commission, chaired by Deputy Foreign Minister Giorgi Manjgaladze, to handle negotiations on border delimitations with Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Russia. (https://civil.ge/archives/110435)
• 25 April: President Mikheil Saakashvili criticized Russia's decision to increase gas prices from USD 63 to USD 110, stating it is designed to create hardships for Georgian families. The rise in gas prices is expected to lead to an increase in electricity prices, as much of Georgia's electricity is generated from imported gas. Saakashvili instructed the government to subsidize the increased electricity tariffs for the most socially vulnerable citizens. Finance Minister Lexo Alexishvili indicated that around GEL 10-11 million will be necessary to cover the subsidies for the increased tariffs. Saakashvili argued that the increase serves a specific purpose: to punish Georgian families for pursuing an independent path, seeking territorial integrity, and aiming for economic development. The government is also expected to subsidize electricity tariffs for citizens who consume small amounts of electricity. (https://civil.ge/archives/110440)
  • The total subsidy cost allocated by the Gov was 16 million USD (https://civil.ge/archives/110438)
• While speaking about wine row with Russia Okruashvili said on April 20 that “even if you export – excuse me for this expression – feces to Russia it can be sold there.” This led to the Russian MFA summoning Ambassador Chubinishvili (https://civil.ge/archives/110445)
• Withdrawal Delay: The process to withdraw military hardware from the Akhalkalaki military base, initially scheduled for April 26, has been delayed. On April 25, local residents of Akhalkalaki, a predominantly ethnic Armenian town, blocked the road to protest against the base's pullout. Their concerns center around potential negative impacts on social-economic conditions in the region. Mikheil Kaminin, a spokesman for the Russian Foreign Ministry, indicated that the command of the base had requested the local military police to ensure the safe movement of military equipment, but the Georgian authorities declined to intervene, stating it was not their responsibility. (https://civil.ge/archives/110444)
  • Protest Description: Georgian Interior Minister Vano Merabishvili characterized the protest rally outside the Russian military base in Akhalkalaki as a “show staged by a small group” of individuals, primarily those employed at the base. Merabishvili mentioned that only 20-25 individuals participated in the protest, which he described as a “show” staged for the cameras of Russian television stations. Merabishvili suggested that the protest was organized by individuals associated with the base and their families, indicating that it was not directed from Moscow and that no large-scale protests were expected in Akhalkalaki. (https://civil.ge/archives/110447)
  • Georgian Defense Minister Irakli Okruashvili accused Russian security services (FSB) of orchestrating provocations in Akhalkalaki to disrupt the withdrawal of a Russian military base. Okruashvili stated that a large rally was planned for May 3 in Akhalkalaki, aimed at hindering the first stage of the base's withdrawal. (https://civil.ge/archives/110480)
• 27 April: A small group of Georgians and foreigners organized a “supra” (traditional Georgian feast) outside the Russian embassy in Tbilisi to express support for Georgian wine. The participants identified themselves as part of the “World Association of Wine Lovers.” (https://civil.ge/archives/110453)
• 27 April: Burjanadze marks the 100th anniversary of the Duma by making a speech at the Duma, in which she criticized Russia's double-standard policy regarding the ban of Georgian wine. This was met by interruptions from lawmakers, notably Alexey Mitrofanov.
  • Burjanadze urged for a new Caucasian policy, advocating for practical action against separatism rather than just verbal condemnation. She asserted that Russia must reject its double standards and act as a mediator in regional conflicts for its policy in the Caucasus to be clear and successful. (https://civil.ge/archives/110455)
    • Unofficial reports suggested that Boris Grizlov, Chairman of the Russian State Duma, canceled a scheduled meeting with Burjanadze, which was to occur on the sidelines of the ceremony marking the Duma’s anniversary on April 28.
  • Sergey Mironov, Chairman of the Council of Federation of Russia, called on April 28 for the resumption of regular sessions among the four parliamentary speakers from Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Russia. He indicated that he had already discussed this initiative with his Azerbaijani and Armenian colleagues, who welcomed the idea. Mironov expressed optimism that Nino Burjanadze, the Georgian Parliamentary Chairperson, would not oppose the initiative. The last meeting of the four parliamentary speakers took place in September 2005 in Moscow. (https://civil.ge/archives/110463)
  • Nino Burjanadze, Parliamentary Chairperson of Georgia, reiterated on May 1, 2006, that Georgia is ready for constructive dialogue with Russia. She emphasized that Georgia's aspirations to join Euro-Atlantic structures, like NATO, do not threaten Russia's legitimate interests. Burjanadze acknowledged the existence of problems in Russian-Georgian relations, suggesting the need for a frank and constructive approach to resolve them. (https://civil.ge/archives/110479)
• 25-26 April: The Russian and Georgian sides reached agreements on several sections of the state border during the negotiations. The discussions included disputable sections of the border and the delimitation of the Black Sea maritime space between the two countries. A protocol was signed to coordinate the agreed-upon sections of the border. The next round of negotiations is scheduled to take place in Russia during the third quarter of 2006. (https://civil.ge/archives/110458)
• 27 April: Defense Minister Irakli Okruashvili stated on April 27 that Russia's ban on importing Georgian wine could have a positive side by prompting Georgia to diversify its foreign markets and improve the quality of its wines. He expressed gratitude for the ban, suggesting it allows Georgia to shift from a low-level consumer market to higher-level consumer markets in both eastern and western Europe as well as the United States. Okruashvili emphasized that the ban would enable Georgian producers to focus on creating and selling wines of higher quality, which could lead to increased revenues. Following his previous statement about the Russian market, which included a controversial comment regarding the sale of poor-quality products, the Russian Foreign Ministry summoned the Georgian Ambassador to express protest. Okruashvili downplayed the backlash, suggesting that if Russians were upset by his remarks, they could simply drink cold water, which he characterized as of low quality. (https://civil.ge/archives/110460)
  • He justified his strong language toward Russia, saying it is the only effective way to communicate with them based on his experience. Okruashvili admitted that his strong statements were also intended to increase international attention to the Georgia-Russia wine dispute, accusing Russia of resenting Georgia’s economic growth. (https://civil.ge/archives/110485)
• 28 April: Noghaideli meets with wine producers. Following a closed-door session, it was decided to form a joint group aimed at collaboratively addressing the challenges posed by Russia's ban on Georgian wine. Levan Koberidze, the sales and marketing director of the Georgian Wines and Spirits company, indicated that this group would help coordinate activities among wine producers. The wine producers reiterated that re-entering the Russian market remains a top priority for them despite the current ban. (https://civil.ge/archives/110465)
• Georgian Prime Minister Zurab Nogaideli stated on May 2 that the government is currently discussing Georgia’s potential withdrawal from the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) but did not provide further details. (https://civil.ge/archives/110487)
  • President Mikheil Saakashvili instructed the government on May 2 to evaluate the consequences of Georgia’s potential withdrawal from the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Speaking at the School of Public Administration in Kutaisi, Saakashvili suggested that Georgia should consider leaving the CIS if no benefits are derived from membership. If Georgia finds no further benefit from the CIS and only humiliation, Saakashvili said the Georgian people, Parliament, and government should make a decision that reflects the dignity of the nation. (https://civil.ge/archives/110492)
  • Sergey Mironov, Chairman of Russia's Council of Federation, expressed concerns on May 3 about Georgia's potential withdrawal from the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Mironov warned that such a move would primarily harm the Georgian population. (https://civil.ge/archives/110506)
  • On May 4, Sergey Bagapsh, the leader of the breakaway region of Abkhazia, stated that one of Abkhazia’s key foreign policy goals is to join the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Bagapsh indicated that the region would "push forth the issue" of joining the CIS by the end of the year, according to Interfax. (https://civil.ge/archives/110511)
  • Georgian Foreign Minister Gela Bezhuashvili announced on May 7 that consultations have begun between Georgian and Ukrainian officials regarding the potential benefits and implications of membership in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). The discussions, which took place on May 6, centered on evaluating the positive aspects of CIS membership and considering the possible consequences of withdrawing from the organization. (https://civil.ge/archives/110533)
  • Georgian State Minister for Euro-Atlantic Integration Issues, Giorgi Baramidze, stated on May 8 that Georgia will most likely withdraw from the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). This comment was made during his talks with Estonian officials in Tallinn. (https://civil.ge/archives/110540)
  • On May 10, 2006, Georgian Prime Minister Zurab Nogaideli announced the establishment of a governmental commission tasked with assessing the potential consequences of Georgia's withdrawal from the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). (https://civil.ge/archives/110556)
  • On May 11, 2006, Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili addressed ongoing consultations regarding the potential withdrawal of Georgia from the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). The President clarified that quitting the CIS “is not a goal in itself.” Instead, it reflects a process of reassessing Georgia's strategic alliances and geopolitical positioning, especially in light of recent tensions with Russia. These statements came during Saakashvili’s meeting with Estonian President Arnold Rüütel, highlighting Georgia’s intent to strengthen ties with European partners while navigating its relationship with Russia and its status within post-Soviet structures like the CIS. (https://civil.ge/archives/110566)
  • Upcoming Meeting: Georgian Vice-Premier Giorgi Baramidze, who is also the State Minister for European Integration Issues, will attend a meeting of the Heads of Governments from the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) in Dushanbe, Tajikistan, on May 27. (https://civil.ge/archives/110584)
  • Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Fradkov commented on Georgia’s potential withdrawal from the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) on May 19, during a press conference in Minsk. He emphasized that Russia does not forcibly retain any member state within the CIS and noted that the organization still has relevance and utility. (https://civil.ge/archives/110628)
  • In Dushanbe, Baramidze stated that Georgia finds no sense in remaining a part of the CIS, indicating a critical reassessment of its involvement in the organization. Baramidze articulated that Georgia had initially hoped the CIS would facilitate conflict resolution and enhance economic ties. However, he remarked that "everything turned out to the contrary for Georgia," suggesting that the organization has not fulfilled its promises or expectations for Georgia. (https://civil.ge/archives/110668)
  • Semneby also commented on Georgia's possible exit from the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), saying it is the country's sovereign right to choose its affiliations. However, he urged Georgia to carefully weigh the pros and cons before making such a decision. (https://civil.ge/archives/110679)
  • Sergey Mironov, Chairman of the Russian Council of Federation, warned on May 26 that Georgia would lose economic preferences if it decides to quit the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). (https://civil.ge/archives/110686)
• Russian President Vladimir Putin appointed Valery Kenyaikin as Russia’s chief negotiator in talks with Georgia regarding military issues in May. Kenyaikin replaced Igor Savolsky, the Russian Foreign Ministry’s special envoy for CIS affairs. Kenyaikin was also appointed as Chairman of the State Commission responsible for preparing the Agreement between Russia and Georgia on Friendship, Good Neighborhood, Cooperation, and Mutual Security. (https://civil.ge/archives/110490)
• President Mikheil Saakashvili stated on May 2 that Russia's current policy towards Georgia threatens the country's sovereignty and independence, urging the nation to recognize this threat. Saakashvili criticized those undermining Georgia’s European identity and accused them of conducting a propagandistic war against the nation, describing these individuals as a significant problem for Georgia. (https://civil.ge/archives/110493)
  • He accused Russia of using economic leverage, such as banning imports of Georgian agricultural products and wines, to incite public unrest with the aim of regime change in Georgia. He cited a Russian official's comment questioning why the Georgian public hasn’t protested against their leadership, reiterating that the goal of Russia's policy is to create starvation and unrest in Georgia.
  • Saakashvili stated that Georgia does not suffer from "Russo-phobia" and desires intensive dialogue and friendship with Russia, provided that it respects Georgia's sovereignty.
• On May 3, Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili responded to Russia’s ban on Georgian wine imports during his visit to Lithuania. Saakashvili expressed gratitude, saying the ban has inadvertently "advertised" Georgian wine globally. He added that Russia made "a very foolish move" by implementing the ban, which highlighted Georgia’s wine industry to the world. He mentioned plans to return to the Russian market eventually but stressed the importance of expanding into European and American markets. (https://civil.ge/archives/110507)
• Russia has officially banned the import of the Georgian mineral water "Borjomi," as announced by Russian chief sanitary inspector Genady Onishchenko on May 4. Onishchenko stated that the decision stemmed from recent inspections, particularly in the Moscow region, which revealed that the waters marketed as "Borjomi" did not meet the required specifications. (https://civil.ge/archives/110520)
  • Georgian Prime Minister Zurab Nogaideli stated that Russia's ban on the import of the mineral water “Borjomi” is “a politically-motivated decision.” He made this remark while attending the Invest in Georgia business forum in London on May 5. Nogaideli emphasized the need for Georgia to actively pursue entry into new markets, despite efforts to re-enter the Russian market. (https://civil.ge/archives/110522)
  • The Russian consumer protection agency ordered customs to prevent the import of “Borjomi” after an inspection revealed that out of 69 samples tested in the Moscow region, 68 did not meet standards, according to Russian chief sanitary inspector Genady Onishchenko.
  • Georgian Agriculture Minister Mikheil Svimonishvili criticized the ban, asserting that Russia is “fighting against everything that is Georgian,” which he claims has no relation to combating falsification.
  • Parliamentary Chairperson Nino Burjanadze stated that Russia’s decision “was not a surprise.”
• The Russian consumer protection agency announced it would revoke Borjomi’s safety certificates effective May 7, citing the product's failure to meet standards. Russian chief sanitary inspector Genady Onishchenko reported that an inspection in the Moscow region revealed that 68 out of 69 samples of Borjomi failed to meet quality specifications. He claimed that the waters marketed as ‘Borjomi’ do not actually correspond to the defined standards. (https://civil.ge/archives/110524)
  • The Georgian Glass & Mineral Waters Company (GGMW), which produces Borjomi, denied the allegations, asserting they were groundless.
  • President Saakashvili hinted at the possibility of Georgia quitting the CIS and tasked the government with assessing the economic consequences of such a move.
• Following the ban on Borjomi mineral water, Russian chief sanitary inspector Genady Onishchenko announced the ban on another Georgian mineral water brand, Nabeghlavi, effective May 5. The import ban was reported by the Russian consumer protection agency on May 6. (https://civil.ge/archives/110530)
  • In a letter to the Russian customs service, Onishchenko stated that he would revoke Nabeghlavi's safety certificates starting May 10.
  • The Russian consumer protection agency reported that all 175,560 bottles of Nabeghlavi inspected in the Moscow region failed to meet the required standards.
• On May 9, President Mikheil Saakashvili addressed World War II veterans in Tbilisi, emphasizing the temporary nature of the tense relations between Georgia and Russia. Saakashvili expressed confidence that Georgia would eventually find common ground with Russia, highlighting their shared history of fighting against Fascism and their status as neighboring countries. He criticized certain Russian representatives for implementing strict economic measures against Georgia, which he stated were intended to worsen the social conditions of Georgian families. However, he maintained that these measures are temporary. (https://civil.ge/archives/110543)
• On May 10, 2006, Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili publicly criticized the Georgian Agriculture Ministry and local winemakers for their lack of initiative in promoting authentic Georgian wines in new markets. This session, broadcasted by Georgian television, was marked by a dramatic demonstration involving bottles of what Saakashvili claimed were falsified Georgian wines purchased during a trip to Vilnius, Lithuania. (https://civil.ge/archives/110548)
  • The president expressed frustration at the Agriculture Ministry's failure to adequately promote Georgian wines, accusing it of being inactive while foreign producers capitalized on marketing opportunities. He remarked that while local wines were left to rot in Georgia, foreign wines were successfully penetrating markets and generating substantial revenue.
  • Saakashvili addressed grievances from some Georgian winemakers who blamed the government for losing access to the Russian market after Russia imposed a ban on Georgian wine imports. He urged these producers to actively seek out new markets in Europe, Poland, and Ukraine. He challenged the notion that exploring markets in Europe and China was "mythical," emphasizing the tangible opportunities available for Georgian wines in these regions.
  • The president noted that the falsified wines were selling for prices between 6 to 8 US dollars, illustrating the market potential that Georgian wines could tap into if properly marketed and promoted.
  • On May 10, 2006, Georgian Prime Minister Zurab Nogaideli announced significant actions taken by the Financial Police against the production of counterfeit wines in Georgia. Eight wine-producing factories in the western region of Imereti were impounded by the Financial Police due to allegations of producing falsified wines. Nogaideli stated that the government will intensify efforts to combat counterfeit Georgian wines being sold both domestically and abroad. (https://civil.ge/archives/110557)
• The upcoming meeting between representatives of the Georgian and Russian Border Guard Departments is set to take place on May 11, 2006, at the Chechen section of the Russian-Georgian border. The primary aim of this meeting is to discuss cooperation between the two border guard departments. This reflects ongoing efforts to manage border security and address issues arising from the complex geopolitical situation between Georgia and Russia. (https://civil.ge/archives/110564)
• 12 May: Inspection Decree: Mikhail Rimzha, the Chief Sanitary Inspector of Belarus, signed a decree to inspect the quality of Borjomi mineral water imported from Georgia. (https://civil.ge/archives/110578)
• Withdrawal Announcement: Russia began removing heavy military equipment from its Akhalkalaki military base on May 13, as reported by RIA Novosti and Interfax. Types of Equipment: Assistant Commander of the Russian Land Troops, Igor Konoshenkov, announced that the withdrawal includes seven battle tanks, ten armored vehicles, amphibious scout cars, and other military hardware. (https://civil.ge/archives/110582)
  • On May 25, the Georgian Defense Ministry reported significant movements concerning Russian military assets in Georgia: 3 infantry fighting vehicles (BMP) and 24 trucks loaded with field kitchens and bakeries, along with 28 trailers, were pulled out from Russia’s military base in Batumi, located in the Adjara Autonomous Republic.A train carrying military hardware and equipment is set to transport these assets to the Russian military base in Gyumri, Armenia. (https://civil.ge/archives/110666)
• Chiefs of the Coast Guard Services of Georgia and Russia are meeting in Sochi, a Russian Black Sea resort, on May 12-13. The talks focus on combating illegal activities in the Black Sea region and coordinating joint efforts to address these issues. The Chiefs of the Coast Guard Services are set to sign a cooperation plan for the years 2006-2007. (https://civil.ge/archives/110585)
• On May 15, Georgian Prime Minister Zurab Nogaideli addressed concerns about Russian investments in Georgia during an appearance on the political talk show Pirvelebi aired on Imedi television. He emphasized that the Georgian government does not perceive Russian investments as a threat to national security and is committed to an open-door policy for foreign investments, including those from Russia. (https://civil.ge/archives/110600)
  • Nogaideli reiterated that the government will not impose “artificial restrictions” on Russian state or private companies wishing to participate in Georgia’s privatization process. He believes that investments—whether from Russia or elsewhere—create jobs, strengthen the economy, and increase state revenues, which ultimately benefits Georgia.
  • The Prime Minister assured that accepting Russian investments does not pose a security risk for Georgia. He firmly stated that restricting investments based on nationality would be ineffective and counterproductive
• In an interview with the Ukrainian business daily Ekonomicheskie Izvestia, published on May 18, Georgian State Minister for Economic Reforms Kakha Bendukidze addressed concerns regarding Russian investments in Georgia, asserting that such fears are "over-exaggerated." Bendukidze argued that apprehensions about Russian capital are unfounded, noting that it would be unusual for Russian investors to focus their interests on countries like Indonesia while overlooking Georgia or Ukraine. He suggested that the fear surrounding Russian investments resembles concerns seen in other countries, such as Estonia, which considered nationalizing its railway to avoid Russian acquisition. (https://civil.ge/archives/110613)
• In an interview with Komsomolskaya Pravda, Sergey Ivanov, the Russian Defense Minister, confirmed Russia's intent to significantly strengthen its border security from the Caspian Sea to the Black Sea. He cited concerns over terrorist activities, admitting that movements from neighboring regions are alarming. Ivanov noted that the Russian military has engaged foreign nationals infiltrating from Georgia during ongoing anti-terrorist operations in Chechnya. The Georgian Foreign Ministry welcomed the idea of increased Russian border control, as it could offer Georgia enhanced protection from armed groups originating from the North Caucasus. However, they stressed that the primary focus should be on the sections of the border related to Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which are particularly vulnerable to illegal arms trafficking. (https://civil.ge/archives/110617)
• 19 May: The Georgian government has recently taken a significant step towards addressing the aftermath of the South Ossetian conflict by submitting a draft law on property restitution to the Parliament. This law aims to facilitate the return and compensation of victims of the conflict, a long-standing commitment made by Georgia when it joined the Council of Europe in 1999. (https://civil.ge/archives/110618)
  • The draft law titled “Compensation, Restitution and Restoration of Rights for the Victims of the Georgian-Ossetian Conflict” aims to provide a legal framework for the return of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees to their properties in South Ossetia, should they wish to return and can prove ownership.
  • It recognizes the rights of all IDPs and refugees to return to their homes and establishes a process for them to reclaim their properties. Approximately 60,000 ethnic Ossetians and 10,000 ethnic Georgians were displaced due to the conflict, with many seeking refuge in Russia.
  • An 18-member tripartite commission will be established to handle restitution claims, with six members each from the Georgian and South Ossetian sides, along with six representatives from unspecified international organizations. The commission is designed to operate independently for nine years, with strict measures against any attempts at political pressure.
  • The commission will allow any affected individuals to appeal for restitution or compensation within seven years of its establishment. Decisions on applications are expected within six months, or nine months for more complex cases. Victims may receive either financial compensation or equivalent property, with provisions for financial assistance and allowances to facilitate their return.
  • The law was developed with input from the Venice Commission, which supports its adoption as part of a broader conflict resolution process. The U.S. has also urged South Ossetian authorities to engage with Georgia on this draft law, signaling international interest in its successful implementation.
  • The South Ossetian government has shown skepticism towards the draft law. Officials like Boris Chochiev, Deputy Chairman of the South Ossetian government, labeled it a "PR campaign" with no real benefit for refugees. The lack of enthusiasm from Tskhinvali indicates potential difficulties in moving forward with the law without cooperation from the South Ossetian side.
    • Surveys suggest that over 90% of ethnic Ossetian refugees are reluctant to return, citing occupation of their properties by others. This sentiment could hinder the effectiveness of the proposed law, as the practical challenges of property restitution remain considerable.
• During a meeting on May 18-19 at the Council of Europe in Strasbourg, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov characterized discussions with Georgian Foreign Minister Gela Bezhuashvili as “constructive.” The talks addressed various issues, including bilateral relations and the resolution of ongoing conflicts between Georgia and its breakaway regions. (https://civil.ge/archives/110635)
  • Focus on Peacekeepers: Lavrov urged Bezhuashvili not to create “artificial problems” regarding the operations of Russian peacekeepers in the conflict zones. He emphasized the importance of providing them with “normal working conditions.”
  • Joint Working Group: Lavrov expressed support for the establishment of a joint Georgian-South Ossetian working group aimed at developing a peace program for conflict resolution. This indicates a potential step forward in dialogue between the conflicting parties.
  • Railway Rehabilitation Consortium: The Russian Foreign Minister welcomed the formation of a consortium involving Georgian, Abkhaz, Russian, and Armenian representatives, focused on rehabilitating the Abkhaz section of the railway that connects Russia with Georgia and Armenia. This initiative is seen as a significant infrastructure collaboration.
  • Concerns Over Security Documents: Lavrov raised concerns about Tbilisi’s refusal to approve documents concerning security guarantees and the non-resumption of hostilities related to the Abkhaz and South Ossetian conflicts. This refusal could hinder efforts for peace and stability in the region.
  • Internally Displaced Persons Registration: Lavrov noted that Bezhuashvili assured him that efforts would be made to expedite the registration process for internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the Gali district of breakaway Abkhazia. He expressed regret over what he viewed as delays in this registration process for individuals who have already returned.
• On May 25, Vadim Fefilov, a journalist from Russian NTV television, was deported to Moscow after being denied an entry visa upon his arrival at Tbilisi airport. Vadim Fefilov was deported back to Moscow after Georgian authorities refused to grant him an entry visa. The specific reasons for this decision have not been publicly explained by officials in Tbilisi. The NTV team had arrived in Georgia to cover celebrations marking Georgia's Independence Day, which was scheduled for May 26. (https://civil.ge/archives/110673)
• On June 3, President Mikheil Saakashvili announced that he and Russian President Vladimir Putin will meet in St. Petersburg on June 13. This agreement followed a phone conversation initiated by Saakashvili, aimed at resuming a constructive dialogue between Georgia and Russia. (https://civil.ge/archives/110743)
  • Additional context: failed peace talks in Abkhazia, renewed tensions in South Ossetia
  • Mironov praised Georgian President Saakashvili’s initiative to organize this high-level meeting. Mironov and Burjanadzeexpressed support for resuming meetings among the Parliament Speakers of the Caucasus Four: Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Russia. (https://civil.ge/archives/110791)
  • The discussions began nearly three hours late and primarily focus on secessionist conflicts according to Georgian officials. (https://civil.ge/archives/110837)
    • Sergey Prikhodko, an aide to Putin, stated that the meeting aims to provide a positive impulse for improving relations between the two countries, as reported by Interfax. While no significant breakthroughs are anticipated from the talks, Tbilisi officials view the commencement of high-level dialogue as a positive development.
  • President Saakashvili expressed hope that Russia would continue to be Georgia’s major economic and trade partner. President Putin acknowledged that Russia remains Georgia’s primary trade and economic partner and highlighted the impressive increase in Russian investments in Georgia, which had grown fivefold in 2005. Saakashvili commented on the beautification of St. Petersburg and noted that Tbilisi has also undergone significant changes in recent years, inviting Putin to visit Georgia to witness these transformations. (https://civil.ge/archives/110838)
  • Vladimir Putin stated that relations between Russia and Georgia are “not normal,” and the discussions were aimed at finding a resolution to this situation. Both leaders agreed that Georgia and Russia should take steps to normalize relations and create favorable conditions for developing interstate links. Putin emphasized the need to improve the mechanisms for interaction between the two countries and expressed a desire to collaboratively address existing problems. Mikheil Saakashvili highlighted the secessionist conflicts as the primary issue affecting the relationship between Russia and Georgia. Saakashvili stressed the historical context, mentioning that problems in the Caucasus have traditionally been resolved effectively when Georgia and Russia worked together. (https://civil.ge/archives/110839)
  • The conversation was described as "very frank" and aimed at diffusing current tensions between Russia and Georgia. Despite a constructive tone, both leaders made pointed remarks, with Saakashvili accusing Russia of annexing territories in breakaway regions (Abkhazia and South Ossetia), while Putin reiterated the right to self-determination for the residents of these areas. (https://civil.ge/archives/110840)
    • Putin acknowledged that political relations are “not normal” but described the talks as “very useful,” emphasizing the need to normalize interactions. Both presidents expressed a willingness to resolve existing issues through dialogue and joint efforts, recognizing the lack of sufficient contact as a barrier.
    • Saakashvili highlighted that unresolved conflicts are a major issue in Russo-Georgian relations and expressed readiness for peaceful dialogue, with Russia playing a key role. He emphasized that 300,000 Georgians were displaced from Abkhazia in the 1990s, arguing that this context undermines claims of self-determination from the breakaway regions. Putin referred to the situation in Chechnya, advocating for democratic processes to determine the will of the people.
    • Putin noted positive trends in economic relations, highlighting a fivefold increase in Russian investments in Georgia in 2005, and emphasizing the importance of remittances from Georgians working in Russia. The presidents discussed the need for a guaranteed energy supply, with significant Russian involvement in Georgia’s energy sector.
    • Although not a focal point of the talks, Putin mentioned that the ban on Georgian wine imports would be addressed once quality control issues were resolved.
    • Saakashvili reiterated concerns about Russia providing refuge to Georgian criminals, particularly mentioning Aslan Abashidze, a former leader of the Adjara Autonomous Republic. Putin expressed surprise at the recent arrest warrant issued for Abashidze, recalling that Georgia had previously assured Russia it would not seek extradition.
  • On June 14, Peter Semneby, the EU's Special Representative for the South Caucasus, described the recent talks between Russian President Vladimir Putin and Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili in St. Petersburg as “a turning point” in the relationship between the two countries. Semneby emphasized the importance of the “frank discussions” that took place, stating, “I think that was what was needed, and I hope this will be a turning point.” (https://civil.ge/archives/110855)
• June 2006 announcement: The Georgian Border Guard Department is set to open additional checkpoints along the border with Russia, effective during the summer period. These measures are implemented annually to reinforce border security as the melting snow increases the risks of illegal cross-border movements in high mountainous regions of northern Georgia. (https://civil.ge/archives/110807)
• On June 14, MS said he appointed Noghaideli to oversee the Russian-Georgian relationship (https://civil.ge/archives/110845)
• 8 July: Russia closed the Zemo Larsi checkpoint on the Russo-Georgian border, citing the need for repair works. The duration of the closure is unknown, according to the Georgian Border Police. Zemo Larsi is the only legal border checkpoint between Georgia and Russia. The other two checkpoints are located in the breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Vasil Maglaperidze, Governor of Georgia's Mtskheta-Mtianeti region, expressed skepticism, stating that repair works may not be the real reason for closing this major highway. (https://civil.ge/archives/111002)
  • Georgia described the closure as “unfriendly and provocative.” According to a Russian-Georgian agreement, both sides are required to notify each other of movement restrictions due to repairs at border checkpoints three months in advance. The Georgian government received no prior notice and was informed only two hours before the closure, violating the agreement. (https://civil.ge/archives/111009)
  • Georgia increased security measures at the Ergneti checkpoint, near the administrative border with South Ossetia, to prevent foreign citizens from entering Georgia via the Roki Tunnel. Georgian State Minister Giorgi Khaindrava stated that the closure of Zemo Larsi aimed to complicate the situation in South Ossetia, and entry through the Roki Tunnel is illegal. Several passengers traveling from Russia to Georgia and Armenia have been stranded in the conflict zone as Georgia refuses them entry. Georgian television showed Zurab Arsoshvili, a regional official, instructing Armenian citizens to return to Russia and use Zemo Larsi to enter legally, since the Roki Tunnel does not have a legal checkpoint for entry into Georgia. (https://civil.ge/archives/111012)
    • Georgian Prime Minister Zurab Nogaideli announced a temporary easing of movement for Georgian citizens returning home from Russia. Citizens who were unable to enter Georgia due to Russia's closure of the Zemo Larsi border crossing will be allowed to use the Roki Tunnel in breakaway South Ossetia. This measure is effective only until July 14 and does not apply to freight transportation. (https://civil.ge/archives/111014)
  • The Georgian Foreign Ministry (MFA) accused Russia of closing the Zemo Larsi border crossing point to facilitate the legalization of smuggling arms and cargo through the Roki Tunnel in breakaway South Ossetia. In response to the closure, the Russian Foreign Ministry stated that the decision was made to equip and modernize the customs checkpoint to prevent smuggling and the infiltration of mercenaries into Russia. (https://civil.ge/archives/111036)
• 31 AUgust: Saakashilu meets with winemakers as the vintage season opens. Saakashvili described the situation as an "economic war" with Russia, asserting that the wine embargo is part of a broader strategy by Moscow to destabilize Georgia and incite social unrest. The President criticized the Russian political establishment for its actions against Georgia, framing them as efforts to undermine the current government and prevent Georgia from becoming strong and unified. The President asserted that there is no point in negotiating with Russia regarding the wine market, viewing such discussions as potentially legitimizing Moscow’s aggressive stance. (https://civil.ge/archives/115210)
• In a speech on September 8, President Mikheil Saakashvili of Georgia accused "certain forces in Russia" of attempting to undermine the country's development through economic embargoes, propaganda, and local collaborators. Speaking during a visit to Gurgaani in eastern Georgia, he emphasized the importance of the upcoming harvest, stating it poses a significant challenge amidst these efforts to disrupt Georgia's progress. Saakashvili detailed three methods of sabotage he attributed to Russia: an economic blockade, a smear campaign against Georgia's image, and the actions of local collaborators, all of which he claimed had failed. He urged Georgians to remain steadfast against provocations, particularly in light of recent clashes in the South Ossetia region. He also outlined initiatives to support the grape harvest, which is projected to yield 85,000 tons, including measures for purchasing grapes to assist local wine-growers and ensuring supply to the armed forces. (https://civil.ge/archives/115283)
• On November 6, 2006, Russian chief sanitary inspector Genady Onishchenko announced that Russia's consumer protection agency is in discussions with the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and Transdnestria regarding the potential import of wines produced there. This follows a ban on imports of Georgian and Moldovan wines imposed in March, which was attributed to pesticide contamination. Onishchenko expressed optimism about the ongoing talks, stating that they hold promise for accessing these wines in the Russian market. (https://civil.ge/archives/111352)
  • On November 8, 2006, the Georgian Foreign Ministry issued a warning to Russia's consumer protection agency regarding its discussions with the breakaway region of Abkhazia about potentially importing Abkhaz wines into Russia. The ministry emphasized that any agreement made with the secessionist authorities would be deemed illegal. This statement followed comments by Genady Onishchenko, head of Russia's Consumer Protection Agency, who had initiated talks on this matter after Russia imposed a ban on Georgian wines in March 2006. The Georgian MFA criticized Onishchenko for not only unjustly obstructing the import of Georgian products but also overstepping his authority in making statements about Georgian-Russian trade relations, which they argued hinders Russia's efforts to join the World Trade Organization. (https://civil.ge/archives/111364)
• On February 10, 2007, NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, speaking at the Munich Conference on Security Policy, expressed his goal of seeing more countries join NATO by 2009, including Serbia, Ukraine, and Georgia. Meanwhile, Russian President Vladimir Putin, also addressing the conference, described NATO's expansion toward Russia's borders as a "serious provocation" that diminishes mutual trust, questioning the purpose of such growth. Scheffer dismissed Putin's remarks as "disappointing" and unhelpful. Georgian Foreign Minister Gela Bezhuashvili supported Scheffer's comments, interpreting them as an indication that Georgia and Ukraine were part of NATO's strategic plans. U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, in his address, reassured that Russia need not fear democracies on its borders, while criticizing some of Russia's policies, including arms transfers and the use of energy resources for political leverage. (https://civil.ge/archives/111911)

Border closure

• On August 14, 2006, Georgian Foreign Minister Gela Bezhuashvili publicly condemned Russia for the continued closure of the Zemo Larsi border crossing point, the only legal border access between Georgia and Russia. (https://civil.ge/archives/115099)
• On August 24: Teimuraz Mamsurov, the leader of Russia's North Ossetian Republic, has urged Russian authorities to expedite the reopening of the Zemo Larsi border crossing with Georgia. (https://civil.ge/archives/115168)
• Temporary Reopening: Russia has partially reopened the Zemo Larsi border crossing point, allowing cars to cross from August 31 until September 3. However, trucks will not be permitted to pass. (https://civil.ge/archives/115201)
• Reclosure of Zemo Larsi Checkpoint: Russia closed the Zemo Larsi border crossing with Georgia on September 3, just days after it was temporarily reopened on August 31. The reopening was reportedly at the request of North Ossetian leader Teimuraz Mamsurov to allow North Ossetian residents, who had visited relatives in Georgia, to return home. Georgian officials view the closure as a political move by Russia to redirect traffic through the Roki Tunnel in South Ossetia, which they see as an attempt by Moscow to legitimize the crossing into the breakaway region. (https://civil.ge/archives/115230)

Kodori crisis

ASATIANI

• For more than a decade, Kodori had been the subject of lawlessness and controlled by criminals de facto independent from the central government (473)
• In July 2006, an operation by Georgian special forces took control of the region (473)
• It was renamed Upper Abkhazia (473)
• It was seen as a bridgehead in Abkhazia and a pre-condition of reuniting the whole of Abkhazia to Georgia (473)

ZOURABICHVILI

• Merabishvili accused Kvitsiani of working with Abkhaz separatists and Russia to destabilize the Georgian government (261)
• Zourabichvili criticized the Kodori operation and the overall Georgian takeover of the region as having given an excuse for Russian troops to invade it in 2008 (261)
• On October 25, 2006, Merabishvili's plane is targeted by an air-to-surface missile while flying over the Kodori Gorge, but no injury is reported (263)
• In the summer of 2006, Georgia threatened to drown Russian civilian ships traveling to Abkhazia, but eventually acquiesced (268)

PAX GEORGIANA

• Georgia was accused of having violated the 1994 ceasefire agreement with the Kodori Operation (138)
• Paata Zakareishvili warned in early 2006 that the "window of opportunity" that followed the rise of Saakashvili and Baghapsh was "slowly closing down" (147)
• In the summer of 2006, an Istanbul Meeting is held between Georgian and Abkhaz NGO and journalist representatives, but the Georgian government does not attemd (148)
• The international community largely sided with Russia in the aftermath of the Kodori Crisis: UNGA Resolution 1716 of 13 Oct. 2006 which recognized the role of Russia in mediation (157)
• Abkhazia is seen to have definitely chosen Russia's military protection after the Kodori crisis (157)
• The Abkhaz cut all economic ties with Tbilisi after Kodori (158)
• Baghapsh was forced to show his anti-Georgian credentials, reject any accusation of Georgian sympathies, and adopted a rhetoric just as strict as Ardzinba's was (158)
• On 13 April 2006, the Georgian Parliament adopts a non-binding resolution against Russian bases and peacekeepers (160)
• In November 2006, the UNSC rejects the request to remove Russian peacekeepers from ABkhazia (172)

ASMUS

• Okruashvili was the most vocal advocate of a possible military option to regain the territories (79)
• He famously quipped he'd resign as MOD if he failed to regain control of his native Tskhinvali by Jan 1, 2007 (79)
• Okruashvili would take foreign guests bear hunting in the Kodori Gorge (80)
• Okruashvili's MOD inspired itself from Operation Storm in 1995 and the Israeli 1967 victory (79)
• It seems that Okruashvili was publicly a hawk and MS was a soft rhetoric guy in public (80)
• Okruashvili resigned in November 2006 and sought asylum in France (80-81)

IIFFMCG I

• The establishment of alternative governments by Geogia in Abkhazia and SO was one of the most controversial moves by Tbilisi in the conflict resolution process (30)
  • It was motivated in part by the threat of Kosovo, as having formal administrations in the territories would illegitimize any Russian recognition attempt. (30)
  • It was also motivated by a desire to show how alternative communities could develop under Georgian assistance (31)

IIFFMCG II

• In November 2006, there was an independence referendum in South Ossetia (15)
• Many South Ossetians voted in the 2007 and 2008 Russian elections (15)
• The Sanakoyev administration was a change in strategy by Tbilisi from using security forces to building a political bridgehead (15)
• The appointment by Tbilisi led to a dual power structure in the region and Tbilisi called for a 2+2+2 format and started presenting Sanakoyev in international forums (15)
• In July 2006, the Georgian Parliament passed a resolution on the withdrawal of Russian peacekeepers and transformation of that operation. The resolution was feared to risk to destabilization so Western powers dissuaded Tbilisi from enforcing it (16-17)
• In September 2006, MS spoke at the UNGA and spoke of Russia's "annexation" and "bandit-style occupation" of Abkhazia and SO in an unprecedented harsh speech in which he demanded the withdrawal of the peacekeepers from both territories (17)
  • The speech was made a day after the NATO Council in New York launched an intensified dialogue with Georgia, which was seen as symbolic by Russia (17)
• The peace momentum that started in 2002 during approaches by Shevardnadze and Putin ended with the Kodori Crisis (89)
• In response to Kodori, Sokhumi suspended its participation in the peace mechanisms (90)
• The Georgian decision to install the alternative pro-Georgian authorities in the upper Kodori Valley was criticised by some analysts who believed that such a step could adversely affect the Georgian-Abkhaz peace process. (90)
• Other analysts put Tbilisi’s move in the context of the ongoing international controversies over the future recognition of Kosovo and Moscow’s warnings of its possible recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. In other words, they regarded the installation of the pro-Georgian administration in Kodori as a preventive move aimed at making Russia’s recognition of Abkhazia more difficult, and therefore less feasible. (90)
• Regardless of which of the above two assessments was more correct, it does not seem that the presence of the alternative administration and the Georgian security forces in the upper Kodori Valley really warranted the suspension by the Abkhaz side of its participation in most of the peace mechanisms. They seemed to serve more as a convenient excuse than a valid reason for Sukhumi’s decision to considerably limit its participation in the peace process. (90)
• In May 2006, the Georgian Parliament adopted a law recognizing the right of restitution and comensation to the victims of the Georgian-Ossetian conflict, as it had committed to do in 1999 when joining the COE (112)
  • It was mostly in favor of Ossetians, as there 60,000 Ossetian IDPs from the 90s conflict, against 10,000 Georgians (113)
  • The law created an 18-member tripartite commission to hear the appeals submitted by the victims of the conflict, including six seats to be occupied by international organizations, who would in turn select six Georgians and six Ossetians to complete the commission (113)
  • Though the law was passed on December 30, 2006, Tskhnvali rejected it altogether. (113)
• On 26 April 2006 the de facto “Parliament of the Republic of South Ossetia” adopted two resolutions: the “Declaration on the genocide of the South Ossetians in 1989 - 1992” and the Resolution “on the political and legal assessment of the 1989 - 1992 developments.” The two resolutions were meant to serve as a reminder of the events in 1989 - 1992, and in so doing to justify South Ossetian intransigence. The first resolution requested the international community to recognise the atrocities of 1989 - 1992 as genocide against the Ossetian nation and to recognise Georgia as “morally, legally and financially responsible for crimes against humanity.” It requested Georgia “to take the necessary measures to create proper conditions for the refugees’ rights and property restitution with full compensation for the moral and material damage.” The second resolution called for the recognition of the “international legal personality of the Republic of South Ossetia” and the application of “all lawful measures to prevent provocation on the part of Georgia aimed at destabilising the situation in South Ossetia and at raising the incessant blockade.” (113-114)
• Events heated up in the summer of 2006: the South Ossetian NSC was killed when a bomb went off as he was opening his garage door (114)
  • A few days later, two teenagers died and four civilians were injured in a bomb explosion in Tskhinvali (114)
  • On July 18, the Georgian Parliament passed a resolution calling on the government to launch procedures to suspend Russian peacekeeping operations in Abkhazia and SO immediately (114)
  • Clashes in the SO conflict zone in September 2006 led to deaths on both sides (114)
• In the November 2006 elections, Kokoity won 98.1% and Sanakoyev 94% (115)
• The Temporary Administrative Unit was created by the Parliament on May 8, 2007 (116)
  • On May 11, Sanakoyev addressed the Georgian Parliament saying that the Ossetian people's future "was only in a democratic and stable Georgia" (116)
• Kokoity raised the spectre of an Ossetian civil war, while some believed such a conflict could be used by Tbilisi as an excuse to intervene (116)
• Kokoity on May 12 said measures were needed to remove Sanakoyev from the SO territory and broke all participation in talks with Tbilisi. The latter responded that it might be forced to neutralize separatist forces in response (116)
• Report: "The establishment of alternative South Ossetian and Abkhaz administrations in the breakaway regions in 2006 was regarded by many as the most controversial Georgian move in the conflict resolution process. It was probably motivated by a few considerations. The strongest may have been related to the ongoing controversies over Kosovo, and Moscow’s warnings that it would recognise Abkhazia and South Ossetia if Kosovo’s independence was recognised by the Western powers. For considerable parts of the territories of South Ossetia and Abkhazia to be under the formal control of pro-Georgian administrations may, therefore, have been regarded by the Georgian leadership as a preventive measure, aimed at making Russian recognition of the two separatist provinces more difficult, and therefore less feasible. (123)
• According to Tskhinvali, Tbilisi designed the Tiger's Leap strategy in early 2006 designed to recapture SO and envisioning a number of large-scale provocations and false-flag operations. (182-193)
  • The plan envisaged a Georgian invasion in May 2006 and would include a weeklong operation that would capture all major cities and blockade the Roki Tunnel (193)
  • According to Tskhinvali, the plan never materialized since the Georgian army's level of preparedness aswell as its equipment were deemed insufficient by high command (193)
• Saakashvili described Kodori as "an exceedingly important strategic bridgead, rendering us capable of reachng Sokhumi by air within a mere five minutes" (197)

IIFFMCG III

• The Kodori Gorge was in the hands of the Monadire militia led by Kvitsiani and his nephew Bacho Argvliani (71)
• Kvitsiani had been dismissed as local governor in December 2004 (71)
• Monadire was disbanded in April 2005 (71)
• Tbilisi accused Monadire of being involved in illegal arms trade, human trafficking, and hostage taking, as well as appropriating humanitarian aid sent to the local population (71)
• UNOMIG had ceased all monitoring activities in the gorge since 2003 due to a hostage-taking incident (71)
• Kvitsiani rejected calls for disarmament in July 2006 and refused the entry of central government police (71)
  • In response, merabishvili led a police operation which led to a gunbattle near the village of Sakeni on July 25 (71)
  • Kvitsiani and Argvliani and their closest accomplishes escaped from the Gorge to Abkhazia proper (71)
  • The MIA seized huge deposits of modern Russian armaments worth several million US dollars (71)
  • In addition, several victims of human trafficking were freed and fugitives that had found refuge in the gorge - arrested (71)
  • Kvitsiani then ended up in Russia, from where he routinely goes on state TV to issue terroristic threats against Georgia (71)
• Kodori was renamed Upper Abkhazia and the exile government was placed in Chkhalta (71)
• By Novembe 2006, a new police station was opened, as well as houses for police officers, a hospital, a bank, a school, a local government building, and communication networks, while a Svaneti-Kodori road was being built (71)
  • Merabishvili was tasked with the rebuilding (71)
• According to Tblisi, from 2006 to the war, the Georgian police force, from the Criminal police Department and the Special Tasks Main Division and a local-made Border Police station added up to 380-580 police officers in the region (72)
  • They were armed with light weapons and conducted routine patrls in the 22 villages of the region (72)
• UNOMIG and CIS PKF resumed joint patrolling of the region on October 12, 2006 (72)
• On December 14-16, UNOMIG and CIS witnessed the demolition of a large stock of armanents that had been seized by the MIA during the July operation (72)
  • Joint UNOMIG/CIS patrols were held in March, May and June 2007 (72)
• In July 2007, UNOMIG established a base in Ajara, launching daily monitoring of the region until August 9 (72)
• ON October 25, 2006, three BM-21 Grad missiles fell on Ajara near where Ivane Merabishvili was, as he was visiting the gorge. Fire came from Tkvarcheli district (72)
• On August 19, 2006, Russia's Pension Fund opened a branch in Tskhinvali and the ceremony was attended by Kokity and the head of the Pension Fund Gennady Batanov (150)
• In the second half of 2006, Gazprom started the rapid constructio of the Dzuarikau-Tskhinvali Pipeline to supply SO with Russian natural gas circumventing Georgia, ivnesting 600 million USD (152)
  • Georgia complained that it was an infringement (152)
• In March 2006, the Abkhaz border guard units launched construction of their HQ near Russian PKF Checkpoint 210, in violation of the Moscow Agreement (188)
  • Georgia claims Russian peacekepers assisted in the cnstruction (188)
• Abkhazia cites 25 July 2006 as "the point of departure signalling the escalation of the Abkhazi situation" (547)
  • Sokhumi viewed it as a sign that Georgia was openly confirming its commitment to finding a military solution to the conflict (547)
  • Abkhazia claimed that Georgia installed heavy military equipment in the region as soon as 2006 and estimated the number of local troops at 1500-3000, increasing to 6000 in 2008 (547)
  • In his 28 September 2006 report, the UN Secretary General confirmed 13 ceasefire violations (548)
  • In Resolution 1716, the UNSC expressed concern with regard to the actions of the Georgian side in the Kodori Valley (548)

• March 27-28: JCC meeting in Vladikavkaz. Tbilisi pushes for a special commission to implement its peace plan on South Ossetia, along with the demilitarization of the conflict zone. Tskhinvali, Vladikavkaz and Moscow push for a "joint Georgian-Ossetian action program" on conflict resolution and drafting a non-resumption of hostilities agreement (https://civil.ge/archives/110216)
  • In a rare move, the US expressed hope for an agreement in Vladikavkaz (https://civil.ge/archives/110224)
  • But the JCC failed to discuss the peace plan (https://civil.ge/archives/110244)
  • JCC did agree to set up a 10 member working group to develop a joint action plan for the peaceful resolution of the conflict. (https://civil.ge/archives/110261)
• 27 March: High-voltage power line Kavkasioni in Kodori is damaged by a bullet shot in the village of Sakeni, leading to accusations of sabotage (https://civil.ge/archives/110219)
• 27 March: PM Noghaideli delivers speech at OSCE Permanent Council, calling for the establishing of a joint Georgian-Ossetian police In the conflict zone and calling for a bilateral meeting with Kokoity, as well as the establishment of an OSCE checkpoint in Gupta (https://civil.ge/archives/110220)
• 28 March: UNSC convenes to discuss an extension of UNOMIG, but Russia blocks attendance by Georgia (https://civil.ge/archives/110232)
  • In response, Georgia called on the UNSC to not adopt the resolution (https://civil.ge/archives/110243)
  • On March 31, the UNSC adopted a stronger resolution than the January one, extending thee UNOMIG mission for six months and calling on the sides to resolve the conflict based on the Boden paper, which defines the status of Abkhazia within the Georgian State, while calling on Tbilisi to "address seriously legitimate Abkhaz security concerns to avoid steps which could be seen as threatening and to refrain from militant rhetoric." (https://civil.ge/archives/110276)
  • Russia praised the resolution (https://civil.ge/archives/110289)
  • The resolution was dubbed a defeat of Georgian diplomacy by the opposition Republican Party, but characterized as a step forward compared to thee Janaury resolution by the Georgian MFA (https://civil.ge/archives/110301)
• 29 March: Irakli Alasania, at the time an aide for Saakashvili, met with Baghapsh and Shamba in Sokhumi to establish contacts (https://civil.ge/archives/110241)
  • The meetings led to the resumption of the Georgian-Abkhaz Coordination Council, which had been paused since 2001 (https://civil.ge/archives/110247)
    • Heidi Tagliavini, the UN Secretary-General’s Special Representative to Georgia, met with Sergey Bagapsh, the leader of Abkhazia, on April 11 in Sokhumi. The main topic of discussion was the potential restoration of the Georgian-Abkhaz Coordination Council. (https://civil.ge/archives/110350)
    • On May 10, 2006, Irakli Alasania, the Georgian President’s aide for Abkhaz issues, announced that a session of the Georgian-Abkhaz Coordination Council is set to take place in Tbilisi the following week. The upcoming session will be led by Sergey Shamba, the Foreign Minister of the breakaway region of Abkhazia. The meeting will focus on IDPs, security cooperation, and economic cooperation. Alasania mentioned that these meetings would occur regularly, nearly every month, indicating a commitment to ongoing dialogue and cooperation between Tbilisi and Sokhumi. (https://civil.ge/archives/110558)
      • UN-Sponsored Meeting: The meeting is being held under the auspices of the United Nations and includes participation from the Russian side as a facilitator, along with the Group of Friends of the Secretary-General and representatives from the OSCE. (https://civil.ge/archives/110587)
      • Successful Meeting: Officials from both the Georgian and Abkhaz sides praised the first session of the Coordinating Council, viewing it as an opportunity for regular meetings and enhanced dialogue. Working Group Timetable: The first working group on security will meet in Gali on May 30, the second on IDPs in Sokhumi on June 5, and the third on social and economic issues in Zugdidi on May 22. (https://civil.ge/archives/110595)
• 30 March: Tbilisi and Tskhinvali launch talks on the restitution bill in Vladikavkaz, envisioning the creation of a multilateral commission (https://civil.ge/archives/110257)
• 1 April: Georgian police arrests Vazha Khachapuridze, representative of Kokoity on conflict issues, near the conflict zone after finding hundreds of smuggled cigratee boxes in his car (https://civil.ge/archives/110280)
  • A day before, SO reported of the temporary detentionn by Georgian police in Khashuri of Khazbi Guliev, Deputy MIA of SO, released after OSCE involvement.
  • Khacvhapuridze was sentenced to two months of pretrial detention (https://civil.ge/archives/110286)
• 4 APril: Saakashvili says in Russian press that "Georgian authorities will never tolerate separation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia from Georgia". In response, VP Khajimba said that Abkhazia "will never return to Georgia" (https://civil.ge/archives/110297)
• Willingness to Meet Abkhaz Leadership: On April 7, President Saakashvili expressed his readiness to meet with the Abkhaz leadership, but only if the talks have concrete goals and outcomes. (https://civil.ge/archives/110320)
  • Saakashvili emphasized that any talks would focus on the property rights and dignified return of those displaced from Abkhazia during the conflict in the early 1990s. The Georgian Ministry for Refugees and Accommodation is conducting an inventory of IDP properties in Abkhazia using satellite imagery, a program initiated by Saakashvili in response to potential property sales by Abkhaz authorities.
  • Saakashvili warned that any attempts to seize properties belonging to displaced persons of all ethnicities (Georgians, Estonians, Ukrainians, Russians, Greeks) would be treated as violations under Georgian and international law.
  • Commitment to Peaceful Resolution: Saakashvili reaffirmed that Georgia seeks a peaceful resolution to the Abkhaz conflict, focusing on the protection of property rights and the safe return of displaced persons.
• Warning Against Military Action: U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Daniel Fried emphasized on April 7 that Georgia "cannot afford military adventurism" and that there should be "no military answer" to the conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
• Georgian Ministry of Defense Accusation: On April 8, the Georgian Ministry of Defense (MoD) accused the Joint Peacekeeping Force (JPKF) in South Ossetia and its commander Marat Kulakhmetov of bias and failure to ensure demilitarization in the conflict zone. During joint monitoring on March 21, 22, and 30 by Georgian, Russian, and Ossetian peacekeepers, along with OSCE observers, unauthorized military hardware, including an anti-aircraft gun and armored vehicles, was found in the Ossetian village of Isakkau and in Tskhinvali. (https://civil.ge/archives/110330)
  • The Georgian MoD stated that this was the sixth instance since December 2005 where military equipment was found, which they claimed highlighted the partiality and ineffectiveness of Russian peacekeepers.
• New Border Policy: Authorities in the breakaway region of Abkhazia have expressed gratitude towards Russia for its decision to ease controls at the border, allowing foreign citizens to enter the unrecognized republic for the first time. This development marks a significant change in the movement of people into Abkhazia. (https://civil.ge/archives/110358)
  • The Georgian Foreign Ministry protested Russia’s move, stating that only the Kazbegi-Zemo Larsi checkpoint is legitimate on the Georgia-Russia border. Checkpoints like Gantiadi-Adler (Abkhazia) and Roki-Kvemo Zaramagi (South Ossetia) are considered illegal by Georgia. The Georgian Foreign Ministry urged Russia to comply with the 1993 Agreement on Customs Border Checkpoints, signed between the two countries. Russia eased controls at the Gantiadi-Adler checkpoint on the border with breakaway Abkhazia, which Georgia claims is an attempt to give this illegitimate checkpoint international status. (https://civil.ge/archives/110373)
• Abkhaz Foreign Minister Sergey Shamba stated that Russia closed its military base in Gudauta in 2001. However, if Russia and the OSCE decide to monitor the former base, Abkhazia will oppose Georgia's involvement in this process. Georgia insists on international monitoring to confirm the closure of the Gudauta base, as required by the 1999 OSCE Istanbul treaty. According to Maj.-Gen. Sergey Chaban, only 4 helicopters and 130 Russian peacekeepers are stationed at the Gudauta base now. (https://civil.ge/archives/110375)
• In April, South Ossetian leader Eduard Kokoity met with Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Grigory Karasin in Tskhinvali to discuss peacekeeping operations in the Georgian-Ossetian conflict zone. Kokoity accused the OSCE observers of “biased reporting” on the situation in the conflict zone. He expressed serious complaints regarding the OSCE’s actions, equating them to the actions of Georgian special services. Kokoity announced that South Ossetia would adopt a “very tough position” toward OSCE activities. He indicated that restrictions would be placed on OSCE employees who exceed their agreed-upon mandates. Kokoity mentioned the intention to revisit the 1993 memorandum of understanding signed by the leaders of South Ossetia and the OSCE, which allows for the free movement of OSCE monitoring officers in the conflict zone. (https://civil.ge/archives/110392)
• An explosion occurred late on April 17 in the abandoned house of the Georgian village of Vanati. The explosion resulted in damage to the house but no casualties were reported. Georgian officials asserted that the explosion was caused by a mortar shell fired from the nearby Ossetian village of Dmenisi. The South Ossetian authorities reported that two explosions took place in Vanati but denied any involvement. South Ossetian Defense Minister Anatoly Barankevich characterized the incident as a “common provocation” by the Georgian side, suggesting that such incidents often occur in spring to destabilize the situation. (https://civil.ge/archives/110396)
  • The Georgian MoD has requested the Joint Peacekeeping Forces (JPKF) stationed in the South Ossetian conflict zone to investigate the shelling incident. As of April 18, the Georgian MoD noted that there had been no response from the JPKF regarding this appeal. (https://civil.ge/archives/110410)
• On April 19, Boris Chochiev, the Deputy Chairman of the breakaway South Ossetian government, expressed criticism regarding Georgia’s draft law on property restitution for victims of the South Ossetian conflict. Lack of Substance: Chochiev described the draft law as “one more PR campaign” by the Georgian authorities, suggesting that it would not provide meaningful relief for refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs). He characterized the legislation as inadequate and a mere advertisement rather than an effective solution to the pressing issues faced by these individuals. (https://civil.ge/archives/110419)
  • International Recognition: The draft received positive feedback from the Council of Europe’s Venice Commission on March 19, indicating that it was viewed favorably from a constitutional and legal perspective.
• Routine military exercises are scheduled to take place in the breakaway region of Abkhazia from April 24 to April 27. The upcoming drills will involve approximately 5,000 servicemen, including reserve troops, as reported by Apsnipress. (https://civil.ge/archives/110426)
  • This follows a previous set of military exercises conducted in Abkhazia from March 21 to March 24, which included the participation of around 4,000 troops. The increasing scale of these exercises indicates a continued emphasis on military readiness in the region.
• In late April, Georgian police arrested two Russian citizens, Aleksandr Goncharov and his wife, Marina, near the village of Rukhi. The couple was detained on suspicion of illegally crossing the Georgian border. They were reportedly carrying fake identification documents at the time of their arrest. (https://civil.ge/archives/110430)
• Boris Chochiev, Deputy Chairman of the breakaway South Ossetian government and co-chairman of the Joint Control Commission (JCC), has suggested holding a JCC session on May 11-12 in Tskhinvali. The session was originally scheduled for late April but has been postponed. The South Ossetian side intends to advocate for the establishment of a joint Georgian-Ossetian working group during the session. This group would work on developing a mutually acceptable program for the peaceful resolution of the conflict. The creation of this joint working group, consisting of up to 10 members, was previously agreed upon during a JCC session held in Vladikavkaz on March 27-28. (https://civil.ge/archives/110443)
• 28 April: Kokoitu visits Baghapsh in Sokhumi. The two leaders signed a protocol on the exchange of notes regarding the ratification of the "Agreement on Friendship and Cooperation between the Abkhaz and South Ossetian Republics." This agreement, originally signed in Tskhinvali on September 19, 2005, includes provisions for mutual assistance in economic, political, and humanitarian areas. The agreement specifies that if either region faces threats to peace and stability, they will immediately consult each other to coordinate actions to prevent or address such threats. (https://civil.ge/archives/110437)
• 29 April: The Georgian side has formulated a program that includes delivering up to 35 computers to schools located in the conflict-affected areas. This initiative also encompasses the reconstruction of existing school facilities in South Ossetia. Tbilisi has extended an invitation to Tskhinvali to allow pupils from schools in the conflict zone to participate in international educational programs, which could broaden their learning opportunities and exposure. Boris Chochiev, the deputy chairman of the South Ossetian government, has dismissed Tbilisi’s draft law on restitution, labeling it as a "PR campaign" that would not effectively address the needs of refugees and internally displaced persons. (https://civil.ge/archives/110470)
• Defense Minister Irakli Okruashvili pledged to resign if Georgia fails to regain control over breakaway South Ossetia by January 1, 2007 (May 1). Okruashvili emphasized that Georgia would focus on solving the issue through peaceful means and diplomatic efforts, with support from international partners, especially the United States. He said that once the conflicts with Abkhazia and South Ossetia are resolved, he would leave politics. (https://civil.ge/archives/110481)
  • Georgian State Minister for Conflict Resolution Giorgi Khaindrava described Defense Minister Irakli Okruashvili's statement about a South Ossetia reunification deadline as “unclear.” Khaindrava noted that setting deadlines for resolving the South Ossetian conflict is unrealistic, and he distanced himself from Okruashvili's remarks. (https://civil.ge/archives/110489)
  • Kokoity described Okruashvili’s statements as “boastful” and unhelpful for fostering peace or confidence between the conflicting sides. He further criticized Okruashvili’s remarks as an attempt to divert attention from Georgia’s internal socio-economic issues, suggesting that the Georgian government was using the conflict as a scapegoat for their problems. Kokoity mockingly suggested that if Okruashvili wishes to resign, he should do so immediately rather than wait for a reason related to South Ossetia. (https://civil.ge/archives/110512)
  • In an interview published on May 4 by the Russian daily Vremya Novostey, Georgian Parliamentary Chairperson Nino Burjanadze expressed her apologies to Russian citizens regarding comments made by Defense Minister Irakli Okruashvili. Burjanadze stated that while it is understandable to be offended by Russia's policy towards Georgia, such language is inappropriate. She characterized Okruashvili's comments as emotional and incorrect, emphasizing that he should have chosen his words more carefully. (https://civil.ge/archives/110514)
• On May 2, MS He recounted receiving an SMS from MegaPhone (a Russian mobile operator) while flying over the Shida Kartli region, which includes breakaway South Ossetia, calling it a classic example of uncivilized annexation. (https://civil.ge/archives/110493)
  • Saakashvili highlighted the presence of Russian border guard officers in South Ossetia and the establishment of a border guard department, alleging that Russia is conducting daily annexations of Georgian territory.
• On May 2, the Russian Foreign Ministry accused Georgia of obstructing the return process for internally displaced persons (IDPs) to the Gali district of breakaway Abkhazia. In an information note, the ministry stated that Georgia declined to participate in a working group session focused on IDP returns scheduled for May 3-4 in Moscow. (https://civil.ge/archives/110500)
  • The UNHCR's proposal to send IDP registration data in April also reportedly lacked support from Georgia, despite the willingness of other parties, including the Abkhaz side and the UN, to proceed.
• On May 2, Deputy Russian Foreign Minister Mikhail Kaminin stated that Russia is willing to invite a German-initiated group of observers to monitor the situation at the Gudauta military base in breakaway Abkhazia. Russia expressed readiness to receive the monitoring mission if Tbilisi changes its unconstructive stance. (https://civil.ge/archives/110501)
  • Giga Bokeria, an influential MP from the ruling party, stated that Russia prefers a one-time monitoring mission, while Georgia seeks regular international oversight and also wants Russia to destroy the Gudauta airfield runway.
  • A delegation from the NATO Parliamentary Assembly visited breakaway Abkhazia on May 6 but was denied access to the Gudauta military base by the Russian authorities. Pierre Lellouche, President of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, expressed regret over Russia's change of position, which prevented the delegation from visiting the Gudauta base. (https://civil.ge/archives/110531)
  • Denial of Refusal: Mikhail Kaminin, the Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman, denied claims that Russia refused the NATO Parliamentary Assembly delegation, led by President Pierre Lellouche, access to the Gudauta military base in Abkhazia. On May 12, Kaminin stated that the NATO delegation did not express a desire to visit the Gudauta base during their discussions with Russian peacekeeping forces. (https://civil.ge/archives/110577)
    • Previous Interest: He noted that NATO representatives had previously shown interest in visiting the base but indicated that such visits would require clearly defined goals, like confirming the base's closure.
• Georgian Foreign Ministry accused Russian peacekeeping forces in the Abkhaz conflict zone of extorting money from the local Georgian population in the Gali district of Abkhazia. (https://civil.ge/archives/110502)
  • The Georgian Ministry of Defense issued a separate statement on May 2, claiming that three drunken Russian peacekeepers wounded a local resident of Gali and beat up two other men. The Georgian Foreign Ministry stated that Russian peacekeepers patrolled the Gali district on April 29-30, checking residents’ IDs and demanding the so-called "Form 9" document issued by Abkhaz authorities for movement between Abkhazia and the rest of Georgian territory. Those lacking the document were allegedly forced to pay GEL 10 to move from Gali to Zugdidi (Samegrelo region).
  • The Georgian Foreign Ministry argued that these actions demonstrate a systematic violation of human rights by the Russian peacekeepers.
• Sergey Bagapsh, leader of breakaway Abkhazia, met with Sergey Baburin, Vice-Speaker of the Russian State Duma, in Sokhumi on May 2. (https://civil.ge/archives/110503)
• The Georgian Parliament had instructed the government to present the peace plan by May 1, 2006, as per a resolution adopted in October. But the plan was delayed and not presented on time. (https://civil.ge/archives/110504)
• Delegations from Georgia, Russia, Armenia, Abkhazia, and Turkey are set to hold two-day talks in Moscow on May 3-4 to discuss the restoration of the Russian-Georgian railway that passes through breakaway Abkhazia, according to the Georgian Railway Company. The Georgian delegation is led by Irakli Ezugbaia, the Chief of the Georgian state-run Railway Company. In addition to technical matters, the discussions will focus on the creation of a joint consortium involving the Turkish and Armenian sides, along with Georgian, Russian, and Abkhaz representatives. This consortium would likely oversee the coordination and management of the railway project, with potential economic and political implications for the region. (https://civil.ge/archives/110505)
  • 5 May: The Georgian, Abkhaz, Russian, and Armenian sides have signed a protocol to establish the Black Sea Railways consortium, which aims to rehabilitate the Abkhaz section of the railway connecting Russia, Georgia, and Armenia. The consortium will operate as an open joint stock company, according to Andrey Turukin, the representative of Abkhazia in Russia for railway issues. (https://civil.ge/archives/110526)
    • This protocol marks the first agreement signed by all participating parties, with Abkhazia recognized as a full-fledged party in the process.
• Abkhaz leader Sergey Bagapsh has submitted a peace plan, titled “Key to the Future,” to the Parliament of the breakaway region for consideration, as reported by Apsnipress on May 4. The plan focuses on restoring confidence between the Georgian and Abkhaz sides by moving away from military rhetoric and diversifying peace initiatives that should eventually be implemented. The ultimate aim is to establish good neighborly relations between what are described as "hostile countries." (https://civil.ge/archives/110521)
  • The plan suggests that principles of economic integration in the Black Sea region, along with enhanced economic and regional cooperation through the “Strategy of a Broader EU Neighborhood,” could help reinforce commitments to fostering good neighbor relations.
  • On May 6, the Parliament of breakaway Abkhazia reviewed a document titled “Comprehensive Resolution of the Georgian-Abkhaz Conflict,” which was proposed by Abkhaz leader Sergey Bagapsh. Abkhaz parliamentarians acknowledged the significance of being the first to propose a peace plan for conflict resolution but indicated that the proposal requires further refinement. (https://civil.ge/archives/110534)
    • The Abkhaz peace plan, referred to as “Key to the Future,” includes several key proposals for Tbilisi, such as:
      • Acknowledging past mistakes and apologizing for policies of assimilation and war.
      • Abandoning political and economic pressure on Abkhazia.
      • Signing a peace agreement to ensure security and stability.
      • Engaging in consultations about peaceful coexistence and cooperation against organized crime.
      • Rejecting the politicization of economic issues, especially concerning railway rehabilitation.
    • While some parliamentarians praised the initiative, others expressed caution regarding certain elements:
      • Concerns about the potential for violence from returning refugees in the Gali district.
      • Hesitance to agree on the railway project before official recognition of Abkhaz independence.
    • The document reflects the aspiration of the Abkhaz people for independence, with calls for the Georgian President to recognize this independence highlighted by Abkhaz MP Viacheslav Tsugba. However, the call for a careful approach regarding sensitive topics was also emphasized, particularly by MP Teimuraz Achugba.
  • Parts of the Abkhaz Peace Plan: (https://civil.ge/archives/110545)
    • Recognition of Independence: The Abkhaz peace plan includes a demand for the recognition of Abkhazia’s independence, reflecting the aspirations of the Abkhaz people.
    • Apology for Past Policies: It calls for Georgia to reassess past mistakes and apologize to the Abkhaz for policies of assimilation, war, and isolation
    • Ending Economic Blockades: The document emphasizes a cessation of political and economic pressure on Abkhazia and a lifting of the economic and information blockade.
    • Peace Agreement: A proposal for signing a peace agreement that ensures security across land, sea, and air.
    • Bilateral Consultations: It suggests launching consultations between the Georgian and Abkhaz leaders to discuss the terms of peaceful coexistence.
    • Cooperation Against Crime: A call for cooperation in combating organized crime.
    • European Neighborhood Strategy: The plan advocates for the development of civilized cooperation methods within the framework of the European neighborhood strategy.
    • International Guarantees: It urges the international community and the UN Security Council to guarantee non-resumption of hostilities.
  • Positive Step: Georgian State Minister for Conflict Resolution Issues, Giorgi Khaindrava, acknowledged that the development of the Abkhaz-proposed peace plan is a positive step, even if Tbilisi does not agree with all its provisions. Skepticism of Russian Guarantees: Khaindrava indicated that Tbilisi does not view Russia’s guarantees as credible, highlighting a fundamental disagreement on security assurances. Concerns about One-Sidedness: Khaindrava criticized this demand as one-sided, suggesting that both sides, including the Soviet Union and its successor (Russia), share blame for the conflict in Abkhazia. (https://civil.ge/archives/110596)
• The Joint Control Commission (JCC), comprising representatives from Georgia, South Ossetia, Russia, and North Ossetia, is scheduled to convene in Tskhinvali on May 11-12, 2006. The primary focus of the JCC session will be the establishment of a working group tasked with developing a joint program for conflict resolution. This reflects ongoing efforts to address and manage tensions in the region effectively. (https://civil.ge/archives/110561)
  • On May 11, 2006, participants of the Joint Control Commission (JCC) regarding South Ossetia expressed strong disapproval of remarks made by Georgian Defense Minister Irakli Okruashvili. Boris Chochiev, the South Ossetian chief negotiator, criticized the statement as illogical, arguing that it undermined the collective efforts aimed at peacefully resolving the conflict. He suggested that such comments could derail ongoing diplomatic work. Teimuraz Kusov, representing Russia’s North Ossetia side, called Okruashvili's comments “irresponsible,” suggesting they could heighten tensions rather than foster a peaceful dialogue. This sentiment was echoed by other participants who stressed the importance of measured communication. (https://civil.ge/archives/110567)
  • The participants agreed to schedule a meeting of the Ministers of Internal Affairs as part of the JCC framework. This meeting is expected to take place on the following day. Additionally, they agreed to hold a future meeting between the Education Ministers, likely in response to a recent Georgian proposal aimed at rehabilitating schools in the conflict zone. This initiative underscores a focus on improving education and cooperation among communities affected by the conflict. (https://civil.ge/archives/110572)
    • The parties encountered challenges in reaching a consensus regarding an OSCE-proposed initiative aimed at developing and signing an agreement on non-resumption of hostilities. While the South Ossetian and Russian sides expressed support for the initiative, the Georgian representatives were hesitant.
    • Joint Working Group: The commission agreed to establish a joint working group to develop a program for resolving the South Ossetian conflict. (https://civil.ge/archives/110583)
      • Economic Rehabilitation Funding: The parties agreed on monitoring mechanisms for the €10 million allocated by the European Union for the economic rehabilitation of the South Ossetian conflict zone, with a donors conference scheduled for June 14 in Brussels.
      • Rejection of Hostility Document: Georgian State Minister Giorgi Khaindrava announced the Georgian side's rejection of a proposal for a new document on non-resumption of hostilities, labeling it as a "Moscow’s initiative."
  • Willingness to Meet: Georgian Interior Minister Vano Merabishvili expressed readiness to meet with Mikhail Mindzaev, the Interior Minister of breakaway South Ossetia, on May 14. Planned Meeting: The Georgian and South Ossetian sides have agreed to hold a meeting between their Interior Ministers before June 10, in advance of discussions within the quadripartite Joint Control Commission (JCC) scheduled for May 11-12. (https://civil.ge/archives/110588)
• Criminal Activities Allegations: Merabishvili also referenced the recent arrest of several South Ossetian policemen by Georgian police, which he claimed indicated the involvement of South Ossetian officials in criminal activities. The arrested policemen were reportedly found driving a car stolen in Tbilisi. (https://civil.ge/archives/110588)
• 15 May: Submission to Parliament: The Georgian government has submitted its peace plan for Abkhazia to the Parliament for consideration. (https://civil.ge/archives/110592)
  • Georgian Peace Plan: The Georgian side plans to submit its peace plan to the Abkhaz representatives at a meeting with the UN Secretary General’s Group of Friends, expected to arrive in Tbilisi on May 22. (https://civil.ge/archives/110593)
  • Tbilisi's main priorities: return of IDPs, confidence-building and security, economic rehabilitation, and political status. (https://civil.ge/archives/185474)
    • Irakli Alasania announced that during the upcoming visit from the UN Group of Friends, Georgia will officially consult on the possibility of changing the existing peacekeeping format in Abkhazia.
      • On May 18, Sergey Shamba, the Foreign Minister of breakaway Abkhazia, expressed serious concerns regarding the potential withdrawal of Russian peacekeeping troops from the conflict zone. In an interview with the Itar-Tass news agency, he articulated that such a withdrawal could lead to a resurgence of violence, highlighting the delicate balance maintained by the presence of these peacekeepers. Shamba warned that the removal of Russian peacekeepers might "lead to a resumption of bloodshed." He defended the peacekeepers' role, dismissing Georgian claims of their ineffectiveness as "groundless." He argued that substantial evidence would be necessary to justify any demand for their withdrawal. He asserted that if Georgia were to pursue the withdrawal of Russian troops, it would signify a withdrawal from the negotiating process. This is significant because the peacekeeping operation is part of the Statement on Measures for Political Settlement of the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict, which was signed in Moscow on April 2, 1994. This agreement underscores the peacekeepers' role in maintaining stability and facilitating dialogue between the conflicting parties. (https://civil.ge/archives/110620)
        • Anatoly Zaytsev, the Deputy Defense Minister of Abkhazia, claimed that the local armed forces are capable of securing the border with Georgia should Russian troops withdraw. This statement reflects confidence in Abkhazia's military capabilities but also raises concerns about the potential for increased tensions in the region.
    • Sergey Shamba, the Foreign Minister of breakaway Abkhazia, stated on June 1 that Georgia’s proposals for a peace plan will not bring the two sides closer together. Speaking at a news conference in Sokhumi, Shamba indicated that Abkhaz officials reviewed Georgia's “roadmap” for resolving the Abkhaz conflict during a session of the National Security Council. He expressed that the Abkhaz found nothing in Georgia's proposals that could align their positions. The details of Tbilisi’s peace plan remain confidential, so specifics are not publicly known. Shamba suggested that for a peaceful resolution, Georgia should apologize for instigating the armed confrontation in the early 1990s and lift the economic blockade of Abkhazia. He also asserted that the recognition of Abkhazia’s independence should be a final step in resolving the conflict. (https://civil.ge/archives/110736)
• Unauthorized Flight: The Georgian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported that a military helicopter flew over South Ossetia in the direction of Tskhinvali-Java twice on May 15. Violation of Airspace: The MoD characterized the flight as “unauthorized” since it was not coordinated with the Georgian authorities, viewing it as a violation of Georgia’s airspace. (https://civil.ge/archives/110594
• On May 16, a delegation of Russian senators, led by Victor Ozerov, Chairman of the Defense Committee of the Council of Federation of Russia, visited Abkhazia. This visit was reported by the Apsnipress news agency and involved meetings with key officials from the breakaway region. (https://civil.ge/archives/110590)
• On May 19, the Georgian Foreign Ministry expressed strong concerns regarding a joint session held between the governments of Russia’s North Ossetian Republic and breakaway South Ossetia in Tskhinvali. The ministry demanded an explanation from Russia regarding this meeting, interpreting it as a potential violation of Georgia's territorial integrity and internal affairs. (https://civil.ge/archives/110629)
  • Outcome of the Joint Session: The South Ossetian Press and Information Committee reported that the meeting concluded with the signing of a joint program focused on social, economic, and cultural cooperation between South Ossetia and North Ossetia.
  • Integration Efforts: Eduard Kokoity, the leader of South Ossetia, highlighted the significant strides made toward integrating South and North Ossetia. This session marked the second such meeting, following a previous one in Vladikavkaz in March.
  • On May 23, the Russian Foreign Ministry issued a statement defending the participation of officials from North Ossetia in a session of the South Ossetian government held in Tskhinvali on May 19. The Ministry described the event as unremarkable, emphasizing the historical and cultural ties between the two regions. The Russian Foreign Ministry stressed that North and South Ossetia represent more than just geographic names; they are part of a single nation with deep-rooted historical, cultural, and economic connections. (https://civil.ge/archives/110658)
• On May 25, a high-level delegation from the Group of Friends of the UN Secretary-General concluded its visit to Tbilisi and Sokhumi, providing a positive assessment of the role of Russian peacekeeping troops in the conflict zone of Abkhazia. Here are the key highlights from their statement and discussions: (https://civil.ge/archives/110671)
  • The delegation emphasized that Russian peacekeeping troops, operating under the auspices of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), play a crucial stabilizing role in the region. Ambassador Baas reiterated that the CIS peacekeeping force is deemed to be playing an important stabilizing role. He noted that this perspective was confirmed during discussions with the UNOMIG chief military observer, who also praised the collaboration between UN observers and CIS peacekeeping forces.
• On May 25, the Georgian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported that a military helicopter violated Georgian airspace over the breakaway South Ossetia region. The helicopter flew over the Java district, a part of the breakaway region that has been a focal point of tension between Georgia and South Ossetian separatists. (https://civil.ge/archives/110676)
  • Russian Ambassador to Georgia Vladimir Chkhikvishvili dismissed Georgia's allegations of a Russian helicopter violating Georgian airspace on May 25, calling them "mythic." (https://civil.ge/archives/110680)
• On May 26, the Russian Foreign Ministry informed Civil Georgia that it is currently reviewing a draft law on property restitution for the victims of the South Ossetian conflict, prepared by the Georgian government. (https://civil.ge/archives/110677)
• Georgia's Foreign Ministry condemned the Russian Foreign Ministry's description of Sergey Bagapsh as the "President of Abkhazia" in an information note issued on May 26.The Georgian Ministry stated it is "unacceptable" to refer to the Abkhaz leader with this title, given that Abkhazia is not internationally recognized, even by Russia. (https://civil.ge/archives/110684)
• May 27: Georgian law enforcers arrested 41 men in the South Ossetian conflict zone, reportedly for violating visa requirements. The arrests occurred during raids by Georgian forces, including the Defense Ministry, along the Tamarasheni-Kekhvi section of the Trans Caucasus Highway and in the Ossetian village of Khelchua. South Ossetian sources claimed that ethnic Ossetians, including women, were detained, with women released after two hours. Reports of the number of detainees varied between 40 and 60. (https://civil.ge/archives/110688)
  • At 2 am on May 28, 41 men were released from Gori police station, with claims they were warned that such actions could continue. South Ossetian Press reported that two men from Khelchua remained detained and that 25 detainees were allegedly beaten by Georgian police.
  • Georgian media reported retaliation by South Ossetian militia, who detained and beat several Georgian men before releasing them after the Ossetians were freed. South Ossetian officials condemned the Georgian raids as a "vandal act" and criticized Georgian Defense Minister Irakli Okruashvili.
  • Condemnation of arrests: Kokoity condemned the Georgian law enforcement's arrest of Ossetians in the conflict zone on May 27. Call for emergency session: He urged an emergency session of the Joint Control Commission (JCC), which oversees the ceasefire in the conflict zone. Kokoity accused Georgia of executing a "well-planned" destabilization under the direction of the United States, aimed against South Ossetia and Russia. (https://civil.ge/archives/110689)
    • Combat readiness: He called for maintaining high combat readiness and instructed South Ossetian law enforcement to prevent further detentions by Georgian forces. He ordered that any unauthorized persons in the conflict zone be arrested and, if they resisted, to be destroyed.
  • Claims of Police Violence: South Ossetian reports claimed that at least 25 detainees were beaten by Georgian police. Some released Ossetians were interviewed and showed visible wounds, alleging abuse during their detention. (https://civil.ge/archives/110691)
    • Following the arrests, South Ossetian militia groups reportedly detained several Georgian men and subjected them to violence, releasing them only after the Georgian side freed the Ossetian detainees.
    • Georgian Public Defender Sozar Subari announced an investigation into the abuse claims, asserting that responsible officers would face consequences if the allegations were confirmed. Giorgi Khaindrava, the Georgian State Minister for Conflict Resolution Issues, defended the actions of the law enforcement by stating that the detainees lacked Georgian visas, constituting a legal violation. He later planned to visit Tskhinvali to assess the situation.
  • Call for High-Level Talks: Authorities in breakaway South Ossetia requested high-level talks between the Georgian, South Ossetian, and Russian leadership, with participation from OSCE Chairman-in-Office, Belgian Foreign Minister Karel De Gucht, on May 29. The South Ossetian side aims for the meeting to facilitate the signing of an agreement on security guarantees and non-resumption of hostilities. (https://civil.ge/archives/110700)
  • Admission of Violations: Georgian State Minister for Conflict Resolution Issues Giorgi Khaindrava and Public Defender Sozar Subari, during their visit to Tskhinvali on May 29, acknowledged that the rights of Ossetian civilians arrested on May 27 were violated. (https://civil.ge/archives/110701)
• Rotation of Georgian Peacekeepers: The rotation of Georgian peacekeeping troops began on May 28, as announced by Georgian Prime Minister Zurab Nogaideli earlier in February. The plan is to rotate troops every three months. The South Ossetian side condemned the troop rotation, claiming that they were not notified in advance, as required by existing agreements within the Joint Control Commission (JCC). (https://civil.ge/archives/110695)
  • According to the South Ossetian Press and Information Committee, the Georgian troops were deployed along the Tamarasheni-Kekhvi section of the Trans Caucasus Highway under the pretext of this rotation.
• Accusations Against Georgia: The Russian Foreign Ministry accused Georgia of instigating the incident by deploying special purpose units in the Georgian-Ossetian conflict zone, which was described as a violation of existing agreements. During the operation on May 27, Georgian special forces reportedly blocked several checkpoints established by the Joint Peacekeeping Forces (JPKF), which include Russian peacekeepers. The statement emphasized that these personnel were not affiliated with the Georgian battalion that is part of the JPKF. (https://civil.ge/archives/110702)
  • Provocation and Destabilization: The Russian Ministry labeled Georgia's actions as a provocation aimed at destabilizing the situation in the conflict zone and undermining peaceful resolution efforts. It noted that the confrontations could have escalated into violence, which was averted only due to the restraint shown by Russian peacekeepers.
• Customs Checkpoint Requirement: Giorgi Khaindrava, the Georgian State Minister for Conflict Resolution Issues, stated that any new Russian troops wishing to rotate the peacekeeping battalion must enter through legally operating customs checkpoints. He emphasized that the Roki Tunnel, which connects the breakaway region of South Ossetia with Russia's North Ossetian Republic, is not an acceptable entry point under the existing agreements. (https://civil.ge/archives/110704)
  • Previous Notification: Khaindrava mentioned that Georgia had formally communicated this stance to Russia on May 23, warning that entering South Ossetia via the Roki Tunnel would constitute a violation of their agreements.
  • Russian Peacekeeper Rotation: Despite Georgia's position, the Russian side announced that it began a rotation of its peacekeeping troops on May 29, a process expected to last four days. This rotation is a standard procedure, but Georgia's insistence on the use of legal customs checkpoints adds tension to the situation.
  • Claims of Intent to Thwart: The Itar-Tass news agency reported comments from Russia's North Caucasus Military District, alleging that Georgia intends to hinder the planned rotation of Russian peacekeeping troops.
  • Major General's Statement: Maj. Gen. Marat Kulakhmetov, the Commander of the Joint Peacekeeping Forces (JPKF), announced that Russia would proceed with its scheduled rotation of peacekeeping troops, despite objections from the Georgian government. He indicated that the rotation would occur as planned, asserting that Georgia was likely attempting provocations to thwart this process. (https://civil.ge/archives/110706)
    • Departure of Russian Troops: Kulakhmetov reported that a convoy of Russian troops from the North Caucasus Military District, specifically from Prokhladnoe, North Ossetia, had already departed for the conflict zone as part of the rotation process.
  • Illegal Rotation of Troops: The MoD accused Russia of conducting an “illegal rotation” of its so-called peacekeeping battalion in South Ossetia. This rotation was executed without the consent of the Georgian co-chairman of the Joint Control Commission, Giorgi Khaindrava, violating existing agreements. (https://civil.ge/archives/110712)
  • Characterization of Russia's Actions: Nogaideli described Russia's decision to send its rotation of peacekeeping troops via the Roki Tunnel as an “impudent act.” He criticized Russia for using what Georgia considers an “illegal border checkpoint” at the Roki pass, which connects the breakaway region of South Ossetia with Russia’s North Ossetian Republic. The Prime Minister stated that Russia's actions were indicative of a broader pattern of disrespect for bilateral agreements between Georgia and Russia. He noted, “Through this act, Russia has demonstrated that it is not interested in bilateral agreements,” emphasizing the lack of adherence to established protocols in the conflict zone. (https://civil.ge/archives/110716)
  • Georgian authorities warned that sending new Russian peacekeepers to South Ossetia via the Roki Tunnel—deemed an illegally operating border checkpoint—could prompt a reevaluation of the necessity for Russian peacekeepers in the region. Giorgi Khaindrava, the State Minister for Conflict Resolution Issues, indicated that if Russia fails to justify its actions, he would advocate for reconsidering the presence of Russian peacekeeping forces. (https://civil.ge/archives/110718)
  • Russia's Foreign Ministry expressed bewilderment at Georgia's accusations that Russia conducted an illegal rotation of peacekeepers in the South Ossetian conflict zone. Russia responded that the movement of its military personnel and equipment was conducted in line with the Joint Control Commission (JCC) rules, and that the JCC was notified on April 24 and May 11. Russia rejected Georgia’s visa requirement for peacekeepers, arguing that South Ossetia is not under Tbilisi’s control and falls within the internationally recognized Zone of Conflict, governed by the JCC and JPKF. (https://civil.ge/archives/110724)
  • Bokeria emphasized that Georgia’s goal is to restore control over South Ossetia and that Russian peacekeepers are an obstacle to this objective. (https://civil.ge/archives/110725)
  • MP Givi Targamadze reported that on May 31, a convoy of 30 trucks carrying Russian soldiers entered South Ossetia through the Roki Tunnel, increasing the number of Russian servicemen in the conflict zone to at least 1,000, which exceeds the agreed limit of 500. Russia claimed it was conducting a rotation of peacekeepers in South Ossetia, but Targamadze argued that this was actually an increase in military presence. On May 30, 13 trucks with Russian servicemen and 2 infantry combat vehicles were deployed in Tskhinvali, South Ossetia’s capital, as part of this supposed rotation. Targamadze said Russia justified its actions by stating some new soldiers were filling gaps in the Russian quota for the Joint Peacekeeping Forces (JPKF), but no Russian soldiers had actually left the area as required by the rotation procedure. Targamadze described this as an occupation of Georgian territory, prompting the Parliamentary Committee for Defense and Security to request that Georgia's Foreign Ministry inform foreign diplomats and ask the OSCE to monitor the situation. He also called for an emergency session of the Joint Control Commission (JCC) and suggested that the Georgian Parliament might adopt a special resolution after assessing the situation, possibly at its next session on June 6. (https://civil.ge/archives/110726)
  • Russia denied Georgia’s accusations of sending 500 extra troops to South Ossetia under the guise of a peacekeeper rotation. Viacheslav Sendov, a spokesman for the Russian Defense Ministry, stated that the 500 Russian servicemen sent to South Ossetia were part of a planned rotation to replace peacekeepers who had been there for six months. Sendov emphasized that no additional troops had been sent or would be sent to the region beyond the regular rotation. (https://civil.ge/archives/110727)
  • Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov suggested that Georgia’s recent actions in South Ossetia might indicate plans to resolve the conflict through forceful means, which he warned would be a huge mistake. Lavrov emphasized that Russia continues to respect Georgia’s territorial integrity but noted that South Ossetia is an internationally recognized conflict zone where Russian peacekeepers are maintaining peace. (https://civil.ge/archives/110732)
  • The Georgian Parliament's Committee for Defense and Security has requested the Foreign Ministry to inform foreign diplomats and urged the OSCE to monitor the situation at the JPKF base in Tskhinvali. An emergency session of the Joint Control Commission (JCC) was proposed to address the issue, and a potential special resolution might be discussed in Parliament on June 6. This follows a February 15 resolution from the Georgian Parliament to replace the Russian-led peacekeeping forces with an international peacekeeping operation, though no deadline was set for the government to act. (https://civil.ge/archives/110729)
• On May 31, Georgian State Minister for Conflict Resolution Issues Giorgi Khaindrava announced that Georgia will not participate in the upcoming emergency session of the quadripartite Joint Control Commission (JCC) scheduled for June 2 in Tskhinvali. This decision follows the May 27 incident in the conflict zone, which has heightened tensions between the involved parties. Khaindrava confirmed that the Georgian side has opted out of the emergency session proposed by Russian and South Ossetian representatives. He expressed concerns about the spontaneity of the meeting, emphasizing that such gatherings should not be conducted without adequate preparation. (https://civil.ge/archives/110719)
  • The Georgian State Minister insisted that if the JCC is to convene, it should take place in Tbilisi, asserting that this demand is legitimate. The JCC has previously met in Tskhinvali, most recently on May 11-12, but Georgia is now advocating for a more neutral and legally grounded venue.
  • In response to Georgia's stance, Eduard Kokoity, the leader of South Ossetia, accused the Georgian government of planning a “military operation” against South Ossetia in the upcoming months. This claim adds to the escalating rhetoric between the sides, suggesting a growing perception of imminent conflict.
• The Russian Foreign Ministry emphasized on June 1 that while it respects the principle of territorial integrity, the principle of self-determination must also be considered in resolving the South Ossetian conflict. It stated that Georgia's territorial integrity is not a current reality but rather a potential outcome that can only be achieved through complex negotiations. The South Ossetian position is understood by Russia as based on the right of self-determination, which is equally important under international law. (https://civil.ge/archives/110723)
  • Georgia condemned the Russian Foreign Ministry’s June 1 statement on South Ossetia, accusing Moscow of failing to act as an impartial mediator in the conflict. (https://civil.ge/archives/110734)
  • Georgian officials, including MP Kote Gabashvili, accused Russia of using these incidents and the peacekeeper rotation as provocations to incite Georgia into a military response. Gabashvili indicated that these provocations are reactions to Georgia's NATO aspirations, but assured that Georgia would not yield to them, anticipating further provocations throughout the summer. The NATO Parliamentary Assembly recently passed a declaration encouraging intensified dialogue with Georgia, which Georgian authorities are highlighting as a positive development.
    • Political analyst Shalva Pichkhadze described the Russian statements as threats rather than preconditions for recognition of South Ossetia, viewing them as part of a broader strategy by Russia. In contrast, Russian military analyst Pavel Felgengauer warned that the situation could lead to military confrontation in the summer. (https://civil.ge/archives/110737)
• 1 June: The Georgian Foreign Ministry accused Russia of provoking tensions in South Ossetia to disrupt an upcoming donors conference in Brussels. The conference aims to discuss funding for economic rehabilitation programs in the conflict zone, which are seen as crucial for confidence building. According to Georgia, Russia's actions aim to prevent these rehabilitation projects by accusing Georgia of planning provocations and attempting to resume armed conflict. The conference will seek contributions of EUR 10 million from donor countries to fund infrastructure and economic projects based on an OSCE-led Needs Assessment Study. (https://civil.ge/archives/110733)
• On June 1, lawmakers from breakaway South Ossetia and Russia’s North Ossetian Republic issued a joint statement urging Russia to ensure the security and protect the rights of Russian citizens living in South Ossetia amid perceived "provocative actions" by Georgia. The statement, directed to both chambers of the Russian Parliament, accused Georgia of choosing a path toward destabilization in the conflict zone and pursuing a plan for the forceful integration of South Ossetia into Georgia. (https://civil.ge/archives/110731)
• Nino Burjanadze, the Parliamentary Chairperson of Georgia, stated on June 1 that Georgia should not succumb to Russia’s provocations in South Ossetia and should resolve all disputes through diplomatic means. Speaking from Helsinki, where she attended a conference of EU parliamentarians, Burjanadze characterized the Russian “rotation” of peacekeepers in the conflict zone as a deliberate provocation. She emphasized the importance of showing restraint and not yielding to these provocations. (https://civil.ge/archives/110720)
• On June 2, Russian Defense Minister Sergey Ivanov issued a warning regarding potential provocations against Russian peacekeeping troops stationed in the South Ossetian conflict zone. He stated, "Anything is possible at any time there," indicating heightened concerns over the security of Russian forces. (https://civil.ge/archives/110739)
• On June 2, the South Ossetian side accused Tbilisi of undermining a scheduled session of the quadripartite Joint Control Commission (JCC), which was proposed to take place in Tskhinvali, the capital of the breakaway region. The Georgian government declined to participate in the session in Tskhinvali, instead suggesting that the meeting be held in Tbilisi. Boris Chochiev, Deputy Chairman of the South Ossetian government and Chief Negotiator for the region, claimed that the Georgian side’s invitation was a "deliberate action aimed at thwarting this meeting," emphasizing that negotiators from South Ossetia were unwilling to travel to Tbilisi due to concerns about their safety. (https://civil.ge/archives/110740)
• On June 2, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov suggested that Georgia should not hesitate regarding the possibility of a referendum in South Ossetia concerning “self-determination.” He emphasized that the issue is a matter of international law and is typically resolved through an expression of the people's will. Lavrov cited Russia's willingness to advocate for a similar referendum in Chechnya, which had taken place. (https://civil.ge/archives/110742)
• On June 2, Giorgi Khaindrava, the Georgian State Minister for Conflict Resolution Issues, expressed skepticism about the likelihood of Russia withdrawing its additional troops from the South Ossetian conflict zone in the near future. Georgia claims there are over 1,000 Russian servicemen in the area, which is twice the number allowed by existing agreements. In contrast, Russia maintains that it has simply rotated its troops as per established protocols. Khaindrava reiterated the Georgian government's position, emphasizing the desire for Russian peacekeepers to leave the conflict zone. He described South Ossetia as having transformed into a "military facility," indicating the presence of approximately 6,000 militias alongside the Russian forces. He strongly refuted Russia’s allegations that Georgia intends to use military force to reclaim control over the region, stating, "Only a crazy can think of using force against the background of current militarization of the region." This comment underscores the heightened tensions and complexities of the situation in South Ossetia. (https://civil.ge/archives/185476)
• On June 3, Giorgi Khaindrava, the Georgian State Minister for Conflict Resolution Issues, traveled to Tskhinvali, the capital of breakaway South Ossetia. His visit aimed to assess the situation regarding the rotation of Russian peacekeeping forces in the region. Khaindrava's agenda includes a meeting with Marat Kulakhmetov, the commander of the Joint Peacekeeping Forces, as well as discussions with officials from the breakaway region. His objective is to verify whether all Russian servicemen have indeed left the conflict zone as claimed. This visit underscores ongoing tensions and the complexities surrounding peacekeeping operations in South Ossetia. (https://civil.ge/archives/110750)

CONTEXT: Putin and Saakashvili announce upcoming meeting on June 13

• South Ossetian leader Eduard Kokoity and Abkhaz leader Sergey Bagapsh visited Vladikavkaz, the capital of Russia's North Ossetian Republic, on June 6. Bagapsh and Kokoity met with North Ossetian President Teimuraz Mamsurov during their visit. (https://civil.ge/archives/110783)
  • After their visit to Russia's North Ossetian Republic on June 6, Eduard Kokoity and Sergey Bagapsh arrived in Kabardino-Balkaria on June 7. The two secessionist leaders met with Arsen Kanokov, the President of Kabardino-Balkaria, in Nalchik. Following their meeting in Kabardino-Balkaria, Bagapsh and Kokoity traveled to another Russian republic, Karachaevo-Cherkessia. (https://civil.ge/archives/110789)
• On June 9, the Georgian Parliament passed the first hearing of a draft law concerning property restitution for victims of the South Ossetian conflict from the early 1990s. (https://civil.ge/archives/110764)
• 9 June: Alasania reveals in parliamentary hearing details of the Abkhaz Peace Plan: Georgia is open to consultations granting Abkhazia broad internal sovereignty based on federalism principles. Abkhazia will have “dignified representation” in Georgian government branches. Safe and dignified return of IDPs without preconditions. Collaboration between Abkhaz and Georgian law enforcement to ensure security for returning individuals. Development of a joint action plan with the UN police component to facilitate the return process. Georgia's readiness to adhere to non-resumption of hostilities and pursue peaceful conflict resolution. Support for direct participation of international and regional organizations in conflict resolution. Assistance in economic and infrastructure rehabilitation in Abkhazia. Joint economic projects involving Georgian and Abkhaz populations. Consultation on integrating Abkhazia in the EU Neighborhood Policy and Black Sea regional initiatives. A comprehensive settlement process should be executed step-by-step based on a joint action plan. (https://civil.ge/archives/110804)
  • Following talks in Moscow with Russian officials, Alasania indicated that Russia is not ready to positively contribute to conflict resolution.
• On June 9, two men were wounded during a police operation conducted by Georgian authorities in the village of Avnevi, located in the South Ossetian conflict zone. The Georgian side alleges that one of the injured men, Alan Bazaev, who was detained, is suspected of distributing counterfeit currency. Mikhail Mindzaev, the Interior Minister of breakaway South Ossetia, stated that the accusations from the Georgian side are intended to discredit Tskhinvali in the eyes of the international community. Marat Kulakhmetov, commander of the Joint Peacekeeping Forces (JPKF) stationed in the South Ossetian conflict zone, commented that any police operations against criminal suspects should be coordinated with the JPKF, which did not occur in this instance. (https://civil.ge/archives/110812)
• At a conference in Brussels on June 14, donor countries from the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) committed over EUR 10 million towards the economic and infrastructure rehabilitation of the South Ossetian conflict zone. (https://civil.ge/archives/110854)
  • Russia announced it is considering allocating 100 million Rubles (approximately EUR 3 million) to provide "additional assistance to South Ossetia." Part of this funding may be used for specific projects coordinated with the OSCE. The Georgian Foreign Ministry condemned Russia’s decision as “unilateral and non-transparent,” asserting that bypassing Georgia and donor countries undermines the international community's efforts for a political settlement of the conflict. (https://civil.ge/archives/110870)
• In an interview with RIA Novosti on June 14, Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili expressed uncertainty about the Parliament's decision regarding the Russian peacekeepers stationed in the Abkhaz conflict zone. (https://civil.ge/archives/110845)
• On June 16, the Georgian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported that a monitoring operation on June 15 identified the presence of three unauthorized South Ossetian militia groups in areas adjacent to the Ossetian village of Zemo Prisi and the Georgian-administered village of Prisi, located in the eastern part of the breakaway region's capital, Tskhinvali. These groups reportedly comprised eight, fifteen, and thirty armed Ossetian men, respectively. (https://civil.ge/archives/110866)
  • The Georgian MoD also protested against the South Ossetian side's decision to “illegally reposition” its police post near the village of Avnevi.
  • In its statement on June 16, the Georgian MoD claimed that these unauthorized actions by the South Ossetian side demonstrate that the Russian peacekeeping troops in the conflict zone are failing to fulfill their duties.
  • The accusations from Tbilisi followed a protest from the South Ossetian side concerning the repositioning of a Georgian police post, which was moved about 900 meters closer to the South Ossetian village of Zemo Prisi on June 14. This move was not coordinated with the Joint Peacekeeping Forces (JPKF) in the conflict zone and was condemned by Maj. Gen. Marat Kulakhmetov, the Commander of the JPKF.
• On June 17, the Georgian Ministry of Defense reported that a small passenger plane illegally flew from Russia to the breakaway region of Abkhazia, landing at Babushera Airport near the Abkhaz capital, Sokhumi. This incident marks the fourth violation of Georgian airspace within the past two months. (https://civil.ge/archives/110875)
• On June 21, Giorgi Volsky, the Georgian Deputy State Minister for Conflict Resolution Issues, along with representatives from the Interior Ministry, visited Tskhinvali to facilitate talks between Georgian Interior Minister Vano Merabishvili and Mikhail Mindzaev, the Interior Minister of the breakaway region of South Ossetia. The officials aimed to determine the date and venue for the long-scheduled meeting. (https://civil.ge/archives/110896)
• Negotiators from Georgia, South Ossetia, Russia, and North Ossetia will convene in Tskhinvali on June 22 as part of the Joint Control Commission (JCC), according to the Georgian State Minister for Conflict Resolution Issues. Reports indicate that a separate meeting between Georgian Interior Minister Vano Merabishvili and South Ossetian Interior Minister Mikhail Mindzaev will also take place on the same day in Tskhinvali. (https://civil.ge/archives/110897)
• The South Ossetian side has confirmed that Georgian Interior Minister Vano Merabishvili will meet with South Ossetian Interior Minister Mikhail Mindzaev on June 22, according to the South Ossetian Press and Information Committee (PIC). Mindzaev expressed hope that the upcoming meeting will help defuse tensions between the two sides. (https://civil.ge/archives/110899)
  • Georgian Interior Minister Vano Merabishvili and State Minister for Conflict Resolution Issues Giorgi Khaindrava arrived in the breakaway South Ossetian capital Tskhinvali on June 22 for discussions. At the outset of the meeting, the South Ossetian side expressed optimism regarding the discussions. Boris Chochiev, the chief negotiator for South Ossetia and its deputy prime minister, remarked that high-level contacts between Georgian and Ossetian law enforcement could pave the way for resolving the conflict. The talks are also attended by Yuri Popov, the Russian Foreign Ministry’s special envoy, along with representatives from the Russian Interior Ministry, including Alexander Rostovtsev, and officials from Russia’s North Ossetian Republic, such as Murat Tkhostov and Soslan Sikoev. (https://civil.ge/archives/110906)
  • The first-ever meeting between Georgian Interior Minister Vano Merabishvili and his counterpart from breakaway South Ossetia, Mikhail Mindzaev, on June 22 in Tskhinvali did not yield any significant outcomes. One major point of contention in the protocol was the re-establishment of the Special Coordination Center (SCC), which was originally set up in 2001 to facilitate cooperation between Georgian and Ossetian law enforcement for joint policing in the conflict zone. The proposed protocol also included stipulations for monitoring all police posts in the conflict zone before July 10 and preventing the unilateral establishment of checkpoints without prior agreement with the JCC. (https://civil.ge/archives/110908)
    • Merabishvili criticized the document's language, describing certain phrases as “absolutely incomprehensible” and objecting to implications that suggested equal status between the two ministers and reaffirmed South Ossetia's self-determination.
    • He emphasized that his priority is the security of Georgian citizens and expressed a desire for the South Ossetian side to designate someone responsible for this security, questioning the legitimacy of South Ossetia's governance, especially in light of a prominent banner in Tskhinvali that read, "Putin Our President."
    • Following the talks, a verbal agreement was reached: the Georgian side would remove its police post near Zemo Prisi, while the South Ossetian side would dismantle its post near the Georgian village of Avnevi within a week.
    • Concurrently, the South Ossetian side is constructing a road that will connect Tskhinvali to the northern part of the region and the Roki Tunnel, avoiding Georgian villages to the north.
• On June 26, the Georgian Foreign Ministry sent a formal note to Russia, expressing strong protest against what it termed "unilateral actions" and "direct cooperation" with the breakaway South Ossetian authorities without prior agreement with Tbilisi. (https://civil.ge/archives/110922)
  • The ministry specifically cited a joint session between Russia’s North Ossetian Republic and South Ossetia as evidence of Moscow’s unilateral actions. Georgia also condemned Russia’s separate funding for the unrecognized republic, which bypasses the OSCE-led rehabilitation projects. This is seen as further proof of Moscow's unilateral involvement.
  • During the same period, Georgian Deputy Foreign Minister Merab Antadze is in Moscow from June 26-28 to participate in a Ministerial Conference focusing on drug trafficking routes from Afghanistan. Antadze is scheduled to hold bilateral consultations with officials from the Russian Foreign Ministry on the sidelines of the conference, which may provide an opportunity to address these tensions directly.
• On June 26, Sergey Bagapsh, the leader of the breakaway region of Abkhazia, expressed his willingness to meet with Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili to discuss and potentially sign an agreement aimed at preventing the resumption of hostilities. During a news conference in Sokhumi, Bagapsh stated: He is open to discussing "any kind of issue" with Saakashvili but emphasized that any meeting must be well-prepared to ensure it is productive. Bagapsh indicated that while the Abkhaz side is ready to sign the agreement on non-resumption of hostilities, previous discussions faltered due to unacceptable amendments proposed by the Georgian side. (https://civil.ge/archives/110923)
  • Role of Russian Peacekeeping Troops: A significant point of contention in the agreement involves the function and status of Russian peacekeepers stationed in the conflict zone under the aegis of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). This issue remains a major barrier to reaching a consensus. Lifting the economic blockade imposed on Abkhazia. Reopening air, sea, and rail routes connecting Abkhazia with Georgia and other regions.
• First meeting of the joint working group on security issues in the Abkhaz conflict zone was held on June 30, in Gali, breakaway region of Abkhazia. Participants included representatives from Georgia, Abkhazia, OSCE, UN Mission to Georgia, CIS Peacekeeping Troops, and diplomats from the British, French, and Russian embassies (representing the Group of Friends of the UN Secretary General). Main focus was on tackling criminality in the conflict zone using joint coordinator groups, created in January 2006 during UN-mediated talks in Gali. Coordinators were tasked with developing a plan to fight criminality and build confidence in the Abkhaz conflict zone before the next meeting. The sides agreed to hold the next meeting in September to continue discussions on security. (https://civil.ge/archives/110953)
• Parliament Speakers of breakaway regions Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Transnistria met in Moscow on July 4, 2006. They signed an agreement on cooperation, as reported by the Interfax news agency. Abkhaz Parliament Speaker Nugzar Ashuba emphasized the long-standing support for relations among their regions, citing shared goals, tasks, and similar relationships with Russia. This agreement follows a previous cooperation summit held in the Abkhaz capital, Sokhumi, on June 14, where leaders from the three regions signed similar documents. (https://civil.ge/archives/110967)
  • Georgia protested the participation of Russian officials, including the Vice-Speaker and parliamentarians, in the summit. The Georgian Foreign Ministry criticized the "pro-separatist rhetoric" of Russian parliamentarians, suggesting it casts doubt on Russia's stated support for Georgia’s territorial integrity. (https://civil.ge/archives/110971)
• Abkhazia's Defense Minister, Sultan Sosnaliev, denied reports that Russia had delivered additional armament to the Gudauta military base, as reported by Apsnypress on July 7, 2006. Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili claimed during a visit to Washington on July 6 that Russia had deployed new armament to the Gudauta base, according to RIA Novosti. (https://civil.ge/archives/111003)
• Oleg Albarov, Secretary of the National Security Council of breakaway South Ossetia, was killed by an explosion on July 9, 2006, while opening his car garage in Tskhinvali. South Ossetian Interior Minister Mikhail Mindzaev said it appeared to be a remote-controlled bomb and blamed Georgia for the assassination.
  • Boris Chochiev, Vice-Premier of South Ossetia, also accused Georgia, claiming the murder was part of a Georgian destabilization plot ahead of the G8 summit in St. Petersburg (July 15-17). Russian Maj. Gen. Marat Kulakhmetov, commander of the Joint Peacekeeping Forces in South Ossetia, called it a well-planned provocation intended to destabilize the region. (https://civil.ge/archives/111006)
  • Georgian officials denied involvement, with Giorgi Volski, Deputy State Minister for Conflict Resolution, describing the incident as a provocation aimed at undermining stability. MP Nika Rurua suggested the murder might have been a result of infighting between criminal groups in South Ossetia, connected to local authorities.
  • Georgian State Minister Giorgi Khaindrava alleged on July 9 that Russian special services may have been responsible for the murder of Oleg Albarov, Secretary of the National Security Council of breakaway South Ossetia. (https://civil.ge/archives/111008)
    • Khaindrava claimed Albarov was well-disposed toward Georgia and was a potential rival to South Ossetian leader Eduard Kokoity in the upcoming presidential elections in November. Giorgi Arveladze, Chief of the Georgian President’s Administration, described the murder as “political terror” and linked it to internal power struggles in South Ossetia.
• A joint working group meeting is scheduled for July 11 in Sokhumi, the capital of breakaway Abkhazia, to address issues related to refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs). The meeting is part of the Georgian-Abkhaz Coordinating Council and will focus on the organized return of IDPs and refugees, along with their security. (https://civil.ge/archives/111016)
• Border row and ROki Tunnel in July 2006: Authorities in breakaway South Ossetia warned that Tskhinvali would take "adequate measures" if Georgia does not reopen a major road in the conflict zone. Boris Chochiev, South Ossetia's deputy Prime Minister, reported that armed groups from Georgian law enforcement have blocked the Trans Caucasus Highway near Tskhinvali, affecting access to Georgian villages. Chochiev stated that the Georgian action violates agreements allowing for free movement of people in the conflict zone. (https://civil.ge/archives/111019)
  • The Georgian government announced heightened security measures to prevent movement through the illegally operating Roki Tunnel following the closure of the Zemo Larsi border crossing, the only legal checkpoint between Georgia and Russia. However, Georgian Prime Minister Zurab Nogaideli stated that the road would be temporarily opened before July 14 to allow citizens returning to Georgia to enter.
• Nino Burjanadze, the Georgian Parliamentary Chairperson, criticized Russia at the UN Security Council on July 11 for supporting secessionist authorities in Abkhazia. Burjanadze accused Russian peacekeepers of failing to fulfill their duties in the Abkhaz conflict zone and called for a UN-led peacekeeping operation instead. She claimed that Russian peacekeepers are responsible for 10% of all crimes in Abkhazia and accused Russia of supplying arms to secessionist forces. In response, Russian Ambassador Vitaly Churkin expressed disappointment, stating that Burjanadze's remarks were a "big mistake" and counterproductive to achieving a political settlement. (https://civil.ge/archives/111010)
  • Condemnation of Burjanadze's Speech: The Russian Foreign Ministry criticized Nino Burjanadze, the Chairperson of the Georgian Parliament, for her remarks at the UN Security Council on July 11. They described her speech as "unprecedentedly rude" and filled with "anti-Russian" sentiments. Call for Abkhaz Representation: Russian officials, including spokesman Mikhail Kaminin, argued that the Abkhaz side should also be allowed to address the UN Security Council to provide their perspective on the conflict. (https://civil.ge/archives/111042)
  • Resolution in Development: The Georgian Parliament is preparing a resolution to demand the withdrawal of Russian peacekeepers from Abkhazia. Kote Gabashvili, Chairman of the Parliamentary Committee for Foreign Affairs, stated that consultations on the resolution would begin upon Nino Burjanadze's return from New York. Gabashvili emphasized that once the resolution passes, the mandate of Russian peacekeepers will be politically terminated. He noted that the Parliament does not see the need to review the government's assessment of the peacekeepers, as it has already been assessed negatively. (https://civil.ge/archives/111043)
  • Commitment to Peacekeepers: Ivanov stated that Russia "will not let anyone offend its peacekeepers" stationed in South Ossetia, reinforcing Russia's protective stance towards its military personnel in the area. (https://civil.ge/archives/111047)
• Russian Media Reports: On July 12, Russian media widely reported claims from Russia's federal security service (FSB) suggesting that Georgia is planning a provocation in breakaway South Ossetia.Allegations of a Planned Attack: The FSB indicated that an unnamed individual, allegedly connected to the Georgian government, communicated with them about a plan to kill 15-20 ethnic Georgian residents in the South Ossetian conflict zone. Pretext for Military Action: The reported intent behind this alleged action is that it would serve as a pretext for a military incursion by Georgian troops into the unrecognized republic of South Ossetia. (https://civil.ge/archives/111041)
  • Warnings Against Provocations: On July 13, Sergey Lavrov warned about the potential for provocations in the South Ossetian conflict zone. He expressed hope that reports of a planned military incursion by Georgia were unfounded. Lavrov cautioned that if the reports of Georgia's military intentions were accurate, it would signal a potential resurgence of violence in the region. (https://civil.ge/archives/111046)
  • Denial of Provocations: Georgian officials firmly denied any intention to stir tensions in the South Ossetian conflict zone. Giga Bokeria, a prominent member of the ruling National Movement party, stated that recent Russian claims suggested an impending provocation from the Russian side, particularly in light of Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili's recent visit to the United States. (https://civil.ge/archives/111051)
• Incident Overview: The explosion occurred in the early hours of July 14. An explosive device was reportedly placed on a tree near the residence of Bala Bestauti, identified as a commander of a special purpose unit within the unrecognized republic's Defense Ministry. Connection Between Explosions: Maj. Gen. Marat Kulakhmetov, the commander of the Joint Peacekeeping Forces in the region, indicated that the explosives used in both incidents were similar, suggesting a pattern of targeted attacks aimed at destabilizing an already tense situation. (https://civil.ge/archives/111053)
  • Allegations of Responsibility: The South Ossetian authorities blamed Tbilisi for orchestrating the blasts, asserting that both attacks were part of a broader strategy to destabilize the region. Tbilisi, however, denied these accusations. Targeted Individual: Bala Bestauti was reportedly included in a "black list" of South Ossetian officials published by the Georgian Interior Ministry the previous November, which further complicated the narrative surrounding the motivations behind the attack.
• In July 2006, Blocked Entry: A car carrying Yuri Popov, the chief Russian negotiator for South Ossetian issues, and Valery Evnevich, the deputy commander of the Russian land forces, was stopped by Georgian Military Police near Gori. The vehicle was registered to the Russian Embassy in Tbilisi and was en route to Tskhinvali for a ceremony marking the 14th anniversary of Russian peacekeeping troops in South Ossetia. Gela Bezhuashvili stated that the movement of Russian officials in the conflict zone had not been agreed upon in advance. He emphasized the existing agreement that any such movement should be coordinated two weeks prior to travel, which had not occurred in this case. Bezhuashvili urged all parties to refrain from unauthorized movement in the conflict zone.
  • Russian Officials' Response: In contrast, Yuri Popov claimed that their movement had been pre-approved by the Georgian side. He described the encounter as confrontational, with about 20 representatives of the Georgian Military Police blocking their path and insisting they return to Tbilisi. Following the incident, the Russian officials returned to Tbilisi. The Russian Foreign Ministry subsequently issued a protest note to Georgia regarding the obstruction, highlighting the growing diplomatic tensions between the two countries. (https://civil.ge/archives/111062)
• On July 14, 2006, the Russian Foreign Ministry issued a stark warning to Georgia regarding its military activities and rhetoric concerning the South Ossetian conflict. The Russian Foreign Ministry called on Georgia to exercise restraint, cautioning that any attempts to resolve the South Ossetian conflict through force would provoke a response. They emphasized that aggressive actions would not go unanswered. The ministry accused Georgia of escalating tensions in South Ossetia by provoking Russian peacekeepers, intimidating the local population, and obstructing free movement in the area. They portrayed these actions as a calculated strategy to exert pressure on Tskhinvali. The Russian statement highlighted ongoing military preparations by Georgia, including large-scale exercises at the Orpolo firing range and the establishment of military infrastructure, such as a hospital in Gori. They cited these developments as evidence of a potential offensive against South Ossetia. (https://civil.ge/archives/111061)
  • On July 14, 2006, the Georgian Foreign Ministry issued a strong condemnation regarding the blast in Tskhinvali that resulted in the deaths of two civilians and injuries to four others. Georgia accused both Russia and South Ossetian authorities of orchestrating provocations, which they claimed were intended to escalate tensions in the region. Deputy Foreign Minister Merab Antadze specifically highlighted the blast as part of a broader pattern of provocations aimed at justifying military action. Antadze articulated concerns that the actions by Russia and South Ossetia were aimed at creating a pretext for military intervention under the guise of protecting Russian citizens. This reflected ongoing fears in Tbilisi about Moscow’s intentions in the conflict zone. (https://civil.ge/archives/111059)
  • On July 14, 2006, Givi Targamadze, the Chairman of the Parliamentary Committee for Defense and Security in Georgia, made serious allegations regarding Russia's military activities in the breakaway region of South Ossetia. Targamadze accused Russia of sending heavy military equipment, specifically mentioning the delivery of around 20 infantry fighting vehicles and URAL-type trucks into South Ossetia. Despite the provocations, Targamadze stated that Georgia would respond "promptly and effectively" but emphasized that this response would not involve the deployment of military units. This suggests a preference for non-military measures in dealing with the heightened tensions. (https://civil.ge/archives/111065)
    • Denial of Allegations: Russian Defense Ministry spokesman Viacheslav Sedov stated that claims made by Georgian officials about sending heavy armament to South Ossetia were false. He emphasized that discussions regarding the deployment of military hardware or personnel to South Ossetia were not taking place. (https://civil.ge/archives/111067)
  • On July 15, 2006, a mine explosion in the South Ossetian conflict zone injured a serviceman from the Russian peacekeeping battalion. The Russian peacekeeper sustained serious injuries from the explosion, highlighting the dangerous conditions in the conflict area. The explosion occurred near the Pauk observation post, which is a strategic point in the region where several major roads intersect. This area has been a focal point for military activity and tension between conflicting parties. (https://civil.ge/archives/111074)
  • Lavrov stated that Georgia's actions have disrupted a scheduled session of the Joint Control Commission (JCC), which was supposed to take place on July 17 in Tbilisi. He emphasized that the failure to conduct this meeting was a significant setback for peace efforts. Lavrov accused certain elements within the Georgian government, whom he referred to as the "party of war," of acting independently and irresponsibly, suggesting they were undermining President Saakashvili's control over the situation. The Russian officials reported another incident on July 15, where a vehicle carrying Russian negotiator Yuri Popov and Deputy Commander of the Russian land forces Valery Evnevich was stopped by Georgian law enforcement. Evnevich stated that Georgian officers acted rudely and fired shots into the air, further escalating tensions. (https://civil.ge/archives/111076)
  • On July 16, 2006, the Russian Foreign Ministry issued a strong condemnation of the brief detention of Russian officials by the Georgian Military Police on July 15. The Russian officials, including Yuri Popov, the chief negotiator on South Ossetia, and Valery Yevnevich, the deputy commander of the Russian land forces, were stopped while traveling from Tskhinvali to Tbilisi. The car belonging to the Russian Embassy was blocked at gunpoint, and the officials were subjected to a search. Reports indicated that Georgian servicemen fired shots in the air and verbally abused the Russian officials. The Georgian authorities described the incident as a routine check of documents, implying that there was no intent to provoke or escalate tensions. The Russian Foreign Ministry characterized the detention as a deliberate provocation aimed at increasing tensions in the South Ossetian conflict zone. They suggested that this act was part of a broader pattern of provocations against Russian diplomats and peacekeepers, which they claimed intensified during the G8 summit in St. Petersburg. (https://civil.ge/archives/111078)
  • Khaindrava described the decision by the Georgian Military Police and its chief, Alexander Sukhitashvili, to detain Russian diplomats as an "irresponsible act." He highlighted the potential diplomatic repercussions, noting that Georgia had already received complaints from its western partners regarding the incident. In response to Russia's claims that Georgia was preparing to use force in South Ossetia, Khaindrava asserted that Georgia's approach was centered on a "Peace Plan" that had international backing. He dismissed suggestions that Georgia had military intentions. (https://civil.ge/archives/111079)
  • Nogaideli attributed the thwarting of the JCC session to provocations initiated by the opposing sides, emphasizing that such actions made it unreasonable to refer to the JCC as a quadripartite body, which traditionally includes representatives from Georgia, South Ossetia, Russia, and North Ossetia. Nogaideli's remarks came in the wake of statements made by Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, who had blamed the disruptions on the detentions of Russian officials by Georgian Military Police on July 14 and 15. (https://civil.ge/archives/111081)
  • De Gucht expressed disappointment over the detention of Russian officials, including chief negotiator Yuri Popov and deputy commander Valery Yevnevich. He emphasized that stopping diplomatic delegates in such a manner violates internationally recognized diplomatic practices. The OSCE Chairman also expressed regret at the postponement of the Joint Control Commission (JCC) meeting, which was scheduled for July 17 in Tbilisi. He underscored the importance of resuming constructive dialogue, especially amid rising tensions in the region. De Gucht urged all parties involved to take the earliest opportunity to address the pressing issues collectively. He described the failure to engage in dialogue as disappointing and emphasized the need for diplomatic solutions. Following the incident and subsequent tensions, Russian negotiator Yuri Popov indicated that the JCC session might be relocated to Moscow, potentially taking place in late July or early August. This shift reflects the deteriorating relations and complications in negotiations due to the recent events. (https://civil.ge/archives/111083)
  • On July 17, 2006, Sergey Prikhodko, an aide to Russian President Vladimir Putin, announced that Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili had requested a meeting with Putin during the upcoming CIS informal summit scheduled for July 21-22. This request for dialogue reflects ongoing efforts by Georgia to engage diplomatically with Russia, despite the heightened tensions surrounding the conflicts in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. (https://civil.ge/archives/111084)
• On July 17, 2006, the Georgian Parliament passed a significant resolution concerning the peacekeeping forces stationed in the conflict zones of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The resolution highlighted the lack of progress in conflict resolution and called for urgent actions regarding the peacekeeping operations currently in place. (https://civil.ge/archives/111095)
  • The resolution references earlier decisions made by the Parliament (Resolution 1927-II from October 11, 2005, and Resolution 2655-I from February 15, 2006), which had set out expectations and frameworks for peace in the conflict zones.
  • It notes a troubling increase in military capabilities by the de facto authorities in both Abkhazia and South Ossetia, alongside rising incidents of terrorism and human rights violations.
  • The resolution expresses that the current peacekeeping operations have failed to create a conducive environment for conflict resolution and have instead facilitated ongoing violations and tensions. It condemns the actions of Russian armed forces in these regions, labeling them as major obstacles to peaceful conflict resolution.
  • The Parliament directs the Georgian government to take immediate steps to suspend the so-called peacekeeping operations and withdraw Russian peacekeeping forces from Georgian territory. It emphasizes the need to cancel relevant international agreements that support the existing peacekeeping structures.
  • The resolution instructs the government to begin working on changing the current peacekeeping format, engaging the international community to inform them about Georgia's plans for peaceful conflict resolution.
  • It calls for efforts to inform and engage residents of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, focusing on confidence-building initiatives and establishing a peaceful, democratic society based on internationally recognized standards throughout Georgia.
• On July 17, 2006, Sergey Shamba, the Foreign Minister of breakaway Abkhazia, commented on the possibility of withdrawing Russian peacekeepers from the Abkhaz conflict zone in response to moves by the Georgian Parliament. Shamba told Apsnipress news agency that although each conflicting party has the right to advocate for the withdrawal of peacekeepers, the final decision on such matters rests with the heads of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), under whose aegis the peacekeeping forces in Abkhazia were deployed. (https://civil.ge/archives/111097)
  • President Saakashvili stated on July 18 that the Georgian government will make a final decision about Russian peacekeepers in conflict zones after his upcoming meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin at the CIS summit on July 21-22. (https://civil.ge/archives/185482)
  • South Ossetian leader Eduard Kokoity stated that Russian peacekeeping forces will remain in the South Ossetian conflict zone until the conflict is fully resolved. (https://civil.ge/archives/111099)
  • Russian Foreign Ministry Response: Spokesman Mikhail Kaminin described the Georgian Parliament's July 18 resolution demanding the withdrawal of Russian peacekeepers as an attempt to escalate tensions. Military Reaction: Valery Yevnevich, the Deputy Commander of Russian Land Forces overseeing peacekeeping, warned that the removal of Russian troops would lead to immediate bloodshed. (https://civil.ge/archives/111100)
  • Abkhaz Leader's Response: Sergey Bagapsh condemned the Georgian Parliament's July 18 resolution calling for the withdrawal of Russian peacekeepers, calling it "the most destructive political decision" since their deployment. Warning to Georgia: Bzhania stated that Georgia should take full responsibility for any potential deterioration of the situation in the conflict zone following this decision. (https://civil.ge/archives/111101)
  • CAVEAT TO RUSSIAN REACTION: Parliament had already passed five similar resolutions in the past, including three under Shevardnadze, which had not led to such strong reactions in the past.
  • Russian Foreign Ministry Condemnation: The Russian Foreign Ministry strongly condemned the Georgian Parliament’s July 18 resolution on the withdrawal of Russian peacekeepers from Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Russia emphasized that unilateral actions by Georgia cannot annul the international agreements that serve as the legal basis for Russian peacekeepers' presence in the conflict zones. The Russian Foreign Ministry warned that Georgia’s ultimatums and push for peacekeeper withdrawal could result in a new crisis and humanitarian catastrophe. (https://civil.ge/archives/111103)
  • Georgian Government Action: Prime Minister Zurab Nogaideli instructed the Foreign Ministry and the State Minister for Conflict Resolution to begin implementing the Parliament's July 18 resolution. (https://civil.ge/archives/111105)
  • Georgian Foreign Minister Gela Bezhuashvili acknowledged that withdrawing from the agreements underpinning Russian peacekeepers' deployment in Abkhazia and South Ossetia is a difficult but feasible process. There are legal tools for withdrawal, though the process is complex and disputable. The Georgian government is preparing specific proposals aimed at unfreezing the conflict resolution process. Bezhuashvili highlighted the government's readiness for compromise in discussions with Russia. (https://civil.ge/archives/111106)
  • Chechen Prime Minister's Warning: Ramzan Kadyrov, Prime Minister of Chechnya, cautioned that withdrawing Russian peacekeepers from Georgia's conflict zones could destabilize the entire Caucasus region. (https://civil.ge/archives/111107)
  • Protection of Citizens: Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov stated that Russia will protect its citizens and peacekeepers in Abkhazia and South Ossetia "by all available means," warning against any threats to their lives or dignity. (https://civil.ge/archives/111111)
  • As Saakashvili was set to travel to Moscow, Officials in Tbilisi are beginning to prepare the legal framework necessary for the withdrawal of Russian peacekeepers, as mandated by the Georgian Parliament's July 18 resolution. Gabashvili referenced a 2003 agreement between the Russian and Georgian Presidents, stating that the peacekeeping forces would remain in Abkhazia until one party requests their termination. He countered claims that the withdrawal process is legally ambiguous. (https://civil.ge/archives/111115)
  • Mayor of Moscow, Yuri Luzhkov, visited Sokhumi, the capital of breakaway Abkhazia, on July 20 and expressed a willingness to cooperate with the Abkhaz leadership as if they were an independent state. (https://civil.ge/archives/111116)
    • Protest Summoned: On July 20, the Georgian Foreign Ministry summoned the Russian Charge d’Affaires to protest Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov's visit to Abkhazia, which was not authorized by Tbilisi. (https://civil.ge/archives/111120)
  • Troop Maneuvers: Russian Defense Minister Sergey Ivanov announced on July 20 that ongoing military maneuvers in the North Caucasus are designed to support Russian peacekeeping forces if necessary. He mentioned that Russia has a strategy in place to address issues related to potential conflict escalation, with the maneuvers dubbed "Caucasus Boundary" being part of this plan. (https://civil.ge/archives/111117)
  • On July 20, Georgian Defense Minister Irakli Okruashvili made significant statements regarding Georgia's approach to the Abkhaz and South Ossetian conflicts during a political talk show on Rustavi 2 TV. Okruashvili stated that Georgia should aim to renounce all agreements related to the conflicts within a few months. (https://civil.ge/archives/111124)
  • On July 20, it was announced that President Mikheil Saakashvili of Georgia will not be visiting Moscow as initially scheduled on July 21-22. Giorgi Arveladze, the Chief of the President’s Administration, confirmed the postponement during a news conference but did not provide further details regarding the reasons for the change. (https://civil.ge/archives/111125)
    • On July 21, Georgian Deputy Foreign Minister Merab Antadze announced that efforts to arrange a face-to-face meeting between Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili and Russian President Vladimir Putin during the informal CIS summit in Moscow had been unsuccessful. This failure was cited as the reason for the postponement of Saakashvili's planned visit. (https://civil.ge/archives/111132)
    • Concerns About Public Statements: Bokeria mentioned that Putin was uncomfortable with public statements made after their meetings, fearing it could damage his image. (https://civil.ge/archives/111134)
    • Putin's Schedule: Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman Mikhail Kaminin stated that President Putin's tight schedule prevented the arrangement of face-to-face talks with President Saakashvili during the informal CIS summit in Moscow. (https://civil.ge/archives/111135)
    • Talks Ongoing: Georgian Foreign Minister Gela Bezhuashvili announced that discussions are underway to arrange a meeting between Russian and Georgian leaders. (https://civil.ge/archives/111136)
  • On July 21, Teimuraz Mamsurov, the leader of Russia's North Ossetia, stated that his republic is cooperating with South Ossetia “actually as with an independent state,” reflecting a significant level of political and administrative alignment between the two regions. This statement emphasizes North Ossetia's support for South Ossetia amid ongoing tensions in the region. (https://civil.ge/archives/111131)
  • On July 21, Boris Chochiev, the Deputy Prime Minister of breakaway South Ossetia, expressed strong criticism regarding the dismissal of Giorgi Khaindrava, the State Minister for Conflict Resolution Issues in Georgia. Chochiev claimed that Khaindrava's resignation indicated that the Georgian leadership was opposed to a peaceful resolution of the ongoing conflict. (https://civil.ge/archives/111133)

• 22 July: Emzar Kvitsiani, leader of the paramilitary group Monadire, announced his defiance against Georgia’s central authorities, stating he will resist any attempts to disarm his militia. Monadire was established by local residents to protect the gorge from potential threats posed by Abkhaz troops, comprising an estimated 300-400 members. It was legalized under the Defense Ministry in 2002. In 2005, then-Defense Minister Irakli Okruashvili disbanded Monadire, leading to local discontent and criticism from former government officials like Irakli Alasania.
  • Kvitsiani claimed distrust and disobedience toward the current authorities, accusing them of planning an incursion against his group on July 27. He stated any armed force entering the gorge would be repelled. After Monadire’s disbandment, Okruashvili accused its members of criminal activities, asserting the need for anti-criminal operations in the gorge. However, no such operations have been reported since then. (https://civil.ge/archives/111144)
• Prime Minister's Response: PM Zurab Nogaideli dismissed Emzar Kvitsiani’s threats, stating that he does not represent the local population and that any disobedience is unlikely. MP Nika Rurua, deputy chairman of the parliamentary committee for defense and security, warned that if Kvitsiani continues to act outside the law, he will be treated as a criminal and arrested. (https://civil.ge/archives/111146)
• Allegations Against Russia: Parliamentary Chairperson Nino Burjanadze suggested on July 23 that Russia may be supporting Emzar Kvitsiani, the leader of the paramilitary group Monadire in Kodori gorge, who threatened to resist disarmament by Georgian authorities. Burjanadze noted that Defense Minister of breakaway Abkhazia, Sultan Sosnaliev, and Commander of the Russian peacekeeping troops, Sergey Chaban, had met with Kvitsiani, implying potential Russian involvement in the situation. (https://civil.ge/archives/111147)
  • Strength of Monadire Group: Originally formed to protect the gorge from Abkhaz troops, Monadire has around 300-400 members, although Kvitsiani now claims the group has over 1,000 members.
• Demand for Ministerial Rejection: Emzar Kvitsiani, leader of the Kodori-based paramilitary group Monadire, called on the Georgian Parliament not to approve Vano Merabishvili as Interior Minister and Irakli Okruashvili as Defense Minister. The Parliament is set to begin discussions on the reshuffled cabinet on July 24. Kvitsiani warned that if the two ministers are approved, there will be public protests demanding the dissolution of Parliament. (https://civil.ge/archives/111148)
  • Irony in Dialogue Request: In a phone interview, Kvitsiani ironically invited PM Zurab Nogaideli, MP Giga Bokeria, and State Minister Kakha Bendukidze to Kodori for discussions, asserting that their presence would bring peace to the region.
  • Previous Statements: Kvitsiani's initial defiance was prompted by alleged plans from Okruashvili to disarm the Monadire group, which had previously been part of the Defense Ministry but was disbanded in 2005.
• Official Reactions: PM Zurab Nogaideli dismissed Kvitsiani’s claims, stating he does not represent the local population. Influential MP Giga Bokeria acknowledged Kvitsiani as a threat but cautioned against overestimating the situation. (https://civil.ge/archives/111151
  • Potential Police Action: Burjanadze suggested a police operation might be necessary if tensions persist in Kodori, although Tbilisi is cautious about using force in this sensitive region.
  • Government Response Criticism: MP Nika Gvaramia criticized the government for not addressing Kvitsiani's alleged criminal ties earlier and emphasized that local clans in Kodori should exert pressure to stabilize the situation.
• Warning from Abkhaz Parliament Speaker: Nugzar Ashuba, Speaker of the breakaway Abkhaz Parliament, cautioned on July 24 that any Georgian police operation in the Kodori gorge against Emzar Kvitsiani could result in "negative consequences." Ashuba emphasized that any operations near the border with Abkhazia would provoke "unpredictable negative consequences." (https://civil.ge/archives/111143)
• Increase in Unauthorized Flights: The South Ossetian Press and Information Committee reported a significant rise in unauthorized flights of Georgian military planes and helicopters over the South Ossetian conflict zone in the past two days. On July 24, a military helicopter was observed flying towards Java, a town in the northern part of breakaway South Ossetia. This helicopter was followed by up to seven planes also heading in the direction of Java. Russian peacekeeping posts in Eredvi and Pauk reported sightings of military planes and three helicopters flying over the conflict zone during the early hours of July 23. (https://civil.ge/archives/111152)
• Abkhaz Leader's Warning: Sergey Bagapsh, leader of breakaway Abkhazia, stated that Georgia would violate the 1994 Moscow cease-fire agreement if it sends troops to Kodori gorge, warning of an escalation of tensions in the region. (https://civil.ge/archives/111154)
• Georgia's Request to OSCE: Georgian Foreign Minister Gela Bezhuashvili urged the OSCE to increase the number of its observers in South Ossetia and expand their activities to cover the entire region, including the Roki Tunnel, which connects South Ossetia with Russia's North Ossetian Republic. (https://civil.ge/archives/111155)
  • Bezhuashvili highlighted the importance of controlling the Russian-Georgian border, particularly the Roki Tunnel, to prevent the flow of weapons from Russia into South Ossetia.
  • The United States has also called for the OSCE to expand its presence in South Ossetia, a move that Russia is expected to oppose.
• Saakashvili ruled out any discussions with Kvitsiani unless the warlord surrenders his arms. He said the only matter to discuss would be the type of prison cells for Kvitsiani and his group. Saakashvili used strong language to emphasize his determination, warning that anyone who betrays Georgia or threatens its unity will face severe consequences. He accused Kvitsiani's group of criminal activities, claiming they had robbed and killed Georgian IDPs (internally displaced persons) during the 1993 conflict in Abkhazia. (https://civil.ge/archives/111156)
  • Saakashvili's comments coincided with reports that the Georgian Defense Ministry had sent additional troops to western Georgia and heightened security in regions near Abkhazia, where Kodori gorge is located.
• On July 24, influential MP Givi Targamadze, chair of the parliamentary committee for defense and security, stated that Emzar Kvitsiani, the defiant Kodori-based warlord, leads a well-equipped paramilitary group that was armed by Russia. Targamadze assured that relevant authorities are working on resolving the issue, expressing confidence that the Kvitsiani problem will be solved soon and effectively. (https://civil.ge/archives/111157)
• On July 24, Russian peacekeeping forces reportedly detained a convoy of Georgian servicemen in the Abkhaz conflict zone. The convoy included two light armored vehicles and two other vehicles carrying around ten Georgian servicemen from the Defense and Interior Ministries. The detainment occurred in the security zone near the village of Khudon in Georgia's Tsalenjikha district. (https://civil.ge/archives/111159
• On July 25, Georgian Defense Minister Irakli Okruashvili and Interior Minister Vano Merabishvili were reported to be in Mestia, a mountainous region in western Georgia near breakaway Abkhazia. Media outlets, including Rustavi 2, Imedi, and Public TV, reported that units of Interior and Defense Ministry forces were deployed in the area. (https://civil.ge/archives/114941)
  • There were also reports of media restrictions, with Imedi TV claiming that law enforcement officers barred their crew from filming and confiscated recordings. This situation further emphasizes the tense and uncertain atmosphere surrounding the government's response to Kvitsiani's defiance.
• On July 25, reports surfaced of a military convoy from Georgia moving towards the Kodori Gorge in breakaway Abkhazia, a tense and strategically significant region. The convoy, which included 30 Kamaz-type trucks, 18 Niva off-road vehicles, and two armored vehicles, was reportedly heading into the gorge, according to Anatoly Zaitsev, the chief of staff of Abkhazia's armed forces. In response, Abkhaz troops were placed on high alert. (https://civil.ge/archives/114943)
  • The Georgian government's move has sparked concerns and condemnations from Abkhaz officials, who view the convoy as a violation of the 1994 Moscow ceasefire agreement, which stipulates that Georgian troops should be kept outside Abkhazia’s boundaries. A statement from the Abkhaz Foreign Ministry denounced the deployment, calling it a breach of the agreement.
  • Georgian media reports that Defense Minister Irakli Okruashvili and Interior Minister Vano Merabishvili are in Kodori Gorge to meet with local leaders, including the influential Council of Elders.
• On July 25, Georgian Parliamentary Chairperson Nino Burjanadze called on Emzar Kvitsiani, the Kodori-based warlord, and his militia to surrender their arms and stop defying the central authorities. Addressing the situation in Kodori Gorge, Burjanadze urged Kvitsiani and his supporters to cease opposing their own country and people. (https://civil.ge/archives/114944)
• Georgian authorities have declined to comment, but it is believed that 500 troops from both the Interior Ministry and Defense Ministry have been deployed to the area. Access to Kodori is now heavily restricted, and phone communication with the area was cut on July 25. (https://civil.ge/archives/114945)
  • In Tbilisi, Parliamentary Chairperson Nino Burjanadze held talks with representatives of the Kodori and Svaneti communities, discussing the tense situation. The meeting became heated as Svan leaders urged the government to negotiate with Kvitsiani rather than resort to force, but President Mikheil Saakashvili reiterated his firm stance, ruling out negotiations unless the militia surrendered their arms.
• On July 25, the Russian Foreign Ministry issued a strong statement regarding the tense situation in Kodori Gorge, accusing Georgia of violating the 1994 Moscow Agreement on ceasefire and the separation of forces. (https://civil.ge/archives/114947)
• On July 25, Georgian Foreign Minister Gela Bezhuashvili addressed the escalating situation in Kodori Gorge, denying reports that the Georgian Defense Ministry had deployed troops to the area. He emphasized that the Interior Ministry's forces were the only units present near Kodori, where Emzar Kvitsiani and his paramilitary group operate. Bezhuashvili categorically ruled out any military operations or actions on territory controlled by the Abkhaz secessionist authorities, stating, "I want to categorically rule out any military operation [in the Kodori gorge]." (https://civil.ge/archives/114950)
• Amid rising tensions, reports emerged that members of the Kodori Gorge council of elders were negotiating with both Kvitsiani and Georgian officials, seeking a peaceful resolution after Kvitsiani's defiance of central authorities on July 22. The council aims to convince Kvitsiani to leave the gorge temporarily, while he is pressing for the legalization of his militia, Monadire (Hunter), which had been disbanded in 2005. Georgian officials, however, are unwilling to negotiate directly with Kvitsiani, labeling him a "betrayer." (https://civil.ge/archives/114951)
• On July 25 evening, gunfire was reported in Kodori Gorge, with the Georgian news agency InterPressNews confirming the sound of shots, while Russian television cited the Russian peacekeeping command in Abkhazia, indicating a shootout near the village of Omarishara. (https://civil.ge/archives/114948)
  • However, Irakli Batiashvili, a member of the Forward Georgia opposition party, reported receiving a call from Kvitsiani, who claimed clashes had erupted with Interior and Defense Ministry forces near Sakeni village in the gorge.
  • Unconfirmed reports from Rustavi 2 television suggested that Kvitsiani may have fled to Sokhumi, the capital of the breakaway region of Abkhazia.
• Education Minister Kakha Lomaia announced in the evening during an interview that a police operation is currently taking place in Kodori Gorge, aimed at addressing the situation involving the rebellious paramilitary group Monadire (Hunter), led by warlord Emzar Kvitsiani. (https://civil.ge/archives/114953)
• In a notable development, the Interior Ministry released a recording of a phone conversation between Kvitsiani and Irakli Batiashvili of the opposition Forward Georgia party. In this conversation, Kvitsiani claimed that the Deputy Defense Minister of Abkhazia, Gari Kupalba, offered assistance from Abkhaz fighters to resist government forces. However, Batiashvili later stated that the recording had been edited and was missing Kvitsiani’s assertion that he declined Kupalba’s offer. (https://civil.ge/archives/114954)
• At least four people have been injured in an ongoing police operation aimed at disarming rebel warlord Emzar Kvitsiani and his militia in upper Kodori gorge, which is located in breakaway Abkhazia. This information was reported by various Georgian media sources early on July 26. Meanwhile, Russian news agencies, citing the Russian peacekeeping command in the Abkhaz conflict zone, reported that Georgia has sent additional troops—approximately 300—to Kodori gorge. (https://civil.ge/archives/114957)
• An official report stated late on July 25 that government forces had successfully disarmed a 60-member unit of the militia. The report also noted that the rebels blew up one of the bridges in the gorge. (https://civil.ge/archives/114958)
  • Conflicting reports about the whereabouts of Emzar Kvitsiani were circulating late on July 25, with Rustavi 2 reporting that he had fled to Sokhumi, the capital of Abkhazia, though this has not been confirmed. Additionally, early on July 26, Rustavi 2 mentioned that a group of militia members from the North Caucasus had arrived in the gorge to support Kvitsiani’s forces, but no independent confirmation of this report is available.
• The Georgian authorities have issued a call for local civilians to evacuate areas in Kodori Gorge where rebel militiamen are concentrated. Giorgi Arveladze, the chief of the Georgian President’s Administration, stated on July 26 that it has become increasingly difficult to differentiate between local civilians and militia members amid the ongoing police operation. (https://civil.ge/archives/114959)
• Current Situation: An Abkhaz source reported calm in upper Kodori Gorge, where Georgian police forces are conducting checks in Azhara and Gentsvishi villages. The report indicates that Kvitsiani’s militiamen have ceased resistance and dispersed into the forest. Georgian police are reportedly conducting house-to-house searches in some villages of Kodori Gorge, although this information has not been independently confirmed. (https://civil.ge/archives/114960)
• Warning from Abkhaz Leadership: Sergey Bagapsh, the Abkhaz leader, issued a stern warning on July 26, stating that Abkhaz forces will open fire if Georgian troops enter even "one meter" into Abkhaz-controlled territory. Reports from Abkhaz media indicate that Abkhaz troops are currently concentrated near the Kodori Gorge, suggesting a heightened military presence in the area. (https://civil.ge/archives/114967)
• Police Presence to Continue: Influential parliamentarian Giga Bokeria announced that Georgian police forces will remain in upper Kodori Gorge to maintain order even after the current operation to clear the area of the rebel militia group Monadire is completed. Georgian officials assert that the 1994 Moscow agreement on cease-fire and separation of forces prohibits the deployment of armed forces in Kodori but does not extend to police forces. (https://civil.ge/archives/114973)
• Attempted Escape: Rebel warlord Emzar Kvitsiani attempted to break through a government siege to escape into Abkhaz-controlled territory but was thwarted as government forces maintain control of the area. As of late July 26, shootouts in the gorge had ceased, and no significant changes in the situation were anticipated overnight. (https://civil.ge/archives/114974)
  • Government Control: Most villages in upper Kodori Gorge are now under government control, including Sakeni, Zemo and Kvemo Omarishara, Gentsvisi, and Chkhalta, which was previously a stronghold of Kvitsiani's militia.
• Charges Filed: Emzar Kvitsiani has been charged by the Georgian General Prosecutor's Office for illegal possession of arms and forming an illegal armed group. (https://civil.ge/archives/114964)
• Officials confirmed the death of one civilian due to a bomb attack carried out by army helicopters on the village of Chkhalta, where rebel warlord Emzar Kvitsiani and his militia were located. Emzar Kvitsiani managed to escape the village, and law enforcement agencies are actively trying to locate him.
  • Weapons Seized: A significant quantity of weapons has been confiscated, including IGLA and STRELA anti-aircraft missile systems. Several militia members have been captured, with most surrendering their arms during the operation.
• The Georgian Interior Ministry announced on July 27 that it is offering GEL 100 000 (about USD 56 000) as a reward for valuable information leading to the capture of warlord Emzar Kvitsiani. (https://civil.ge/archives/114983)
• The ruling National Movement party accused opposition parties of failing to support the government during a critical period, following the defiance of Emzar Kvitsiani and his militia. Most opposition parties condemned Kvitsiani's actions but urged the government to avoid using force in the sensitive Kodori Gorge area, which is near breakaway Abkhazia. MP Davit Gamkrelidze, leader of the New Rights party, advocated for the legalization of the Monadire militia by incorporating it into the Defense Ministry, opposing military action against them. MP Zurab Tkemaladze from the Industrialists party expressed his opposition to military actions while acknowledging that armed disobedience is unacceptable. The Republican opposition party condemned Kvitsiani but blamed the situation on the government's "irrational policy." Shalva Natelashvili, leader of the Labor Party, accused the government of committing "genocide" against the Georgian population in Kodori Gorge. On July 27, seven opposition parties issued a joint statement criticizing the government's response and labeling it as an "adventure" that provoked a large-scale armed operation. (https://civil.ge/archives/114985)
• Interior Minister's Statement: Georgian Interior Minister Vano Merabishvili suggested that rebel warlord Emzar Kvitsiani may have escaped into Abkhaz-controlled territory. He mentioned that sources indicated Kvitsiani might have left the Kodori area two days prior, although this information had not been confirmed. (https://civil.ge/archives/114987)
  • Interview Broadcast: Russian Public Television (ORT) aired an interview with Kvitsiani, purportedly recorded on July 27. In the interview, Kvitsiani challenged Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili to come and talk with him, stating, “but he will never dare.”
• 27 July: Establishment of Abkhaz Government-in-Exile: Saakashvili declared that the Abkhaz government-in-exile, currently operating from Tbilisi, will be relocated to the Georgian-administered upper Kodori Gorge. He emphasized that this area would serve as "Abkhazia's temporary and legitimate administrative center." (https://civil.ge/archives/114988)
  • The president stated that the newly established government-in-exile would exercise "full jurisdiction" and "full control" over the Kodori territory, marking a significant assertion of Georgian authority in the region.
  • He criticized the idea of having the Abkhaz government-in-exile based in Tbilisi, stating that it was more appropriate for it to operate from within Abkhazia, specifically from Kodori.
• Operation Success: Saakashvili emphasized that the operation had successfully cleared the gorge of "bandits" who had terrorized the local population for years. He noted the strategic importance of the Kodori Gorge, situated close to Sokhumi, the capital of Abkhazia. (https://civil.ge/archives/114989)
  • The president described Kvitsiani's actions as a serious challenge to the state, prompting the deployment of special forces. He acknowledged that the failure to address the situation earlier was a mistake but praised the professionalism of the Georgian troops, who worked to minimize civilian casualties.
  • Saakashvili criticized certain media outlets for irresponsible reporting, which he claimed compromised the safety of government forces by revealing troop movements and operational details.
  • He suggested that Kvitsiani's defiance was part of a broader series of provocations against Georgia, potentially linked to external pressures and coinciding with recent parliamentary decisions regarding Russian peacekeeping forces in conflict zones.
  • Humanitarian Aid and Rehabilitation: The president ordered immediate humanitarian assistance for the residents of Kodori and plans for the rehabilitation of infrastructure, including roads and an airfield, to improve access to the gorge.
• The decision by Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili to relocate the Abkhaz government-in-exile to the upper Kodori Gorge has drawn strong condemnation from the authorities in breakaway Abkhazia. Sergey Shamba, the Foreign Minister of Abkhazia, stated that they have prepared a special statement asserting their right to take any necessary action to prevent the establishment of this government in the region. Shamba emphasized that the Abkhaz leadership reserves the right to use "any means" to counter Tbilisi's plans. This reflects the heightened tensions surrounding the issue, as the move by the Georgian authorities is seen as a direct challenge to Abkhaz sovereignty. (https://civil.ge/archives/114991)
• Threat of Action: Bagapsh stated that he does not rule out using "all means, including diplomatic and military" to prevent the establishment of the Abkhaz government-in-exile in Kodori Gorge. This stark warning underscores the seriousness of the Abkhaz authorities' opposition to the Georgian government's actions. (https://civil.ge/archives/114993
  • Discussion on Diplomatic Relations: He indicated that the Abkhaz government would be discussing the suspension of any ongoing talks with Georgia, asserting that Georgia is violating previously reached agreements. This could lead to a further breakdown in communication and potential escalation of conflict.
• The refusal of Abkhaz negotiators to participate in the weekly "Chuburkhinji sessions" marks a significant escalation in the already fraught relations between Tbilisi and the breakaway region of Abkhazia. This decision follows President Saakashvili's announcement to establish the Abkhaz government-in-exile in the strategically important upper Kodori Gorge, which has drawn sharp condemnation from the Abkhaz leadership. (https://civil.ge/archives/114996)
  • Refusal to Engage: The Abkhaz side, represented by Ruslan Kishmaria, chief of the Gali district administration, announced that they would not hold talks with Georgian representatives, specifically citing the inclusion of members from the Tbilisi-based Abkhaz government-in-exile as a reason. This refusal highlights the Abkhaz authorities' rejection of Tbilisi's claim to legitimate governance in the region.
  • Chuburkhinji Sessions: These sessions have historically included representatives from Georgia, Abkhazia, Russian peacekeepers, and UN observers to address ongoing issues in the conflict zone. The Abkhaz decision to boycott these talks underscores a breakdown in dialogue, which could further complicate conflict resolution efforts.
  • Georgian Readiness: Despite the Abkhaz refusal, President Saakashvili stated on July 27 that Georgia is prepared to actively participate in the Chuburkhinji sessions. This willingness contrasts sharply with the Abkhaz stance, indicating a significant rift between the two sides.
• Foothold for Military Action: Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman Mikhail Kaminin expressed fears that Georgia may use the upper Kodori Gorge as a base for a military solution to the ongoing Georgian-Abkhaz conflict. This assertion reflects Russia's longstanding concerns about Georgia's military intentions in areas close to the conflict zone. (https://civil.ge/archives/115002)
  • Denial of Violations: The Georgian Foreign Ministry has countered the claims made by Russia, stating that the operations carried out in the gorge were a police operation aimed at dismantling criminal gangs led by warlord Emzar Kvitsiani, rather than a military campaign against Abkhaz forces. Georgia insists that it is operating within the bounds of the Moscow agreement.
  • Support from the UN Security Council: Georgian envoy to the UN, Irakli Alasania, reported that the Security Council discussed the situation in Kodori Gorge and showed understanding toward Georgia's police operation aimed at restoring order in the region. This suggests a level of international support for Georgia's actions, countering Russia's accusations.
• The Georgian government has established its official representation in the upper Kodori Gorge, marking a departure from the 13-year status quo where Tbilisi had nominal authority over this strategically significant area. (https://civil.ge/archives/115003)
• Anatoly Chaban, the Commander of Russian peacekeeping troops in the Abkhazia conflict zone, reported on July 29 that Georgia has begun the process of withdrawing its troops from upper Kodori Gorge. Chaban noted that 21 military vehicles had been observed leaving the gorge towards Zugdidi, which is located in the Samegrelo region, just across the administrative border from Abkhazia. (https://civil.ge/archives/115006)
  • Despite the initial signs of withdrawal, Chaban highlighted that a significant number of Georgian military vehicles, specifically 112, remain stationed in the gorge. This suggests that the withdrawal process may not be fully realized and will likely continue.
  • Chaban made these remarks after participating in a quadripartite meeting in Chuburkhinji, which included representatives from Georgia, Abkhazia, Russian peacekeepers, and UN observers. This forum is crucial for discussing the security situation and coordinating responses among the involved parties.
• Batiashvili has been charged with plotting a coup in collusion with rebel warlord Emzar Kvitsiani, who recently announced defiance against the Georgian government. Deputy General Prosecutor Kakha Koberidze stated that Batiashvili provided recommendations and instructions to Kvitsiani and failed to report that Gari Kupalba, the Deputy Defense Minister of breakaway Abkhazia, was offering military support to Kvitsiani. Batiashvili has denied the charges, claiming they are politically motivated. Supporters from Forward Georgia have echoed these sentiments, suggesting that his arrest is a means of silencing opposition voices. (https://civil.ge/archives/115007)
  • The Interior Ministry has released a recorded phone conversation between Batiashvili and Kvitsiani from July 26. In this conversation, Kvitsiani mentions Kupalba’s offer of assistance with Abkhaz fighters to counter Georgian government troops. Batiashvili has contested the integrity of the recording, arguing that it was edited and omits crucial context where Kvitsiani allegedly declines Kupalba’s offer. Notably, Batiashvili also encouraged Kvitsiani during the call, telling him to “stand firm.”
• On July 30, the Tbilisi City Court ordered Irakli Batiashvili, a member of the opposition Forward Georgia party, to undergo two months of pre-trial detention. This decision follows his arrest on July 29 in connection with allegations of involvement in a coup attempt orchestrated by rebel warlord Emzar Kvitsiani. (https://civil.ge/archives/115009)
  • Prosecutors allege that Batiashvili “gave recommendations and instructions” to Kvitsiani, facilitating a plot against the Georgian government. Batiashvili has categorically denied these charges, labeling his arrest as a politically motivated maneuver aimed at silencing opposition.
  • Batiashvili's attorney has argued that the evidence presented by the prosecution—specifically a tapped phone conversation between Batiashvili and Kvitsiani—does not substantiate the claims of a coup plot. The defense emphasizes that the conversation lacks context and fails to confirm any actual plotting by Kvitsiani.
  • Zviad Dzidziguri, an MP from the Conservative Party, suggested that the arrest was intended to terrorize dissenters. Davit Berdzenishvili, a member of the Republican Party, echoed this sentiment, expressing skepticism about the legality of the arrest given the lack of substantive evidence
• On July 29, Georgian Interior Minister Vano Merabishvili informed President Saakashvili that the wanted warlord Emzar Kvitsiani is believed to be in Russia. Merabishvili's comments indicated a concern that Kvitsiani, along with other exiled Georgian figures, might be part of a broader provocative agenda by foreign states. (https://civil.ge/archives/115010)
  • President Saakashvili expressed bewilderment over Russia's alleged support for figures like Kvitsiani, whom he referred to as "political corpses." He questioned why Russia would harbor such individuals and suggested that their presence could lead to provocations against Georgia.
  • In response to the allegations, the Russian Embassy in Tbilisi denied having any information regarding Kvitsiani's presence in Russia. They reiterated that they had received no credible intelligence from the Georgian side concerning Kvitsiani's whereabouts.
  • Contradicting Merabishvili's assertion, Giorgi Arveladze, the chief of the Georgian President's Administration, claimed on July 28 that Kvitsiani was in Sokhumi, the capital of the breakaway region of Abkhazia. This inconsistency highlights the confusion and complexity surrounding the situation.
• On July 29, Nora Kvitsiani, the sister of Emzar Kvitsiani, was arrested and subsequently sentenced to a two-month pretrial detention by the Tbilisi City Court on July 30. She faces charges related to her alleged involvement in illegal armed formations and the illegal purchase and possession of weapons. Nora Kvitsiani has denied the accusations against her, which could indicate that her legal defense may focus on challenging the evidence presented by the prosecution. Emzar Kvitsiani, along with his nephew Bacho Argvliani (Nora's son), is currently wanted by Georgian law enforcement authorities. Officials believe that Emzar Kvitsiani is likely in Russia, further complicating efforts to apprehend him. Bacho Argvliani is believed to be hiding in the forests of the Kodori Gorge, which has historically been a stronghold for ethnic Georgians in the Abkhazia region. This area has been a focal point of conflict and instability in Georgia. (https://civil.ge/archives/115011)
• Okruashvili expressed that Tbilisi is willing to allow international monitoring of upper Kodori Gorge. However, this is contingent upon an independent international inspection of the Gudauta military base in breakaway Abkhazia first. This condition underscores Georgia's desire to ensure that Russian military activities are transparent and in compliance with international agreements. (https://civil.ge/archives/115020
• The Russian Foreign Ministry warned of "dangerous developments" in the Kodori Gorge, accusing Georgia of violating the 1994 ceasefire by conducting a military operation disguised as a police action and planning to station the Abkhaz government-in-exile there, which could escalate tensions further. (https://civil.ge/archives/115005)
• Abkhaz leader Sergey Bagapsh warned that Georgia's refusal to allow monitoring in Kodori Gorge suggests preparations for war. Russian Defense Minister Sergey Ivanov called for an inspection of the Georgian police forces stationed in Kodori Gorge, citing a violation of the 1994 Moscow agreement. (https://civil.ge/archives/115023)
• Tbilisi is using the monitoring of upper Kodori Gorge as leverage to push for an international inspection of the Gudauta military base in Abkhazia. Georgian Defense Minister Okruashvili stated that monitoring in Kodori will only resume after Gudauta base is inspected by an independent international party. Georgia wants regular international inspections at Gudauta and the destruction of the airfield, while Russia insists on a one-time inspection. Abkhazia’s Foreign Minister Shamba rejected the linkage between Kodori monitoring and Gudauta inspections, calling it legally groundless. Abkhaz Defense Minister Sosnaliev accused Georgia of deploying 500 troops to Kodori and announced measures in response. (https://civil.ge/archives/115025)
• The Georigan MFA also expressed readiness for direct, result-oriented dialogue with Abkhazia to establish a new framework for conflict resolution. (https://civil.ge/archives/115028)
• The Georgian-Abkhaz Coordinating Council meeting scheduled for August 2 was canceled due to Abkhaz refusal to participate, citing issues with the Georgian delegation. Previously, on July 28, Abkhaz negotiators boycotted talks due to the presence of Tbilisi-based Abkhaz government-in-exile representatives. (https://civil.ge/archives/115030)
  • Abkhaz Foreign Minister Sergey Shamba blamed Tbilisi for thwarting the August 2 Georgian-Abkhaz Coordinating Council talks due to a last-minute change in the Georgian delegation. Abkhazia proposed holding the session with just Antadze and Irakli Alasania, but Georgia rejected this offer. The new Georgian delegation members included displaced persons from Abkhazia, raising concerns that they might represent the Tbilisi-based Abkhaz government-in-exile, which Abkhazia opposes. (https://civil.ge/archives/115027)
• Georgian Foreign Minister Gela Bezhuashvili stated in an interview that Russia has "exhausted its role as mediator" in Georgia's secessionist conflicts and emphasized that Georgia will adhere to the 1994 Moscow agreement unless it is revised. (https://civil.ge/archives/115042)
  • Additionally, he mentioned that First Deputy Foreign Minister Valery Chechelashvili will handle talks with Russia, with Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Andrey Denisov expected to visit Georgia in September. (August 2006)
• 4 August: The Abkhaz Defense Ministry reported at least 10 casualties from clashes between Georgian troops and rebel militia in upper Kodori Gorge over the past two days, with a recent shootout occurring near the village of Azhara. Georgian media indicated the discovery of an abandoned militia camp in upper Kodori Gorge but reported no ongoing clashes. (https://civil.ge/archives/115045)
  • A group of approximately 15 rebel militia members escaped into Abkhaz-controlled territory from upper Kodori Gorge, as reported by Rustavi 2 television on August 4. Bacho Argvliani, the nephew of wanted warlord Emzar Kvitsiani, was reportedly among those who escaped. Georgian officials claim Kvitsiani is currently in Russia, a statement that Moscow has denied. (https://civil.ge/archives/115052)
• Georgia protested a flight by a Russian Mi-24 assault helicopter over its Interior Ministry checkpoints in upper Kodori Gorge on August 4, claiming it dropped anti-heat seeking missiles. In response, Sergey Chaban, commander of the Russian peacekeeping troops in Abkhazia, stated that the helicopter's flight was legal and merely transported officers to checkpoints in lower Kodori Gorge. (https://civil.ge/archives/115047)
• On August 7, 2006, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Grigory Karasin met with Abkhaz leader Sergey Bagapsh and Foreign Minister Sergey Shamba in Sokhumi (https://civil.ge/archives/115066)
• On August 8, 2006, Sergey Shamba, the Foreign Minister of breakaway Abkhazia, expressed serious concerns regarding the potential for renewed hostilities with Georgia. Shamba indicated that the ongoing tensions and perceived threats from Georgia have prompted Sokhumi to prepare for potential military confrontations. He stated, "We are getting ready for war because we feel a constant threat." Shamba mentioned ongoing consultations with Russian officials regarding security guarantees for Abkhazia, underscoring the region's reliance on Russian support. He pointed out that most residents of Abkhazia hold Russian passports, implying a need for protection from perceived threats. (https://civil.ge/archives/115068)
• Military Presence: Okruashvili asserted that Georgia has the right to maintain a restricted number of arms in upper Kodori Gorge, claiming this does not violate the 1994 Moscow cease-fire agreement. This statement reflects Georgia's commitment to its security and its stance on the ongoing tensions in the region.
  • Russian Role in Monitoring: He criticized the idea of Russian helicopters being involved in monitoring operations, stating that "Russians will have a nominal role" and that Georgia would set the provisions for any monitoring efforts. (https://civil.ge/archives/115070)
• On August 9, 2006, Georgian Foreign Minister Gela Bezhuashvili announced that UN observers would be able to begin monitoring the upper Kodori Gorge starting August 20. While expressing readiness to allow UN monitoring in the upper gorge, Bezhuashvili insisted on the necessity for monitoring in lower Kodori Gorge, which is under the control of Abkhaz secessionist authorities. This demand highlights Georgia's concerns about the overall security situation and its desire for comprehensive oversight. (https://civil.ge/archives/115077)
• On August 9, 2006, in a notable development regarding the ongoing tensions in the Kodori Gorge, Abkhazia's Foreign Minister Sergey Shamba announced a potential offer for demilitarization in the area. Shamba indicated that the Abkhaz side is willing to withdraw its troops from the lower Kodori Gorge, but only if Georgia agrees to pull back its forces from the upper gorge. This proposal is framed as a reciprocal measure aimed at reducing military presence in the conflict zone. (https://civil.ge/archives/115080)
• On August 10, 2006, the Russian Foreign Ministry expressed support for establishing a UN human rights office in the Gali district of Abkhazia, which is predominantly inhabited by ethnic Georgians. (https://civil.ge/archives/115082)
  • Russian Support for Human Rights Office: During his visit to Abkhazia on August 7-8, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Gregory Karasin urged the Abkhaz authorities to consider the international community’s perspective on the necessity of opening a UN human rights office in Gali. This office would be responsible for monitoring human rights conditions, particularly for the local Georgian population.
  • Past Opposition from Abkhaz Authorities: Historically, the Abkhaz authorities have opposed Georgia’s calls for a UN human rights office in Gali, viewing it as an infringement on their sovereignty. The proposed office would likely monitor the treatment of ethnic Georgians in the area, a point of contention in the broader conflict between Georgia and Abkhazia.
• On August 10, 2006, tensions escalated between Tbilisi and Sokhumi regarding the composition of the monitoring team for upper Kodori Gorge. Disagreement on Monitoring Team Composition: The Abkhaz representative, Ruslan Kishmaria, announced that the Georgian side opposes the inclusion of Abkhaz military observers in the monitoring group for upper Kodori Gorge. Instead, Tbilisi is advocating for the inclusion of Georgian military observers in the team. This disagreement underscores the lack of trust between the two sides and complicates the monitoring efforts. (https://civil.ge/archives/115084)
  • Quadripartite Meeting: The issue was discussed during a quadripartite meeting held in Chuburkhinji, a village within the Gali district of Abkhazia. However, Temur Gabisonia, a member of the Georgian negotiating team, claimed that the topic was not addressed in the session. He suggested that decisions regarding the Kodori Gorge monitoring should be made by higher-level officials, highlighting a potential disconnect between the representatives of both sides.
  • August 11: Rejection of Russian Involvement: The Georgian Foreign Ministry firmly stated that it considers any participation of Russian peacekeepers in the monitoring process of upper Kodori Gorge unacceptable. This stance is rooted in deep-seated distrust towards Russian peacekeepers among the Georgian population, especially in areas with significant ethnic Georgian communities, such as Abkhazia.Simultaneous Monitoring Demand: Georgia is demanding that monitoring also include the lower part of Kodori Gorge, which is controlled by the Abkhaz separatist authorities. The Ministry argued that this requirement is backed by the same legal agreement that governs ceasefire and separation of forces. (https://civil.ge/archives/115088)
• 31 August: Condition for Resuming Talks: Sokhumi (the capital of Abkhazia) will only resume negotiations with Tbilisi if Georgian troops are withdrawn from upper Kodori Gorge. This condition is based on commitments under the 1994 agreement prohibiting military presence in that area. UN Secretary General’s Special Representative to Georgia, Jean Arnault, recently suggested that talks could be held between Abkhaz officials and Georgian State Minister for Conflict Resolution Issues, Merab Antadze, in September. (https://civil.ge/archives/115211)
• 1 September: Baghapsh visits Moscow and states that Abkhazia would pull out of talks with Georgia if Georgian forces do not withdraw from the upper Kodori Gorge, reverting to pre-July conditions. (https://civil.ge/archives/115218)
• Attack on Abkhaz Checkpoint: The Abkhaz news agency Apsnipress reported that an Abkhaz checkpoint in Adanga Pass, lower Kodori Gorge, was attacked by gunfire on the night of September 1. Abkhaz troops responded with return fire, although no casualties were reported. The Abkhaz Defense Ministry blamed the incident on Georgian provocations, accusing Georgian forces of undermining peace in the Kodori Gorge and escalating tensions. (https://civil.ge/archives/115222)
• Abkhaz troops are scheduled to conduct large-scale military exercises from September 24-27. The maneuvers will involve approximately 3,000 servicemen, including reserve troops. Gari Kupalba, Deputy Defense Minister of the unrecognized republic, indicated that shooting training will take place in the lower Kodori Gorge, which is under Abkhaz administration. (https://civil.ge/archives/115254)
• The Russian Foreign Ministry criticized Georgia on September 7 for its military operations in upper Kodori Gorge, stating that these actions have led to a deadlock in the Abkhaz conflict resolution process. Georgia conducted what it termed a "police operation" in late July to address local rebel militias, which Russia claims has hindered the activities of the Georgian-Abkhaz Coordinating Council aimed at facilitating dialogue. Moscow also condemned Georgia's plans to relocate the headquarters of the Abkhaz government-in-exile to Kodori Gorge, arguing that it undermines the authority of the elected Abkhaz government and could exacerbate tensions. Additionally, Russia opposed Tbilisi's initiative to convene an international conference for funding Kodori's rehabilitation and called for the withdrawal of Georgian troops, advocating instead for monitoring by UN observers and Russian peacekeepers. Tbilisi has agreed only to UN oversight, and Russia plans to address the monitoring issue at an upcoming UN Security Council session. (https://civil.ge/archives/115265)
• On September 9, Georgian State Minister for Conflict Resolution Issues Merab Antadze met with Sergey Shamba, the Foreign Minister of breakaway Abkhazia, in Sokhumi to discuss the possibility of resuming meetings under the Georgian-Abkhaz Coordinating Council. The council's session originally scheduled for August 2 was canceled due to the Abkhaz side's refusal to participate, primarily demanding the withdrawal of Georgian troops from the upper Kodori Gorge. During their talks, the Georgian delegation reaffirmed its commitment to a peaceful dialogue and urged the Abkhaz representatives to resist any Russian provocations that might heighten tensions and destabilize the region. (https://civil.ge/archives/115293)
• 11 September: Emzar Kvitsiani, a wanted warlord, has issued a video threat to initiate partisan warfare against Georgian governmental forces in the Kodori Gorge, urging locals to evacuate women and children. His message was aired on Tbilisi-based Imedi television after being anonymously delivered to the station. In the video, Kvitsiani, dressed in camouflage, demands the immediate release of his sister Nora and several co-fighters arrested following the Georgian military's takeover of the gorge in late July. He declared an intention to target Georgian army helicopters and police, asserting that the Georgian authorities' violent actions would lead to bloodshed. Kvitsiani claimed to have received numerous offers of support, including from groups in the North Caucasus. He has been on the run since the Georgian Interior Ministry announced a GEL 100,000 reward for information leading to his capture, initially believed to be in Sokhumi before reports suggested he may have fled to Russia. (https://civil.ge/archives/115295)
  • On September 11, Georgian Prime Minister Zurab Nogaideli responded to threats made by wanted warlord Emzar Kvitsiani regarding his intentions to launch partisan warfare against government troops in the Kodori Gorge, dismissing them as just another set of threats that Kvitsiani has made multiple times before. Nogaideli emphasized that significant reconstruction efforts and investment programs are currently underway in the gorge, and he mentioned plans for the Abkhaz government-in-exile to establish itself in the area soon. When questioned about Kvitsiani's whereabouts, the Prime Minister declined to provide any information, stating, "even if I had information about this, I would not tell you about it." (https://civil.ge/archives/185595)
• On September 20, the Georgian daily *Rezonansi* reported that a clash in the upper Kodori Gorge resulted in the injury of one police officer during an encounter with armed rebels. This incident follows threats from wanted rebel warlord Emzar Kvitsiani, who had warned of potential guerrilla warfare against government forces in the area. Deputy Interior Minister Levan Gvazava confirmed the armed confrontation, stating it was between Georgian police and Abkhazian criminal gangs rather than involving Kvitsiani's forces. (https://civil.ge/archives/115373)
• The breakaway Abkhaz Foreign Ministry stated on September 25, 2006, that Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili's recent UN speech signals Georgia’s intent to withdraw from the Georgian-Abkhaz peace negotiations. The Abkhaz authorities criticized Saakashvili for framing the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict as a Georgia-Russia issue, suggesting this narrative shifts blame for the early 1990s conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia onto Russia. They argued that Saakashvili’s approach reflects Georgia’s lack of readiness for peaceful coexistence with Abkhazia. The statement also emphasized that Russian peacekeeping forces remain the only effective guarantee against renewed hostilities in the region. (https://civil.ge/archives/115417)
• On September 27, 2006, Abkhaz leader Sergey Bagapsh accused the Georgian government of trying to provoke Abkhazia into taking "tough measures" in the Kodori Gorge by renaming it "Upper Abkhazia" and arranging a visit there for foreign diplomats. Bagapsh criticized these moves as provocations and argued that diplomats should honor the 1994 Moscow agreement by not recognizing the area as under Georgian administration. He warned that if diplomats engage directly with the Georgian-backed government-in-exile in Kodori rather than with Sokhumi, Abkhazia may reconsider its stance in ongoing negotiations. Bagapsh denounced the Tbilisi-based government-in-exile as illegitimate, describing Georgia's actions as an attempt to escalate tensions in the region. (https://civil.ge/archives/115424)
• On September 26, 2006, Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili announced that foreign diplomats visiting Sokhumi for talks on the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict will also be required to meet with the Tbilisi-backed Abkhaz government-in-exile, which is set to be based in the upper Kodori Gorge. Saakashvili emphasized the importance of this new protocol, seeing it as a strategic change to include the government-in-exile in diplomatic discussions. He praised the government-in-exile's chairman, Malkhaz Akishbaia, as a capable negotiator. In response, Abkhaz leader Sergey Bagapsh warned that if diplomats engage with what he called a "puppet government" in Kodori, Sokhumi may reconsider its participation in the current negotiation framework. (https://civil.ge/archives/115425)
• On September 26, 2006, Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili claimed that Emzar Kvitsiani, a wanted warlord, is currently hiding in Moscow and recording video messages from a studio there. Saakashvili referenced a video aired on Georgian television on September 10, in which Kvitsiani threatened to initiate partisan warfare against Georgian government forces in the Kodori Gorge. He expressed concern over Kvitsiani's statements, suggesting they could serve as a pretext for provocations by Russian authorities. Saakashvili assured the public that serious counter-intelligence efforts are underway to prevent any such provocations linked to Kvitsiani's activities in Moscow. (https://civil.ge/archives/115428)
• On September 27, 2006, Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili inaugurated the headquarters of the Abkhaz government-in-exile in the upper Kodori Gorge, designating it as "Upper Abkhazia" and a temporary administrative center with the intention of eventually returning to Sokhumi. This event coincided with the 13th anniversary of the expulsion of Georgian troops from Sokhumi, a date marked by the Abkhaz authorities. Saakashvili emphasized the area's significance under Georgian sovereignty and announced that foreign diplomats would be required to meet with the exiled government, which he aimed to legitimize. In response, Abkhaz leader Sergey Bagapsh dismissed Saakashvili's claims as foolish and warned of serious consequences if the exiled government was included in negotiations, asserting that such actions would undermine the peace process. (https://civil.ge/archives/115429)
• 2 October 2006: Georgia has agreed to allow Russian peacekeeping forces to join UN observers in monitoring the Tbilisi-administered upper Kodori Gorge, marking a shift from its earlier position that excluded Russian forces. This decision, announced by the Georgian State Minister for Conflict Resolution Issues, reflects Tbilisi's consideration of international opinions and the parties involved, and it expresses readiness to initiate relevant consultations promptly. (https://civil.ge/archives/115503)
• On February 16, 2007, the Georgian Oil and Gas Corporation (GOGC) announced that Azerbaijan would increase its gas supplies to Georgia from 1 million to 1.3 million cubic meters per day until April 1, at a rate of USD 120 per 1,000 cubic meters. This agreement was finalized during GOGC General Director Alexander Khetaguri's visit to Baku on February 15-16. The additional gas supply is sourced from Azerbaijan’s reserves outside the Shah-Deniz field. Since January 2007, Georgia had already received 30 million cubic meters of gas from Azerbaijan. (https://civil.ge/archives/111857)
• On March 20, 2007, Russia's state-owned Channel One aired a video message from the wanted warlord Emzar Kvitsiani, in which he demanded that Georgian authorities withdraw troops from the upper Kodori Gorge and release his sister, Nora Kvitsiani, along with several of his co-fighters. Kvitsiani threatened that failure to meet these demands would result in the Kodori Gorge being lost, and he placed the blame on U.S. President George Bush and Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili. He also called for the expulsion of Saakashvili from Georgia, urging his compatriots to unite against him. This was the third video message from Kvitsiani, following earlier threats and claims of responsibility for attacks in the region. (https://civil.ge/archives/112126)
• On August 2, 2007, Abkhaz authorities strongly condemned Georgia's decision to open a NATO Information Center branch in upper Kodori Gorge, calling it a provocative act. The Abkhaz Foreign Ministry issued a statement expressing concern over Georgia's military activities in the region, asserting that this move further confirmed Tbilisi's intentions to continue its military build-up in that area of Abkhazia. The NATO center, which was inaugurated on July 26, primarily aimed to facilitate public awareness campaigns and roundtable discussions about NATO and its activities. (https://civil.ge/archives/112794)

New Georgian policy towards South Ossetia

• 7 August: Several passenger buses have become trapped near the administrative border of breakaway South Ossetia after being barred from entering the capital, Tskhinvali, by the Georgian Financial Police. The affected passengers, primarily vendors returning from Tbilisi's outdoor market in Lilo, have been left stranded. The Georgian authorities cited efforts to combat smuggling as the reason for the bus stoppage, though no official statement has been released yet. In response, South Ossetian Interior Minister Mikhail Mindzaev condemned the action as "a provocation" and stated that the South Ossetian side would take "adequate measures" in response. (https://civil.ge/archives/115057)
  • Georgian law enforcement agencies have permitted several passenger buses to enter the breakaway South Ossetian capital, Tskhinvali, on August 7, after they had been trapped at the administrative border for a day. (https://civil.ge/archives/115058)
• On August 7, three Georgian policemen were injured in an attack by unidentified gunmen near the village of Avnevi, located in the South Ossetian conflict zone. (https://civil.ge/archives/115062)
  • Georgian Response: The Georgian State Minister's press office described the incident as a provocation aimed at escalating tensions and potentially involving Georgia in an armed confrontation. South Ossetian Response: In contrast, Tskhinvali accused the Georgian side of attempting to undermine the situation and obstruct ongoing negotiations. (https://civil.ge/archives/115059)
  • Reinforcement of Police: Merabishvili announced that the Georgian police presence in the village of Avnevi would be strengthened with the deployment of a special purpose unit to enhance security for local residents. Accusations Against Moscow: He attributed the attack to provocations orchestrated by Moscow, suggesting that such incidents were part of a broader strategy to escalate tensions in the region. Agreement on Deployment: Marat Kulakhmetov, Commander of the Joint Peacekeeping Forces, noted that both sides had agreed on the deployment of an additional 12 Georgian policemen to Avnevi. (https://civil.ge/archives/115063)
• On August 7, 2006, the Georgian Foreign Ministry issued a statement calling for a complete overhaul of the existing Russian-led negotiating and peacekeeping arrangements regarding the South Ossetian conflict. The Georgian Ministry asserted that the current Russian-led peacekeeping and negotiation formats have "exhausted their resources," indicating a lack of effectiveness in managing the conflict. Changes proposed include: Changing the current formats of negotiations and the Joint Peacekeeping Forces; Expanding the responsibilities of peacekeeping forces to cover the entire Tskhinvali region; Defining the status of the Tskhinvali region within Georgia while simultaneously focusing on the economic rehabilitation of the conflict zone. (https://civil.ge/archives/115067)
• On August 8, 2006, the Prime Minister of breakaway South Ossetia, Yuri Morozov, visited Vladikavkaz to discuss the integration process between South Ossetia and Russia’s North Ossetia. Morozov's visit highlights a notable boost in the integration efforts between South Ossetia and North Ossetia. The South Ossetian Press and Information Committee (PIC) reported that ministries and structures within South Ossetia are now operating in alignment with agreements made with their counterparts in North Ossetia. (https://civil.ge/archives/115072)
• On August 8, 2006, Merab Antadze, the Georgian State Minister for Conflict Resolution Issues, announced Georgia's intention to pursue revisions to the decade-old agreement that underpins the current Russian-led peacekeeping and negotiation framework for the South Ossetian conflict. (https://civil.ge/archives/115073)
  • Revision of the Dagomis Agreement: Antadze indicated that during the upcoming session of the Joint Control Commission (JCC), Georgia plans to formally propose amendments to the 1992 Dagomis Agreement. This agreement, also known as the Sochi Agreement, was established by then-Russian President Boris Yeltsin and then-Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze.
  • Joint Control Commission (JCC): The JCC was created to oversee the cease-fire in the South Ossetian conflict zone and includes negotiators from Georgia, South Ossetia, Russia, and North Ossetia. The proposed revisions reflect Georgia's dissatisfaction with the current peacekeeping arrangements and its desire for a more effective mechanism.
• On August 14, 2006, the South Ossetian authorities announced their intention to address several key issues during the upcoming quadripartite Joint Control Commission (JCC) meeting scheduled for August 17-18 in Moscow. (https://civil.ge/archives/115100)
  • Joint Working Group Initiatives: The South Ossetian side aims to initiate activities of a joint working group established to formulate a comprehensive program for resolving the South Ossetian conflict. This highlights the ongoing efforts to create a structured dialogue for conflict resolution.
  • Enhanced Cooperation between Law Enforcers: A significant focus will be on improving cooperation and interaction between South Ossetian and Georgian law enforcement agencies operating in the conflict zone. This indicates an interest in reducing tensions and fostering better communication amid ongoing disputes.
  • Interior Ministers Meeting: The South Ossetian authorities plan to organize a meeting between the Georgian Interior Minister, Vano Merabishvili, and his South Ossetian counterpart, Mikhail Mindzaev. The previous meeting on June 22 yielded minimal results, but the upcoming talks are seen as a chance to address issues more constructively.
  • Failure to Reach Agreement: The JCC failed to agree on "key issues" during its session, according to a joint information note posted by the Russian Foreign Ministry. Time Out Decided: Georgian State Minister for Conflict Resolution Issues, Merab Antadze, stated that the sides decided to take a "time out" and will continue discussions in early September. (https://civil.ge/archives/115135)
    • Accusation of Withdrawal: Russian chief negotiator Yuri Popov accused Tbilisi of withdrawing from its earlier commitments to develop a joint program for peaceful conflict resolution with South Ossetia. Popov stated that during the JCC session, the Georgian side linked the development of the joint program to the necessity of changing the current negotiating format, which he viewed as a disavowal of prior agreements.
      • Georgian Proposals: The Georgian side pushed for two major issues during the JCC session: To launch the development of an agreed program for conflict resolution by September 1. To start working on concrete proposals to expand the current negotiating format and establish effective international guarantees before launching rehabilitation programs in the conflict zone. (https://civil.ge/archives/115140)
• Increase in Forces: On August 24, Georgia began implementing an increase in its peacekeeping forces in the South Ossetian conflict zone, raising the number of Georgian peacekeeping personnel from 312 to 412. (https://civil.ge/archives/115159)
• Initiative Group Established: On August 25, the ruling Unity (Edinstvo) party of breakaway South Ossetia formed an "initiative group" to organize an independence referendum. The proposed question for the referendum will be: "Do you agree with the preservation of the South Ossetian Republic's current status of independent state and [for South Ossetia] to be internationally recognized?" (https://civil.ge/archives/115167)
  • Condemnation from Tbilisi: The Georgian Foreign Ministry criticized South Ossetia's plans for an independence referendum, stating it aims to "deliberately heighten tension" and destabilize the region.The Ministry warned that the referendum could disrupt the ongoing peace process in the area. (https://civil.ge/archives/115191)
• Accusations from South Ossetia: Authorities in breakaway South Ossetia claimed that the Georgian side targeted the southern outskirts of Tskhinvali with mortar shelling overnight on August 26. They stated that the shelling only stopped after South Ossetian forces returned fire and was stabilized with the arrival of peacekeeping forces. (https://civil.ge/archives/115175)
  • In contrast, Georgian media reported that the South Ossetian forces initiated fire towards the Georgian village of Ergneti, located south of Tskhinvali.
• Accusation of Gunfire: Authorities in breakaway South Ossetia accused the Georgian side of opening fire on the outskirts of Tskhinvali during the night of August 30. This accusation follows similar reports from the South Ossetian side on August 29 and August 26, indicating ongoing tensions in the region. (https://civil.ge/archives/115196)
• 1 September: Georgian Objection to Gas Pipeline: Georgia's Foreign Ministry declared the construction of a gas pipeline between Russia’s North Ossetian Republic and the breakaway region of South Ossetia "illegal." Pipeline Negotiations: In June, South Ossetia’s Prime Minister, Yuri Morozov, met with officials from Gazprom in Moscow to discuss the pipeline, with construction planned to start in August. Current Gas Supply Route: South Ossetia currently receives gas through a pipeline routed through Georgian-controlled territory. (https://civil.ge/archives/115219)
• Helicopter Attack: South Ossetian militia fired at a Georgian Defense Ministry MI-8 helicopter carrying the Georgian Defense Minister, Irakli Okruashvili, and the Deputy Chief of Staff on September 3, damaging the helicopter and forcing an emergency landing. No injuries were reported. Georgian Response: Defense Minister Okruashvili condemned the attack, attributing it to "armed groups of Ossetians" and pledged to stop such incidents, noting this was not the first time Georgian helicopters had come under fire. The South Ossetian Press and Information Committee reported that the helicopter was “shot down” for violating South Ossetian airspace over the Znauri district, stating that warnings were ignored. South Ossetian officials cited repeated Georgian airspace violations, allegedly 240 incidents in five months, as the reason for their defensive actions. (https://civil.ge/archives/115226)
  • Attack on Presidential Escort Helicopter: On August 28, a helicopter escorting Georgian President Saakashvili and a group of visiting U.S. Senators was reportedly targeted by a Strela-2 anti-aircraft missile while flying over the South Ossetian conflict zone near the village of Avnevi.The missile exploded near the escort helicopter but did not cause any damage. The exploded shell was recovered and handed over to U.S. authorities for further investigation. (https://civil.ge/archives/115221)
  • Prior Security Concerns: In February 2006, Georgia’s Interior Ministry reported finding an IGLA anti-aircraft missile system near the conflict zone, allegedly intended to target President Saakashvili's helicopter. (https://civil.ge/archives/115227)
  • JPKF Statement on Unauthorized Flights: The Joint Peacekeeping Forces (JPKF) in the South Ossetian conflict zone stated that recent Georgian military flights over the area are considered "provocative" and unauthorized. JPKF cited the June 30, 2002 decision by the Joint Control Commission, which prohibits unauthorized flights over the JPKF’s zone of responsibility. (https://civil.ge/archives/115228)
  • Russian Accusation Against Georgia: Russia’s chief negotiator for South Ossetian issues, Yuri Popov, stated that the recent helicopter incident was provoked by Georgia, alleging that a Georgian army aircraft violated the airspace of the Georgian-Ossetian conflict zone. Popov mentioned that the Russian Foreign Ministry had no information to support South Ossetian claims that the Georgian helicopter had fired first. (https://civil.ge/archives/115232)
  • Georgia Accuses Russia of Destabilization: Merab Antadze, Georgia's State Minister for Conflict Resolution, accused Russia of inciting armed conflict and destabilizing Georgia, particularly in the South Ossetian region. OSCE Response: Ambassador Roy Reeve, head of the OSCE Mission in Georgia, echoed the prohibition on flights in the conflict zone but condemned the attacks on the Georgian aircraft. (https://civil.ge/archives/115236)
  • Call for Change in Negotiation Format: Merab Antadze, Georgia's State Minister for Conflict Resolution, urged for a change in the current Russian-led format for negotiating the South Ossetian conflict. Antadze suggested transforming the Joint Control Commission, which includes representatives from Georgia, South Ossetia, Russia, and North Ossetia, into a bilateral arrangement between Georgia and South Ossetia. (https://civil.ge/archives/115237)
  • Threat of Force in South Ossetia: Givi Targamadze, a senior Georgian MP and chairman of the Parliamentary Committee for Defense and Security, indicated that the use of military force may be considered to address the South Ossetian conflict. (https://civil.ge/archives/115229)
  • Kokoity’s Approval: Eduard Kokoity, the leader of the unrecognized South Ossetian republic, praised his forces for shooting at a Georgian army helicopter that he claimed had violated South Ossetian airspace on September 3. End of Warnings: He stated that South Ossetian authorities would no longer issue warnings, indicating that appropriate measures would be taken to protect their borders in the future. (https://civil.ge/archives/115241)
  • Terrorist Act Accusation: Georgian officials characterized the attack on a helicopter carrying Defense Minister Irakli Okruashvili as a terrorist act committed by South Ossetian militias. (https://civil.ge/archives/185593)
  • JCC Session Postponed: The quadripartite Joint Control Commission (JCC) meeting on South Ossetia, scheduled for September 5-6 in Vladikavkaz, has been postponed until mid-September. North Ossetian chief negotiator Murat Tkhostov clarified that the delay is not related to the recent helicopter incident involving Georgia but rather due to scheduling conflicts for the South Ossetian negotiator, Boris Chochiev. (https://civil.ge/archives/115245)
  • Threat to Statehood: Some senior members of the ruling National Movement party argue that the secessionist authorities in South Ossetia represent a significant threat to Georgian statehood and advocate for their “neutralization.” Opposition MPs have echoed the sentiment, demanding that the government take “adequate responses” against what they refer to as “bandits” in South Ossetia. (https://civil.ge/archives/115248)
  • On September 5, the U.S. Embassy in Tbilisi announced that a thorough investigation conducted by Georgia's Ministry of Internal Affairs and the FBI confirmed that the helicopter carrying a U.S. Senate delegation, led by Senator John McCain, was not fired upon during their trip on August 28. The embassy clarified that it was another helicopter—part of the same mission—that was the intended target of an anti-aircraft missile, not the one carrying the senators. The confusion arose when reports indicated that an escort helicopter was attacked while accompanying President Saakashvili and the Senate delegation en route to the Svaneti region. (https://civil.ge/archives/115242)
  • MP Giga Bokeria described the Tskhinvali region as a “nest of terrorism” while reiterating the commitment to a political resolution. An amendment to the National Security Concept is being proposed to introduce a “principle of total defense,” enhancing reserve troops and mobilization plans due to perceived increased foreign threats. (https://civil.ge/archives/115253)
• On September 8, a shooting incident in the South Ossetian conflict zone resulted in the death of one Georgian officer and injuries to two others, according to official sources from Georgia. The Georgian State Minister for Conflict Resolution Issues reported that the law enforcement officers were fired upon while pursuing a group of smugglers in the area between the villages of Khetaburovo and Nikozi, located southeast of Tskhinvali, the capital of the breakaway region. Details surrounding the incident remain limited, and South Ossetian officials, as well as the command of the Joint Peacekeeping Forces, have not yet provided comments. (https://civil.ge/archives/115274)
  • On September 8, a clash in the South Ossetian conflict zone resulted in the deaths of three South Ossetian militia fighters and one Georgian officer. The incident occurred when a Georgian Interior Ministry special forces vehicle reportedly opened fire at a South Ossetian checkpoint near the villages of Tbeti and Nikozi. Georgian authorities confirmed the death of their officer and reported two others were hospitalized with non-life-threatening injuries. Shida Kartli Governor Mikheil Kareli described the incident as a provocation by South Ossetian and Russian forces, while the South Ossetian Press and Information Committee claimed that the clash was part of ongoing tensions in the region, alleging that Georgia had positioned military equipment nearby. (https://civil.ge/archives/115275)
  • On September 8, a clash in the South Ossetian conflict zone resulted in the deaths of three South Ossetian militia members and one Georgian officer, escalating tensions between Tbilisi and Tskhinvali. The incident occurred when a Georgian Interior Ministry vehicle, reportedly on an anti-smuggling mission, approached a South Ossetian checkpoint and was allegedly attacked by militia members. Georgian officials claimed that the clash began when officers attempted to check the IDs of the militia personnel. In the aftermath, Georgian Interior Minister Vano Merabishvili confirmed the death of the Georgian officer and stated that the situation could lead to more aggressive operations in the area. Key Georgian parliamentarians condemned the incident, labeling it a terrorist act, and expressed concerns about the role of Russian peacekeepers in heightening tensions. South Ossetian officials warned of potential military confrontations, indicating a precarious situation in the region. (https://civil.ge/archives/115279)
  • Georgian Prime Minister Zurab Nogaideli declared on September 8 that the current status quo in the South Ossetian conflict zone is unacceptable, emphasizing the need for immediate action to resolve ongoing tensions. Following a clash that resulted in the deaths of three South Ossetian militia members and one Georgian officer, Nogaideli described the incident as part of a troubling pattern of provocations. He condemned the violence and briefed foreign diplomats on the situation, urging a shift away from the ineffective status quo to foster progress in addressing the conflict. (https://civil.ge/archives/115281)
• 8 September: In an interview with the Russian news agency Regnum, Mikhail Mindzaev, the Interior Minister of breakaway South Ossetia, issued a stern warning regarding potential hostilities with Georgia, stating that the South Ossetian side would carry out sabotage attacks on Georgian economic and military targets if Tbilisi initiates military action. He characterized a recent clash that resulted in casualties on both sides as a sign of escalating tensions and declared that South Ossetia would also shoot down any Georgian aircraft operating over the region. Mindzaev emphasized that the presence of Russian peacekeeping forces is currently the only deterrent preventing Georgia from launching an attack. (https://civil.ge/archives/115282)
• On September 8, the Georgian Foreign Ministry reaffirmed Tbilisi's commitment to achieving a peaceful resolution to the South Ossetian conflict and proposed several measures aimed at reducing tensions in the region. These measures include the involvement of impartial guarantors in the peace process, demilitarization, enhanced monitoring of South Ossetia, and control over the Roki Tunnel, which connects the region to Russia. The Ministry highlighted a recent clash, resulting in casualties on both sides, as evidence that Russian peacekeeping forces are failing to contribute positively to the peace efforts, emphasizing the need for effective actions to prevent provocations and promote peace. (https://civil.ge/archives/115284)
• On September 9, Tskhinvali, the capital of breakaway South Ossetia, experienced a "massive fire" overnight, with reports indicating that the shooting originated from the Georgian village of Ergneti at 12:10 a.m. and lasted for about 20 minutes. The South Ossetian Press and Information Committee reported no casualties resulting from the incident. Mikhail Mindzaev, the Interior Minister of South Ossetia, noted that additional gunfire occurred at a South Ossetian checkpoint north of Tskhinvali near the Georgian village of Tamarasheni. RIA Novosti quoted Paata Bedianashvili, the commander of the Georgian peacekeeping battalion in the area, who confirmed that a skirmish had erupted between South Ossetian militiamen and Georgian police officers, stating that there were no injuries among the Georgian forces. (https://civil.ge/archives/115289)
• On September 10, Georgian and South Ossetian troops engaged in a brief exchange of gunfire after midnight, although no casualties were reported, according to both Georgian and Russian sources. The shootout was described as less intense compared to a previous incident that occurred overnight on September 9. The Russian command of the Joint Peacekeeping Forces indicated that the gunfire took place in the southern area of Tskhinvali, near the Georgian village of Ergneti, as reported by RIA Novosti. (https://civil.ge/archives/115292)
• In mid-September, breakaway South Ossetia has announced plans to hold an independence referendum on November 12, coinciding with presidential elections in the region. The referendum will ask voters whether they support maintaining South Ossetia's status as an independent state and seeking international recognition. This move follows a similar referendum in 1992, which resulted in a 98% vote for independence but was not recognized internationally. Georgian officials have expressed concerns that this referendum could exacerbate tensions and disrupt the ongoing peace process, emphasizing that it will lack legal legitimacy. The situation is further complicated by Russian support for such referendums, as President Putin and Foreign Minister Lavrov have suggested that self-determination is an essential aspect of international law, pointing to past referendums in Chechnya. In contrast, Abkhazia, another breakaway region, has no immediate plans for a similar referendum, as its leader stated that there is no current need for one. (https://civil.ge/archives/115302)
  • Russian MPs, led by Boris Grizlov, Chairman of the Duma Council, have announced plans to observe the upcoming independence referendum in South Ossetia, set for November 12, the same day as presidential elections in the region. Grizlov stated that the actions of the Georgian government are compelling South Ossetia to pursue this referendum, framing it as a rightful expression of the local population's desires. He emphasized that if the South Ossetians wish to hold the referendum, they should be allowed to do so. Additionally, the Russian Duma Council intends to send observers to a similar referendum in Moldova's breakaway region of Transnistria. (https://civil.ge/archives/115309)
  • Georgian State Minister for Conflict Resolution Issues Merab Antadze criticized Russian State Duma Chairman Boris Grizlov's recent comments supporting the planned independence referendum in South Ossetia, asserting that such statements violate Georgia’s sovereignty. Grizlov had indicated that Russian parliamentarians would observe the November 12 referendum and suggested that Georgia's policies have necessitated this action from South Ossetia. In response, Antadze condemned Grizlov's remarks as "destructive," urging Russia to adhere to international law, respect Georgia's sovereignty, and refrain from illegal crossings of the Georgian border by Russian citizens. (https://civil.ge/archives/115317)
  • Terry Davis, Secretary General of the Council of Europe, criticized the planned independence referendum in South Ossetia, stating that the secessionist authorities are "wasting time and effort" on the initiative scheduled for November. He emphasized that the results of such a referendum would not be recognized and urged the South Ossetian leadership to prioritize meaningful negotiations with the Georgian government instead. Davis expressed concern over the ongoing violence affecting both sides and called for an immediate dialogue to resolve the conflict, stressing the importance of finding a peaceful, internationally accepted solution for the stability of the region and the territorial integrity of Georgia. (https://civil.ge/archives/115318)
• The chief negotiator for South Ossetia, Boris Chochiev, has proposed postponing the upcoming session of the Joint Control Commission (JCC) scheduled for September 14-15 in Tskhinvali. In a letter to the JCC co-chairmen, Chochiev suggested that if agreed upon, a consultative meeting of the JCC chairmen could still take place on September 14, followed by a plenary session on September 15-16. The South Ossetian side has previously requested a delay, which resulted in the rescheduling of the session from early September to mid-September. However, Chochiev did not provide specific reasons for the latest postponement request. (https://civil.ge/archives/115310)
  • The Joint Control Commission (JCC) session on the South Ossetian conflict, set for September 15 in Tskhinvali, faced potential collapse due to South Ossetia’s refusal to admit Paata Bedianashvili, the Georgian peacekeeping commander, to the talks. South Ossetia cited Bedianashvili’s alleged involvement in Georgia’s 2004 military actions against South Ossetia as the reason for denying him entry. Georgian State Minister for Conflict Resolution, Merab Antadze, who was in Tskhinvali to finalize the session's agenda, argued that blocking Bedianashvili’s participation undermines the talks. The agreed agenda included discussions on recent incidents, law enforcement cooperation, and economic rehabilitation initiatives led by the OSCE, all aimed at supporting a peaceful resolution in the region. (https://civil.ge/archives/115331)
  • The September 15 Joint Control Commission (JCC) session on the South Ossetian conflict was disrupted after South Ossetian authorities barred Georgian peacekeeping commander Paata Bedianashvili from entering Tskhinvali, alleging his role in Georgia’s 2004 military actions against South Ossetia. Georgian State Minister Merab Antadze condemned this decision as unacceptable and a deliberate attempt to hinder negotiations, which he argued highlights the JCC’s limitations and outdated format for addressing regional tensions. Antadze suggested that South Ossetia’s stance challenges the functionality of the current peacekeeping and conflict-resolution framework. (https://civil.ge/archives/115333)
  • South Ossetian negotiator Boris Chochiev accused Georgia of intentionally disrupting the Joint Control Commission (JCC) talks scheduled for September 15-16 by including Georgian peacekeeping commander Paata Bedianashvili in its delegation. South Ossetia denied Bedianashvili entry, citing his alleged involvement in past hostilities, including a 2004 conflict and the shelling of Tskhinvali in 2005. In response, Georgian Minister Merab Antadze declined to attend the talks, which Chochiev interpreted as a Georgian strategy to undermine the JCC negotiation framework. The parties are now considering relocating the session to Vladikavkaz, in Russia’s North Ossetia, for a potential late-September meeting. (https://civil.ge/archives/115337)
  • South Ossetian leader Eduard Kokoity proposed a meeting in Tskhinvali on September 17 with the Russian, Georgian, and North Ossetian co-chairs of the Joint Control Commission (JCC) to discuss the peace process. The Russian and North Ossetian representatives agreed to attend, with Russian negotiator Yuri Popov affirming the value of dialogue among JCC members. However, Georgian State Minister for Conflict Resolution Merab Antadze will be absent due to a scheduled visit to the United States. This offer follows a failed JCC session on September 15-16, disrupted by a dispute over the Georgian delegation’s composition. (https://civil.ge/archives/115342)
• 15 September: Maia Chigoeva-Tsaboshvili, head of the Tbilisi-based NGO Georgian-Ossetian Union "Iber-Ironi," has announced her candidacy for the South Ossetian presidential elections set for November 12. While expressing concerns that current leader Eduard Kokoity, who is seeking re-election, might use his influence to manipulate the election, she voiced hope that he would allow her to participate fairly. Chigoeva-Tsaboshvili, who is also a member of the Georgian opposition party Industry Will Save Georgia and a candidate in Tbilisi’s municipal election, advocates for a peaceful resolution to the South Ossetian conflict in line with the OSCE's guidelines, aligning with the Georgian government’s stance. (https://civil.ge/archives/185598)
• On September 22, 2006, Russia's Foreign Ministry accused Georgia of undermining the South Ossetia Joint Control Commission (JCC), a multi-party negotiation mechanism aimed at peace in the region. Tensions escalated when a second round of the JCC’s 51st session was delayed on September 15 due to disputes over the Georgian delegation's makeup. Although rescheduled for September 26-27 in Vladikavkaz, Georgia requested a further postponement until October, citing scheduling conflicts. The Russian Foreign Ministry criticized Georgia’s actions as an effort to dismantle the existing peace framework, but reiterated support for the JCC as a valuable tool for conflict resolution. Moscow also urged Georgia to consider South Ossetian leader Eduard Kokoity’s invitation for high-level talks to ease tensions. (https://civil.ge/archives/115391)
• On September 22, 2006, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov criticized Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili's address to the UN General Assembly, accusing him of presenting misleading information. Saakashvili claimed that Russia was annexing Georgian territories and that Russian-led peacekeeping operations obstructed peace, particularly by preventing displaced Georgians from returning to Abkhazia. Lavrov countered by asserting that approximately 60,000 internally displaced persons had already returned to the Gali district and highlighted the UN Security Council’s regular acknowledgment of Russia’s positive peacekeeping role in Abkhazia. Lavrov also questioned Saakashvili’s call for demilitarization, pointing to Georgia’s recent arms imports. (https://civil.ge/archives/115396)
  • On September 23, 2006, Russian President Vladimir Putin, during a visit to France, expressed Russia’s willingness to act as a guarantor for resolving Georgia's "frozen conflicts," emphasizing that dialogue and compromise are essential for a successful settlement. At a joint briefing with French President Jacques Chirac and German Chancellor Angela Merkel, Putin highlighted the shared position of France and Germany on pursuing a diplomatic solution. This statement followed Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili's UN address, where he accused Russia of seeking to annex Georgian conflict zones and hindering peace with its peacekeeping operations. Putin acknowledged Saakashvili's concerns, describing him as “especially emotional” but deeply invested in his country's welfare. (https://civil.ge/archives/115403)
• On September 25, 2006, Khvicha Nikorashvili was severely injured when his mini-van exploded near Prisi in the South Ossetian conflict zone. Georgian media initially reported that a rocket-propelled grenade struck the vehicle, but the Georgian State Minister for Conflict Resolution later suggested it was likely caused by a landmine. This incident follows a September 23 clash in which two South Ossetian militia members were injured, although Georgian police deny involvement, attributing the violence to conflicts among South Ossetian groups. (https://civil.ge/archives/115418)
• On September 27, 2006, a passenger bus was robbed by unknown gunmen in Tskhinvali, the capital of South Ossetia, with no reported casualties among the passengers. The robbery occurred near a militia station while the bus was en route to the Georgian-populated Didi Liakhvi gorge, and it followed a similar incident the previous day. Merab Antadze, the Georgian State Minister for Conflict Resolution Issues, criticized the Russian peacekeeping forces for their inaction during these incidents, stating that both occurred within their zone of responsibility. He emphasized that these events underscore the need for a reassessment of the current peacekeeping format and operational mechanisms. (https://civil.ge/archives/115427)
• On September 29, reports emerged that a Georgian SU-25 fighter jet flew unauthorized over the South Ossetian conflict zone at an altitude of 3,000 meters, according to the South Ossetian Press and Information Committee. The spokesman for Joint Peacekeeping Forces, Vladimir Ivanov, claimed this incident followed eight other Georgian fighter jets flying over the area on September 27, which he described as a violation of agreements. Additionally, it was reported that three North Ossetian peacekeepers were allegedly assaulted by Georgian servicemen near Avnevi on September 28, although Georgia confirmed only that a vehicle carrying Russian peacekeepers was stopped for a document check, denying any assault occurred. (https://civil.ge/archives/115457)
• On October 9, 2006, the Central Election Commission (CEC) of the breakaway region of South Ossetia rejected Maia Chigoeva-Tsaboshvili's application to participate in the upcoming presidential elections scheduled for November 12. Chigoeva-Tsaboshvili, the head of the Tbilisi-based NGO "Iber-Ironi" Georgian-Ossetian Union, was denied registration due to two main reasons: she is not a citizen of the South Ossetian Republic, and she missed the registration deadline, which was October 8. The election will feature three candidates: the incumbent leader Eduard Kokoity, Inal Pukhaev, who heads the Tskhinvali district administration, and Oleg Gabodze. Officials in Tbilisi have indicated that Pukhaev and Gabodze were nominated to create the appearance of a competitive election. (https://civil.ge/archives/111161)
• On October 10, 2006, reports emerged that two Georgian policemen were injured near the village of Kekhvi in the South Ossetian conflict zone. Georgian media attributed the injuries to an attack on the police checkpoint, while the South Ossetian Press and Information Committee claimed the injuries resulted from an accidental explosion at the checkpoint. The South Ossetian authorities dismissed the Georgian accusations of their involvement, asserting that Kekhvi was heavily fortified by Georgian troops and labeling the allegations as unfounded. (https://civil.ge/archives/111167)
• During a Joint Control Commission (JCC) session in Vladikavkaz on October 12, 2006, Georgian negotiator Merab Antadze advocated for a shift in the negotiating format regarding South Ossetia, proposing that the EU, U.S., Russia, and OSCE act as "guarantors" in the peace process instead of the existing quadripartite format that includes negotiators from Georgia, South Ossetia, Russia, and North Ossetia. Tbilisi argued that the current format is outdated, ineffective, and unfair; however, this proposal ultimately led to a deadlock in talks, according to Dimity Medoev, the breakaway region's envoy in Russia. Both Moscow and Tskhinvali criticized Tbilisi's push to change the format, labeling it an attempt to stall the peace process. (https://civil.ge/archives/111187)
• The recent session of the quadripartite Joint Control Commission (JCC) in Vladikavkaz on October 12-13, 2006, ended without any results, primarily due to Georgia's insistence on changing the current negotiating format. Russian chief negotiator Yuri Popov stated that the Georgian side's inflexible position hindered progress, as they sought to replace the quadripartite format with bilateral talks under the aegis of the OSCE, involving the EU, U.S., and Russia. Both Popov and Boris Chochiev, the chief negotiator from South Ossetia, emphasized that the JCC is not authorized to alter the negotiating format. Despite the failure to reach an agreement, Georgian State Minister for Conflict Resolution Issues Merab Antadze expressed a willingness to continue talks. This session was a continuation of a previous JCC meeting held in Moscow on August 17-18, where key issues also remained unresolved. (https://civil.ge/archives/111192)
• On October 24, the newly formed Salvation Union of Ossetians announced plans to hold “alternative presidential elections and a referendum” in breakaway South Ossetia on November 12, coinciding with official elections and a referendum for independence organized by the secessionist authorities. The initiative, led by critics of the current leadership, including Vladimir Sanakoev, aims to present an alternative to Eduard Kokoity, the incumbent leader. The alternative group has established its own Central Election Commission, although no candidates have been officially registered yet; however, speculation suggests Maia Chigoeva-Tsaboshvili and Jemal Karkusov may run. Meanwhile, the South Ossetian authorities have accused Georgian special services of planning provocations to disrupt the elections. (https://civil.ge/archives/111266)
• South Ossetian leader Eduard Kokoity accused the Georgian authorities of attempting to establish a "puppet government" in South Ossetia, aimed at undermining the current leadership. Kokoity's comments followed the announcement by the newly-formed Salvation Union of Ossetians, which is believed to have backing from Tbilisi, to hold alternative presidential elections and an independence referendum on November 12, concurrent with the official votes organized by the secessionist government. He alleged that the Georgian government is exerting pressure on Ossetians to create a pro-Georgian administration, citing plans to nominate former South Ossetian Prime Minister Dimitri Sanakoev as a candidate for the presidency. The South Ossetian Central Election Commission confirmed that only residents with South Ossetian citizenship would be eligible to vote in the upcoming elections and urged residents of Georgian villages to acquire South Ossetian citizenship, although there has been little response to this call. (https://civil.ge/archives/111271)
• On October 26, Shadiman Bliadze was killed and his son seriously injured when they stepped on an anti-tank mine near the Georgian village of Kekhvi in the South Ossetian conflict zone. Georgian State Minister for Conflict Resolution Issues Merab Antadze condemned the incident as a "terrorist act directed against the peaceful local population" and criticized the Russian peacekeeping forces in the area for their perceived inaction. (https://civil.ge/archives/111291)
• On October 27, construction began on a gas pipeline connecting Russia's North Ossetia to the breakaway region of South Ossetia, as reported by RIA Novosti and Itar-Tass. The official launch ceremony was attended by South Ossetian leader Eduard Kokoity and North Ossetian Republic Head Teimuraz Mamsurov. The Dzaurikau-Tskhinvali pipeline, which will stretch 163 kilometers and include sections at elevations of 3,000 meters, is expected to be completed by the end of 2007. Georgian Parliamentary Chairperson Nino Burjanadze urged the international community to condemn what she described as the "illegal construction" of the pipeline on Georgian territory, noting that South Ossetia currently receives gas from areas under Georgian control. (https://civil.ge/archives/111292)
• Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili expressed readiness to meet with South Ossetian leader Eduard Kokoity in Bakuriani to foster dialogue and trust, as conveyed by Georgian Prime Minister Zurab Nogaideli during the OSCE Permanent Council on October 27. Nogaideli emphasized that Bakuriani, historically a peaceful area for Ossetians, symbolizes the possibility of coexistence despite past conflicts. However, Murat Jioyev, the South Ossetian Foreign Minister, rejected the proposed location as a precondition for talks, insisting that the venue should be negotiated. He emphasized that the primary aim of the high-level meeting should be to establish a non-resumption of hostilities agreement. Saakashvili previously indicated that Georgia would only consider signing such an agreement after the internationalization of peacekeeping operations in South Ossetia. (https://civil.ge/archives/111296)
  • South Ossetian deputy prime minister and chief negotiator Boris Chochiev rejected Georgia's proposal to hold high-level talks between South Ossetian leader Eduard Kokoity and President Saakashvili at the Bakuriani ski resort, calling it "cynical." This statement followed Georgian Prime Minister Zurab Nogaideli's assertion that Bakuriani is a historically peaceful area for Ossetians. Chochiev emphasized that many Ossetians had fled Bakuriani due to violence in the early 1990s, and under the current circumstances, he categorically ruled out Georgian territory as a venue for discussions. He called for thorough preparation, including prior consultative meetings to define the format, venue, and agenda for any potential talks. (https://civil.ge/archives/111299)
  • South Ossetian leader Eduard Kokoity stated on October 30 that he is open to meeting Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili in a third country, provided that an agreement on the non-use of force is signed prior to the meeting. Kokoity emphasized that this document should outline the non-resumption of hostilities between Georgia and South Ossetia. However, Tbilisi has conditioned its willingness to sign such an agreement on the internationalization of the peacekeeping operation in South Ossetia. The Georgian side had proposed the ski resort of Bakuriani as a venue for the talks. (https://civil.ge/archives/111308)
• Six candidates have registered to run for the alternative presidential elections in breakaway South Ossetia, scheduled for November 12, organized by the newly formed Salvation Union of Ossetians, which opposes the current secessionist government. The candidates include Maia Chigoeva-Tsaboshvili, Giogi Chigoev, Teimuraz Jeragoev, Anatoly Dudaev, Tamar Charaeva, and Dimitri Sanakoev, the former prime minister of South Ossetia. While the Georgian authorities deem these elections illegitimate, Tskhinvali claims they are being orchestrated with Tbilisi's support to create a "puppet government." Uruzmag Karkusov, the chairman of the alternative Central Election Commission based in the Georgian village of Eredvi, announced the candidates on October 30. (https://civil.ge/archives/111305)
• On October 31, the South Ossetian Press and Information Committee reported that South Ossetian militiamen had "liquidated" a four-member Georgian armed group near the village of Sinaguri in the Java district, which is located in the northern part of the breakaway region. No casualties were reported on the South Ossetian side following the incident, which occurred at dawn. However, Paata Bedianashvili, the commander of the Georgian peacekeeping battalion in the area, stated that the village is outside the conflict zone and not under the peacekeepers' jurisdiction, thus he could neither confirm nor deny the report or the presence of Georgians. (https://civil.ge/archives/111312)
  • On October 31, South Ossetian leader Eduard Kokoity declined to hold talks with the Georgian government, accusing Tbilisi of "state terrorism." He confirmed that a four-member Georgian sabotage group was allegedly destroyed in the Java district, claiming they were plotting attacks on infrastructure ahead of South Ossetia's independence referendum set for November 12. The clash reportedly occurred near the village of Sinaguri around 7 am, although the Georgian side has not yet verified these claims. Kokoity had previously indicated a willingness to meet Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili in a third country, contingent upon signing a non-use of force agreement, but the proposal for talks at Georgia's Bakuriani ski resort was rejected. (https://civil.ge/archives/111313)
  • On October 31, Georgian Foreign Minister Gela Bezhuashvili dismissed reports of a clash in South Ossetia that allegedly resulted in the deaths of four armed Georgian men, labeling them as "disinformation." He suggested that these claims are part of an effort to escalate tensions in the region, which he emphasized is not in Georgia's interest as the country aims for a peaceful resolution to ongoing conflicts. Bezhuashvili expressed a desire for Russia to play a constructive role in resolving these issues and made his comments before traveling to Moscow. (https://civil.ge/archives/185491)
  • Following a reported clash on October 31 in South Ossetia, Tbilisi and Tskhinvali exchanged accusations, with Georgian officials branding the claims of four armed men being killed as "disinformation." The South Ossetian government asserted that a Georgian "saboteur-terrorist squad" was neutralized near Sinaguri, alleging that the group included Chechen militants planning sabotage ahead of a planned independence referendum. South Ossetian leader Eduard Kokoity refused to engage in further talks with Georgia, accusing it of state terrorism. Georgian Foreign Minister Gela Bezhuashvili emphasized the need for peaceful resolution and dismissed the incident as an effort to escalate tensions, while Tbilisi's administration criticized the South Ossetian reports as part of pre-election hysteria. Additionally, the situation is complicated by ongoing tensions surrounding the presence and rotation of peacekeeping forces in the conflict zone, with Russia accusing Georgia of violating terms regarding troop rotations. (https://civil.ge/archives/111314)
  • The South Ossetian authorities reported that four Chechen militants were killed in a clash on October 31, contradicting earlier claims that they were members of a Georgian saboteur squad. Footage aired by Russian state television displayed the scene, featuring a corpse, explosives, Kalashnikov rifles, and materials labeled as "Wahhabism literature." South Ossetian officials allege that these militants infiltrated from Georgian-controlled areas. In response, Tbilisi dismissed these assertions as "disinformation," attributing them to "pre-election hysteria" in the breakaway region, which is preparing for an independence referendum and presidential elections on November 12. (https://civil.ge/archives/111316)
  • On October 31, the Georgian Foreign Ministry characterized a reported clash in the Java district of South Ossetia as "disinformation" and a provocation aimed at undermining efforts for potential high-level talks between Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili and South Ossetian leader Eduard Kokoity. The South Ossetian side initially claimed to have eliminated a squad of Georgian saboteurs but later changed its narrative, identifying the group as Chechen militants. The South Ossetian Foreign Ministry stated that the deceased were found with weapons, explosives, and materials indicating extremist affiliations, asserting they had infiltrated from Georgia. This incident has led to renewed calls from Tbilisi for an expansion of international monitoring in the region, highlighting concerns over ongoing provocations and the need for a revised peacekeeping format. (https://civil.ge/archives/111317)
• On November 1, 2006, the South Ossetian Foreign Ministry criticized upcoming "alternative" presidential elections and an independence referendum, planned for November 12 by opponents of the secessionist authorities, asserting they were part of a Georgian effort to destabilize the region. Organized by the Salvation Union of Ossetians, a group opposed to the separatist government, these alternative polls are reportedly backed by Tbilisi, which secessionist authorities claim is attempting to establish a "puppet government" in South Ossetia. Tbilisi, however, has deemed both the official and alternative elections illegitimate. Dimitri Sanakoev, a former prime minister of South Ossetia, is among the candidates in the alternative election, actively campaigning in areas like Akhalgori, which is under Georgian control despite being part of South Ossetia's former autonomous region. (https://civil.ge/archives/111325)
• On November 2, 2006, the newly established Salvation Union of Ossetians organization, believed to have unofficial support from Tbilisi, issued a warning about potential provocations planned by the secessionist authorities in South Ossetia ahead of an upcoming independence referendum and presidential elections. Vladimir Sanakoev, one of the organization's founders, claimed to have information indicating that Tskhinvali officials were planning terrorist acts at polling stations to blame on the Georgian authorities, thereby discrediting Tbilisi. (https://civil.ge/archives/111333)
• On November 12, 2006, two simultaneous elections are set to take place in breakaway South Ossetia, potentially leading to the establishment of two rival presidents. Incumbent de facto leader Eduard Kokoity is expected to secure re-election, while his opponent, former prime minister Dimitri Sanakoev, is favored in the so-called "alternative" elections, which are believed to be backed by Tbilisi. The alternative polls will occur in Georgian-controlled villages and are organized by the Salvation Union of Ossetians, a Tbilisi-supported NGO critical of Kokoity. Despite Tbilisi's official stance that these elections are illegal, they will not obstruct the process. Concerns about potential provocations and violence surround the elections, with both sides accusing each other of plotting disturbances to undermine the legitimacy of the voting process. (https://civil.ge/archives/111355)
• On November 8, 2006, the U.S. Department of State condemned the upcoming independence referendum and presidential elections in breakaway South Ossetia, scheduled for November 12, stating that these actions would only serve to exacerbate tensions and distract from the need for a peaceful resolution to the conflict. The statement emphasized the United States' support for Georgia's sovereignty and territorial integrity, reiterating that South Ossetia is recognized as part of Georgia by the international community. The U.S. urged both Tskhinvali and Tbilisi to engage in direct negotiations to find a peaceful solution that defines South Ossetia's status within Georgia while allowing for significant autonomy. Additionally, the statement highlighted the importance of implementing OSCE-backed economic rehabilitation programs to ease tensions and build confidence for future talks. (https://civil.ge/archives/111366)
• On November 10, 2006, the Russian Foreign Ministry issued a stern warning to Tbilisi regarding the upcoming November 12 independence referendum in South Ossetia, asserting that the polls would reflect the South Ossetian people's stance and should be considered in realpolitik. Both the U.S. and EU had condemned these elections, and Russia cautioned that Tbilisi's efforts to support an "alternative government" in South Ossetia could provoke military confrontation. The ministry denounced the so-called "alternative polls" organized by the Salvation Union of Ossetians, claiming they were backed by Tbilisi and aimed at exacerbating tensions. It warned that such actions, along with the potential establishment of a "state apparatus" by the Georgian side, could lead to significant instability and a critical situation for Russian peacekeeping forces. Additionally, the ministry predicted that if Tbilisi recognized these alternative structures, it would heighten tensions and risk escalating the conflict into a more violent phase, potentially derailing the Georgian-Ossetian peace process. (https://civil.ge/archives/111357)
• On November 11, 2006, NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer condemned the upcoming independence referendum and presidential elections in breakaway South Ossetia, stating that they "serve no purpose" and only exacerbate tensions in the South Caucasus. In a statement, Scheffer rejected the legitimacy of the so-called "referendum" and "elections," reaffirming NATO's support for Georgia's territorial integrity. He urged all parties involved to engage in good faith negotiations aimed at achieving a political settlement, emphasizing that a peaceful resolution is essential for long-term peace and stability in the region. (https://civil.ge/archives/111386)
• On November 13, 2006, hundreds gathered in Tskhinvali, the capital of breakaway South Ossetia, to celebrate what they called a "successful independence referendum and presidential elections." South Ossetian leader Eduard Kokoity addressed the crowd, expressing pride in their unity and aspiration for independence, and according to election officials, he is set to be re-elected as President. Meanwhile, in the Georgian village of Eredvi, Dimitri Sanakoev celebrated a victory in alternative presidential elections organized by the Salvation Union of Ossetians, a Tbilisi-backed group comprised of ethnic Ossetians who oppose Kokoity's leadership. (https://civil.ge/archives/111392)
• Terry Davis, the Secretary General of the Council of Europe, condemned the November 12 independence referendum and presidential elections in breakaway South Ossetia, labeling them as "unnecessary, unhelpful, and unfair." He emphasized that the results would not be recognized by the international community and criticized the process for failing to contribute to a peaceful political solution, particularly noting that ethnic Georgians were excluded from voting. Davis stated that the circumstances surrounding the referendum rendered it irrelevant, even as an indicative poll. (https://civil.ge/archives/111393)
• The breakaway South Ossetian Central Election Commission announced early results from the November 12 referendum, reporting that 99% of voters supported independence, while 96% voted for the current leader, Eduard Kokoity, in the presidential elections. In response, Council of Europe Secretary General Terry Davis criticized the polls as "unnecessary, unhelpful, and unfair," a sentiment echoed by the EU, U.S., and NATO, all of whom condemned the elections. However, Russia indicated that the referendum results should be "taken into consideration." (https://civil.ge/archives/111395)
• South Ossetian leader Eduard Kokoity announced on November 13 that Tskhinvali will seek the extradition of Dimitri Sanakoev, who claims victory in alternative presidential elections backed by Tbilisi. Kokoity labeled Sanakoev and Uruzmag Karkusov, chairman of the Eredvi-based alternative election commission, as "traitors" to South Ossetia, stating that they face criminal charges. Karkusov reported that his house in Java had been burned down amid the political tensions. Kokoity also expressed his intention to pursue international recognition for South Ossetia based on the recent referendum results, acknowledging that while immediate recognition is unlikely, the vote will serve as a significant argument in their favor. (https://civil.ge/archives/111400)
• The European Union, represented by the Finnish Presidency, condemned the November 12 referendum and presidential elections in breakaway South Ossetia, stating that these actions contradict Georgia's sovereignty and territorial integrity. The EU emphasized that the situation in South Ossetia did not allow for the free expression of the popular will and reiterated its support for Georgia's internationally recognized borders. The declaration urged all parties involved to adhere to existing agreements and return to negotiations to facilitate a transparent and swift resolution to the South Ossetian conflict, affirming that the referendum and elections failed to contribute to peaceful conflict resolution. (https://civil.ge/archives/111403)
• The OSCE Chairman-in-Office, Belgian Foreign Minister Karel De Gucht, condemned the November 12 referendum and presidential elections in South Ossetia, declaring that the OSCE does not recognize the outcomes or any electoral activities in the region, labeling them as "counterproductive." He emphasized that these actions do not contribute to a peaceful resolution of the conflict and instead exacerbate tensions and divisions. Minister De Gucht reiterated that the international community regards South Ossetia as an integral part of Georgia and supports ongoing efforts by both sides to stabilize the situation and advance the negotiating process towards a peaceful settlement. (https://civil.ge/archives/111404)
• The Russian Foreign Ministry hailed the November 12 referendum and presidential elections in South Ossetia as a successful expression of the "free will" of the South Ossetian people, with a reported voter turnout of 95.2%. They described this participation as high even by established democratic standards and noted the presence of independent observers from various countries. Despite Tbilisi and some Western nations attempting to downplay the significance of the elections, the Ministry asserted that the results should be recognized. They also condemned alternative polls conducted in Georgian-controlled areas of South Ossetia, claiming that these efforts undermine the legitimacy of the elections and adversely affect the local Georgian population. (https://civil.ge/archives/111406)
• On November 14, 2006, the Central Election Commission (CEC) of breakaway South Ossetia announced that Eduard Kokoity has been re-elected as "President" with 98.1% of the votes. Additionally, the CEC reported that 99.88% of voters supported independence in the referendum held on November 12. These polls and the referendum were condemned by the EU, NATO, the US, the Council of Europe (CoE), and the OSCE chairman. In contrast, Russia characterized the independence referendum as a legitimate expression of the free will of the South Ossetian people. (https://civil.ge/archives/111414)
• On November 16, 2006, the Central Election Commission (CEC) based in the Georgian-controlled village of Eredvi announced the results of the alternative presidential elections held in breakaway South Ossetia on November 12. Dimitri Sanakoev, the ex-prime minister of the region, was declared the winner with 94% of the votes. This announcement followed the declaration of Eduard Kokoity as the winner of the presidential elections held in the areas controlled by secessionist authorities. Additionally, the Eredvi-based CEC reported that 94% of voters supported launching peace talks with Tbilisi to explore the possibility of a unified federal state with Georgia. The turnout for the alternative polls was reported at 96% among approximately 57,000 eligible voters, whereas the Tskhinvali-based CEC claimed around 55,000 eligible voters were registered for their elections. The Eredvi CEC asserted that polling stations had been established even in areas under secessionist control, a claim that was vehemently denied by Tskhinvali. (https://civil.ge/archives/185495)
• On November 17, 2006, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Grigory Karasin congratulated Eduard Kokoity on his re-election as President of South Ossetia during a meeting in Moscow. Karasin described Kokoity's victory in the November 12 presidential elections as "convincing" and wished him success in his leadership role. Both officials expressed the belief that the overwhelming support Kokoity received from voters, along with the results of the independence referendum, would contribute positively to peace, stability, and economic rehabilitation in the Georgian-Ossetian conflict zone. The discussions also touched upon the "alternative elections" conducted by Tbilisi-loyal groups in South Ossetia. (https://civil.ge/archives/111440)
• The Salvation Union of South Ossetia, a Tbilisi-loyal group advocating for the integration of the breakaway region into Georgia, called on President Mikheil Saakashvili on November 30 to establish rule of law and security throughout South Ossetia. Vladimir Sanakoev, co-founder of the group, accused the regime in Tskhinvali, supported by Russian military structures, of inciting tensions between Ossetians and Georgians to bolster de facto President Eduard Kokoity's support. He criticized the oppressive environment in Tskhinvali that stifles dissent and emphasized the need for a government that earns the trust of both communities. The group, formed in October, held an alternative presidential election on November 12, resulting in the declaration of Dimitri Sanakoev as the winner, with his inauguration reportedly set for early December. (https://civil.ge/archives/111532)
• On December 1, 2006, Dimitri Sanakoev, the self-proclaimed president loyal to Tbilisi, was inaugurated in the Georgian village of Kurta, near Tskhinvali, following a controversial presidential election in South Ossetia where he won 94% of the vote on November 12. Sanakoev, a former Prime Minister of the breakaway region, emphasized his commitment to protecting the interests and security of the South Ossetian people in his inaugural address, delivered in both Ossetian and Georgian. The ceremony was attended by Georgian officials, including State Minister for Conflict Resolution Issues Merab Antadze and several parliamentarians, indicating a significant political gesture amid the ongoing tensions between Georgia and the separatist region. Unofficial reports suggested plans for establishing the headquarters of this "alternative government" in Kurta. (https://civil.ge/archives/111540)
• Following his inauguration on December 1, 2006, in the Georgian village of Kurta, Tbilisi-loyal South Ossetian President Dimitri Sanakoev has begun forming his 12-member cabinet. Uruzmag Karkusov has been appointed as Prime Minister, having previously overseen the alternative presidential elections that took place alongside the secessionist-organized elections on November 12. Interior Minister duties will be handled by Jemal Karkusov, who was formerly part of the secessionist government and escaped from prison in a 2005 jailbreak linked to the Georgian Interior Ministry. Maia Chigoeva-Tsaboshvili, head of the Iber-Ironi Georgian-Ossetian Union, will serve as Foreign Minister. Chigoeva-Tsaboshvili indicated that the remaining ministerial positions would be filled within the next ten days. (https://civil.ge/archives/111541)
• Following the inauguration of Dimitri Sanakoev on December 1, 2006, as the Tbilisi-loyal president of South Ossetia, Georgian officials expressed their readiness to formalize his government, recognizing what they described as "a new reality" in the region that should be acknowledged by the international community. The ceremony took place in Kurta, northeast of the South Ossetian capital, Tskhinvali, which is set to become the headquarters for Sanakoev's government. Georgian State Minister for Conflict Resolution Issues Merab Antadze attended the inauguration, emphasizing that Sanakoev's leadership represents a significant shift in South Ossetian dynamics that could influence both Georgian and Ossetian societies. Sanakoev declared his commitment to safeguarding the interests of the South Ossetian people and ensuring their security and revival. The formation of his government is underway, with Uruzmag Karkusov appointed as Prime Minister and Jemal Karkusov as Interior Minister, while Maia Chigoeva-Tsaboshvili is set to serve as Foreign Minister. Sanakoev aims to fill the remaining cabinet positions within ten days, highlighting his intentions to establish a governance structure that could play a crucial role in the ongoing conflict resolution efforts. (https://civil.ge/archives/111542)
• On December 2, 2006, Georgian State Minister for Conflict Resolution Issues Merab Antadze highlighted the emergence of a "new force" in South Ossetia following the alternative presidential elections that resulted in the election of Tbilisi-loyal Dimitri Sanakoev as president. Speaking at Sanakoev's inauguration ceremony in the Georgian village of Kurta, Antadze emphasized the importance of engaging in dialogue with any group that represents the interests of the local population, suggesting that the international community should also participate in this process. His attendance at the ceremony prompted South Ossetian chief negotiator Boris Chochiev to cancel a planned meeting with Antadze in Tskhinvali, indicating tensions between the opposing sides. Antadze expressed that all parties involved in the conflict should recognize and assess the influence of this new force, which he believes could bridge the interests of both Georgian and Ossetian communities, and affirmed Georgia's commitment to continuing discussions with the secessionist authorities. (https://civil.ge/archives/111543)
• On December 2, 2006, the breakaway South Ossetian authorities expressed concern over Tbilisi's efforts to legitimize the so-called alternative government led by Dimitri Sanakoev, viewing it as a threat to the existing Joint Control Commission (JCC) format for conflict resolution. In a statement, the South Ossetian side accused Tbilisi of exacerbating tensions between Georgia and South Ossetia, particularly criticizing the attendance of Georgian State Minister for Conflict Resolution Issues Merab Antadze at Sanakoev's inauguration ceremony. They claimed that the Georgian government and its Western allies were attempting to promote the idea of a "diarchy" in South Ossetia, undermining the peace process. Antadze, while reaffirming Tbilisi's non-recognition of the alternative elections, acknowledged the emergence of a "new reality" in the region and highlighted the need for the international community to recognize the influence of this new force. (https://civil.ge/archives/111547)
• On December 4, 2006, leaders from North Ossetia and South Ossetia, Teimuraz Mamsurov and Eduard Kokoity, respectively, convened a meeting in Vladikavkaz where they discussed the potential unification of their regions. Mamsurov emphasized that "the unification of our peoples is the only sound perspective for our future," highlighting the importance of solidarity between the Ossetian communities. Kokoity echoed this sentiment, expressing a commitment to achieving their "national dreams." This meeting underscored the growing collaboration between the two regions amid the ongoing tensions in South Ossetia and the broader geopolitical dynamics in the Caucasus. (https://civil.ge/archives/111555)
• On December 5, 2006, officials from the Tbilisi-loyal alternative government of South Ossetia, led by Dimitri Sanakoev, expressed their desire to participate in the ongoing negotiation process concerning the region. Currently, negotiations are conducted through the Joint Control Commission, which includes representatives from Georgia, South Ossetia, Russia, and North Ossetia. Maia Chigoeva-Tsaboshvili, who is expected to be appointed as foreign minister in Sanakoev's cabinet, stated that while the Georgian side has criticized the effectiveness of the current format, they believe that involving the alternative government could enhance its potential for resolving the conflict. (https://civil.ge/archives/111560)
• On December 5, 2006, the Russian Foreign Ministry criticized Georgian State Minister for Conflict Resolution Issues Merab Antadze for attending the inauguration of Tbilisi-loyal Dimitri Sanakoev in the South Ossetian conflict zone, arguing that the so-called alternative election held on November 12 lacked local support and aimed to undermine legitimate democratic processes in South Ossetia. The ministry asserted that the overwhelming majority had backed the official South Ossetian President Eduard Kokoity and condemned Tbilisi’s efforts to legitimize this "alternative government." The Russian statement expressed concern that such actions indicated a lack of commitment from Georgia to constructively resolve the Georgian-Ossetian conflict and likened it to Tbilisi's controversial support for an alternative government in the Kodori Gorge, which had previously escalated tensions with the Abkhaz authorities. (https://civil.ge/archives/111562)
• On December 5, 2006, South Ossetian chief negotiator Boris Chochiev dismissed the proposal for the Tbilisi-loyal alternative government, led by Dimitri Sanakoev, to participate in negotiations over the South Ossetian conflict as "absurd" and "unethical." Chochiev argued that the alternative authorities, described as an "illegal organization," were attempting to undermine the existing negotiating framework of the Joint Control Commission (JCC), which includes representatives from Georgia, South Ossetia, Russia, and North Ossetia. He asserted that the alternative government, established by the Georgian leadership, had no legitimate claim to represent the interests of the Ossetian people within the JCC. (https://civil.ge/archives/111564)
• On December 7, 2006, Dimitri Sanakoev, the Tbilisi-loyal self-imposed president of South Ossetia, appointed seven ministers to his newly formed cabinet, bringing the total to 12 members. The appointments included Jemal Karkusov as Interior Minister, Teimuraz Jerapov as Economy Minister, Avtandil Gogidze as Finance Minister, Konstantine Kevlishvili as Minister of Agriculture and Natural Resources, Maia Chigoeva-Tsaboshvili as Foreign Minister, Vladimir Sanakoev as Minister of Information, Science and New Technologies, and Tamaz Maisuradze as Minister of Construction and Transport. Prime Minister Uruzmag Karkusov will lead the cabinet, while the positions for Healthcare, Culture, Justice, and Conflict Resolution Ministers remain vacant, with Chigoeva-Tsaboshvili stating that these roles would be filled soon. (https://civil.ge/archives/111576)
• On December 11, 2006, South Ossetian leader Eduard Kokoity announced plans to reduce the breakaway region's armed forces by 30%, expressing hope for a reciprocal move from the Georgian side amidst accusations of militarization by Tbilisi, particularly in and around the conflict zone. Kokoity's remarks were made during a government session in Tskhinvali, where he indicated a desire to resume talks within the quadripartite Joint Control Commission (JCC), which includes representatives from Georgia, South Ossetia, Russia, and North Ossetia. He instructed his Foreign Minister, Murat Jioyev, to organize a meeting with the JCC co-chairmen, stating, “The Georgian side has actually brought the negotiating process to nothing. We should not let this happen.” The Georgian government's February 2006 assessment indicated that the South Ossetian side could mobilize around 5,500 troops across various military and paramilitary units. (https://civil.ge/archives/111592)
• On December 14, 2006, the Tbilisi-loyal alternative authorities in South Ossetia, led by Dimitri Sanakoev, accused the rival secessionist government in Tskhinvali, headed by Eduard Kokoity, of intimidating local residents to hinder cooperation with the alternative administration. The accusations arose after the alternative government reportedly appointed Nina Khetagurova as Healthcare Minister without her consent, claiming she was offered a salary of $1,000 per month, a car, and a house in the Georgian village of Kurta, where Sanakoev's administration is based. Khetagurova allegedly informed South Ossetian law enforcement that she had rejected the offer. In response, Vladimir Sanakoev, the Minister of Information and Science, stated that Khetagurova was intimidated by Kokoity's government, asserting that such actions demonstrate Kokoity’s concern over the alternative government being composed of local residents. As of December 7, Dimitri Sanakoev had appointed eight out of twelve ministers in his cabinet, including Uruzmag Karkusov as Prime Minister, while the Healthcare Minister position remained vacant, along with three other ministerial roles in Culture, Justice, and Conflict Resolution. There would be no Ministry of Defense in the alternative government. (https://civil.ge/archives/111619)
• On December 20, 2006, South Ossetian leader Eduard Kokoity announced a meeting with negotiators from the Joint Control Commission (JCC) scheduled for December 27 in Tskhinvali. However, the Georgian side has decided to boycott this meeting, instead proposing an informal gathering among the JCC co-chairmen, which includes representatives from Georgia, Russia, South Ossetia, and North Ossetia. Boris Chochiev, the South Ossetian chief negotiator, stated that the meeting aims to address the accumulated issues in the negotiation process and to explore ways to resolve the current stalemate, which he attributed to the Georgian side's actions. The discussions were expected to focus on mutually acceptable proposals for peacefully settling the Georgian-Ossetian conflict. (https://civil.ge/archives/111652)
• On December 27, 2006, an informal meeting of the Joint Control Commission (JCC) in Tskhinvali ended without constructive results due to Georgian State Minister Merab Antadze's refusal to participate in discussions with South Ossetian leader Eduard Kokoity within the JCC framework, opting instead for separate talks. Kokoity criticized Antadze's level of authority, stating he would only meet with Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili, and expressed concern over reports that EU Special Representative Peter Semneby might meet with Tbilisi-backed alternative president Dimitri Sanakoev, warning that such a meeting would be deemed disrespectful and result in Semneby's exclusion from South Ossetia. (https://civil.ge/archives/111693)
• On December 27, 2006, Georgian State Minister for Conflict Resolution Issues Merab Antadze met with Dimitri Sanakoev, the Tbilisi-backed self-imposed leader of South Ossetia, in the Georgian village of Kurta. This engagement sparked anger among Tskhinvali authorities and Moscow, but Antadze emphasized the need for dialogue with all parties in the region that represent local interests. (https://civil.ge/archives/111697)
• On December 28, 2006, the Parliament of South Ossetia passed a restitution law in its final reading, granting internally displaced persons and refugees the right to return to their properties if they can prove ownership. A special tripartite commission, comprising representatives from both Georgian and South Ossetian sides alongside international organizations, will handle appeals from victims of the conflict. This law was part of Georgia's commitments upon joining the Council of Europe in 1999. (https://civil.ge/archives/111710)
• On January 1, 2007, South Ossetian leader Eduard Kokoity and government chairman Yuri Morozov outlined the region's independence agenda for the year ahead. Kokoity emphasized that promoting South Ossetia's independence on the international stage would be the top priority for 2007, noting that the region's reputation had grown following the November 12, 2006, referendum and presidential elections, which demonstrated the region's sovereignty. Morozov warned that the year would be challenging, stressing the need to secure international recognition of the referendum results and achieve energy independence from Georgia through a new gas pipeline linking South Ossetia to Russia. Meanwhile, Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili was expected to visit the village of Tamarasheni near Tskhinvali on January 2. (https://civil.ge/archives/109480)
• On January 2, 2007, Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili visited the Georgian village of Tamarasheni, located within the South Ossetian conflict zone and less than a kilometer from Tskhinvali. Addressing local residents, Saakashvili offered to improve infrastructure, including schools, roads, and hospitals, on both Georgian- and separatist-controlled areas, urging cooperation to enhance living conditions without preconditions. Saakashvili used a bypass road, avoiding Tskhinvali, and expressed hope for eventual unrestricted travel within Georgia. He later visited Achabeti, another Georgian village in the conflict zone. Concurrently, Georgian Interior Minister Vano Merabishvili visited the upper Kodori Gorge in Abkhazia to celebrate the New Year with Georgian forces stationed there. (https://civil.ge/archives/111717)
  • On January 2, 2007, South Ossetia’s Foreign Ministry condemned Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili's visit to Georgian villages in the South Ossetian conflict zone as a “demarche” intended to escalate tensions. The ministry claimed Saakashvili’s visit demonstrated support for “destructive forces” aligned with the Tbilisi-backed government based in the village of Kurta, which South Ossetian authorities view as illegitimate. In a statement reported by OSinform, South Ossetia urged the international community and negotiating parties to dissuade Georgia from “provocative actions” and to pursue solutions within existing peace negotiation frameworks, aligning with South Ossetia’s previously proposed peaceful initiative. (https://civil.ge/archives/111716)
• On January 31, 2007, Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili announced that residents of Georgian-controlled enclaves in South Ossetia would receive a one-time financial aid payment of GEL 100 (approximately USD 58). He emphasized his personal commitment to monitoring the situation in the Didi Liakhvi and Patara Liakhvi gorges, areas where these Georgian villages are located. Additionally, the Tbilisi-backed administration in South Ossetia, based in the village of Kurta, revealed plans to support local economic development through an upcoming project aimed at fostering small and medium-sized businesses, with further details to be provided soon. (https://civil.ge/archives/111845)
• On January 31, 2007, Georgian Foreign Minister Gela Bezhuashvili announced Georgia’s willingness to hold unconditional talks with Abkhazia’s de facto authorities, aiming for "target-oriented negotiations." Abkhaz leader Sergey Bagapsh responded, expressing readiness for direct discussions with Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili, contingent on Tbilisi's commitment to confidence-building and adherence to existing agreements. Georgian Minister Merab Antadze echoed this willingness but emphasized the need for thorough preparation for any high-level meeting. Efforts to hold a summit between Saakashvili and Bagapsh have stalled since late 2005, primarily due to disagreements over a treaty on non-resumption of hostilities. Key points of contention include Tbilisi's push to replace Russian peacekeepers with an international force, which has led to Abkhazia's hesitancy to sign the treaty. Similarly, Georgia has refrained from signing a non-hostility pact with South Ossetia, linking such agreements to a shift away from Russian-led peacekeeping. (https://civil.ge/archives/185503)
• Dmitri Medoev, a representative of the unrecognized South Ossetian authorities, rejected Tbilisi's calls for bilateral negotiations on February 5, 2007, stating that such talks outside the existing quadripartite format would harm the peace process. Medoev emphasized that Russia, as a major guarantor, must remain involved in negotiations, and that Georgia should consider Russia's position. This comes as Georgian officials have recently avoided participating in the Joint Control Commission (JCC), which includes representatives from Georgia, South Ossetia, Russia, and North Ossetia. Instead, Tbilisi advocates for a bilateral "constructive dialogue" with the involvement of the EU, U.S., OSCE, and Russia as mediators. (https://civil.ge/archives/111848)
• On March 26, 2007, President Mikheil Saakashvili announced that Tbilisi plans to establish a "temporary administrative unit" in the South Ossetian region to help the local population assume responsibility for the region's future. In a televised address to the National Security Council, Saakashvili explained that this unit would support the local people in taking part in peacekeeping and security efforts, helping address socio-economic issues. The move aims to facilitate negotiations and eventual elections for the region's status within Georgia. Saakashvili also referred to the growing political influence of Dimitri Sanakoev, a Tbilisi loyalist, as a blow to South Ossetian secessionist leader Eduard Kokoity. This announcement followed a March 25 attack, in which two Georgian policemen were killed near the conflict zone, an event Saakashvili attributed to provocation by Kokoity's regime. (https://civil.ge/archives/112151)
  • On March 27, 2007, further details emerged regarding President Saakashvili's proposal to establish a temporary administrative unit in South Ossetia, which would likely see Dimitri Sanakoev, the self-declared leader of the alternative South Ossetian government, take charge. The Georgian government emphasized that this new administrative structure would enable Tbilisi to govern the region with the involvement of local leaders, including Sanakoev's movement, “People of South Ossetia for Peace”. Gela Bezhuashvili, the Georgian Foreign Minister, stressed the importance of recognizing this new reality in the region for peace efforts. Sanakoev's administration would help provide local governance and support for rehabilitation in the region, benefiting both ethnic Georgians and Ossetians. While most Georgian officials supported the initiative, the opposition remained cautious, questioning the plan's potential impact on resolving the conflict. (https://civil.ge/archives/112079)
  • On March 29, 2007, the Russian Foreign Ministry warned that Tbilisi’s plan to create a temporary administrative unit in Georgian-controlled South Ossetia, led by pro-Tbilisi leader Dimitri Sanakoev, could destabilize the already fragile situation in the region. Russia condemned the move, labeling Sanakoev’s group a "puppet government" and argued that attempts to introduce new parties into the negotiation process would be a violation of international norms. The Ministry cautioned that this initiative could lead to increased tensions, potentially resulting in military conflict, and urged Georgia to reconsider its approach and engage constructively in the peace process. (https://civil.ge/archives/185513)
  • On March 30, 2007, Georgian authorities condemned the Russian Foreign Ministry’s reaction to Tbilisi’s plan to set up a provisional administrative unit in South Ossetia. The Georgian government accused Russia of using “unfriendly” and “provocative” language, particularly in calling Tbilisi’s actions a threat to the region's stability. The Georgian State Minister for Conflict Resolution expressed surprise at Moscow’s tone, which he deemed to resemble "special services" rhetoric. Furthermore, Georgia rejected Russia’s claim that there were only two “internationally recognized” parties in the conflict, asserting that the Georgian government was the sole legitimate party and was engaging in negotiations with various local forces, including the South Ossetian separatist leadership. (https://civil.ge/archives/112172)
• On April 5, 2007, President Saakashvili praised the Georgian Parliament for endorsing a proposal to create a provisional administrative entity in South Ossetia, calling it a "very important and principled decision." He explained that the initiative aimed to institutionalize the autonomous rights of the Ossetian population while protecting Georgia’s territorial integrity and preventing external interference. The proposal, approved with near unanimous support in Parliament, was seen as a sign that state interests were prevailing over political ambitions. Saakashvili emphasized the need for compromises, flexible talks, and intensive dialogue with all parties to ensure peaceful conflict resolution, despite acknowledging the challenges and provocations that might arise. (https://civil.ge/archives/112199)
• On April 11, 2007, Russian Ambassador Vyacheslav Kovalenko commented on President Saakashvili's initiative to create a provisional administrative entity in South Ossetia, calling it "very important" but "incorrect." Kovalenko warned that while it was a serious step, the creation of new administrative structures would not lead to peace but rather trigger further confrontation in the region. His remarks came after Georgian Parliamentary Chairperson Nino Burjanadze briefed foreign diplomats about the initiative, which had already passed two readings in Parliament. Despite Kovalenko's objection, Burjanadze noted that the majority of diplomats supported the Georgian government's approach. (https://civil.ge/archives/112220)
• On April 11, 2007, South Ossetian leader Eduard Kokoity warned that anyone who establishes contacts with Dimitri Sanakoev's alternative government in South Ossetia or the Abkhaz government-in-exile in the Georgian-controlled upper Kodori Gorge would be denied entry to South Ossetia. Kokoity condemned such actions, calling the recognition of these self-styled governments the "height of cynicism and provocation." The alternative government, loyal to Tbilisi, was set up in the village of Kurta, near the breakaway capital of Tskhinvali. (https://civil.ge/archives/112221)
• On April 13, 2007, the Parliament of breakaway South Ossetia strongly condemned Tbilisi’s plans to create a provisional administrative unit in the region, calling it an action that aggravates Georgian-Ossetian relations. The South Ossetian authorities labeled the alternative president and government, along with the proposed administrative entity, as illegal and puppet entities designed to undermine the official South Ossetian authorities. They argued that these developments could potentially escalate the tense situation into violence, threatening both regional stability and Russia's national security interests. Meanwhile, the Georgian Parliament passed a law to establish this entity, aiming to resolve the conflict peacefully, define South Ossetia’s autonomous status, and prepare for democratic elections. (https://civil.ge/archives/112232)
• On April 23, 2007, President Mikheil Saakashvili announced plans for creating a transitional administration in South Ossetia starting May 1, aiming for peaceful conflict resolution. He proposed a five-point plan, offering cooperation to both Eduard Kokoity's secessionist authorities and the Sanakoev-led alternative government. This plan includes the creation of a provisional administration, with appointed deputy ministers for key sectors like finance, education, health, and more. Saakashvili emphasized the goal of granting higher autonomy to South Ossetia, along with a financial package for the region's development. He expressed the intention to involve ethnic Ossetians in Georgian governance, aiming for unity and peace. Saakashvili also criticized the current negotiation format as ineffective, asserting that local populations had grown tired of meaningless talks and that future negotiations should involve ethnic groups from all sides. He reiterated Georgia’s readiness to engage with Russia and other parties, while stressing that the Georgian government has full political support for the initiative and was prepared for swift action. (https://civil.ge/archives/112278)
• On April 23, 2007, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Grigory Karasin rejected the idea of holding talks with the alternative government of South Ossetia, stating that Russia would not engage with these “artificial structures” created by Georgia. Karasin criticized Georgia's efforts to support the alternative government, accusing them of turning it into the “genuine side” in the conflict through an active PR campaign. He argued that such actions erode trust with the existing governments of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, undermining the peace process. Karasin emphasized Russia's commitment to neighborly relations with Georgia and the peaceful resolution of conflicts, but reiterated that it would not recognize the alternative government. (https://civil.ge/archives/185515)
  • On April 24, 2007, Georgia called on Russia to coordinate the financial aid allocated for the rehabilitation of the South Ossetian conflict zone with Tbilisi. Merab Antadze, the Georgian State Minister for Conflict Resolution Issues, expressed concern that Russia had spent the €3 million allocated for rehabilitation without transparency or coordination, making it unclear where and how the funds were utilized. In contrast, other donors, including the European Union, had pledged €7 million for various rehabilitation projects in the region. Russian officials, including Gennady Bukaev, defended the spending, stating that the funds had been used for the reconstruction of social facilities, and announced plans to visit Tskhinvali on April 25 to review the projects. (https://civil.ge/archives/112287)
• On May 11, 2007, Dimitri Sanakoev, the Tbilisi-backed leader of South Ossetia's alternative administration, will address the Georgian Parliament as part of a move to legalize his administration in Tbilisi-controlled areas of the breakaway region. On May 7, President Mikheil Saakashvili urged the establishment of a provisional administrative entity in South Ossetia, emphasizing the need to transition from words to action for resolving the conflict and establishing autonomous governance. Parliamentary Chairperson Nino Burjanadze, who met Sanakoev on May 4, praised his administration as serious and responsible. South Ossetian secessionist leaders and Russia have dismissed Sanakoev’s government as a “puppet,” but Burjanadze countered that his administration had raised specific issues on regional autonomy, naming conventions, and financial matters. Attempts to engage with secessionist leader Eduard Kokoity were rebuffed, though Saakashvili described the offer of talks as “very special” given Kokoity’s history of promoting violence. (https://civil.ge/archives/112344)
• On May 8, 2007, South Ossetian secessionist leader Eduard Kokoity warned that Tskhinvali may withdraw from negotiations with Tbilisi if Georgia continues to promote Dimitri Sanakoev as an alternative leader, a move Tskhinvali sees as an attempt to divide Ossetian society. Kokoity accused Georgia of escalating tensions and undermining the peace process, stating that "civilized dialogue" is the only acceptable path forward for South Ossetia. Talks are already stalled, with Tskhinvali and Moscow favoring the quadripartite Joint Control Commission (JCC) as the negotiation format. However, Tbilisi opposes the JCC, viewing it as biased and outdated, and seeks an alternative negotiation framework. (https://civil.ge/archives/112349)
• On May 8, 2007, the Georgian Parliament voted 149 to 4 to establish a provisional administration in South Ossetia, paving the way for Dimitri Sanakoev—the Tbilisi-backed alternative South Ossetian leader—to be appointed as its head. This decision aligns with a recent law from April and is intended to create a flexible legal framework, allowing room for future adjustments. Following parliamentary approval, President Saakashvili is expected to issue a decree appointing Sanakoev by May 11, when he is scheduled to address Parliament. Due to sensitivities around regional identity, the administration’s name has been left undefined to avoid controversy, as some Georgian officials reject the term “South Ossetia” in favor of “Samachablo” or “Tskhinvali Region.” Meanwhile, Eduard Kokoity, the South Ossetian secessionist leader, warned that if Georgia continues supporting Sanakoev’s administration, Tskhinvali may exit negotiations. Kokoity and Moscow insist on using the quadripartite Joint Control Commission (JCC) as the negotiating framework, which Georgia seeks to bypass, labeling it biased and outdated. (https://civil.ge/archives/112352)
  • On May 10, 2007, President Mikheil Saakashvili formally appointed Dimitri Sanakoev as the head of the provisional administrative entity in South Ossetia, establishing his authority just before Saakashvili's departure for Poland. This appointment, finalized by presidential decree, grants Sanakoev official status for his May 11 address to the Georgian Parliament, a demand made by opposition parties who threatened to boycott his speech otherwise. Sanakoev's position, initiated after his installation as the alternative South Ossetian leader in Tbilisi-controlled areas last November, represents a strategic move by Georgia to challenge the long-standing status quo in the conflict zone. According to the Caucasus Institute for Peace, Democracy, and Development (CIPDD), this approach aims to diminish the ethnic dimension of the South Ossetian conflict, signaling a shift in Tbilisi's policy. (https://civil.ge/archives/112363)
• On May 11, 2007, Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Mikheil Kaminin condemned South Ossetian militia actions as a “serious violation” of ceasefire agreements, following an incident on May 7 in which South Ossetian armed men threatened Joint Peacekeeping Forces (JPKF) and unarmed OSCE observers. The confrontation occurred when peacekeepers discovered an anti-aircraft gun (Zu-23-2) and a Strela-2 handheld air defense weapon near Nikozi and Avnevi in the South Ossetian conflict zone. The militia fired warning shots, blocking further inspection. The OSCE and Tbilisi condemned the incident, and the weapon was seized by peacekeepers on May 8 and transferred to JPKF headquarters. Kaminin praised the “effectiveness” of Russian peacekeepers, asserting that this incident underscores Russia’s neutral role in peacekeeping and conflict resolution—a rare public reproach from Moscow toward Tskhinvali. (https://civil.ge/archives/112370)
• On May 11, 2007, Georgian State Minister for Conflict Resolution Merab Antadze visited Tskhinvali to address the South Ossetian authorities' roadblocks restricting access to Georgian-controlled villages. Antadze began discussions with Boris Chochiev, South Ossetian deputy prime minister, and planned to meet with Marat Kulakhmetov, the commander of the Joint Peacekeeping Forces. That day, Georgian media showed South Ossetian law enforcement setting up concrete barriers near Tskhinvali. The South Ossetian Press and Information Committee claimed the road closures were for security, to prevent "provocations" from Georgia’s "puppet government" under Dimitri Sanakoev. They demanded Tbilisi dismantle Sanakoev’s administration before unblocking the roads. Georgian Prime Minister Zurab Nogaideli responded firmly, rejecting this "blackmail" and affirming support for dialogue with Sanakoev. (https://civil.ge/archives/112371)
• On May 11, 2007, Dimitri Sanakoev, appointed by President Saakashvili as head of South Ossetia's provisional administration, addressed the Georgian Parliament, advocating for broad autonomy for the Ossetian people within a unified Georgia as the path to resolving the conflict. He emphasized the need for direct dialogue between Georgians and Ossetians, supported by international assistance, and rejected the secessionist aims of Tskhinvali’s authorities. Reflecting on the futility of armed conflict, Sanakoev called for compromises and urged the implementation of the 2006 law on property restitution for conflict victims. His speech was praised by Parliamentary Chairperson Nino Burjanadze, but was boycotted by Russian Ambassador Vyacheslav Kovalenko, reflecting Moscow's opposition to the promotion of Sanakoev’s administration. (https://civil.ge/archives/112372)
  • Dimitri Sanakoev's address to the Georgian Parliament on May 11, 2007, emphasized direct dialogue as the only path to resolving the South Ossetian conflict. He acknowledged the historical challenges, citing the Soviet legacy and external forces as contributing to the strife, but stressed that a unified Georgia could provide Ossetians with autonomy, ensuring their cultural identity and future. Sanakoev expressed regret over the violence and loss of generations in South Ossetia, emphasizing the need for a peaceful, prosperous future where children would grow up in a stable environment, not under the shadow of conflict. He urged mutual compromise and international support to heal wounds and rebuild trust. Ultimately, he proposed broad autonomy for South Ossetia within Georgia, complemented by joint economic and social projects to restore faith between the two communities. The speech was an appeal for cooperation to create a shared, peaceful future for both Georgians and Ossetians. (https://civil.ge/archives/112373)
• On May 12, 2007, a shootout in the South Ossetian conflict zone left a Georgian policeman injured and a civilian from Tskhinvali slightly wounded. The clashes involved automatic rifles and grenade launchers, occurring between southern Tskhinvali and Georgian villages like Nikozi and Ergneti, and later near northern Tskhinvali and villages such as Tamarasheni and Kverneti. The Georgian side accused South Ossetian militias of initiating the fire, while South Ossetia's Interior Minister, Mikhail Mindzaev, claimed his forces responded to a Georgian attack on Tskhinvali. These incidents followed the appointment of Dimitri Sanakoev as head of a provisional administration by Georgia on May 10. In retaliation, South Ossetian leader Eduard Kokoity ordered a blockade of Georgian villages, only offering to lift it once Tbilisi disbanded Sanakoev's administration. Sanakoev condemned the shootouts, accusing Tskhinvali authorities of attempting to escalate tensions. (https://civil.ge/archives/112379)
• On May 16, 2007, Russian diplomat Yuri Popov ruled out any talks with Dimitri Sanakoev, the head of the Tbilisi-loyal South Ossetian provisional administration, stating that Moscow did not recognize him as a legitimate party in the conflict. Popov emphasized that Sanakoev represented Georgia's executive authorities, and thus, was not considered a valid negotiating partner. He further remarked that engaging with Sanakoev was not feasible at this stage. Popov, who is Russia's chief negotiator in the Joint Control Commission (JCC) overseeing South Ossetia, traveled to Tskhinvali afterward for discussions with South Ossetian authorities and Russian peacekeepers, aiming to ease tensions in the region. (https://civil.ge/archives/112397)
• On May 16, 2007, Georgian Foreign Minister Gela Bezhuashvili declared that Tbilisi had made a “breakthrough” with the emergence of Dimitri Sanakoev, the alternative South Ossetian leader. Bezhuashvili highlighted that Sanakoev, a former defense minister in the secessionist government, had garnered significant support from both Georgian and Ossetian populations and was the first former separatist to call for peace. He contrasted Sanakoev’s legitimacy with that of Eduard Kokoity, the de facto South Ossetian leader, whom he claimed had little connection to the Ossetian people or culture, unlike Sanakoev. Despite Tbilisi’s willingness to engage in talks with Kokoity, Bezhuashvili noted that Kokoity had consistently rejected all invitations for dialogue. (https://civil.ge/archives/112400)
• On May 29, 2007, Russian Ambassador in Georgia Vyacheslav Kovalenko warned that Tbilisi’s support for Dimitri Sanakoev’s South Ossetian provisional administration was “dangerous” and was “leading in the wrong direction.” Kovalenko emphasized that there were only two sides to the conflict: Tbilisi and Tskhinvali. He also expressed Moscow's concern about the potential for escalating tensions to lead to war. His remarks followed an intensive shootout in the conflict zone overnight on May 29. The Georgian State Ministry for Conflict Resolution called for immediate measures to de-escalate the situation, treating the incident as a final warning. (https://civil.ge/archives/112462)
• On June 27, 2007, Moscow reaffirmed its refusal to engage in talks with the Tbilisi-backed South Ossetian provisional administration led by Dimitri Sanakoev. The Russian Foreign Ministry emphasized that the Kurta-based authorities were not considered a party in the South Ossetian conflict. Moscow stated that it supported the Tskhinvali-based separatist authorities, asserting that any talks should involve direct negotiations with the central Georgian government in Tbilisi rather than with local representatives loyal to Georgia. (https://civil.ge/archives/112604)
  • This statement came in response to recent media speculation suggesting that Moscow might shift its support to the Tbilisi-aligned administration. The Russian Ministry dismissed such claims as misleading and unhelpful, stressing that they would not contribute to confidence-building in the ongoing negotiation process.
• On June 29, 2007, Eduard Kokoity, the leader of the South Ossetian secessionist authorities, met with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov in Moscow. The discussions occurred against the backdrop of rising tensions in the South Ossetia region. (https://civil.ge/archives/112616)
  • The meeting followed two key incidents: a mortaring attack on Tskhinvali by Georgian forces, which injured a South Ossetian militiaman (though Georgia denied the accusation), and a scuffle between local Georgian residents and Russian peacekeepers on June 28. The latter incident revolved around the construction of a road in the conflict zone, with the peacekeepers temporarily blocking the work, which led to protests. Russian peacekeepers later showed restraint and withdrew, resuming the road construction. This incident was portrayed as a victory by Tbilisi, fueling calls for the withdrawal of Russian troops from the region.
  • During their talks, Lavrov and Kokoity expressed concern over the escalating violence, particularly the shelling of Tskhinvali and actions against Russian peacekeepers. Lavrov warned that rising tensions were becoming dangerous and criticized Georgian actions as destabilizing for South Ossetia. The Russian Foreign Ministry condemned the Georgian actions, asserting that they were meant to destabilize the situation.
  • However, while supporting South Ossetia, Lavrov also urged Kokoity to show restraint toward the local Georgian population, particularly regarding issues such as water supply and freedom of movement. These issues had previously led to tensions, with South Ossetian authorities blocking roads and cutting off irrigation water to Georgian villages in the conflict zone.
  • Lavrov also reiterated Moscow's stance that the current Moscow-led formats for negotiations should remain central to resolving the conflict. After the talks, Kokoity expressed that Moscow's backing for Tskhinvali was “full support,” while Lavrov stressed the need for flexibility in addressing issues within the region.
  • Tensions had increased following Dimitri Sanakoev’s visit to Brussels earlier in June, signaling that Georgia's efforts to create a provisional administration for South Ossetia were gaining European support. The European Union welcomed Tbilisi’s efforts but emphasized that the success of an all-inclusive consultative process would require time and confidence-building measures.
• On July 4, 2007, Vyacheslav Kovalenko, Russia’s Ambassador to Georgia, stated that there was no need for “new players and new parties” in the South Ossetian conflict resolution process. He was responding to Tbilisi’s promotion of Dimitri Sanakoev, the head of its loyal provisional administration in South Ossetia, whom they hoped would have a role in resolving the conflict. Kovalenko emphasized that the two internationally recognized sides in the conflict were the Georgian central authorities and the secessionist authorities in Tskhinvali. In response, President Mikheil Saakashvili rejected this view, insisting that there was no distinct “South Ossetian side” but rather a conflict involving ethnic Georgians and ethnic Ossetians on the Georgian side, portraying the conflict as one involving “criminal elements” in Tskhinvali, influenced by Russian forces. Tbilisi's promotion of Sanakoev, an ethnic Ossetian, was a reflection of this stance. (https://civil.ge/archives/112641)
• On July 13, 2007, a state commission was established, chaired by Prime Minister Zurab Nogaideli, to develop South Ossetia’s autonomous status within the Georgian state. This initiative was confirmed by Petre Mamradze, head of the government’s administration, and supported by a decree signed by President Mikheil Saakashvili. The process is expected to involve inclusive dialogue with all forces and communities within South Ossetia. Many observers view the initiative as a move to further support Dimitri Sanakoev, the head of the Tbilisi-loyal South Ossetian provisional administration, who has been advocating for the region's status within a unified Georgia. Sanakoev had previously emphasized this theme during a Batumi conference on July 3, as part of Tbilisi’s effort to promote him internationally, including his appearances at EU and U.S. diplomatic meetings. (https://civil.ge/archives/112685)
• On July 18, 2007, President Mikheil Saakashvili emphasized that Georgia is engaged in a battle "to win the hearts and minds" of the local population in South Ossetia. During a government session, he urged ministers to work quickly and noted the financial commitment to support rehabilitation and social projects in the region. Saakashvili portrayed the situation as a fight between a rich, inflexible mechanism and the Georgian state, which he described as encompassing various ethnicities. He also revealed that a government commission, chaired by Prime Minister Zurab Nogaideli, would soon explore the region's autonomous status within Georgia, working closely with Dimitri Sanakoev, the head of the Tbilisi-loyal South Ossetian provisional administration. The commission’s goal is to restore connections between all communities in South Ossetia and the Georgian state. Saakashvili reiterated his opposition to terms like "the Georgian side" and "the South Ossetian side," aiming to frame the conflict not as an ethnic issue but as one involving "criminal elements" in Tskhinvali manipulated by external forces, particularly Russia. He concluded by calling for more intensive and proactive conflict resolution efforts, both in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. (https://civil.ge/archives/112708)
• On July 20, 2007, Yuri Popov, Russia’s chief negotiator for South Ossetia, suggested that Dimitri Sanakoev, the head of the Tbilisi-backed South Ossetian provisional administration, could potentially participate in negotiations within the framework of the Joint Control Commission (JCC). However, Popov stressed that Sanakoev’s administration should not be considered a separate party to the conflict, emphasizing that he operates as part of the Georgian government, overseeing areas under Georgia’s sovereignty. Popov proposed holding an informal JCC meeting in Tbilisi from August 1-3, in preparation for a plenary session. He also criticized Georgia for increasing its police presence in the conflict zone, calling it unjustified and destabilizing, which he claimed provoked South Ossetians into inappropriate actions. Popov warned that Russia might increase its peacekeeping force by 300 personnel if necessary, although he deemed it unnecessary at the moment as peacekeepers were managing their tasks effectively. Additionally, Popov noted that the Georgian battalion in the Joint Peacekeeping Forces (JPKF) seemed to follow orders more from Tbilisi than from JPKF commanders. (https://civil.ge/archives/112725)
• On July 25, 2007, Tbilisi initiated a new attempt to define the status of South Ossetia, marking the second such effort in two years. The newly formed state commission, chaired by Prime Minister Zurab Nogaideli, held its first session on July 24, which included representatives from the Georgian government, civil society, and Ossetian communities in Georgia, along with Dimitri Sanakoev, head of the Tbilisi-backed South Ossetian provisional administration. (https://civil.ge/archives/112743)
  • The commission, which aims to work on South Ossetia's status, will focus on five sub-groups: constitutional and legal issues, economic, financial, cultural, and educational issues. The commission's framework is built on three core principles: Georgia’s territorial integrity, strong political and cultural guarantees for South Ossetia, and human rights. The commission's next session was scheduled for July 28 in the village of Kurta, where Sanakoev’s administration is based.
  • However, Tskhinvali (the seat of the secessionist South Ossetian authorities) rejected the process, calling the commission's approach "illegal" and "absurd." They argued that South Ossetia's status was already determined in referendums held in 1992 and November 2006, neither of which have been internationally recognized. They also criticized Tbilisi for conducting talks with Sanakoev's administration, calling him a "puppet" and an "outcast" in Ossetian society, noting that even his relatives had distanced themselves from him. Tskhinvali also accused Tbilisi of rushing to define South Ossetia's status, partly due to the international precedent set by Kosovo’s declaration of independence, which they believed could embolden similar movements in South Ossetia, Abkhazia, and Transnistria.
  • Tbilisi, on the other hand, emphasized that the process was crucial for the restoration of Georgia’s territorial integrity and voiced its intent to involve both Russia and the EU in the commission. However, Tbilisi also made it clear that the Tskhinvali authorities were invited to participate in the process, despite their rejection of the commission’s legitimacy.
  • On July 29, 2007, the Georgian government announced that the state commission tasked with defining the autonomous status of South Ossetia within Georgia would reconvene on August 15 in Tbilisi. The commission's sub-groups, which were formed during a session on July 28 in the Tamarasheni village in the conflict zone, are expected to propose a framework for the region’s status within the Georgian state, covering issues such as constitutional and legal matters, economic, financial, cultural, and educational concerns. (https://civil.ge/archives/112766)
    • The session included participation from officials from both the central Georgian government and the Tbilisi-backed South Ossetian provisional administration, alongside civil society representatives and Ivliane Khaindrava, a lawmaker from the opposition Republican Party, who was the only opposition member engaging with the commission. The Republican Party remains the sole opposition group cooperating with the commission.
    • Tbilisi has requested the involvement of Russia and the EU in the commission's work. Peter Semneby, the EU's special representative for the South Caucasus, stated that while the EU had not yet decided whether to respond to Georgia’s request, it could offer expertise on status issues and related legislation. In contrast, Russian ambassador Vyacheslav Kovalenko expressed doubts about Russia's involvement, although Georgian Prime Minister Zurab Nogaideli remained optimistic that Russia would participate in some capacity.
    • Tskhinvali's secessionist authorities have already rejected any involvement in the commission, continuing their opposition to Georgia's efforts. It is anticipated that the commission’s proposals will align with the framework Tbilisi had outlined in its 2005 document, Initiatives of the Georgian Government with Respect to the Peaceful Resolution of the Conflict in South Ossetia.
• On July 30, 2007, Uruzmag Karkusov, the prime minister of the Tbilisi-backed South Ossetian provisional administration, urged the wider use of the term “South Ossetia” rather than “Tskhinvali Region”, with the goal of making it more acceptable to the Georgian public. Speaking in an interview with the Georgian Public Broadcaster, Karkusov emphasized that using “South Ossetia” would help normalize the term in discussions about the region's future status. (https://civil.ge/archives/112769
  • While many Georgian officials remain hesitant to use “South Ossetia” due to concerns over legitimizing the name, the Georgian Foreign Ministry officially refers to the region as “Tskhinvali Region/South Ossetia” in its documents. The ongoing state commission working to define South Ossetia’s status within Georgia is expected to adopt this terminology.
  • The reluctance to widely use “South Ossetia” stems from fears that it could be seen as endorsing the idea of a divided Ossetian nation, with North Ossetia in Russia already calling for a potential unification of the two regions. However, advocates for the term argue that such concerns are speculative and that using "South Ossetia" will not pose a barrier to the negotiation of its political status.
• On August 5, 2007, a peaceful public campaign named “Kokoity Fandarast” (meaning Godspeed in Ossetian) was launched with the aim of removing Eduard Kokoity, the South Ossetian leader. The campaign was spearheaded by Vladimir Sanakoev, the spokesman for the Tbilisi-backed South Ossetian provisional administration. Sanakoev stated that many residents of Tskhinvali and South Ossetia were disillusioned with Kokoity's leadership but were afraid to speak out. (https://civil.ge/archives/112800)
  • The campaign was launched under the People of South Ossetia for Peace movement, founded by Dimitri Sanakoev, who was appointed head of the provisional administration. The campaign's symbol featured a black exclamation mark inside a white triangle with a red border, which aimed to send a warning to Kokoity to end his leadership. Sanakoev harshly criticized Kokoity's regime, calling him a “murderer of South Ossetia’s future” and vowed to continue the peaceful campaign until their goal was achieved.
  • This campaign aligns with earlier comments made by President Mikheil Saakashvili, who had advocated for “people power” as a way to address the South Ossetian conflict.
  • On August 9, 2007, Alania TV, a Tbilisi-based television station aimed at South Ossetian audiences, aired a segment drawing parallels between the Kmara movement, which played a pivotal role in the 2003 Rose Revolution in Georgia, and the Kokoity Fandarast movement. Kmara had been crucial in mobilizing public opinion against the government of then-President Aslan Abashidze in Adjara, contributing to his downfall. The Fandarast movement, also active in Georgia, shares a similar goal: to remove Eduard Kokoity, the secessionist leader of South Ossetia, through peaceful public campaigns. (https://civil.ge/archives/112834
    • The broadcast coincided with the opening of a Kokoity Fandarast office in Kutaisi, Georgia’s second-largest city. The movement, aligned with the Tbilisi-backed South Ossetian provisional administration, is seen as a modern-day counterpart to Kmara, with both aiming to challenge autocratic regimes. Giorgi Kandelaki, a former Kmara activist, noted that the tactics used against Abashidze’s regime could prove useful against Kokoity’s, as the two were seen as similar in nature.
    • In response, Kokoity dismissed the movement, confidently stating that he would “outlive all these movements,” signaling his disregard for the growing opposition efforts.
• On August 6, 2007, officials from South Ossetia and Russia's North Ossetian Republic met in Tskhinvali to prepare for a joint governmental session. The session, scheduled for mid-August, will be co-chaired by Eduard Kokoity, the leader of the South Ossetian separatist government, and Teimuraz Mamsurov, the head of North Ossetia. The meeting is set to take place in Vladikavkaz, the capital of North Ossetia. This development highlights ongoing political coordination between the breakaway region and its Russian counterpart.(https://civil.ge/archives/112801)
• On August 14, 2007, Tbilisi expressed strong dissatisfaction with the wording in a decree by Russian President Vladimir Putin, which referred to South Ossetia as the "Republic of South Ossetia." The decree, published on the Kremlin's official website, awarded state medals to 12 individuals from the breakaway region, including Ella Jioyeva, the education minister of South Ossetia, who was described as the "Education Minister of the Republic of South Ossetia." (https://civil.ge/archives/112859)
  • The use of this terminology angered Georgian officials, particularly Davit Bakradze, Georgia's state minister for conflict resolution issues, who accused Russia of violating international law. Tbilisi's response reflected ongoing tensions between Georgia and Russia over the status of the separatist regions, as the Russian Foreign Ministry often uses similar terms to refer to the leadership of South Ossetia and Abkhazia in official statements.
• On September 1, 2007, tensions escalated between Tbilisi and the breakaway South Ossetian authorities as both sides engaged in a public relations battle. Secessionist authorities in Tskhinvali organized a protest, led by the On Our Own youth movement, targeting Vladimir Sanakoev, founder of the pro-Tbilisi Kokoity Fandarast movement. Protesters defaced his Tskhinvali home with graffiti labeling him and Dimitri Sanakoev, head of the Tbilisi-supported South Ossetian provisional administration, as “traitors.” The Tskhinvali government later distanced itself from the protest, labeling it an unsanctioned act but acknowledged issuing warnings to participants. Sanakoev accused the secessionist authorities of orchestrating the rally and intimidating his family. Meanwhile, Kokoity Fandarast expanded its pro-Georgian messaging through Georgian TV, notably Alania TV, featuring covert footage of masked activists in South Ossetia to showcase internal dissent against secessionist leader Eduard Kokoity. (https://civil.ge/archives/112950)
• On September 4, 2007, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Grigory Karasin met with South Ossetian secessionist leader Eduard Kokoity in Moscow. The meeting addressed tensions surrounding a planned "march" in the South Ossetian conflict zone, reportedly organized under the banner of Kokoity Fandarast, a Tbilisi-supported movement opposing Kokoity. Both sides voiced concerns over the march, which they viewed as provocative. (https://civil.ge/archives/112971
• On September 14, 2007, the Russian Foreign Ministry issued a strong warning to Tbilisi against organizing a "peace march" involving ethnic Ossetians in the South Ossetian conflict zone, suggesting it would exacerbate tensions. Moscow alleged that Georgian authorities were behind the planning, accusing them of offering financial incentives and employing intimidation tactics to gather participants. (https://civil.ge/archives/113036)
  • The ministry expressed concerns that the march could provoke clashes between participants and the local South Ossetian population, potentially escalating into violence involving Russian peacekeepers. They claimed that this scenario could lead to Dimitri Sanakoev, head of the Tbilisi-backed South Ossetian provisional administration, requesting Georgian military intervention to "restore order."
  • Additionally, Moscow suggested that the march might aim to disrupt a scheduled Joint Control Commission (JCC) session later that month in Tbilisi.
  • Russia called the initiative "irresponsible," urging Tbilisi to abandon the plans and appealed to the international community, including the OSCE, to take appropriate action. Georgian officials, however, denied any involvement or plans to organize such a march.
• On September 20, 2007, activists from Kokoity Fandarast, an anti-Kokoity movement advocating for peaceful political change in South Ossetia, reportedly distributed leaflets in Tskhinvali, the capital of the breakaway region. Vladimir Sanakoev, the movement’s founder, described the operation as a testament to their presence in areas under separatist control, claiming activists had risked their lives to carry it out. (https://civil.ge/archives/113068
  • The South Ossetian authorities disputed this account, alleging that the leaflets were dropped from a low-flying aircraft over the conflict zone, which they condemned as a breach of existing agreements. They accused the Georgian side of resorting to provocations following the alleged failure of the planned “peace march” initiative.
  • This act coincided with South Ossetia’s Independence Day celebrations, which included delegations from other breakaway regions such as Abkhazia, Transnistria, and Nagorno-Karabakh, as well as representatives from Russia’s North Ossetia, Karachaevo-Cherkessia, and Moscow.
  • No independent verification of the leaflet distribution has been made, but Sanakoev emphasized the effort as a significant propaganda move, underscoring his movement’s ability to operate within separatist-held territories.
• On September 22, 2007, the Russian Foreign Ministry condemned Western diplomats for attending an international conference on Georgia’s foreign policy priorities held in the village of Tamarasheni, near the South Ossetian capital of Tskhinvali. Organized by the Georgian government on September 21, the conference featured an address by Dimitri Sanakoev, head of the Tbilisi-backed South Ossetian provisional administration, which Russia refers to as a “puppet government.” (https://civil.ge/archives/113084)
  • The Russian Foreign Ministry described the participation of Western diplomats and international organization representatives as an “irresponsible step” aimed at promoting Sanakoev’s administration. It warned that such actions could escalate tensions in the region, undermine the negotiation process, and pave the way toward the potential recognition of the provisional administration.
  • The event also drew criticism from Russia for not coordinating the movement of foreign diplomats through the conflict zone with the Russian-commanded Joint Peacekeeping Forces. Russian peacekeepers briefly stopped the diplomats’ convoy, citing security concerns, before eventually allowing them to proceed to Tamarasheni.
  • Russia called for greater caution from international representatives in engaging with such events to avoid exacerbating the conflict. The incident underscores Moscow’s sensitive stance on foreign involvement in the South Ossetian dispute, particularly concerning actions perceived as legitimizing Tbilisi’s influence in the region.

2006-2007 winter energy crisis

• 4 August 2006: Georgia has halted electricity imports from Russia through the Kavkasioni high-voltage power line following the rehabilitation of the Enguri hydroelectric plant, which now generates 400 megawatts daily. Previously, the Kavkasioni line transmitted approximately 100 megawatts of electricity from Russia each day. The Kommersant also mentioned that Georgia's energy dependence on Russia is expected to decrease further by the end of 2006 with the launch of the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum gas pipeline. (https://civil.ge/archives/115041)
  • The Russian daily Kommersant noted that electricity imports have historically been politicized between Russia and Georgia, with past tensions leading to damages on the power line.
• Although the Russian Emergency Ministry had offered to send an Ilyushin-76 plane and a Mi-26 helicopter to assist with firefighting efforts, the Georgian side indicated that it had sufficient resources to manage the situation independently. In a sign of diplomatic courtesy, Russian news agencies reported that the Georgian Embassy had expressed gratitude to the Russian Emergency Ministry for their offer of assistance. August 17, 2006 (https://civil.ge/archives/115124)
• October 1: Georgian Energy Minister Nika Gilauri announced plans to diversify Georgia's energy supply by securing winter electricity imports from Turkey, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Iran. Following a trilateral meeting in Yerevan, Georgia signed an agreement enabling it to import at least 50 megawatts of electricity from Armenia and Iran in a barter arrangement, returning the same amount in the summer when Georgia typically has surplus energy. A similar deal with Turkey will allow Georgia to import 100 megawatts. Additionally, starting in November, Georgia will receive 300 million cubic meters of gas through Azerbaijan's Shah-Deniz pipeline—significantly more than initially planned—though the price for this increased supply is still under negotiation. While Russian energy company Gazprom remains Georgia’s main gas provider, these steps aim to bolster Georgia's energy security amid potential uncertainties. (https://civil.ge/archives/115490)
• On October 23, Iran and Georgia signed an agreement to swap electricity via Armenia, allowing Iran to supply approximately 50 megawatts to Georgia starting in late November. Iranian Energy Minister Parviz Fattah indicated potential for further cooperation, including transferring electricity to Russia through Georgia, and plans to invite Russia to future discussions. Georgian Energy Minister Nika Gilauri expressed optimism about increasing the capacity of energy exchange to 300 megawatts and highlighted the possibility of connecting Iranian electricity networks to the European Union's grids. Discussions regarding the export of Iranian gas to Georgia are still ongoing. (https://civil.ge/archives/111259)
• Georgian Prime Minister Zurab Nogaideli announced on October 25 that negotiations are ongoing between Iran and Georgia regarding the potential import of Iranian gas, including discussions about pricing. He indicated that some progress has been made towards reaching an agreement on gas supplies, although the talks are still in progress. This follows a recent visit to Tehran by Georgian Foreign Minister Gela Bezhuashvili and Energy Minister Nika Gilauri on October 22-23. (https://civil.ge/archives/111274)
• Parliament's Vice Speaker Mikheil Machavariani announced on October 30 that Russia is anticipated to raise the gas price for Georgia starting in 2007, indicating that the new pricing will be politically motivated rather than based on economic factors. This topic is set to be discussed in a meeting between Prime Minister Zurab Nogaideli and senior parliamentarians on the same day. Currently, the Kazakh state-run company KazTransGaz, which operates the gas distribution in Tbilisi, is in negotiations with the Russian energy giant Gazprom regarding the gas price for next year, with talks expected to conclude by mid-December. (https://civil.ge/archives/111304)
• On November 2, 2006, Russia's energy company Gazprom announced plans to nearly double the price of natural gas for Georgia, raising it from USD 110 to USD 230 per 1,000 cubic meters starting in 2007, according to Interfax news agency. However, Georgian Deputy Energy Minister Alexander Khetaguri and KazTransGaz, the Kazakh state-owned company managing gas distribution in Tbilisi, reported they had not yet received any official notification from Gazprom regarding this price increase. (https://civil.ge/archives/111328)
  • On November 2, 2006, Georgian officials criticized Gazprom’s plan to double the price of gas for Georgia—from USD 110 to USD 230 per 1,000 cubic meters—as a politically motivated decision aimed at pressuring Tbilisi. Georgian Deputy Energy Minister Alexander Khetaguri noted that no formal notification had been received yet, although discussions with Gazprom were ongoing, with a final agreement expected by mid-December. Georgian Foreign Minister Gela Bezhuashvili, in Moscow at the time, argued that the price increase was not economically justified, pointing out that Georgia, being geographically closer, should not pay the same rate as distant European nations. Bezhuashvili emphasized that while dialogue with Russia was progressing, the high gas price was a “political price.” National Bank President Roman Gotsiridze projected that the price hike could reduce Georgia's economic growth by 2% but would not severely impact the economy. Gazprom’s new price would be the highest for any CIS country, surpassing rates for Ukraine (USD 130) and Moldova (USD 170). This development comes amid ongoing diplomatic efforts, with a planned meeting between Georgian President Saakashvili and Russian President Putin at the CIS summit in Minsk, which both sides hope will advance the dialogue. (https://civil.ge/archives/185492)
  • Georgian Prime Minister Zurab Nogaideli convened a session of the government’s energy council on November 2 to address the impending gas price hike from Gazprom, which plans to raise the price from USD 110 to USD 230 per 1000 cubic meters starting in 2007. Describing the increase as a "political price," Nogaideli emphasized the need for the authorities to enhance negotiations with Azerbaijan, Turkey, and Iran to diversify energy supplies. He instructed the Energy Ministry to assist gas distribution companies in securing a more favorable price from Gazprom, and he announced plans to immediately begin construction of two new hydroelectric power plants in Paravani and Gudauri to reduce Georgia’s reliance on imported electricity. (https://civil.ge/archives/111334)
  • On November 3, Davit Usupashvili, the leader of the opposition Republican Party, urged the Georgian government to nationalize energy facilities owned by Russian companies, asserting that ongoing Russian control poses a constant threat to the nation’s energy supplies. He criticized the government for previously transferring ownership of these assets, which include the electricity distribution company Telasi and several hydroelectric power plants, to Russian firms. Usupashvili emphasized the need for an immediate nationalization plan to safeguard Georgia's energy security. (https://civil.ge/archives/111332)
  • On November 4, Georgian Prime Minister Zurab Nogaideli firmly stated that Georgia would not accept the proposed gas price of USD 230 per 1000 cubic meters from Russian energy giant Gazprom, labeling it a "non-commercial price." Nogaideli emphasized that if the price was deemed punitive against Georgia rather than a standard regional rate, there would be no basis for negotiations. He also highlighted that Georgia is actively engaging with Azerbaijan and Turkey to increase its share of gas from the Shah-Deniz pipeline, which is set to begin operations in December 2006. (https://civil.ge/archives/111345)
  • On November 3, U.S. Department of State spokesman Sean McCormack commented on the gas pricing issue between Georgia and Gazprom, stating that Russia should act as a reliable energy supplier and a good partner for its clients. He emphasized that market forces should dictate price levels, suggesting that the ongoing negotiations between Georgia and Gazprom would ideally lead to a fair price agreement. (https://civil.ge/archives/111346)
  • On November 7, 2006, Gazprom's export chief, Alexander Medvedev, stated that the Russian gas monopoly would maintain the current gas price of USD 110 per 1,000 cubic meters for Georgia if Tbilisi agreed to relinquish some of its assets. If not, the price would rise to USD 230 per 1,000 cubic meters. Medvedev did not detail which Georgian assets Gazprom was interested in but mentioned previous indications of interest without receiving a response from the Georgian government. He also warned that Gazprom would cease gas supplies to Georgia altogether if Tbilisi did not agree to a contract at the higher price. The backdrop includes Gazprom's previous attempts to acquire Georgia's North-South Caucasus gas pipeline system, a move that faced opposition likely due to U.S. influence. (https://civil.ge/archives/111359)
  • On November 8, 2006, Georgian Parliamentary Chairperson Nino Burjanadze firmly stated that Georgia would not trade its gas pipeline system with Russia's Gazprom under any circumstances, following Gazprom's executive Alexander Medvedev's suggestion on November 7 that a reduced gas price of USD 110 per 1,000 cubic meters could be offered if Georgia agreed to relinquish some of its assets, presumably the gas pipeline. Burjanadze emphasized the importance of energy independence for Georgia, asserting that the country would pay any price to maintain it, and reassured the parliament that both the ruling majority and opposition lawmakers were united in their aspirations toward NATO and the EU. Concerns had been raised by some opposition members regarding potential government interest in negotiating with Gazprom, with MP Lado Papava warning that selling the pipeline would only provide temporary relief from rising gas prices, while the opposition called into question the role of State Minister for Economic Reforms, Kakha Bendukidze, who had previously suggested a more favorable view toward selling the pipeline, despite asserting that his views did not represent the government’s official position. (https://civil.ge/archives/111360)
  • On November 8, 2006, Georgian Prime Minister Zurab Nogaideli accused Gazprom of political blackmail after the Russian energy company suggested that Georgia relinquish some of its assets in exchange for a reduced gas price of USD 110 per 1,000 cubic meters, compared to the proposed USD 230 per 1,000 cubic meters. Nogaideli described the higher price as a "political price" meant to exert pressure on Georgia, asserting that the country would not yield to such tactics. He emphasized that Georgia was negotiating gas prices not only with Russia but also with other neighboring countries to secure the best deal for its citizens. Meanwhile, Georgian Foreign Minister Gela Bezhuashvili, speaking at a news conference in Paris, condemned Russia's approach, stating that using economic sanctions and blockades to achieve political goals was unacceptable. (https://civil.ge/archives/111361)
  • On November 8, 2006, Georgian State Minister for Economic Reforms Kakha Bendukidze reaffirmed that the government would not succumb to what he termed "Russia's blackmail" regarding gas negotiations with Gazprom, which had recently suggested that Georgia relinquish some of its assets for cheaper gas prices. Bendukidze faced criticism from opposition lawmakers who labeled him a "Russia's agent" due to his previous comments that he saw no threat in potentially selling Georgia's North-South Caucasus Gas Pipeline system, which facilitates the delivery of Russian gas to Georgia and Armenia. In response, Bendukidze dismissed the accusations from the opposition, calling their proposals ultra-leftist and likening them to "Bolshevik and Communist-style ideas," particularly referencing the Republican Party's suggestion to buy back energy facilities controlled by Russian companies. (https://civil.ge/archives/111362)
  • On November 14, 2006, President Saakashvili stated that Georgia will not agree to purchase Russian gas at the price of USD 230 per 1,000 cubic meters, the latest offer from Gazprom. He emphasized, "First let me make it very clear. We will not pay USD 230 because this is not a commercial price – when at this moment some of our neighbors are paying USD 65 in real terms, some of the others are paying USD 110, USD 130," according to Reuters. Saakashvili added that Georgia is not in a dire situation and can find ways to navigate around what he termed a "political price." Earlier, on November 7, Gazprom’s export chief, Alexander Medvedev, warned that gas deliveries to Georgia would cease on January 1, 2007, if Tbilisi did not sign a deal for the higher price. In response, Saakashvili asserted that Georgia would counter Russia’s "blackmail" by diversifying its energy supplies and reducing gas consumption. (https://civil.ge/archives/111410)
• On November 17, 2006, U.S. diplomat Matthew Bryza commented on Georgia's challenging situation regarding gas supplies, particularly in light of Russian gas monopoly Gazprom's demand to sell gas at $230 per 1,000 cubic meters. He noted that Gazprom's offer included an ultimatum for Tbilisi to either accept the price or relinquish some of its strategic energy assets, placing Georgia in a precarious position. Bryza highlighted that both Georgia and Armenia are facing similar difficulties with gas supply stability. In response, Georgia is actively negotiating with Iran, Azerbaijan, and Turkey to secure alternative gas sources, with Bryza emphasizing the U.S. commitment to assisting Georgia in diversifying its energy supplies without entering into a competitive stance against Russia. He underscored the urgency of ensuring that Georgia and its neighbors have adequate energy supplies, especially as winter approaches (https://civil.ge/archives/111438)
• On November 23, 2006, Georgian Prime Minister Zurab Nogaideli announced that he anticipates finalizing potential gas supplies from Iran by December, following discussions with Iranian Vice-President Pervez Dawoodi during the World Economic Forum in Istanbul. Nogaideli indicated that Georgia is negotiating gas supplies with Azerbaijan, Iran, Russia, and Turkey, but did not disclose specific details due to the commercial nature of the talks. Georgia's strategy to reduce dependency on expensive Russian gas relies on the South Caucasus Gas Pipeline (SCP) project, which is expected to provide significant gas supplies next year. However, concerns have arisen regarding Azerbaijan's ability to supply additional gas due to potential shortages, further complicated by Russian pressure on Azerbaijan. Despite Gazprom's offer to supply gas at a higher price of USD 230 per 1,000 cubic meters, Georgia has rejected it, viewing it as a form of political blackmail. Nogaideli and Energy Minister Nika Gilauri plan to visit Baku later in November to discuss these gas supply issues with Azerbaijani officials. (https://civil.ge/archives/111488)
• On November 24, 2006, Georgian Vice-Speaker Mikheil Machavariani reported that Russia is exerting pressure on Azerbaijan to limit its gas exports to Georgia. During his recent visit to Azerbaijan, Machavariani stated that Russia warned Azerbaijan that selling more gas to Georgia would result in higher prices for the Azerbaijani market. However, he noted that Azerbaijani officials expressed their willingness to assist Georgia and are actively seeking solutions to the issue. (https://civil.ge/archives/111476)
• On November 24, 2006, an explosion caused by a gas leak damaged the North Caucasus-Trans Caucasus gas pipeline in Russia’s North Ossetia, according to the Russian news agency RIA Novosti. Georgian Deputy Energy Minister Alexander Khetaguri assured that the explosion would not affect gas supplies to Georgia, stating that the country does not receive gas from this particular pipeline, as it is an internal Russian pipeline. He emphasized that there is no danger to Georgia's gas supply, contrasting the situation with a previous energy crisis triggered by simultaneous explosions in January 2006 that had impacted Russian gas deliveries to Georgia. (https://civil.ge/archives/111490)
• On November 27, 2006, U.S. Ambassador to Georgia John Tefft stated that a long-term energy partnership between Georgia and Iran is unacceptable to the United States. In an interview with the Georgian weekly *Kviris Palitra*, Tefft noted that while the U.S. understood Georgia's short-term deal with Iran in January 2006—necessary due to Russian gas supply disruptions—its position is influenced by UN Security Council resolutions regarding Iran's nuclear program. Tefft clarified that comments made by U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Matthew Bryza on November 17, which some interpreted as tacit approval of Georgia's energy dealings with Iran, were misinterpreted. Bryza had acknowledged Georgia's challenging position after Gazprom's announcement of significant gas price hikes, emphasizing the importance of energy security for Georgia without endorsing long-term ties with Iran. (https://civil.ge/archives/111503)
• On November 27, 2006, Georgian Prime Minister Zurab Nogaideli confirmed that Georgia will proceed with energy cooperation with Iran, including plans to purchase gas from the country. His comments came in response to U.S. Ambassador John Tefft's earlier statement declaring that a long-term energy partnership between Georgia and Iran is unacceptable to the United States. Nogaideli expressed uncertainty about Tefft's remarks but emphasized Georgia's need for energy supplies, particularly in light of Gazprom's announcement of significant price increases for gas. He noted discussions with U.S. officials, including Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Matthew Bryza, who acknowledged Georgia's difficult energy situation and stated that the U.S. would not prevent Georgia from securing gas from Iran during winter. Despite some interpretations of Bryza's comments as tacit approval of Georgia's dealings with Iran, Tefft clarified that those statements were misinterpreted. (https://civil.ge/archives/185497)
• On November 27, 2006, U.S. Ambassador to Georgia John Tefft stated that the United States does not support long-term energy cooperation between Georgia and Iran, although it may overlook short-term deals for emergency gas supplies during winter. In an interview with the Georgian weekly *Kviris Palitra*, Tefft emphasized that U.S. policy is informed by UN Security Council resolutions related to Iran’s nuclear program. Georgian Prime Minister Zurab Nogaideli confirmed that Georgia intends to purchase gas from Iran and possibly exchange electricity, stating that discussions with U.S. officials, including Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Matthew Bryza, clarified that the U.S. would not prevent Georgia from securing gas in winter. Nogaideli noted that negotiations with multiple suppliers, including Russia and Azerbaijan, are ongoing to find the best options for Georgia. His comments come amidst concerns from opposition lawmakers regarding the government’s gas supply strategy for 2007, particularly in light of rising prices from Russia and U.S. warnings against Iranian partnerships. (https://civil.ge/archives/111506)
• President Mikheil Saakashvili announced on November 29, 2006, that his meeting with Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev at the CIS summit in Minsk would yield “very important” results for Georgia’s energy strategy, as the country seeks to reduce its reliance on Russian gas supplies. Saakashvili emphasized that this winter would exemplify the “brotherly relations” between Azerbaijan and Georgia, and he revealed that Georgian Prime Minister Zurab Nogaideli and Energy Minister Nika Gilauri would visit Baku on November 30 to negotiate gas supplies from the Shah Deniz field. Nogaideli also mentioned ongoing discussions with Turkey regarding a restructured deal for gas and highlighted negotiations with Gazprom’s export arm taking place in Yerevan due to logistical issues in Moscow. Additionally, a joint Georgian-Iranian economic commission is set to convene in Tehran in late December to finalize the gas supply arrangements from Iran for 2007. (https://civil.ge/archives/111519)
• President Saakashvili indicated on November 29 that Azerbaijan is ready to supply Georgia with natural gas, a crucial move as Tbilisi seeks alternatives to reduce its dependency on Russian energy. Following a meeting with Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev during the CIS summit in Minsk, Saakashvili expressed optimism about the strengthening of bilateral relations, though he did not confirm any specific agreements. Georgian Prime Minister Zurab Nogaideli, along with Energy Minister Nika Gilauri, is scheduled to visit Azerbaijan on November 30 to discuss potentially re-negotiating the Shah-Deniz gas deal. Currently, Georgia receives 200 million cubic meters of gas as a transit fee and an additional 50 million cubic meters at a reduced price, but it aims to secure more supplies. Meanwhile, negotiations with Russia's Gazprom have become contentious, as the company has proposed a significant price increase for gas. Critics within Georgia warn that shifting from Russian gas could lead to reliance on other suppliers, rather than true diversification of energy sources. (https://civil.ge/archives/111525)
• Georgian Prime Minister Zurab Nogaideli traveled to Baku on November 30 for a one-day working visit focused on negotiating increased gas supplies from Azerbaijan’s Shah-Deniz field. Accompanied by Energy Minister Nika Gilauri and Alexander Khetaguri, General Director of the Georgian Oil and Gas Corporation, Nogaideli aims to enhance Georgia’s gas share from the current contract, which provides 250 million cubic meters. Gilauri expressed the intent for Azerbaijani gas to become a significant component of Georgia's energy consumption. The delegation plans to meet with Azerbaijani leaders, including President Ilham Aliyev and other key ministers, to discuss the details of potential agreements and the strategic partnership in energy supply. (https://civil.ge/archives/111526)
• After talks with Azeri leadership in Baku on November 30, Georgian Prime Minister Zurab Nogaideli expressed optimism regarding gas supplies from Azerbaijan, stating that while the specific amount and price are still to be finalized, Georgia will have sufficient gas for the winter. He noted that negotiations were productive and a meeting among Energy Ministers from Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey is scheduled for December 6-8 to finalize the distribution of gas shares from the Shah-Deniz field. Natik Aliyev, the Azeri Minister of Industry and Energy, reaffirmed Azerbaijan's readiness to assist Georgia, highlighting the strong bilateral relations between the two countries. (https://civil.ge/archives/111535)
• On December 8, 2006, energy ministers from Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey convened in Tbilisi for two days of talks focused on negotiating the distribution of gas from the Shah-Deniz field. Georgia is seeking an increase in its allocation from the South Caucasus Gas Pipeline, which will transport Azerbaijani gas to Turkey via Georgia, from the initially agreed 250 million cubic meters. This meeting follows previous visits by Georgian Prime Minister Zurab Nogaideli and the energy minister to Turkey and Azerbaijan, where Nogaideli expressed optimism about securing additional gas supplies, although the final amounts and pricing still needed to be negotiated, with Georgia's gas consumption expected to reach 1.9 billion cubic meters in 2006. (https://civil.ge/archives/111574)
• On December 9, 2006, following extensive discussions in Tbilisi, Georgian Energy Minister Nika Gilauri announced that Georgia and Azerbaijan would receive additional gas supplies from the Shah-Deniz field, with Turkey agreeing to allocate a portion of its own share, which amounts to 2.8 billion cubic meters in 2007. While a significant step forward was noted, the exact allocation between Georgia and Azerbaijan still requires agreement, with further expert-level meetings scheduled for the following week in Baku. Under the initial contract, Georgia is guaranteed 250 million cubic meters of gas for 2007—200 million as a transit fee and 50 million at a reduced price—starting December 15. However, both Georgia and Azerbaijan are pushing for increased allocations to mitigate expected price hikes from Russian suppliers, with Georgia aiming for 1.5 billion cubic meters to cover most of its 2007 consumption needs, projected at 1.9 billion cubic meters for 2006. (https://civil.ge/archives/111584)
• On December 13, 2006, a delegation of Georgian officials will travel to Baku, Azerbaijan, to continue negotiations regarding gas supplies from the Shah-Deniz field. Led by Alexander Khetaguri, the chief of the state-run Georgian Oil and Gas Corporation (GOGC), the group is expected to be joined later by Energy Minister Nika Gilauri. This meeting is part of ongoing discussions about the redistribution of Shah-Deniz gas among Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey, following a recent meeting on December 8 in Tbilisi. Reports from Azerbaijani news agencies indicate that Turkey is prepared to allocate 1.3 billion cubic meters of gas to Azerbaijan and 800 million cubic meters to Georgia from its share of 2.8 billion cubic meters for 2007, although no official confirmation has been received from Georgian authorities. (https://civil.ge/archives/111604)
• On December 13, 2006, Georgian Energy Minister Nika Gilauri announced that Turkey is prepared to allocate 800 million cubic meters of its gas share from the Shah-Deniz field to Georgia in 2007. However, Gilauri emphasized that this amount does not represent the total gas Georgia anticipates receiving next year. He indicated that Georgia will also receive its designated share and other reserves, with exact figures and pricing expected to be clarified in the coming week to ten days. The Georgian delegation, headed by Alexander Khetaguri of the state-run Georgian Oil and Gas Corporation (GOGC), will begin discussions in Baku on December 14. Recent reports suggested Turkey's readiness to distribute 1.3 billion cubic meters to Azerbaijan and 800 million cubic meters to Georgia from its total share of 2.8 billion cubic meters for Shah-Deniz. With the original contract stipulating 250 million cubic meters for Georgia, this would bring the total to at least 1.05 billion cubic meters for the year. Georgia’s gas consumption for 2006 is projected to reach up to 1.9 billion cubic meters. (https://civil.ge/archives/111609)
• On December 15, 2006, it was reported that Georgia is set to receive 1.01 billion cubic meters of gas from Azerbaijan's Shah-Deniz field following negotiations involving Turkey, Azerbaijan, and Georgia in Baku. According to the Georgian Energy Ministry and Tbilisi-based Rustavi 2 television, while official details are still pending, Georgia may be required to pay approximately USD 120 per 1,000 cubic meters of gas. The discussions among the three nations are scheduled to continue on December 16. Recent Azerbaijani reports indicated Turkey's willingness to allocate 1.3 billion cubic meters of gas to Azerbaijan and 800 million cubic meters to Georgia from its total share of 2.8 billion cubic meters of Shah-Deniz gas. Additionally, Georgia will receive the 250 million cubic meters specified in the original contract. The gas flow through the Shah Deniz pipeline is now expected to commence on December 20, delayed from the earlier date of December 15. (https://civil.ge/archives/111625)
• On December 20, 2006, Georgian Prime Minister Zurab Nogaideli announced that Azerbaijan will become Georgia's primary gas supplier in 2007. During a government session, he noted that ongoing talks regarding the reallocation of Shah-Deniz gas among Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey are now focused on "technical details" and are expected to conclude soon. Nogaideli highlighted President Saakashvili's visit to Turkey for these discussions and indicated that updates would be shared with the public upon completion. Earlier, on December 13, at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies in Washington, D.C., Nogaideli mentioned that Georgia aims to significantly reduce its reliance on Russian gas imports to as low as 20%, or potentially eliminate it altogether, thanks to advancements in negotiations with Azerbaijan. (https://civil.ge/archives/111645)
• Georgian Energy Minister Nika Gilauri announced on December 20, 2006, that a final agreement on the distribution of gas shares from the Shah-Deniz field with Turkey is anticipated following talks with Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan on December 21. While accompanying President Saakashvili on an official visit to Turkey, Gilauri noted that discussions with Azerbaijan had concluded and only "technical details" about the gas delivery schedule remain. He mentioned that the price for the gas is essentially agreed upon, with further negotiations focusing on compensation for Turkey's concession of part of its gas quota to Georgia, potentially through electricity exports. This confirmation follows statements from Azerbaijani Energy Minister Natik Aliyev regarding lingering issues over Georgia's payment for the gas. Gilauri dismissed speculations from Russian media about Georgia's failure to secure additional gas supplies as provocations. Meanwhile, Prime Minister Nogaideli reiterated that Azerbaijan is set to become Georgia's major gas supplier in 2007, aiming to significantly reduce Georgia's dependence on Russian gas imports. (https://civil.ge/archives/111647)
• Russian gas monopoly Gazprom has requested that Georgia specify the amount of gas it plans to purchase from Russia in 2007, as reported by RIA Novosti on December 20. Gazprom spokesman Sergey Kuprianov indicated that the price for Georgia would be USD 235 per 1,000 cubic meters, an increase from the previous demand of USD 230. The Georgian authorities are expected to determine their gas import needs from Russia following the final agreement on the redistribution of gas shares from Azerbaijan’s Shah-Deniz field. Prime Minister Zurab Nogaideli had previously stated on December 13 that Georgia aims to reduce its dependence on Russian gas imports to 20%, or potentially to zero, in 2007. (https://civil.ge/archives/111654)
• President Saakashvili expressed optimism about Georgia's gas supplies from Azerbaijan’s Shah-Deniz field after talks with Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan on December 21. However, he acknowledged that "many technical issues" still need to be resolved. Saakashvili emphasized the importance of reducing Georgia's dependency on a single gas supplier, urging the government to explore multiple sources for gas supplies to ensure reliability. He recognized the rising prices of gas on the global market and stated that the government is focused on minimizing the impact of these increases on Georgian families. Saakashvili reiterated the goal of ensuring that every person in Georgia has access to heat and electricity during the winter months. (https://civil.ge/archives/111658)
• President Saakashvili announced on December 21 that Georgia will primarily rely on Azerbaijani gas from the Shah-Deniz field in 2007, while stressing the need to secure additional sources of gas. After discussions with Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan in Istanbul, Saakashvili expressed optimism about future gas supplies but noted that many technical details remain unresolved. Prime Minister Zurab Nogaideli is expected to travel to Baku for further negotiations regarding the redistribution of gas quotas from Shah-Deniz, where Turkey has agreed to allocate 800 million cubic meters to Georgia from its share of 2.8 billion cubic meters. Although the price for Shah-Deniz gas has yet to be disclosed, it is anticipated to be lower than the USD 235 per 1,000 cubic meters that Gazprom plans to charge Georgia for Russian gas. Georgia aims to secure at least 1.05 billion cubic meters from Shah-Deniz, which would be sufficient for household needs, and is also considering options to import gas from Russia and Iran, depending on the final agreements concerning Shah-Deniz. With anticipated consumption figures for Tbilisi and other regions in mind, Georgia appears set to manage its gas supply effectively while seeking to diversify its energy sources. (https://civil.ge/archives/111659)
• on December 21, 2006 Itera, the gas distribution company operating in Georgia, has cut off gas supplies to the towns of Zestaponi and Dedoplistskaro due to nonpayment, totaling GEL 162,000 for gas consumed. The company has issued warnings that gas supplies to other towns, including Marneuli, Khashuri, Sighnagi, and Telavi, will also be suspended unless outstanding debts of GEL 570,000 are settled by December 26. However, Itera later announced that it would not proceed with any gas cuts during the New Year holiday, stating that the suspension of gas supplies was strictly a commercial decision and not politically motivated. Gas supply to the affected towns will be reinstated once the debts are cleared. (https://civil.ge/archives/111663)
• During a news conference on December 22, Georgian Prime Minister Zurab Nogaideli announced that approximately 70% of Georgia's gas needs in 2007 are expected to be met by Azerbaijan’s Shah-Deniz field. He emphasized that Azerbaijan will be the primary gas supplier for Georgia in the coming year, and all legal and technical matters concerning this arrangement have already been addressed. However, the exact terms and balance of Georgia's gas imports, including additional imports from Russia, will be finalized following Nogaideli’s discussions with Azerbaijani officials planned for December 25. Nogaideli reiterated that Georgia will continue to act as a transit country for Russian gas headed to Armenia. (https://civil.ge/archives/111665)
• On December 22, 2006, Gazprom signed contracts with three companies in Georgia to supply a total of 1.1 billion cubic meters of gas in 2007 at a price of USD 235 per 1,000 cubic meters, as announced by Alexander Medvedev, chief of Gazprom's export arm Gazexport, in Moscow. The agreements include one-year terms for two companies and a three-month term for KazTransGaz-Tbilisi, the distributor in Tbilisi. The other two companies involved are Saqcementi, a cement factory requiring about 250 million cubic meters annually, and Telasi, a Russian-owned electricity grid company needing approximately 300 million cubic meters annually for its power generator plant number 9 in Gardabani. As of the announcement, neither company management nor Georgian authorities had commented on the contracts. (https://civil.ge/archives/111666)
• On December 22, 2006, Russian energy giant Gazprom announced that it had signed agreements with three companies in Georgia to supply a total of 1.1 billion cubic meters of gas in 2007, contradicting Georgian Prime Minister Zurab Nogaideli's earlier statement that almost 70% of Georgia's gas supplies would come from Azerbaijan’s Shah-Deniz field. Gazexport chief Alexander Medvedev stated that the contracts set the price at USD 235 per 1,000 cubic meters, asserting that this supply would constitute a major portion of Georgia's total annual gas consumption of 1.8 billion cubic meters. While Nogaideli confirmed that Georgia would import some gas from Russia, he maintained that the bulk would come from Shah-Deniz, with further details expected after his scheduled talks in Baku on December 25. The contracts signed included one-year terms for two companies and a three-month term for KazTransGaz-Tbilisi, which distributes gas in Tbilisi, indicating a short-term strategy to secure gas supplies amid ongoing negotiations with Azerbaijan and Turkey over Shah-Deniz quotas. Other companies' plans, including those of Itera and Energy-Invest, remain unclear as KazTransGaz-Tbilisi seeks to ensure a reliable supply for Tbilisi households. (https://civil.ge/archives/111668)
• On December 22, 2006, Georgian Prime Minister Zurab Nogaideli announced that due to "technical problems," the launch of gas transmission from Azerbaijan’s Shah-Deniz field would be delayed, leading Georgia to import more expensive gas from Russia starting in January 2007, priced at USD 235 per 1,000 cubic meters. This announcement followed an earlier statement where he indicated that Georgia was expected to receive about 70% of its gas needs from Shah-Deniz. Nogaideli explained that the gas pumping station had been damaged, and restoration could take weeks, prompting the government to seek ways to mitigate the financial impact of the price increase on households. He also requested a postponement of the parliamentary discussion on the 2007 state budget to make necessary amendments. Meanwhile, Kakha Bendukidze, the Georgian State Minister for Economic Reforms, expressed opposition to subsidizing higher gas prices but acknowledged the need for measures to protect vulnerable populations amid these changes. (https://civil.ge/archives/111670)
• On December 23, 2006, the energy ministers of Turkey and Georgia reached an agreement in Ankara regarding the redistribution of Shah-Deniz gas quotas, which allows Georgia to receive 800 million cubic meters from Turkey’s share for 2007, in addition to its original allocation of 250 million cubic meters. While the price for the gas was not disclosed, the import of Shah-Deniz gas to Georgia was delayed due to technical issues, as noted by Georgian Prime Minister Zurab Nogaideli, who mentioned that repairs could take weeks. Consequently, Georgia is expected to rely primarily on imports of Russian gas in early 2007. Gazprom had previously announced contracts with three Georgian companies for the supply of a total of 1.1 billion cubic meters of gas at a price of USD 235 per 1,000 cubic meters for the upcoming year. (https://civil.ge/archives/111671)
• As the launch of gas supplies from Azerbaijan's Shah-Deniz field has been delayed, Georgia is set to rely primarily on imports of expensive Russian gas from Gazprom at a price of USD 235 per 1,000 cubic meters, up from the previous USD 110. Georgian Prime Minister Zurab Nogaideli stated that the delay, initially expected to begin on December 22, is due to "technical problems" at the drilling wells, which could take weeks to resolve. In response to the anticipated high costs of Russian gas, the government is exploring options to subsidize the increased prices for households, particularly to support the most vulnerable populations. Following discussions with lawmakers, there seems to be a consensus on the need for budget amendments to address the emergency situation created by the Shah-Deniz delays, with calls for the government to compensate for the rising costs of gas and electricity. Meanwhile, Nogaideli plans to travel to Baku to finalize technical details regarding the gas quotas from Shah-Deniz, which include receiving 800 million cubic meters from Turkey's share and 250 million from Georgia's original allocation. Gazprom has confirmed contracts with three Georgian companies for a total of 1.1 billion cubic meters of gas in 2007, including a three-month contract with KazTransGaz-Tbilisi, while Saqcementi and Telasi are also set to receive substantial amounts for their operations. (https://civil.ge/archives/111673)
• On December 25, 2006, Georgian Prime Minister Zurab Nogaideli announced that Azerbaijan will provide Georgia with 1 million cubic meters of gas per day during the winter period, following discussions with Azerbaijani leaders in Baku. However, the specifics of the deal, including the price, were not disclosed, though Nogaideli indicated that the price would be "acceptable" for Georgia. It remains uncertain whether this gas supply is part of Georgia's designated Shah-Deniz quota of 250 million cubic meters for 2007 or if it constitutes an additional amount. Reports also suggest that Georgian Energy Minister Nika Gilauri, who accompanied Nogaideli, will remain in Baku for further negotiations. Meanwhile, Turkish Energy Minister Hilmi Güler noted that additional discussions involving Azerbaijani, Georgian, and Turkish officials will occur in Istanbul regarding the redistribution of Shah-Deniz gas shares. This raises questions about Gilauri's earlier claims of having reached an agreement with Turkey on December 22, which included Georgia receiving an additional 800 million cubic meters of gas from Turkey’s share. The Turkish Embassy in Tbilisi did not comment on the reported agreements. (https://civil.ge/archives/111677)
• Intensive discussions by Georgian authorities regarding alternative gas supplies have left many questions unanswered, leading some opposition leaders to suggest that Prime Minister Zurab Nogaideli could face dismissal. Although Georgia claims to have secured an agreement with Turkey for the redistribution of gas shares from the Shah-Deniz field, an unnamed Turkish official contradicted this on December 25, stating that no deal had yet been finalized and that further talks are scheduled for the following week in Istanbul. Georgian Energy Minister Nika Gilauri had previously asserted that an agreement was reached in Ankara, which would allow Georgia to receive 800 million cubic meters of gas from Turkey’s share in 2007, but complications regarding compensation for this gas remain unresolved. In Baku, Nogaideli announced that Azerbaijan agreed to supply Georgia with 1 million cubic meters of gas per day during winter; however, the specifics of this deal, including pricing, remain undisclosed, leaving it uncertain whether this quantity is part of Georgia's Shah-Deniz quota or an additional allocation. President Mikheil Saakashvili praised Azerbaijan's decision as a sign of "brotherly relations" between the two countries, highlighting the challenges posed by the delay in Shah-Deniz supplies due to technical issues, which forces Georgia to rely on more expensive Gazprom gas at USD 235 per 1000 cubic meters. Opposition MP Levan Berdzenishvili criticized the government's failure to secure alternative supplies and suggested that the ongoing difficulties in negotiations point to Nogaideli’s impending political downfall. (https://civil.ge/archives/111678)
• On December 27, 2006, Itera, a Russian company responsible for gas distribution in Georgia's regions, confirmed it has signed a contract with Gazprom to supply 360 million cubic meters of gas in 2007 at a price of USD 235 per 1,000 cubic meters. This agreement was corroborated by Gazprom spokesman Sergey Kuprianov, marking the fourth contract established with the Russian gas monopoly by Georgian companies. Previously, on December 22, Gazprom had secured contracts to provide a total of 1.1 billion cubic meters of gas in 2007 to three other Georgian companies: KazTransGaz-Tbilisi, for a three-month supply; Saqcementi, a cement manufacturer; and Telasi, a Russian-owned electricity grid. With these agreements, Gazprom is set to deliver a total of 1.46 billion cubic meters of gas to Georgia, accounting for over half of the country's annual gas consumption, which was approximately 1.9 billion cubic meters in 2006. (https://civil.ge/archives/111686)
• On December 27, 2006, Georgian Finance Minister Lexo Alexishvili announced that approximately GEL 89-90 million will be allocated from the state budget to help gas distributor companies manage a transition to increased gas tariffs for households, amid rising concerns over gas prices. With Russia expected to supply at least 80% of Georgia's gas needs in 2007 at a price of USD 235 per 1,000 cubic meters, gas tariffs are anticipated to rise significantly, with estimates suggesting the price per cubic meter for households in Tbilisi could increase from GEL 0.34 (approximately USD 0.19) to GEL 0.55 (approximately USD 0.31). Prime Minister Zurab Nogaideli emphasized that Georgia has not received gas from the Shah-Deniz field due to technical issues, although he claimed that an agreement for gas-sharing with Turkey had been achieved, a statement contested by Turkish Energy Minister Hilmi Güler, who stated that further discussions were necessary. As Gazprom signed an additional contract with Itera for 360 million cubic meters of gas, the total supply from Russia to Georgia for 2007 reached 1.46 billion cubic meters, highlighting Georgia's heavy reliance on Russian gas imports. (https://civil.ge/archives/111687)
• On December 27, 2006, Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili expressed optimism about the country's future gas supply, stating that once the technical issues at the Shah-Deniz gas field are resolved—expected within a month to a month and a half—Georgia would primarily rely on Azerbaijani gas, eliminating the need for Russian gas. Saakashvili acknowledged the current challenges, noting that Georgia is facing higher prices for gas imported from Russia, which has already contracted to supply a total of 1.45 billion cubic meters of gas to Georgia in 2007 through agreements with four companies, including KazTransGaz-Tbilisi and Itera-Georgia. He emphasized the importance of restoring the Shah-Deniz supply to reduce reliance on Gazprom, aiming to secure a more stable and cost-effective energy future for the country. (https://civil.ge/archives/111695)
• On December 29, 2006, Georgian Prime Minister Zurab Nogaideli announced that starting in January, Georgia would purchase gas from Azerbaijan at a price of USD 120 per 1,000 cubic meters, following an agreement reached during his visit to Baku on December 25. This deal involves a delivery of 1 million cubic meters of gas per day from sources outside the delayed Shah-Deniz field. While Georgia will continue importing gas from Russia's Gazprom, which has contracted to supply 1.46 billion cubic meters in 2007 at USD 235 per 1,000 cubic meters, Nogaideli expressed the government's intent to eventually reduce and halt these Russian imports once technical issues at Shah-Deniz are resolved. To mitigate the impact of price increases on households, he indicated that GEL 90 million would be allocated to the Energy Ministry to help gas distributor companies manage the transition, reflecting adjustments in the revised state budget to ensure stable energy supplies. (https://civil.ge/archives/111702)
• On December 29, 2006, Georgian Prime Minister Zurab Nogaideli outlined the gas import plan for 2007, indicating that Georgia will primarily rely on Gazprom for its gas supply, while receiving a small portion from Azerbaijan—specifically, 1 million cubic meters per day at a price of USD 120 per 1,000 cubic meters. This Azerbaijani gas, however, will not come from the delayed Shah-Deniz field but from other sources. Nogaideli emphasized the significance of having alternative gas supplies, despite it constituting only one-eighth of the country’s total daily consumption. Currently, Georgia is set to receive approximately 1.46 billion cubic meters of gas from Russia, covering about 80% of its projected needs, with contracts already signed. Although both Nogaideli and President Saakashvili have expressed intentions to eventually halt Russian gas imports once Shah-Deniz is operational, it remains unclear how this transition will occur, especially given the substantial contracts already in place with Gazprom. The average gas price for consumers, combining the higher cost of Russian gas with cheaper Azerbaijani gas, has yet to be finalized, although estimates suggest it could be around USD 191 per 1,000 cubic meters. The Georgian National Energy Regulatory Commission is expected to announce new tariffs in January, while the government is preparing to allocate GEL 105.6 million to help ease the transition to new gas prices for households. (https://civil.ge/archives/111705)
• On December 30, 2006, President Mikheil Saakashvili praised Georgian Energy Minister Nika Gilauri for signing what he called a "historic agreement" regarding gas supplies with Turkey and Azerbaijan. While specific details of the contract were not disclosed, Saakashvili stated that Georgia plans to switch to gas from Azerbaijan's Shah-Deniz field once the ongoing technical issues with drilling are resolved. Energy Minister Gilauri clarified that the agreement entails the supply of 1 million cubic meters of gas per day at a price of USD 120 per 1,000 cubic meters, under a three-month contract totaling 90 million cubic meters. He indicated that Georgia would cease imports of this gas as soon as the Shah-Deniz field becomes operational. Saakashvili also mentioned that Georgia would continue to source gas from other suppliers, including Russia, until Shah-Deniz is online, expressing some confusion about the reasons behind the technical delays at the field. The President concluded by expressing satisfaction with the Energy Ministry's efforts in securing these gas supplies. (https://civil.ge/archives/111713)
• On January 11, 2007, the start of gas imports from Azerbaijan to Georgia was delayed due to technical issues. Initially scheduled for January 10, the delivery was now expected to begin on January 11 or 12. Georgia had contracted to purchase 90 million cubic meters of gas from Azerbaijan over three months at a price of USD 120 per 1,000 cubic meters. Meanwhile, Georgian gas distributors had already secured deals with Russia's Gazprom for gas at a higher price of USD 235 per 1,000 cubic meters. The state was likely purchasing Azerbaijani gas for electricity generation and anticipated more gas imports once the Shah-Deniz field became operational (https://civil.ge/archives/111734)
• On January 15, 2007, the Georgian government allocated a GEL 125 million (approximately USD 72.6 million) loan at a 0.5% annual interest rate and a two-year term to four companies to help prevent a sharp increase in gas prices for consumers. KazTransGaz-Tbilisi, Mtkvari Energy, Energy-Invest, and Itera-Georgia received portions of the loan, ranging from GEL 18 million to GEL 45 million, to stabilize gas supply and prices during the winter. Despite Russia’s gas price hike from USD 110 to USD 235 per 1,000 cubic meters, Georgian consumers did not face increased tariffs in January 2007. The loan was aimed at mitigating the impact of the price rise on households and businesses. (https://civil.ge/archives/111757)
• On January 15, 2007, Georgia began receiving gas from Azerbaijan’s Shah-Deniz field, marking the start of gas flow through the South Caucasus Gas Pipeline, which connects Baku to Erzrum in Turkey via Georgia. Initially scheduled for mid-December, the launch had been delayed due to technical issues at one of the drilling wells. Energy Minister Nika Gilauri confirmed that the problem was resolved and gas began flowing at around 11 a.m. local time. As per the agreement, Georgia will receive 250 million cubic meters of gas, including 200 million cubic meters as a transit fee and an additional 50 million cubic meters at a preferential price in 2007. (https://civil.ge/archives/111761)
• On January 17, 2007, Georgian Energy Minister Nika Gilauri announced that Georgia was receiving gas from three different sources for the first time in its history. These sources included gas imported from Russia via the North-South Gas Pipeline, from Azerbaijan through a rehabilitated Soviet-era pipeline, and from the BP-operated South-Caucasus Gas Pipeline, which transports gas from Azerbaijan’s Shah-Deniz field. Gilauri highlighted this as a significant step in diversifying the country's energy supplies, with Georgia receiving a total of 250 million cubic meters from Azerbaijan, including 200 million cubic meters as a transit fee and an additional 50 million cubic meters at a preferential price for 2007. (https://civil.ge/archives/111770)
• On February 1, 2007, Russian President Vladimir Putin addressed Russia's relationship with Georgia, specifically regarding recent gas negotiations and broader diplomatic ties, at his annual press conference. Putin highlighted that in 2006, Russia refrained from pressuring Georgia to immediately sign a gas contract with Gazprom, allowing Georgia to pursue cheaper gas options with Azerbaijan and Turkey. However, after these talks fell through, Georgia agreed to purchase gas from Russia’s Gazprom at USD 235 per 1,000 cubic meters. Putin emphasized Russia's willingness to respect Georgia's economic preferences and noted that the return of the Russian ambassador to Georgia was intended as a goodwill step toward normalizing relations, though he acknowledged ongoing diplomatic challenges. He reflected on his November 2006 meeting with Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili at a CIS summit in Minsk, where both leaders affirmed the CIS's value as a forum for dialogue despite strained bilateral relations. (https://civil.ge/archives/111854)
• On February 5, 2007, Czech company Energo-Pro took control of 62.5% of Georgia's electricity market by acquiring six hydroelectric power plants and two electricity distribution companies for USD 132 million, following its victory in a privatization tender in June 2006. This agreement, signed by Energo-Pro’s Jiří Krušina and Georgian Economy Minister Giorgi Arveladze, includes a commitment from Energo-Pro to invest over USD 285 million in Georgia’s energy infrastructure. The investment will modernize the electricity network and fund the construction of a new USD 100 million hydropower plant with a 100-megawatt capacity. Czech officials attended the signing in Tbilisi, emphasizing EU support and addressing suspicions of Russian involvement. Initial contract terms, which valued the deal at USD 312 million, were revised to prevent increased electricity tariffs for Georgian consumers, with the final package valued at USD 427 million, combining the acquisition cost and committed investments. Energo-Pro now serves 875,000 customers in western Georgia, marking it as the largest electricity distributor in the country, while other distribution regions remain managed by Russian and Georgian companies. (https://civil.ge/archives/111864)
• On February 7, 2007, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan announced that Turkey is working to allocate 800 million cubic meters of its gas share from Azerbaijan’s Shah-Deniz field to Georgia by July, aiming to help Georgia reduce its reliance on Russian gas. Erdogan made this statement during a joint press conference in Tbilisi with Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili and Azerbaijani leaders. Saakashvili noted that Georgia would begin receiving this supply as soon as Shah-Deniz starts operating, with Azerbaijan also gradually increasing gas exports to Georgia, contributing to Georgia’s access to more affordable, reliable gas. Turkey’s delay in finalizing the agreement has been linked to its existing commitments to supply Shah-Deniz gas to Italy and Greece. Erdogan emphasized the importance of solidarity among Turkey, Georgia, and Azerbaijan to address energy challenges. The leaders also signed the Tbilisi Declaration, underscoring their vision for regional cooperation, including the construction of the Baku-Akhalkalaki-Kars railway, for which Azerbaijan agreed to extend a USD 200 million loan to Georgia for its section of the project. (https://civil.ge/archives/111883)
• On February 16, 2007, the Georgian Oil and Gas Corporation (GOGC) announced that Azerbaijan would increase its gas supplies to Georgia from 1 million to 1.3 million cubic meters per day until April 1, at a rate of USD 120 per 1,000 cubic meters. This agreement was finalized during GOGC General Director Alexander Khetaguri's visit to Baku on February 15-16. The additional gas supply is sourced from Azerbaijan’s reserves outside the Shah-Deniz field. Since January 2007, Georgia had already received 30 million cubic meters of gas from Azerbaijan. (https://civil.ge/archives/111940)
• On March 17, 2007, the Georgian Oil and Gas Corporation (GOGC) announced the launch of gas imports from Azerbaijan's Shah-Deniz field through the South Caucasus Pipeline, after earlier delays caused by technical issues. Georgia will receive 250 million cubic meters of gas, with 200 million cubic meters as a transit fee and 50 million cubic meters purchased at a preferential rate of USD 55 per 1,000 cubic meters. Although Georgia seeks to increase its share, it has not yet reached an agreement with Turkey, which currently holds a larger quota. Turkey's Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan expressed willingness to allocate part of Turkey's share to Georgia, with a final decision expected by July 2007. U.S. Deputy Secretary of Energy Clay Sell also expressed hope that Georgia's share would grow in the future. (https://civil.ge/archives/112103)
• On March 22, 2007, U.S. Ambassador to Georgia John Tefft emphasized the U.S. commitment to finding new routes for delivering Turkmenistan's natural gas to Western markets, particularly through Azerbaijan and Georgia, during his speech at the sixth Georgian International Oil, Gas, Infrastructures and Energy (GIOGIE) conference. He noted that Turkmenistan could play a significant role in diversifying energy supplies, with Georgia expanding as a key transit point. The U.S. aims to promote competition and diversify energy sources, rather than dividing existing resources. Tefft also discussed the importance of pipeline transport over shipping for long-term environmental safety. At the same time, Georgian Parliamentary Chairperson Nino Burjanadze, visiting the U.S., urged the European Union to resist Russian interference in energy diversification projects like the Nabucco Pipeline, which would reduce Europe's reliance on Russian gas. The U.S. and Azerbaijan signed a memorandum on March 22 to further strengthen cooperation on energy security, focusing on projects like the Turkey-Greece-Italy gas pipeline and potentially Nabucco. (https://civil.ge/archives/112135)
• On March 26, 2007, the Georgian Oil and Gas Corporation (GOGC) announced that its chief executive, Alexander Khetaguri, will visit Baku on March 29 to negotiate with AzerGaz for additional gas supplies. In addition to the gas imported from the Azerbaijani Shah-Deniz field, Georgia currently imports 1.3 million cubic meters of gas per day from AzerGaz at USD 120 per 1000 cubic meters. However, the contract with AzerGaz is set to expire on April 1, prompting Tbilisi to seek an extension. (https://civil.ge/archives/112148)
• Azerbaijani state company AzerGaz ceased natural gas supplies to Georgia on April 12, 2007, following the expiration of a contract that had been signed in December 2006. The agreement had provided Georgia with 1.3 million cubic meters of gas per day at a rate of USD 120 per 1000 cubic meters. Despite the cessation of supplies, a Georgian Energy Ministry official stated that negotiations are ongoing to resume the flow of gas. The official assured that the suspension would not impact gas users in Georgia, as the country continues to receive sufficient gas from Russia’s Gazprom and Azerbaijan's Shah-Deniz field. (https://civil.ge/archives/112222)
• On April 16, 2007, Russia announced plans to suspend natural gas supplies to Georgia due to necessary repair work on the North-South gas pipeline. However, the International Oil and Gas Corporation reassured that the suspension would not impact users, stating that gas supplies from Azerbaijan's Shah-Deniz field would be increased. Georgia currently receives one million cubic meters of gas daily from Shah-Deniz, but this increase would need to be significant to replace the 2.4 – 2.5 million cubic meters supplied by Gazprom. Details on the exact increase from Shah-Deniz were expected to be disclosed at a briefing later that day. Additionally, the Georgian National Energy Regulatory Commission (GNERC) was scheduled to discuss new gas tariffs, as gas distribution companies had petitioned for adjustments since February. At that time, consumers in Tbilisi were paying GEL 0.34 (approximately USD 0.19) per cubic meter of gas. (https://civil.ge/archives/112237)
  • On April 16, 2007, the Georgian National Energy Regulatory Commission (GNERC) announced a gas price hike set to take effect on May 1, with Tbilisi residents paying 50.62 Tetri per cubic meter for low-pressure gas, and higher rates for average and high-pressure consumers. Regional prices will vary from 49 to 55 Tetri per cubic meter, depending on the supplier. This increase follows a request from KazTransGaz-Tbilisi, which had sought higher rates. The move is attributed to rising costs, particularly from Russian gas, which Georgia now pays USD 235 per 1000 cubic meters for, a sharp rise from USD 110. Opposition parties have criticized the increase, warning of a significant social impact. (https://civil.ge/archives/112241)
• On April 16, 2007, Alexander Khetaguri, the head of the state-run Georgian Oil and Gas Corporation (GOGC), announced that an agreement with the Shah-Deniz consortium would increase Georgia's daily gas supply to four million cubic meters, up from the previous one million. This new supply would be sufficient to meet the country's entire natural gas demand. The need for additional gas arose after Russia suspended supplies to Georgia for two days due to repair work on the North-South gas pipeline. (https://civil.ge/archives/112243)
• On April 19, 2007, Russia's Gazprom resumed natural gas supplies to Georgia, according to the state-run Georgian Oil and Gas Corporation (GOGC). Gas supplies had been suspended on April 17 due to necessary repairs on the North-South gas pipeline. For the previous two days, Georgia had been receiving four million cubic meters of gas daily from Azerbaijan’s Shah-Deniz field, but this supply was set to return to one million cubic meters per day starting April 20, in line with the previous agreement. (https://civil.ge/archives/112259)
  • On April 25, 2007, representatives from the Georgian Oil and Gas Corporation and the Millennium Challenge Georgia Fund (MCG) visited the Stepantsminda district in the Mtskheta-Mtianeti region to launch the second stage of repairs on the North-South gas pipeline. The MCG plans to allocate USD 25 million to repair a 6.5-kilometer section of the pipeline in the district. The pipeline, which receives gas at the Russian border, transports it to Georgian wholesale customers and transits it to Armenia. A total of USD 44.5 million will be spent as part of the MCG’s Energy Infrastructure Rehabilitation Project to repair the pipeline, with work already underway on six other sections. The third stage will focus on repairs near the Armenian border. (https://civil.ge/archives/112293)
• On May 10, 2007, the Russian daily Kommersant reported that Vladimir Putin's visit to Central Asia was aimed at preventing the construction of trans-Caspian pipelines that would bypass Russia. The timing of the visit, including trips to Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, was seen as a strategic move to prevent Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev from attending a Poland-hosted energy summit. The summit was planned for May 11-12 and was to discuss trans-Caspian pipeline projects involving Poland, Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Ukraine. Putin's trip effectively thwarted Nazarbayev's participation, marking a success for Moscow's counteroffensive ahead of the summit. (https://civil.ge/archives/112359)
• On May 11, 2007, the presidents of Azerbaijan, Georgia, Lithuania, Poland, and Ukraine signed a joint declaration in Krakow to enhance cooperation on transporting oil and gas from Central Asia to Europe through the South Caucasus. Kazakhstan also signed the declaration but was represented by its deputy energy minister. President Mikheil Saakashvili highlighted the importance of the new route, which would run parallel to the existing Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, and emphasized its strategic significance. Saakashvili also referred to a parallel summit held in Turkmenistan between the leaders of Russia, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan, signaling obstacles to the agreement reached in Krakow. (https://civil.ge/archives/112377)
• On June 1, 2007, AzerGaz, Azerbaijan's state-controlled gas company, resumed gas supplies to Georgia, delivering 1.2 million cubic meters daily through the Karadag-Tbilisi pipeline at USD 120 per 1,000 cubic meters. This arrangement renews a contract initially signed in December 2006. During the first quarter of 2007, Georgia had received 115 million cubic meters of gas from AzerGaz. The Georgian Oil and Gas Corporation (GOGC) also confirmed that Georgia would continue receiving gas from Azerbaijan's Shah-Deniz field in addition to this supply. (https://civil.ge/archives/112476)
• On June 14, 2007, Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili and AREVA CEO Anne Lauvergeon discussed the potential construction of a civilian nuclear reactor in Georgia, marking an important step in the country's energy strategy. The meeting, held in Paris, reflects Georgia's interest in exploring nuclear energy options, with Saakashvili emphasizing the project’s alignment with national interests. Parliamentary Chairperson Nino Burjanadze highlighted the significance of cooperation with AREVA, while Prime Minister Zurab Nogaideli expressed caution, stating on June 15 that it is premature to make decisions, especially given Armenia's potential role in replacing its own nuclear reactor. President Saakashvili also raised this topic in a June 13 meeting with French President Nicolas Sarkozy. (https://civil.ge/archives/112548)
  • On August 16, 2007, Georgia's Energy Minister Nika Gilauri announced the establishment of a governmental commission to assess the feasibility of building a civil nuclear reactor in Georgia. Gilauri, who chairs the commission, stated that its primary task would be to evaluate both the positive and negative aspects of the proposed project. The potential construction of the reactor was discussed earlier in June during a meeting between President Saakashvili and Anne Lauvergeon, CEO of the French nuclear energy company AREVA, in Paris. (https://civil.ge/archives/112866
• On June 26, 2007, President Mikheil Saakashvili declared that Georgia has achieved a level of energy security, thanks to diversified energy sources. Speaking at a BSEC summit in Istanbul focused on energy cooperation, Saakashvili highlighted Georgia’s gas imports from Azerbaijan and its strategic role in potential future projects, such as the Trans-Caspian gas pipeline, which would channel Central Asian gas through Azerbaijan and Georgia to Europe. He underscored the success of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline as a model for new regional projects. Although Georgia receives 1.2 million cubic meters of gas daily from AzerGaz at USD 120 per 1,000 cubic meters, over half of its gas supply still comes from Russia at a higher rate of USD 235. Saakashvili emphasized that Georgia's role in Europe’s energy diversification efforts would further boost the country's geopolitical significance. (https://civil.ge/archives/112599)
• On August 6, 2007, Gazprom denied claims from Georgia that it owed USD 2 million for gas transit to Armenia. Georgia's Oil and Gas Corporation (GOGC) chief, Alexander Khetaguri, had stated that Gazprom should pay for the transit of gas through Georgian territory, as per the contract, which grants Georgia 10% of the gas transiting to Armenia. However, due to lower gas consumption during the summer, Georgia had not used its gas quota from Gazprom in the past three months, as it was sourcing gas from Azerbaijan. A Gazprom official clarified that while Georgia had not used its quota, the contract stipulates that payment for transit is made through gas supply, not in cash. (https://civil.ge/archives/112805)
• In the first ten months of 2007, Georgia imported 830 million cubic meters of gas from Russia, valued at over USD 195 million, according to the Georgian Department of Statistics. This was a decrease from 1.4 billion cubic meters imported in the same period the previous year. Georgia's total gas consumption in 2007 was estimated at over 1.7 billion cubic meters. The country also received gas from Azerbaijan. Georgia buys Russian gas at USD 235 per 1,000 cubic meters, with gas imports comprising 40.3% of Georgia’s total imports from Russia. (https://civil.ge/archives/113626)

Irina Sarishvili case

ZOURABICHVILI

• On August 20, 2006, the Georgian MIA launched a special operation to arrest a series of Georgian political figures accused of working for Russia, namely Irina Sarishvili (262-262)
• The members of that party are accused of planning a campaign to destabilize the Georgian government and overthrow Saakashvili, led by Igor Giorgadze (262)
• Sarishvili was the sole figure from the party to remain free to travel between Moscow and Tbilisi (262)

IIFFMCG III

• On September 7, 2006, the MIA arrested 13 leading members of Moscow's satellite political organizations in Georgia, namely the Jutice political party, the Conservative-Monarchist Party, the Caucasian Democratic Institute, and the Anti-Soros Movement, which had illegally purchased firearms were planning to stage a shooting at a protest rally to instigate civil unrest. (16)
• The plot was masterminded by Igor Giorgadze (16)

• On 31 March, Several hundred activists from the pro-Russian Justice Party and Anti-Soros public movement gathered outside the Parliament on March 31 and demanded resignation of President Saakashvili. The Justice Party accused authorities on March 31 of barring a group of its activists from arriving from Zugdidi, western Georgia in the capital city to participate in the protest rally outside the Parliament. (https://civil.ge/archives/110271)
  • The Justice Party (Samartlianoba) is led by fugitive Igor Giorgadze, Georgia?s ex-security chief, who is wanted by Georgia for a failed terrorist attack against ex-President Shevardnadze in 1995. Anti-Soros is a public movement affiliated to the Justice Party. Recently a Giorgadze’s Foundation, described as a charitable organization, has been set up in Georgia, chaired by once an influential politician Irina Sarishvili.
• In April 2006, Mikhail Kaminin, the Russian Foreign Ministry’s spokesman, did an interview. Kaminin described NATO's open door policy as a “sensitive issue” for Russia, particularly concerning Ukraine and Georgia. He indicated that Russia would need to “re-orientate” its military potential in response to NATO's expansion. This reorientation would require significant resources for Russia to adjust its military capabilities and reorganize its military-industrial relations. (https://civil.ge/archives/110457)
• The Georgian media reported on May 23 that the Russian officials have expressed readiness to grant Igor Giorgadze political asylum in Russia. (https://civil.ge/archives/110649)
• During the GUAM summit in Kiev on May 23, President Mikheil Saakashvili sharply criticized Russia for providing a safe haven to individuals wanted for crimes in Georgia. He specifically pointed to Igor Giorgadze, who has been granted political asylum in Russia and is on Interpol's international wanted list for his role in a terrorist act against ex-President Eduard Shevardnadze in 1995. Saakashvili described this situation as an "unprecedented fact," indicating that it exemplifies the ongoing issues stemming from Russia's support for individuals accused of serious crimes. (https://civil.ge/archives/110653)
  • Accusation Against Russia: Saakashvili's comments highlighted what he perceives as Russia's complicity in harboring criminals, undermining stability in the region and obstructing justice for the victims of these crimes.
  • Among other criminals pointed out by MS: Aslan Abashidze, Jemal Gogitidze, Temur Basilia, Gia Chanturia, Levan Mamaladze
• Igor Giorgadze, the former Security Chief of Georgia, is making headlines as he plans to hold a news conference in Moscow on May 24. Giorgadze is currently on Interpol's international wanted list for masterminding a 1995 terrorist attack against ex-President Eduard Shevardnadze. Despite being rumored to be hiding in Russia for several years, this news conference will mark his first public appearance in the country. (https://civil.ge/archives/110619)
  • Reports from Russian media indicate that Vladimir Kolesnikov, the Russian Deputy General Prosecutor, has stated that Moscow is ready to grant Giorgadze political asylum. This development has raised alarms in Tbilisi.
• On May 24, Igor Giorgadze, the former security chief of Georgia and a fugitive wanted on terrorism charges, held a news conference in Moscow, where he made significant political statements regarding the situation in Georgia and his own status. Giorgadze announced his intention to initiate a political movement termed the ‘Revolution of Nettles’ if the administration of President Mikheil Saakashvili does not agree to conduct early presidential and parliamentary elections. He referenced the Rose Revolution—a peaceful protest movement that led to regime change in Georgia in 2003—as a model for his proposed actions. (https://civil.ge/archives/110659)
  • Despite the Russian Deputy General Prosecutor's earlier statements indicating that Russia would grant him political asylum, Giorgadze stated he would not seek asylum in Russia. He emphasized his intention to remain and face the charges against him in Georgia, expressing confidence in his ability to clear his name.
  • Giorgadze indicated that he has already received support from Russia, which he believes will assist him in addressing the charges brought against him by the Georgian government. He noted that the Russian law enforcement agencies were not pursuing him at Georgia's request. He criticized the current Georgian government's policies, suggesting they would lead the country into an “abyss” and asserting that the government is not listening to the will of the people.
  • Giorgadze expressed his desire for improved relations with Russia, indicating that his party aims to establish friendly ties. He made a bold claim that if his party were to gain political power, visa requirements between Georgia and Russia could be lifted quickly.
• On May 24, the Georgian Foreign Ministry summoned Russian Ambassador to Georgia Vladimir Chkhikvishvili to formally express its protest over two significant developments. (https://civil.ge/archives/110664)
• On May 25, leaders of four opposition parties in Georgia—New Rights, Republicans, Conservatives, and Freedom—issued a joint statement condemning the political activities of Igor Giorgadze, the former Security Chief wanted on terrorism charges. The opposition leaders expressed serious concerns over the political activities of Giorgadze, who is currently in Russia and heads the Justice Party (Samartlianoba). They accused the Saakashvili administration of potentially using Giorgadze as a “political scarecrow” to instill fear in the populace. (https://civil.ge/archives/110670
  • The statement highlighted Giorgadze’s connections to various organizations, including Anti-Soros, a public movement, and his Foundation, which is described as a charitable organization. The Foundation is led by Irina Sarishvili, a once influential politician.
• On May 25, a significant political event unfolded as Igor Giorgadze, the ex-security chief of Georgia, appeared on a weekly political talk-show aired by Rustavi 2 television. This marked his first appearance on Georgian television since becoming a fugitive in 1995. He said people should vote for him if they want to restore territorial Integrity (https://civil.ge/archives/110674)
• Activists from the Justice Party, led by fugitive ex-security chief Igor Giorgadze, held rallies in Tbilisi, Kutaisi, Batumi, and Zugdidi on May 26. The protests aimed to demand the resignation of President Saakashvili. In Zugdidi, located in the western region of Samegrelo, clashes between protesters and police occurred. Several activists were reportedly arrested following the confrontation with the police. (https://civil.ge/archives/110681)
• Call for Joint Parliamentary Group: Parliamentarians from the National Movement party urged opposition MPs on May 29 to establish a joint group to investigate the activities of Igor Giorgadze's Justice Party and his Foundation in Georgia. MP Maia Nadiradze, the parliamentary majority leader, suggested that forming a joint group would reduce accusations against them of attempting to create a political scarecrow out of Giorgadze. (https://civil.ge/archives/110698)
  • Opposition Response: Opposition parliamentarians, who have been boycotting sessions for two months, dismissed the proposal as unserious. MP Mamuka Katsitadze noted that special services should handle investigations into terrorist funding rather than a parliamentary group. Criticism of Proposal: MP Zviad Dzidziguri from the Democratic Front called the proposal unserious and suggested it was a tactic to pressure opposition lawmakers to return to parliamentary sessions.
  • Legislative Suggestions: Some members of the ruling party, like MP Nodar Grigalashvili, proposed legislation to ban former KGB employees from holding official positions. This comes after the opposition's earlier attempt to introduce a lustration law was rejected by the parliamentary majority in December.
• 28 May: Dialogue Initiation: Giorgadze has instructed Jemal Gogitidze, the head of the Justice Party’s Moscow branch, to initiate a dialogue with the leadership of breakaway South Ossetia. This move aims to foster conflict resolution through public diplomacy. (https://civil.ge/archives/110711)
  • According to a statement from the Justice Party, this initiative is intended to counteract the plans of the Georgian leadership, which Giorgadze suggests could lead the country towards civil war. He positions his actions as a proactive measure to avert further escalation of conflict. The Justice Party has condemned the May 27 incident in the South Ossetian conflict zone, during which numerous Ossetian civilians were arrested and reportedly beaten by Georgian law enforcement. The party urged the South Ossetian population to exercise patience amidst these tensions.
• 6 September: At least a dozen associates of Igor Giorgadze, Georgia's wanted ex-security chief, were arrested during police raids targeting organizations affiliated with his Justice Party across various cities, including Tbilisi, Batumi, and Gori. These arrests are reportedly connected to an alleged coup attempt orchestrated by Giorgadze, who is currently based in Moscow. Notable figures among the arrested include Temur Zhorzholiani, leader of the Conservative-Monarchist Party, and Maia Nikolaishvili of the Anti-Soros Movement. While officials have not commented on the situation, ruling party members justified the arrests by claiming that these individuals are financed by Russian special services aiming to destabilize Georgia. Opposition politicians, while critical of Giorgadze's party, expressed the need for clarity on the legitimacy of the arrests. (https://civil.ge/archives/185594)
  • A total of 29 activists connected to Igor Giorgadze, Georgia's wanted ex-security chief, have been arrested and charged with plotting a coup, according to Interior Minister Vano Merabishvili. The arrests occurred during a special operation conducted across Georgia early on September 6, targeting leaders of Giorgadze's Justice Party and affiliated political groups. Merabishvili stated that there is substantial evidence to support the charges against the detainees, who allegedly planned to destabilize the government to facilitate Giorgadze's return to Georgia. Additional arrests were carried out in Batumi, Zugdidi, Samtredia, Gori and in the Kakheti region, where local executives of the Justice Party were detained (https://civil.ge/archives/115259)
  • Officials from the ruling National Movement party have expressed strong support for the recent arrests of associates of Igor Giorgadze, asserting that Georgian law enforcement has successfully thwarted a coup attempt. Givi Targamadze, Chairman of the Parliamentary Committee for Defense and Security, stated that there is solid evidence of guilt among the detainees, whose activities he described as detrimental to the country's sovereignty. MP Giga Bokeria emphasized that the arrests were not politically motivated, arguing that Giorgadze’s associates lacked the credibility to be considered genuine political opponents. Following the arrests, Giorgadze’s Justice Party and its affiliated groups announced a boycott of the local self-governance elections scheduled for October 5. (https://civil.ge/archives/115255)
  • During a visit to Poland, President Mikheil Saakashvili expressed his approval of the recent arrests of associates of Igor Giorgadze, the ex-security chief charged with plotting a coup in Georgia. Saakashvili stated that he feels no remorse for the arrests and instead expressed disappointment over the national football team's recent loss to Ukraine. He indicated that those involved in the coup attempt would face consequences, and he noted that previous Russian attempts to destabilize Georgia, such as a wine embargo and military provocations, had failed. Saakashvili emphasized the importance of national unity in countering such threats. (https://civil.ge/archives/115264)
  • Key Russian MPs have condemned the recent arrests of 29 activists associated with Igor Giorgadze, a Moscow-based ex-security chief wanted in Georgia, labeling the actions as "repression" against political opponents of the ruling party. Boris Grizlov, Speaker of the Duma Council, characterized the situation as indicative of an "authoritarian regime" that has emerged in Georgia following the 2003 Rose Revolution. Communist Party leader Genady Zuganov criticized the arrests as a "barbaric measure," asserting that there is a lack of democracy in Georgia, while MP Andrey Kokoshin accused the authorities of employing "Stalinist methods" against a legally operating opposition. Sergey Baburin warned that these actions could have detrimental effects on the Georgian populace and threaten neighboring countries. Giorgadze himself described the arrests as a tactic by the Georgian government to boost their declining popularity through repression. (https://civil.ge/archives/115263)
  • At a news conference in Tbilisi on September 7, Irina Sarishvili, a leader of the Imedi Party and chairperson of Igor Giorgadze's Charitable Foundation, vehemently denied the allegations that associates of Giorgadze were involved in a coup plot. She characterized the claims as "absurd," particularly criticizing the assertion that a crucial meeting took place on May 4, 2006, involving Temur Zhorzholiani, who was actually hospitalized at that time. Sarishvili also addressed the seizure of $49,000 from Maia Topuria's home, dismissing it as funds from the sale of antiques rather than evidence of coup financing. She found it implausible that a coup could be orchestrated with such a small amount of money. (https://civil.ge/archives/115262)
  • On September 7, Tbilisi's Chief Prosecutor Giorgi Gviniashvili announced that criminal charges have been officially filed against 13 individuals linked to a coup plot, following the arrest of 29 activists from the Russian-leaning Justice Party and its affiliates on September 6. Among those charged are Temur Zhorzholiani, leader of the Conservative-Monarchist Party; Maia Nikolaishvili, chairperson of the Anti-Soros Movement; and Maia Topuria, a high-ranking official in the Justice Party. One suspect, Kakha Kantaria, faces additional charges for illegal possession of weapons. The charges are supported by substantial evidence, and the Prosecutor's Office intends to request pre-trial detention for the suspects. Witness identities will remain confidential until the trial, where their testimonies will be presented, and taped evidence has already been released by the Interior Ministry alleging that a coup was being plotted by key figures in Giorgadze's party. (https://civil.ge/archives/115266)
  • Interior Minister Vano Merabishvili stated that the arrests were based on intelligence suggesting a plan to overthrow the government to facilitate Giorgadze's return to Georgia. The charged individuals include prominent figures like Temur Zhorzholiani and Maia Topuria. Interior Ministry footage allegedly shows secret meetings discussing coup plans and organizing protests aimed at disrupting government stability. Ruling party officials have condemned the group as financed by Russian special services, while Giorgadze denounced the arrests as political repression aimed at boosting the ruling party's declining popularity. Opposition leaders expressed concern about the government's handling of the situation, warning against creating a political scapegoat out of Giorgadze. (https://civil.ge/archives/115260)
  • On September 8, Shalva Natelashvili, leader of the Labor Party, condemned the mass arrests of activists linked to Igor Giorgadze’s Justice Party, accusing the Georgian government of trying to dismantle the multi-party system and labeling the detained individuals as political prisoners. He claimed that the current regime, which he asserted was installed with support from U.S. and Russian special services, fears being overthrown similarly to the previous administration. Natelashvili demanded accountability from Western powers regarding democracy in Georgia and alleged that Saakashvili's government is funded by financial backers from both Washington and Moscow. (https://civil.ge/archives/115276)
• On September 8, the Tbilisi City Court ordered 12 activists connected to the Justice Party, linked to the wanted former security chief Igor Giorgadze, to be held in pre-trial custody for two months on suspicion of plotting a coup. A separate hearing began for Maia Nikolaishvili, chairperson of the Anti-Soros Movement, who also faces similar charges, with prosecutors seeking her pre-trial detention as well. The suspects have denied the allegations, claiming that their arrests are politically motivated. Irina Sarishvili, leader of the Imedi Party affiliated with Giorgadze’s Justice Party, criticized the government, suggesting that President Saakashvili's actions could provoke a revolution, while law enforcement also shut down an office of Giorgadze's Charitable Foundation in Tbilisi. (https://civil.ge/archives/115286)
• Maia Nikoleishvili, the chairperson of the Anti-Soros Movement associated with Igor Giorgadze’s Justice Party, was released on bail after pleading guilty to charges of plotting a coup during a court hearing on September 8. Initially facing a request for two months of pre-trial custody, she was instead released on GEL 10,000 bail following her testimony. This development came on the same day that 12 other individuals were sentenced to two months in pre-trial custody for similar charges after being arrested in police raids on September 6. While Nikoleishvili admitted to attending a meeting on May 4 where plans to overthrow the government were discussed, she claimed that several key figures, including Irina Sarishvili and former parliamentarian Elizbar Javelidze, opposed the plan, asserting that it was orchestrated by Giorgadze. Sarishvili later condemned Nikoleishvili’s testimony as false, attributing it to her "personal weakness." (https://civil.ge/archives/115288)
• On September 9, Interior Minister Vano Merabishvili announced that police had thwarted an attempt to plant explosives outside the ruling National Movement party office in downtown Tbilisi. Authorities arrested an activist affiliated with Igor Giorgadze's Justice Party, who was allegedly caught trying to detonate a bomb at the site. Merabishvili revealed that the suspect previously worked in the Security Ministry when Giorgadze served as security chief and has connections to the Communist Party led by Panteleimon Giorgadze, Igor's father. The arrested individual was found with 400 grams of TNT, and Merabishvili commended the counter-terrorism center for its proactive measures in intercepting the plot. (https://civil.ge/archives/115290)
• Sergey Prikhodko, a senior aide to Russian President Vladimir Putin, stated that Moscow has no intentions of orchestrating a coup in Georgia, responding to Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili's claims that Russia seeks to destabilize the country to install a new government. Prikhodko emphasized that Russia is concerned about the inconsistencies between the Georgian government's rhetoric and its actions. He expressed a desire for Georgia to be a friendly neighbor, criticizing what he described as Georgia's propaganda efforts to paint Russia as an external enemy and complicate regional peacekeeping efforts. (https://civil.ge/archives/115314)
• Irina Sarishvili, leader of the political party Hope, which is linked to Igor Giorgadze’s Justice Party, announced plans for an “antifascist movement” called Salvation, aimed at organizing large-scale civil disobedience after Georgia’s October 5 local elections. This peaceful protest campaign seeks to pressure the government to resign. Sarishvili said that Salvation committees will be established nationwide to coordinate actions. Meanwhile, criminal charges related to an alleged coup plot have been filed against 13 activists connected to Giorgadze’s affiliates; one confessed, while others claim the charges are politically motivated. (https://civil.ge/archives/115370)
• On February 5, 2007, Irina Sarishvili, a leader of the Imedi (Hope) political party affiliated with the Justice Party of the wanted former Georgian security chief Igor Giorgadze, was arrested at the Sadakhlo border crossing between Georgia and Armenia. Reports from Tbilisi-based TV networks Imedi and Rustavi 2 indicated that Sarishvili was returning from Russia when detained. Authorities reportedly seized USD 58,000, 7,000 Russian rubles, and over 300 grams of gold from her. While the reason for her arrest has not been officially disclosed, this was Sarishvili’s second arrest in five months, with her previous detainment occurring in September 2006 during a crackdown on Giorgadze’s supporters. (https://civil.ge/archives/111865)
  • Irina Sarishvili, a leader of the Imedi (Hope) political party associated with the wanted former Georgian security chief Igor Giorgadze, was released on February 6, 2007, after being detained for eight hours of interrogation. Sarishvili and her two companions were arrested on February 5 after crossing the Georgian-Armenian border, with authorities reportedly finding USD 58,000 and undeclared gold. Sarishvili denied any wrongdoing, claiming the money was for her and her companions' families, and stated the gold belonged to a taxi driver. The case stirred political controversy, with ruling party MP Givi Targamadze suggesting links to Giorgadze's supporters and Russia. However, Sarishvili denied being in Moscow, and opposition politicians dismissed the allegations as attempts to discredit their NATO views. (https://civil.ge/archives/111868)
• On March 19, 2007, 11 activists from parties and organizations linked to the wanted former security chief Igor Giorgadze's Justice Party went on trial for allegedly plotting a coup, though all the suspects denied the charges. The group had been arrested in September 2006, and Maia Nikoleishvili, the leader of the Anti-Soros Movement, was released on bail after pleading guilty and testifying against the others. In a statement issued on March 19, two American lawyers representing one of the suspects, Maia Topuria, called for the U.S. government to pressure Georgian Parliamentary Chairperson Nino Burjanadze to prevent political interference with the judiciary, labeling the prosecution of Topuria as politically motivated. (https://civil.ge/archives/112110
• On August 24, 2007, Tbilisi City Court sentenced 13 individuals affiliated with the Justice Party of ex-security chief Igor Giorgadze to prison terms for allegedly plotting a coup. The sentences ranged from three and a half to eight and a half years in prison, with Maia Topuria, a relative of Giorgadze, receiving the longest sentence of eight and a half years. While 29 people had been arrested in connection with the plot, only 13 were charged. The case, which some opponents of President Mikheil Saakashvili claimed was politically motivated, was conducted behind closed doors, and defense attorneys criticized the trial as a "travesty". (https://civil.ge/archives/112904)

Espionnage controversy

ZOURABICHVILI

• The worst-yet diplomatic crisis between the two countries (263)
• Led to the recall of the Russian Ambassador (263)
• Zourabichvili criticized the arrests as it is "known fact" that employees of the Russian diplomatic service are also spies (263)
• Zourabichvili claims it was a direct attempt orchestrated by Merabishvili to heighten tensions (263-264)
• She saw in it a media campaign to help bolster UNM's chances at the local elections, set for a week from the arrests (264)

GALEOTTI

• Moscow had stepped up its intelligence operations in Georgia before the espionnage controversy (124)
• The four that Georgia arrested were allegedly GRU agents (124)

• The spy scandal destroyed entirely any incentive for cooperation (Kavadze 73)

GACHECHILADZE

• Gachechiladze believes that the US was not happy about the espionnage controversy because of what it meant: a provocation against Putin, himself coming from spy networks (540)
• The spies received a hero's welcome in Russia (540)
• The spies were handed over to the OSCE in handcuffs by police women. The fact that they were women was also insulting, according to the author (540)
• Putin later admitted that it was this episode that made him order his military leadership to prepare a plan to invade Georgia (540)

IIFFMCG II

• On September 27, 2006, Georgian authorities arrested four Russian military officers, accusing them of being members of an espionage network whose main goal was to prevent Georgia's integration int NATO (19-20)
• This led to a new low in bilateral relations (20)
• Report: "On the Russian side the incident strongly reinforced the already mature intention to punish Georgia" (20)
• For many, the way Georgia handled the affair was heavy handed. The spies were expected to have been expelled, not arrested, despite the standard modus operandi in such cases, and they were released and transferred to OSCE officials in theatrical circumstances (20)
• At a meeting of the NSC< Putin said that "although Russia had consistently met its commitments to withdraw its military units from its former bases on Georgian territory, our servicemen were seized and thrown in jail". (20)
  • Putin labeled the event as state terrorism accompnaued by hostage0taking with US support (20)
• Putin said "these people think that, sheltered by their foreign sponsors, they can feel at ease and secure" (20)
  • MOD Sergey Ivanov made similar allusions at a NATO-Russia meeting in Portoroz at the end of September (20)
• The international reactions, including from the EU, NATO, UN, and OSCE was to express deep concern and call on both sides to mitigate their tone and defuse tensions (20)
• Saakashvili said that Georgia's sovereignty included self-protection against Russian power projections (20)
• On September 28, Russia asked the UNSC to condemn Georgia for taking dangerous and unacceptable steps that could destabilize the region but there was no such condemnation, even though members requested more information about the situation (20)
• On September 29, the Georgian MIA issued a statement accusing the Russian military of engaging in movements on the border with Georgia, claiming the mobilization of Russia's 58th Army deployed in North Ossetia (20)

IIFFMჩG III

• The Russian spies were working under the cover of the Group of Russian Troops in the Trans-Caucasus (16)
• The network was managed by Colonel Anatoly Sinitsin in Armenia. He was choef of station in Yerevan and served at Military Division N. 44843. (16)
• The four spoes detained in Tbilisi and Batumi were: Vice-Colonel Alexander Savva, Dmitry Kazantsev, Alexey Zavgorodny, and Major ALexander Baranov (16)
• GRU Vice-Colonel Konstantin Pichugin was hiding inside the building of the Russian Military Headquarters in Tbilisi (16)

• (Before scandal) In response to Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili’s planned UN General Assembly address seeking an end to Russian-led peacekeeping in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the Russian Foreign Ministry issued a statement defending its peacekeeping operations in these regions. Russia claims that Georgian efforts to replace its forces with an international police presence and Georgia's refusal to commit to non-hostility agreements have destabilized the region, freezing negotiations. Moscow accuses Tbilisi of diverting attention from internal challenges by blaming foreign influences and targeting opposition groups, including recent arrests of pro-Russian activists. Rejecting Georgia’s accusations of ineffectiveness, Russia asserts that its peacekeepers are fulfilling their role of maintaining stability, with support from Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and local populations. Emphasizing the need for mutual consideration of all parties' perspectives, Russia pledges continued adherence to international agreements. (https://civil.ge/archives/115330)

• On September 27, 2006, Georgian police sealed off the area surrounding the headquarters of Russian troops in Tbilisi, prompting speculation about the reasons behind the cordon. Georgian television captured images of the police presence, but officials remained silent on the motives for the security measures. Ivan Volynkin from the Russian Embassy expressed confusion over the situation, stating that the Russian side was unaware of the reasons for the seal-off and insisted on the immediate lifting of the cordon along with a demand for an explanation. A news conference by police officials was scheduled for later that evening to address the situation. (https://civil.ge/archives/115416)
• On September 27, 2006, RIA Novosti reported that four senior Russian military officers have gone missing in Georgia, as confirmed by officials from the Russian Embassy in Tbilisi. Two of the missing officers are stationed at the Russian military base in Batumi, while the other two are based at the Russian Troops' headquarters in Tbilisi. The embassy officials indicated they have no information regarding the officers' current whereabouts. (https://civil.ge/archives/115431)
• On September 27, 2006, Georgia's counter-intelligence service arrested four Russian military intelligence (GRU) officers and eleven Georgian citizens allegedly cooperating with them. The operation, commanded from Yerevan by Anatoly Sinitsin—who was linked to a previous terrorist act in Gori—was aimed at preventing planned provocations in Georgia. Two GRU operatives, including Colonel Alexander Sava, were apprehended in Tbilisi, while the others were arrested in Batumi. Georgian Interior Minister Vano Merabishvili stated that the group had been gathering intelligence on various aspects of Georgia's military and political landscape. Additionally, he highlighted that one GRU officer, Konstantine Pugachin, was reportedly hiding in the Russian Troops' headquarters in Tbilisi, a location where Georgian authorities cannot conduct operations due to diplomatic immunity, prompting demands for his extradition. (https://civil.ge/archives/115432)
• On September 27, 2006, Georgia's intelligence service arrested four Russian military officers and charged them with espionage, alongside eleven Georgian citizens suspected of collaboration. Interior Minister Vano Merabishvili stated that the Russian officers, part of the GRU (Main Intelligence Service), were believed to be involved in a planned provocation against Georgia. The arrests occurred in Tbilisi and Batumi, with two key figures, Colonel Alexander Sava and Dimitri Kazantsev, apprehended in Tbilisi. Merabishvili identified a fifth officer, Konstantine Pichugin, as hiding in the Russian Troops' headquarters in Tbilisi, prompting demands for his extradition. The group's intelligence activities were reportedly focused on Georgia's military, NATO integration, and other strategic sectors. Russian authorities responded by summoning the Georgian ambassador and demanding the immediate release of their officers. (https://civil.ge/archives/115430)
• The Russian Foreign Ministry condemned Georgia's arrest of four Russian military officers on espionage charges, demanding their immediate release. The ministry stated that the officers were responsible for overseeing the withdrawal of Russian military bases from Georgia and accused the Georgian authorities of creating obstacles for Russian servicemen while making unfounded accusations against them. They characterized the arrests as part of a broader anti-Russian stance by the Georgian leadership and summoned the Georgian ambassador to Moscow to express their protest against the actions taken by Georgia on September 27. (https://civil.ge/archives/115433)
• Georgian Defense Minister Irakli Okruashvili announced on September 27 that the police cordon around the headquarters of the Russian Troops in Tbilisi will remain in place until Russia extradites its officers suspected of espionage. Following the arrest of four Russian officers on espionage charges, Okruashvili emphasized that while the headquarters enjoys diplomatic immunity, the Georgian government has justified suspicions regarding individuals within it. He referenced a previous gesture of goodwill in which Georgia released a Russian officer, hoping for reciprocity from Russia, but stated that such constructiveness would not be extended any further. (https://civil.ge/archives/115435)
• 28 September: Unarmed Georgian police continue to maintain a cordon around the Russian Troop Headquarters in Tbilisi following the recent arrests of four Russian officers and eleven Georgian citizens on espionage charges. Georgian authorities claim that another Russian official, also suspected of espionage, is still inside the headquarters, and they are demanding his extradition. Defense Minister Irakli Okruashvili stated that the police will keep the cordon in place until the wanted officer is surrendered. (https://civil.ge/archives/115437)
• Russian Defense Minister Sergey Ivanov reported on September 28 that seven Russian servicemen were attacked and briefly detained in Batumi. According to Ivanov, a vehicle carrying a Russian officer and the servicemen was stopped, leading to an assault in which the attackers seized their weapons and the car. Although the servicemen were released later that night, no explanation was provided for their detention. Ivanov reiterated Russia's demand for the immediate release of four Russian military officers arrested on espionage charges on September 27 and warned that Russia's response to these incidents would be "adequate." (https://civil.ge/archives/115438)
• As of September 28, the Russian Embassy in Tbilisi has ceased issuing visas to all Georgian citizens, as confirmed by spokesperson Mikhail Svirin. The embassy did not provide specific reasons for this decision, which comes on the heels of Georgian authorities arresting four Russian military officers on espionage charges the previous day. Russia condemned the arrests as a provocation and has demanded the immediate release of the officers involved. (https://civil.ge/archives/115439)
• Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov has accused Georgia of escalating tensions following the arrest of four Russian officers on espionage charges, asserting that Russia will utilize all available means to secure their release. The Russian Embassy in Tbilisi has ceased issuing visas to all Georgian citizens, a move that coincides with accusations that Georgia is staging provocations to justify heightened conflict, particularly concerning South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Lavrov stated that Georgia's actions reflect a confrontational policy and indicated that Russia plans to address the situation at the UN Security Council. Meanwhile, Russian Defense Minister Sergey Ivanov dismissed the espionage claims as unfounded, likening the atmosphere in Georgia to the oppressive climate of 1937 in the Soviet Union. (https://civil.ge/archives/115440)
• The Georgian Foreign Ministry has issued a formal note to the Russian embassy, demanding the extradition of Konstantine Pichugin, a Russian military intelligence officer accused of espionage, who is reportedly sheltering within the Russian Troops' headquarters in Tbilisi. This demand follows the arrest of four other Russian officers on September 27 for alleged spying activities. The Georgian police maintain a cordon around the headquarters, and the Russian Embassy has confirmed that its detained officers are in good condition and being treated well by Georgian authorities. (https://civil.ge/archives/115434)
• In response to the recent arrest of four Russian military officers in Georgia on espionage charges, Russian MPs have cautioned the Georgian government to adopt a more restrained approach towards Russia. MP Victor Ylukhin accused Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili of deliberately escalating tensions and urged for a union state between the two nations to maintain peace, while MP Alexey Mitrofanov criticized Georgia's policies, suggesting that the leadership fails to recognize Russia's historical significance and military might, warning that continued provocations could lead to war. (https://civil.ge/archives/115444)
• Georgian parliamentarians from the ruling National Movement party expressed strong support for the arrests of Russian military officers suspected of espionage, viewing it as evidence of Russia's ongoing "aggressive intentions" toward Georgia. Influential MP Giga Bokeria stated that Russia's hostility has been longstanding, as it cannot accept Georgia's independence. MP Levan Bezhuashvili highlighted the increasing activity of Russian intelligence within Georgia, asserting that enhanced efforts by Georgian special services would thwart such anti-state activities. Meanwhile, MP Givi Targamadze criticized the Russian ministers' reactions as "hysterical" and promised to present evidence of the officers' wrongdoing, countering Russian claims that Georgia is provoking conflict. (https://civil.ge/archives/115442)
• The Georgian Ministry of Internal Affairs revealed audio and video evidence on September 28 to support its claims of espionage against four Russian officers and eleven Georgian citizens arrested on September 27. Minister Vano Merabishvili stated that the materials, which include recordings of meetings between the Russian officers and Georgian individuals, demonstrate clear involvement in espionage activities. Among the evidence is a tapped phone conversation between Russian military intelligence officer Konstantin Pichugin and a local operative discussing the location of a Georgian military storehouse. Another recording features a GRU colonel instructing a local operative to visit a military deployment area. Merabishvili emphasized that this is just a portion of the evidence and indicated that more would be released, asserting that these recordings confirm the existence of a Russian spy ring operating in Georgia. (https://civil.ge/archives/115445)
• Sergey Mironov, the Chairman of the Council of the Federation of Russia, expressed concerns on September 28 that the recent arrest of Russian military officers accused of espionage could indicate that Georgia is gearing up for military actions. Mironov noted that history has shown a pattern where heightened accusations of espionage, like those currently seen in Georgia, often precede military preparations. He characterized the situation as not merely an anti-Russian stance by the Georgian government but rather as a deliberate provocation. (https://civil.ge/archives/115446)
• In light of escalating tensions following the arrest of four Russian officers on espionage charges, Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili stated that Georgia should respond to any potential Russian backlash with calmness and without excessive emotion. This comes after Russia halted visa issuance to Georgian citizens, recalled its ambassador, and recommended its citizens avoid traveling to Georgia. Saakashvili noted that Russia has already imposed various sanctions against Georgia, including bans on imports of agricultural products and wine. He emphasized that Georgia's counter-intelligence operations are serious and necessary for safeguarding the democratic state, and he reassured that all legal procedures will be followed regarding the arrested officers, dismissing the panic surrounding the Russian evacuation as unnecessary. Saakashvili asserted that there is no threat to the families of Russian servicemen in Georgia and urged respect for Georgian laws and sovereignty. (https://civil.ge/archives/115441)
• Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Grigory Karasin and U.S. Ambassador to Russia William Burns held discussions regarding the recent arrest of Russian military officers in Georgia on espionage charges. The Russian Foreign Ministry conveyed concerns that the actions taken by the Georgian government pose a threat not only to the bilateral relations between Russia and Georgia but also to regional security. Russia is demanding the immediate release of its officers and the lifting of the blockade surrounding the Russian military headquarters in Tbilisi, while seeking understanding and support from the United States on this matter. (https://civil.ge/archives/115449)
• Nino Burjanadze, the Chairperson of the Georgian Parliament, commented on the ongoing espionage dispute with Russia, urging Russian officials to carefully consider the evidence against the arrested military officers before issuing any threatening statements. She suggested that Russia's quick reaction, without an in-depth analysis of the evidence, indicates either a lack of interest in the details or a strategy of political blackmail against Georgia. Burjanadze's remarks reflect Georgia's stance on the situation, emphasizing the need for factual understanding amidst escalating tensions. (https://civil.ge/archives/115452)
• Givi Targamadze, a senior MP from Georgia's ruling National Movement party, downplayed Russia's response to the recent espionage case involving four arrested Russian military officers, asserting that Russia has limited leverage against Georgia. Targamadze described the situation as a criminal matter rather than a political one, criticizing Russia for politicizing the arrests. He characterized the announced "partial evacuation" of Russian citizens as an inappropriate reaction, suggesting that securing competent legal representation for the officers would have been a more sensible approach. He dismissed the evacuation efforts as theatrical, emphasizing that there is no real threat to Russian citizens in Georgia. (https://civil.ge/archives/115453)
• On September 29, Georgian authorities released Russian serviceman Ruslan Skrilnikov, who had been detained along with four Russian officers on espionage charges but was not formally charged and released after interrogation. As tensions escalated, two planes from the Russian Emergency Ministry were expected to arrive in Tbilisi for the "partial evacuation" of Russian citizens, a move that the Georgian leadership characterized as "hysteria." Additionally, the Russian envoy to the UN called for a Security Council session to address the situation, emphasizing the need for international attention on the matter. (https://civil.ge/archives/115454)
• On September 29, Russia's Ambassador to Georgia, Viacheslav Kovalenko, claimed that the evidence presented by Georgian authorities against four Russian military officers accused of espionage was fabricated, demanding their immediate release and an apology for what he termed "groundless arrests." Kovalenko criticized the video and audio recordings released by the Georgian Interior Ministry as unclear and edited, asserting they lacked any real evidence. He noted that Russia's relations with Georgia had been significantly strained by these actions and indicated that over 100 Russian Embassy employees were evacuating to Russia. His return to Georgia, he stated, would depend on the Georgian government's actions moving forward. (https://civil.ge/archives/115455)
• On September 29, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Grigory Karasin canceled scheduled talks with Georgian Deputy Foreign Minister Giorgi Manjgaladze, which were intended to address border delimitation and the ongoing spy controversy between the two nations. Despite Georgia's preparedness for the discussions, the Georgian Foreign Ministry reported that the meeting was thwarted without explanation. (https://civil.ge/archives/115456)
• Tensions between Georgia and Russia intensified as four Russian military officers faced charges of espionage, with Moscow claiming the evidence against them was fabricated and demanding their immediate release along with an apology from Tbilisi. As part of its response, Russia announced a "partial evacuation" of over 100 citizens, including embassy staff, from Georgia, which Georgian officials criticized as "hysteria." Despite the pressure from Russia, Georgia remained firm, maintaining a blockade around the headquarters of Russian troops and calling for the extradition of another officer suspected of spying. In parallel, Russia sought to address the situation at the UN, while Georgian leaders, including President Saakashvili and influential MPs, urged unity and downplayed the seriousness of Russia's actions. (https://civil.ge/archives/115458)
• Four Russian military officers charged with espionage against Georgia appeared in Tbilisi City Court for a preliminary hearing on September 29, where they were placed in two months of pre-trial custody pending further investigation. The hearing is closed to the public, and alongside the officers, eleven Georgian citizens arrested on September 27 are facing similar charges. (https://civil.ge/archives/115460)
• On September 29, a Russian Embassy official stated that Russia will not consider extraditing officer Konstantin Pichugin to Georgia, despite Georgian claims that he is part of a military intelligence ring operating within the country. Pichugin is reportedly sheltered at the Russian Troops Headquarters in Tbilisi, which has been cordoned off by Georgian police since the arrest of four other Russian officers on espionage charges. Georgian Defense Minister Irakli Okruashvili warned that the security cordon will remain in place until Pichugin is extradited. (https://civil.ge/archives/185600)
• On September 29, a Russian Emergency Ministry cargo plane evacuated over 100 Russian citizens from Tbilisi International Airport in response to escalating tensions between Russia and Georgia following a spy scandal. Among the evacuees was Russia's Ambassador to Georgia, Viacheslav Kovalenko, who had been recalled for consultations. The evacuation primarily included family members of embassy staff and personnel from the Russian Troops Headquarters in Tbilisi. (https://civil.ge/archives/115464)
• NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer called for "moderation and de-escalation" amid rising tensions between Russia and Georgia over a recent spy scandal, emphasizing that NATO would not directly intervene in the dispute, as it remains a bilateral issue. Speaking at a press conference in Slovenia on September 29, he acknowledged the importance of the partnership between NATO and Georgia and indicated that he had engaged with Georgian officials regarding the situation. Scheffer reiterated that while NATO would not play a direct role, he urged all parties involved to exercise restraint. (https://civil.ge/archives/115466)
• On September 29, Tbilisi City Court sentenced two Russian military officers, Dimitri Kazantsev and Alexander Sava, to two months of pre-trial custody on espionage charges. The court will also review the cases of two other officers, Alexander Zavgorodny and Alexander Baranov, who were arrested in Batumi, at the Court of Appeals. In addition, Konstantin Pichugin, another officer accused of spying, was sentenced in absentia as he is believed to be hiding at the Russian Troops Headquarters in Tbilisi. The court also sentenced two other Russians, Alexander Erekhov and Sergey Okrokov, in absentia, while six Georgian citizens were given similar pre-trial custody for allegedly collaborating with Russian military intelligence, and five others admitted guilt during the closed hearing. (https://civil.ge/archives/115465)
• On September 29, Georgian Interior Minister Vano Merabishvili expressed concerns about Russian military activities, describing them as intimidation tactics in response to the arrest of four Russian officers accused of espionage. He highlighted the mobilization of Russia’s 58th Army from North Ossetia towards Georgia and noted large-scale naval maneuvers planned in the Black Sea. Merabishvili also mentioned unusual movements at the Russian military base in Akhalkalaki, southern Georgia, questioning the motives behind these actions and suggesting they were part of a broader pattern of threats from Russia. (https://civil.ge/archives/185601)
• On September 29, Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili criticized Russia's decision to evacuate part of its embassy staff and their families from Georgia, deeming it an "excessive move" given that he asserted there is no security threat to Russian citizens in the country. He described the evacuation as a propagandistic gesture and emphasized the hospitality of the Georgian people. Saakashvili reassured that the Georgian authorities are effectively managing the situation, which he characterized as a necessary response to espionage activities. He urged calm among the public and reiterated that both Georgians and foreigners are safe in Georgia, even suggesting that Russian citizens might be safer there than in their own country. (https://civil.ge/archives/115467)
• On September 29, four Russian officers accused of espionage against Georgia were sentenced to two months of pre-trial detention in Tbilisi, while three other officers, including Konstantin Pichugin, were sentenced in absentia, as Georgia seeks his extradition from the Russian Troops Headquarters in Tbilisi—a request that Russia has rejected. Additionally, ten Georgian citizens suspected of collaborating with Russian military intelligence also received similar custody sentences. The Georgian Interior Ministry released a video of five Georgians confessing to espionage, detailing their cooperation with Russian intelligence since 1999. In the wake of rising tensions, Russia conducted a partial evacuation of its citizens from Georgia, an action that President Saakashvili labeled an unnecessary propaganda move. Meanwhile, NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer urged for moderation in the escalating conflict, while Russian Defense Minister Sergey Ivanov characterized the arrests as provocations linked to Georgia's ambitions to regain control over breakaway regions. Protests outside the Georgian Embassy in Moscow turned violent, with demonstrators vandalizing the premises. (https://civil.ge/archives/115468)
• On September 29, Russian Senator Sergey Mironov condemned Georgia's recent arrests of Russian military officers on espionage charges, labeling it a manifestation of Tbilisi's "spy-mania" that could escalate into a broader conflict in the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. He expressed concern that such paranoia typically precedes military action, suggesting that Georgia might be preparing to use force to address issues in these regions. Mironov dismissed the espionage allegations as "delirium" or a potential "pre-emptive strike" against Russia, accusing Georgia of provoking tensions and engaging in a "very dangerous game." (https://civil.ge/archives/115469)
• In a September 29 interview with Rustavi 2, Georgian Interior Minister Vano Merabishvili asserted that Russia's recent actions, including the arrest of four Russian military officers for espionage, have shattered the myth of its intelligence capabilities and power. He characterized Russia as confused and vulnerable, noting that its military exercises in North Ossetia and the Black Sea should not be exaggerated, viewing them as face-saving measures rather than genuine threats to Georgian security. Merabishvili expressed confidence in Georgia's protection due to strong international support and highlighted the need to address domestic collaborators with foreign intelligence. He also discussed the status of Konstantin Pichugin, a Russian officer accused of espionage, stating that while Pichugin is likely sheltering at the Russian military base in Tbilisi, Georgia respects international law and cannot act on that territory. (https://civil.ge/archives/115470)
• On September 29, the U.S. Embassy in Tbilisi issued a statement urging both Russia and Georgia to work together to resolve the ongoing dispute stemming from the recent spy row. The U.S. government acknowledged the arrest of four Russian citizens and eleven Georgians by the Georgian authorities on espionage charges, emphasizing that this is primarily a bilateral issue between the two countries. The statement called for cooperation and respectful dialogue to address the matter promptly and appropriately, highlighting the importance of resolving such tensions through mutual understanding. (https://civil.ge/archives/115472)
• On September 29, Georgian Defense Minister Irakli Okruashvili indicated in an interview with Imedi television that the extradition of Russian military officers arrested on espionage charges could be a possibility. He mentioned that the Russian authorities might seek the assistance of foreign partners to encourage Georgia to show goodwill and expel the suspects from the country. Okruashvili stated that international norms typically dictate the expulsion of such individuals, suggesting that Georgia might consider this option. He emphasized, however, that Georgian citizens charged with treason would face strict penalties. Additionally, he noted that Russia appears to be withdrawing its remaining spies from Georgia. (https://civil.ge/archives/115473)
• On September 30, 2006, Russia continued to pull out staff from its embassy in Tbilisi, with only two diplomats and some security personnel remaining behind. This action followed a partial evacuation on September 29, which saw most embassy staff, including Ambassador Viacheslav Kovalenko, leave Georgia in response to the arrest of four Russian military officers charged with espionage. The Georgian government characterized Russia's reaction as "hysteria." (https://civil.ge/archives/115474)
• On September 29, 2006, U.S. Department of State spokesman Sean McCormack stated that the United States prefers the ongoing spy dispute between Russia and Georgia to be resolved bilaterally rather than referred to the UN Security Council, emphasizing that it is a matter for the two countries to address themselves. He urged both sides to consider the context of recent events and denied any U.S. involvement in conspiracy theories regarding the situation, reaffirming the importance of neighborly relations in resolving their differences. (https://civil.ge/archives/115475)
• On September 30, 2006, Russian General Alexander Baranov announced the suspension of troop withdrawals from Georgia due to the ongoing spy dispute between the two nations, calling the arrest of Russian military officers on espionage charges a provocation instigated by Georgian officials. Despite this suspension, Baranov noted that Russia had already met its obligations under a prior agreement to withdraw military equipment, with remaining hardware scheduled to leave by October 1, 2007, and the closure of military bases planned for 2008. He emphasized that Russia's priority is now to protect its citizens and national honor. (https://civil.ge/archives/115477)
• On September 30, 2006, the Georgian Foreign Ministry issued a warning to Russia regarding its planned naval maneuvers, stating that these exercises would negatively impact Georgia's trade and economic interests by restricting operations at the Black Sea ports of Batumi, Poti, and Supsa. The ministry condemned the maneuvers as inconsistent with Georgian laws and international norms, asserting that Russia would be held accountable for any adverse consequences resulting from these actions. (https://civil.ge/archives/115479)
• Georgian Defense Minister Irakli Okruashvili asserted on September 30, 2006, that the withdrawal of Russian military bases in Georgia is an "unstoppable" process, dismissing Russian claims of suspending the pullout as mere "hysteria" in response to recent tensions over the detention of four Russian officers on espionage charges. He emphasized that the withdrawal will proceed as per the schedule outlined in the March 31, 2006 agreement, which mandates the complete removal of Russian military equipment from Batumi by the end of 2007 and the closure of the Russian military headquarters in the region by 2008. (https://civil.ge/archives/115485)
• Russian President Vladimir Putin held a conference in Sochi on September 29, 2006, with the leaders of Georgia's breakaway regions, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, amid escalating tensions with Georgia over a recent spy row. This event, which included discussions on the "Economic Development of Southern Russia," was condemned by the Georgian Foreign Ministry as an attempt by Moscow to incite separatism. Concurrently, Russia sought condemnation of Georgia's actions from the UN Security Council, but the U.S. indicated it preferred the matter to be resolved bilaterally. In response to Russia's actions, Georgian officials downplayed threats regarding the suspension of Russian troop withdrawals and expressed concerns over planned Russian naval maneuvers that they argued would harm Georgia's economic interests. Defense Minister Irakli Okruashvili remarked that the Russian military withdrawal would proceed as scheduled, asserting that Moscow's reactions stemmed from "hysteria" over the arrest of Russian officers on espionage charges. (https://civil.ge/archives/115486)
• 1 October: OSCE Chairman Karel De Gucht offered to mediate in the escalating dispute between Georgia and Russia following Georgia's arrest of four Russian officers accused of espionage. In coordination with Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili and the Russian and Georgian foreign ministers, De Gucht urged all sides to uphold international law, avoid provocations, and engage in direct dialogue to resolve the issue quickly. He also expressed willingness to visit the region on short notice if his involvement could help achieve a breakthrough. (https://civil.ge/archives/115491)
  • Amid escalating tensions between Russia and Georgia following Georgia's arrest of four Russian officers on espionage charges, international actors have begun mediation efforts. OSCE Chairman Karel De Gucht has been in contact with leaders on both sides and expressed willingness to mediate directly in the region. EU foreign policy chief Javier Solana urged Georgian President Saakashvili to de-escalate the situation, offering EU support and facilitation of dialogue. The U.S. has also been engaged, with Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice discussing the matter with Saakashvili. Georgian Defense Minister Irakli Okruashvili suggested that Georgia might extradite the officers only if advised by Western allies. In response to the arrests, the Russian military headquarters in Tbilisi remains surrounded by Georgian police, while the Russian Embassy has undergone a partial evacuation. Georgian opposition parties plan a unity rally outside the Russian Embassy to demonstrate solidarity amid the diplomatic standoff. (https://civil.ge/archives/115492)
• Russian President Vladimir Putin labeled Georgia's arrest of four Russian officers on espionage charges as "state terrorism with hostage-taking," a charge he voiced following a Russian Security Council meeting on October 1. Putin criticized Georgia for allegedly trying to "provoke" Russia, asserting that Georgia's actions echo the repressive tactics of Soviet-era figures like Lavrenti Beria. He implied that Georgian authorities were emboldened by foreign sponsors and believed that anti-Russian policies served Georgian interests. Despite these tensions, Putin instructed Russian Defense Minister Sergey Ivanov to continue with the planned withdrawal of Russian troops from Georgia. Georgian officials have not yet responded to Putin’s accusation of "state terrorism," though they previously condemned Russia’s statements as thinly veiled threats of force. (https://civil.ge/archives/115493)
• Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili dismissed Russian President Vladimir Putin's description of Georgia’s arrest of four Russian officers as “state terrorism with hostage-taking” as an overreaction, attributing Putin’s response to nervousness and the influence of Russian propaganda. Speaking to Western reporters in Batumi, Saakashvili downplayed the likelihood of Russia using military force, expressing confidence that Moscow would not act irrationally. He also refuted Putin's suggestion that Georgia’s stance was driven by Western influence, particularly the United States, clarifying that the U.S. had reiterated that this issue was solely between Georgia and Russia. (https://civil.ge/archives/185603)
• Russian Senate Speaker Sergey Mironov issued a sharp rebuke on October 2, warning that Russia, as a "great power," would not tolerate disrespect and would respond in a "simple, accessible and abundantly understandable" way to those he described as lacking "brains." Mironov attributed the worsening of Russian-Georgian relations to what he called a "clique of the Georgian authorities," contrasting this with the historical friendship he claimed existed between the Georgian and Russian people. (https://civil.ge/archives/115495)
• Reports indicate that Georgia plans to hand over four Russian military officers, recently arrested on espionage charges, to the OSCE in Tbilisi on October 2 following discussions between President Saakashvili and OSCE Chairman-in-Office Karel De Gucht. While Georgian officials have not confirmed the details, such a transfer could ease the diplomatic standoff between Russia and Georgia. The arrested officers, initially sentenced to two months of pre-trial detention, became the center of a tense dispute on September 27, when they, along with eleven Georgian citizens, were detained on espionage charges. Georgian Defense Minister Irakli Okruashvili previously suggested that the officers might be released if Western partners requested it. De Gucht is scheduled to meet Saakashvili in Tbilisi, where further details of the potential handover may emerge. (https://civil.ge/archives/115496)
• OSCE Chairman-in-Office Karel De Gucht arrived in Tbilisi on October 2 to engage with Georgian authorities regarding the potential release of four Russian military officers charged with espionage. Discussions between De Gucht and President Saakashvili have commenced at the presidential residence, with a news conference planned to follow their talks. Reports suggest that Georgia intends to hand over the officers to the OSCE as part of the negotiations. (https://civil.ge/archives/115500)
• On October 2, a plane from the Russian Emergency Ministry arrived at Tbilisi International Airport to transport four Russian military officers arrested by Georgia on charges of espionage back to Moscow. The handover process will be facilitated by the OSCE, with discussions ongoing between OSCE Chairman-in-Office Karel De Gucht and Georgian President Saakashvili. An announcement regarding the details of the handover is anticipated at a joint news conference following their talks. (https://civil.ge/archives/115501)
• On October 2, Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili announced that Georgia would release four Russian military officers arrested on espionage charges, following discussions with OSCE Chairman-in-Office Karel De Gucht. Saakashvili emphasized that this decision was a gesture towards Georgia's western allies rather than a concession to Russian threats. He highlighted that the arrests had exposed a significant espionage operation aimed at undermining Georgia, stating that evidence of this intelligence network would be shared with the OSCE. Saakashvili also conveyed a firm message to Russia, expressing a desire for constructive dialogue while rejecting any notion of being treated as inferior. (https://civil.ge/archives/115502)
• On October 2, Georgia officially handed over four Russian military officers accused of espionage to the OSCE in a ceremony broadcast live on Georgian television. The officers, escorted from the Georgian General Prosecutor's Office, were formally informed of their expulsion and banned from re-entering Georgia. The handover was attended by OSCE Chairman-in-Office Karel De Gucht and Georgian Foreign Minister Gela Bezhuashvili, and after the ceremony, the officers were taken to Tbilisi airport in vehicles provided by the OSCE, where a plane from the Russian Emergency Ministry awaited to return them to Russia. (https://civil.ge/archives/185604)
• EU foreign policy chief Javier Solana praised Georgia for the release of four Russian officers accused of espionage, expressing hope that this gesture would lead to the re-establishment of normal relations between Russia and Georgia. He emphasized the EU's readiness to facilitate dialogue and support confidence-building measures between the two nations. Solana had previously warned President Saakashvili of the potential for further escalation in tensions due to the spy controversy. (https://civil.ge/archives/115506)
• On October 2, President Saakashvili declared his commitment to dismantling Russian intelligence networks operating in the breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, despite the recent neutralization of one such network within Georgia. He noted that while Georgia has regained control over 30% of Abkhazia, similar networks remain active in areas still outside of Tbilisi's control. Saakashvili pledged to identify and hold accountable those responsible for these operations, emphasizing that Georgia's strategy against attempts at destabilization would focus on development. He also refuted claims from Abkhaz authorities regarding troop mobilization at the Senaki military base, asserting that no such mobilization was occurring. (https://civil.ge/archives/115508)
• Russian Defense Minister Sergey Ivanov greeted four Russian military officers at Chkalovsky Airport outside Moscow on October 2, following their handover by Georgia. The event, broadcast by Russian NTV, featured Ivanov expressing gratitude to the officers for their bravery and commending the Russian state's efforts to secure their release. (https://civil.ge/archives/115510)
• The U.S. welcomed Georgia's decision to return four Russian officers arrested for espionage, with State Department deputy spokesman Tom Casey expressing appreciation for the OSCE's role in facilitating the transfer. He urged both Georgia and Russia to take steps to deescalate tensions, emphasizing the U.S. commitment to encouraging peaceful resolutions to differences. Casey highlighted the importance of recognizing Georgia's territorial integrity in discussions, noting that conversations promoting resolution are positive, while those that do not contribute to that goal would be unhelpful. (https://civil.ge/archives/115512)
• UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan expressed his approval of the peaceful resolution surrounding the recent tensions caused by the arrest of Russian officers in Georgia. He commended both Georgia and Russia for resolving the issue constructively and acknowledged the role of OSCE Chairman Karel de Gucht in easing the situation. Annan urged all parties involved to engage collaboratively to address ongoing challenges and called for restraint in actions or statements that could undermine regional stability. (https://civil.ge/archives/115524)
• On November 30, 2006, Georgia's Ministry of Internal Affairs announced the arrest of Kakha Bagauri, a 29-year-old Georgian citizen accused of collaborating with Russian intelligence and authorities from the unrecognized South Ossetian government. The Interior Ministry claims Bagauri provided information on Georgian strategic sites to Russian operatives in South Ossetia for planned sabotage. Video evidence shows Bagauri admitting to his cooperation with South Ossetian special services since 2005. Additionally, authorities allege that Bagauri was instructed to recruit Chechen assassins to target Dimitri Sanakoev, who was then a pro-Tbilisi figurehead claiming leadership of South Ossetia following contested elections. (https://civil.ge/archives/111529)
  • On December 1, 2006, the State Security Committee of South Ossetia dismissed Georgian allegations against Kakha Bagauri, a Georgian citizen arrested on November 30 for allegedly collaborating with Russian and South Ossetian intelligence. Georgian authorities claimed Bagauri was involved in espionage, gathering information on Georgian strategic sites for sabotage, and recruiting Chechen hitmen to assassinate Dimitri Sanakoev, the Tbilisi-aligned leader in South Ossetia. The South Ossetian authorities labeled these accusations as "absurd" and a Georgian-provoked narrative, suggesting inconsistencies in Georgia's arrest account and denying any connection between Bagauri and South Ossetia. (https://civil.ge/archives/111539)

Deportation of Georgians from Russia

ZOURABICHVILI

• In the response to the spy row, Russia deported 400 Georgians through "betailleres" (305)
• A racist campaign, a "hunt for Caucasians" is started in all the big cities of Russia (305)

KAVADZE

• Georgian-run businesses in Russia were harassed (73)
• Thousands of Georgians were deported from Russia (73)
• The Kremlin launched a vociferous anti-Georgian campaign fanned by the media and arousing anti-Georgian sentiments and hatred among ordinary citizens (73-74)

PANFILOV

• Russian media reported of the persecution of Georgians in Russian cities, as well as Russians carrying Georgian surnames (118)
• Russian media reported the deportation of 1000 Georgians within days (118)
  • They were deported in cargo planes (118)
• Two Georgians died during the deportation process (118)
• Teachers in schools were required to make lists of students with Georgian surnames (118)
• Russian citizens with Georgian origins started seeing more tax and other investigations and audits (118)
• In protest, a protest in Moscow - "I am Georgian" - was held in Msocow attended by local intelligentsia (118)
  • Russian artist Stalislav Sadalsky received the Georgian citizenship (118)

ASMUS

• Russia launched a pogrom-style harassment of ethnic Georgians (72)
• It closed down Georgian shops (72)

IIFFMCG II

• Above all, this crisis had an impact on Russian domestic affairs and affected the behaviour of Russian authorities toward the Georgian diaspora living in Russia in a way that damaged Russia’s image in the world. “Until now, if government authorities contributed to public xenophobia it was through inaction, incompetence or irresponsibility. Now ethnic hostility is being incited by government figures – legislators and executive officials alike”. (21)
• Some ethnic Georgians, including children, were loaded in cargo planes and expelled from Russia. (21)
• Prominent Georgian intellectuals living in Russia were harassed by the tax police (21)
• Georgian businesses in Moscow were singled out by law enforcement authorities. (21)
• Georgians were portrayed as the most criminal of all ethnic minorities in Russia. (21)
• The campaign took an especially ugly turn when some Moscow schools were ordered to submit to the police lists of children with Georgian names. (21)
• When the EU ministers of foreign affairs expressed deep concern about the economic, political and humanitarian costs of the Russian measures against Georgia and Georgians, Konstantin Kosachev, Chairman of the State Duma Committee for International Affairs, conceded that criticism of several measures imposed by Russian executive organs on Georgians living in Russia was justified. (21)
• Reactions of protest emerged in Russia against the xenophobe reactions of their own authorities. Around a thousand demonstrators gathered in the centre of Moscow on 8 October 2006, many of them with emblems saying “I’m a Georgian”. (21)

• On September 29, Georgian Defense Minister Irakli Okruashvili stated that Russia has exhausted all options for imposing further sanctions against Georgia, asserting that all possible measures have already been implemented. He made these comments while addressing reporters in Batumi. (https://civil.ge/archives/115461)
• The Russian State Duma is preparing to draft legislation that would empower the government to ban money transfers to "certain countries" during emergencies, as announced by Duma Council Chairman Boris Grizlov. This potential law is being proposed in response to Georgia's recent detention of four Russian military officers. Calls for economic sanctions against Georgia have gained traction in Russia, with some officials advocating for a ban on money transfers, which are significant given the thousands of Georgians working in Russia who send remittances back home. In 2006, over one billion USD was transferred from Russia to Georgia, with the majority of foreign money transfers to Georgia originating from the Russian Federation, amounting to USD 219 million from January to August. (https://civil.ge/archives/115497)
• On October 4, 2006, Russian daily newspapers continued to highlight the escalating tensions between Russia and Georgia. **Kommersant** reported a widespread anti-Georgian campaign in Russia, with authorities investigating firms owned by Georgians and canceling cultural events such as a Georgian ballet performance in St. Petersburg. The U.S. and EU's calls for Russia to lift sanctions were met with defiance from Russian authorities, who advised Western powers against interfering in their bilateral relations. **Nezavisimaya Gazeta** noted that Georgia's leadership recognized the futility of trying to counteract the negative impacts of the sanctions and suggested President Saakashvili was softening his rhetoric towards Russia, although time may have been lost for meaningful dialogue. **Rossiyskaya Gazeta** highlighted concerns that amendments to currency laws could soon prohibit money transfers from Russia to Georgia, although current transfers were still possible and not as significant as in other CIS countries. Commentary from **Izvestia**, penned by Aleksandr Dugin, suggested that Saakashvili and his U.S. allies were driving Russia toward conflict, emphasizing a shift in Georgian sentiment away from pro-American views and towards a more nationalist perspective that could align with Russia. (https://civil.ge/archives/115529)
• On October 4, 2006, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov stated that Russia is open to fostering friendly relations with the Georgian people, suggesting that the anti-Russian sentiments expressed by the Georgian leadership are influenced by foreign support for President Saakashvili's administration. Speaking at the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe in Strasbourg, Lavrov expressed Russia's genuine interest in friendship and cooperation with the Georgian populace while emphasizing that Russia would not succumb to provocations from the current Georgian regime, which he criticized for coming to power through what he described as an unconstitutional process and for its perceived alignment with foreign interests. (https://civil.ge/archives/115531)
• On October 4, 2006, Russian President Vladimir Putin issued a stern warning to Georgia, advising against using "language of blackmail and provocation," amid rising tensions that began on September 27. During a meeting with parliamentary leaders, he expressed gratitude for their support of government actions aimed at protecting Russian citizens abroad. The State Duma Council also released a statement condemning Georgian actions as "state terrorism" and asserting Russia's right to impose sanctions for the security of its citizens. Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov reiterated Russia's willingness to foster friendly relations with the Georgian people but refused to succumb to "provocations" from Saakashvili's administration. Despite some parliamentarians cautioning against further sanctions until after Georgia's local elections on October 5, discussions were ongoing regarding toughening sanctions, including a potential ban on money transfers to Georgia. Amidst these developments, Russian law enforcement increased scrutiny on Georgian businesses in Moscow, while Georgia worked on redirecting air travel through third countries to mitigate the effects of the transport blockade imposed by Russia. The U.S. and EU called for the lifting of sanctions, but Moscow showed no signs of compliance. (https://civil.ge/archives/115533)
• On October 5, 2006, Russia announced the cancellation of all employment and residency quotas for Georgian citizens, as stated by Mikhail Tyurkin, Deputy Director of the Federal Migration Service (FMS). He explained that the decision was based on an assessment of Russia's current population and available job opportunities, concluding that specialists from Georgia are deemed unnecessary for the Russian workforce. (https://civil.ge/archives/115547)
• On October 5, 2006, Denis Soldatikov, the press secretary of the Russian Federal Migration Service (FMS), stated that "every hundredth Georgian commits crimes," reflecting a prejudiced view amidst the cancellation of residence quotas for Georgians. He noted the establishment of a special "Georgian" department within the FMS to monitor Georgian citizens in Russia, alleging that many enter the country under false pretenses of studying or engaging in business while actually participating in criminal activities. This announcement is part of a broader anti-Georgian campaign in Russia, characterized by police harassment, arrests, and the closure of businesses owned by Georgians. (https://civil.ge/archives/115548)
• On October 6, 2006, reports surfaced that Russian authorities were actively targeting illegal Georgian migrants in Moscow, allegedly using school records to identify students with Georgian surnames as a means to track down their parents. While a law enforcement source indicated that this strategy was in place, the Russian Interior Ministry spokesperson denied any official instructions related to tracking migrants through educational institutions. Concurrently, police continued investigations into businesses owned by Georgians, resulting in the closure of several restaurants and casinos on allegations of tax evasion. Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili expressed concerns about rising xenophobia in Russia, while reports indicated that a flight carrying around 100 deported Georgian migrants was set to arrive in Tbilisi the same day, alongside a flight for Russian citizens wishing to leave Georgia amidst the escalating tensions. (https://civil.ge/archives/115567)
• On October 6, 2006, the Russian Federal Tax Service announced investigations into two prominent figures of Georgian descent: Zurab Tsereteli, the head of the Russian Academy of Arts, and the well-known novelist Boris Akunin, whose real name is Georgi Chkhartishvili. The Tax Service cited a shortfall of 2.1 million Roubles (approximately 78,000 USD) in the Academy's financial records, describing the audit as part of a "regularly scheduled" check. Akunin suggested that the scrutiny he faced could be connected to a broader campaign by the Russian government targeting individuals of Georgian heritage, expressing shock at the notion of witnessing what he termed "ethnic cleansing" in Russia. (https://civil.ge/archives/115571)
• Mikheil Kasyanov, the leader of Russia's Peoples Democratic Union and a former Prime Minister with presidential aspirations, criticized the Russian government's actions toward Georgia, particularly the informal sanctions imposed on the Georgian people. In a statement, Kasyanov argued that the Russian leadership's call for UN Security Council involvement and the discriminatory campaign against Georgians and ethnic Russians in Russia reflect poorly on the country's status as a Great Power. He condemned the violations of the Russian Constitution, which prohibits discrimination based on ethnicity, and highlighted that Russia's upcoming presidency in the G-8 would be tarnished by such "chauvinist hysteria" and controversies, including the gas disputes. (https://civil.ge/archives/115572)
• The prominent Russian human rights organization "Memorial" has criticized both Russia and Georgia in light of the recent diplomatic crisis following allegations of espionage. Memorial condemned the Georgian government for irresponsibly exposing alleged Russian spies without presenting sufficient evidence to support these claims. Simultaneously, the group denounced Russia's reaction, which it characterized as imposing collective punishment on the Georgian populace for the actions of their government, viewing this as a clear example of racial discrimination. Memorial emphasized that such actions violate legal principles and contribute to ongoing human rights violations, potentially fostering long-term animosity in regional relations. (https://civil.ge/archives/115581)
• On October 6, 2006, Georgian Foreign Minister Gela Bezhuashvili referred to Russia's actions against Georgians as “a soft form of ethnic cleansing” following the deportation of over 130 Georgians from Moscow. Despite public statements from Georgian officials downplaying Russia's sanctions, there are growing concerns within President Saakashvili’s administration regarding potential further pressure from the Kremlin. Tbilisi fears that Russia's sanctions, combined with a crackdown on Georgian-owned businesses and deportations, could signal more severe actions to come. The upcoming independence referendum in breakaway South Ossetia on November 12 raises additional alarm, as many in Georgia suspect that Russia might recognize the region's independence afterward, potentially provoking military action from Tbilisi to regain control. While some analysts, like Alexander Rondeli of the Georgian Foundation for Strategic and International Studies, suggest that direct Russian military intervention is unlikely, others, such as Anatol Lieven from the New America Foundation, warn that Georgian military plans could escalate into a conflict between Russia and Georgia. Russian President Vladimir Putin has declined mediation offers from the OSCE, calling instead for international pressure on Georgia to refrain from using force against the separatist regions. In light of these tensions, EU officials have urged Georgia to moderate its rhetoric, emphasizing the need for confidence-building measures to facilitate peaceful resolutions. (https://civil.ge/archives/115583)
• On October 7, 2006, the Georgian Foreign Ministry accused Russia of engaging in a state-sponsored campaign of "chauvinistic hysteria" against ethnic Georgians living in Russia. The statement highlighted that Georgian citizens, including women and children, are being rounded up and deported based solely on their ethnicity. It also noted that law enforcement raids are targeting businesses owned by Georgians, and Georgian citizens have been dismissed from Russian-administered schools in Georgia. The ministry condemned the support of pseudo-patriotic and neo-fascist organizations for these actions, asserting that Russia's conduct undermines its ability to serve as an impartial mediator in the ongoing conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. (https://civil.ge/archives/115574)
• On October 7, 2006, the Moscow-based radio station Echo Moskvy initiated the "I am Georgian" campaign, encouraging people to protest against the escalating anti-Georgian sentiment in Russia by wearing badges that proclaim their solidarity. The station's statement emphasized that the ongoing political tensions between Russia and Georgia should not lead to the persecution of ordinary Georgians living in Russia, who are not responsible for the animosity between the governments. The campaign aimed to raise awareness and prevent what the station described as the potential for large-scale ethnic cleansing against Georgians in Russia. (https://civil.ge/archives/115584)
• On October 8, 2006, a rally in Moscow attracted over a thousand participants, including human rights activists and members of the liberal opposition, to protest against what they described as "anti-Georgian hysteria" in Russia. The demonstration, organized by the Echo Moskvy radio station, aimed to highlight concerns over the persecution of ordinary Georgians amid rising tensions between Russia and Georgia. Russian Defense Minister Sergey Ivanov stated that Moscow's sanctions should not impact ordinary citizens and must remain within legal boundaries. However, the rally's focus shifted due to the recent murder of prominent investigative journalist Anna Politkovskaya on October 7, overshadowing the original purpose of the protest. Meanwhile, Georgian media reported that a second plane carrying over 100 Georgians deported from Russia was expected to arrive in Tbilisi shortly after the first plane brought back more than 130 deportees on October 6. (https://civil.ge/archives/185605)
• While speaking with senior members of his ruling National Movement party, Saakashvili emphasized that Georgia does not have a dispute with the Russian people and described the anti-Georgian campaign in Russia as a significant problem not just for Georgia but for the entire world, particularly for Russia itself. He also clarified that estimates of one million Georgians living in Russia are exaggerated, asserting that the actual number is closer to 250,000 to 300,000, most of whom are Russian citizens of Georgian descent. Saakashvili offered Georgian citizenship to those individuals, welcoming them to live in Georgia. However, a senior Kremlin official responded that there was no need for high-level discussions at that time. (https://civil.ge/archives/185485)
• On October 10, 2006, a Russian Emergency Ministry IL-62 passenger plane arrived at Tbilisi airport carrying 119 deported Georgians, marking the second group of Georgians expelled from Russia for migration violations, following the earlier arrival of over 130 deportees on October 6. An official from the Georgian Embassy in Moscow reported that approximately 70 Georgians were still detained in various police stations in the Russian capital, awaiting deportation. Additionally, on the same day, a Russian Emergency Ministry plane transported 150 Russian citizens from Georgia as part of a partial evacuation related to the ongoing tensions stemming from a spy controversy that began on September 27. (https://civil.ge/archives/111172)
• On October 13, 2006, Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili urged Georgians living in Russia to return to their homeland to help strengthen and build the country. In a televised address, he emphasized the need for all citizens, not just ethnic Georgians, to contribute to the nation's development and reunification efforts, particularly in the context of regaining control over Abkhazia. Saakashvili announced plans to simplify the rules for granting Georgian citizenship, allowing returnees to maintain their Russian citizenship if desired. He specifically encouraged Georgian expatriates facing difficulties in Russia to consider returning, highlighting Georgia's business-friendly environment, lower taxes, and absence of corruption. (https://civil.ge/archives/111178)
• On October 17, 2006, Russian news agencies reported that the Russian Interior Ministry had uncovered a money laundering ring allegedly operated by members of the ethnic Georgian criminal community. This operation was part of a broader anti-money laundering initiative, revealing nearly $8 billion laundered between 2004 and January 2005. The criminal group, led by an individual known as "Juba," was involved in illegal banking activities and had connections with Georgian criminals, facilitating money transfers to countries including Georgia, Latvia, and the U.S. Following the discovery, it was noted that "Juba" fled to France on October 8, although his real name was not disclosed. (https://civil.ge/archives/111215)
• On October 17, 2006, a plane carrying up to 150 Georgians deported by Russian authorities for migration offenses landed in Tbilisi. This deportation followed a series of actions against Georgians in Russia, and officials from the Georgian Embassy in Moscow confirmed the death of a 48-year-old man, Tengiz Togonidze, who suffered an asthma attack at the Moscow airport prior to his deportation. Reports indicated that he had been detained for varying lengths of time, from five to twenty days, in St. Petersburg, and the embassy attributed his death to inhumane treatment of deportees. During the period from October 5 to October 13, Moscow courts issued 682 deportation orders, with many deportees forced to return to Georgia via Armenia and Azerbaijan. (https://civil.ge/archives/111217)
• The Georgian Foreign Ministry condemned the death of 48-year-old Tengiz Togonidze, who died of an asthma attack on October 17, 2006, at Domodedovo Airport in Moscow before being deported with 149 other Georgians. The Ministry described the incident as a result of an "inhumane, xenophobic" campaign against Georgians in Russia, alleging that Togonidze had been denied sufficient medical care during his detention since his arrest on October 3 in St. Petersburg. The Ministry reported that his health deteriorated during transit from St. Petersburg to Moscow, and his condition worsened fatally upon arrival at the airport. It highlighted the dire circumstances faced by Georgian deportees, including lack of medical care and inhumane treatment, calling the situation a violation of human rights. The Russian newspaper *Kommersant* noted that Togonidze's death severely impacted Russia's reputation in Georgia. (https://civil.ge/archives/111219)
• A public opinion survey conducted by the All-Russian Public Opinion Research Center (VCIOM) revealed that 40% of Russian respondents believe that the measures taken by the Russian authorities against Georgia and its citizens are "adequate and effective." In contrast, 27% of those surveyed deemed the actions as "not adequate," while only 13% considered them "exaggerated." The survey, which included 1,600 respondents across 46 districts in Russia, was conducted on October 14-15, 2006. This data reflects a significant level of support among the Russian public for the government's stance towards Georgia amidst escalating tensions. (https://civil.ge/archives/111229)
• On October 24, the Georgian Parliament established a special 15-member commission to investigate human rights abuses against ethnic Georgians deported from Russia. Chaired by MP Nika Gvaramia from the ruling National Movement party, the commission aims to compile data on violations and report findings to international organizations. While the opposition supports the initiative, they urge the government to take more direct actions, such as allocating funds to assist deportees and sending professional staff to the Georgian embassy in Moscow. Opposition leader Salome Zourabichvili also suggested creating a special fund to support deported Georgians. (https://civil.ge/archives/111252)
• The Georgian Foreign Ministry issued a statement on October 24 condemning the ongoing persecution of ethnic Georgians in Russia, despite international condemnation of a xenophobic campaign against them. Tbilisi called for an immediate halt to the targeting of Georgian citizens and urged Russia to engage in constructive dialogue to address political issues. The Ministry detailed instances of harassment, including street detentions of ethnic Georgians under the guise of paper checks, inquiries from schools regarding students with Georgian surnames, and actions by Russian authorities to issue deportation orders without proper legal processes. The Georgian Foreign Ministry emphasized that such actions violate both universal human rights and Russian law. (https://civil.ge/archives/111267)
• Reports indicate that the intensity of the anti-Georgian campaign in Russia is diminishing, with many Georgian-owned casinos and restaurants that were previously shut down now reopening. The Russian daily Vedomosti highlighted that establishments like the Golden Palace in Moscow and several others in St. Petersburg have returned to business. Additionally, the number of Georgian deportees has significantly decreased, with fewer than 100 still in detention, down from a total of 800. A Kremlin source cited by Vedomosti noted that the campaign was primarily driven by emotional responses, and there is now a recognition that the pressure should be eased. However, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov has stated that there are no current plans to lift economic sanctions against Georgia. (https://civil.ge/archives/111269)
• On November 8, 2006, a human rights and civil society development council under Russian President Vladimir Putin condemned an ongoing anti-Georgian campaign in Russia, highlighting that discrimination against Georgians persists despite Putin's previous criticisms of a "selective approach" in combating crime. The council's statement attributed the campaign to a misinterpretation of political statements from Russian leadership regarding tensions with Georgia, which lower-level officials interpreted as directives to target individuals of Georgian descent. The council expressed concern that such discriminatory practices negatively impact relations between the Russian and Georgian peoples, harm Russia's international image, and constitute an unacceptable method of addressing illegal migration. (https://civil.ge/archives/111363)
• Manana Jabelia, a 51-year-old Georgian woman, died in a Moscow detention center on December 3, 2006, after being arrested for migration offenses six weeks prior; her case was set for trial on December 7. Jabelia's relatives reported she had heart problems, while another Georgian citizen, Tengiz Togonidze, died from an asthma attack at Domodedovo airport in October 2006 before his deportation, prompting the Georgian Foreign Ministry to condemn these incidents as part of an "inhumane, xenophobic" and "anti-Georgian campaign" in Russia. (https://civil.ge/archives/111548)
• Council of Europe Secretary General Terry Davis expressed concern over the death of Manana Jabelia, a 51-year-old Georgian woman who died in a Moscow detention center on December 2, 2006, while awaiting deportation; she was the second Georgian to die in such circumstances within two months. Davis highlighted the need for an investigation into the medical treatment Jabelia received and criticized the surge in deportations of Georgian citizens following heightened tensions between Georgia and Russia. He noted that 79 Georgians remained in Russian detention centers awaiting deportation, while over 3,000 had been deported since early October, emphasizing that ordinary citizens should not suffer due to governmental disputes. (https://civil.ge/archives/111563)
• On February 23, 2007, Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili criticized opposition calls to abandon Georgia’s NATO ambitions in favor of neutrality, describing them as “foolish” and “dishonest.” Responding to a journalist's question about the growing opposition campaign, which argued that NATO membership would require abandoning South Ossetia and Abkhazia, Saakashvili linked the campaign to Russian influence. He dismissed the argument, stating that the proponents of this view were both “foolish” and “dishonest,” calling it a dangerous combination. His comments were a sharp rebuke of the anti-NATO rhetoric gaining traction among certain political groups. (https://civil.ge/archives/111871)
  • In early February 2007, the Georgian government was considering filing a lawsuit against Russia in the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) over the abuse of Georgians deported from Russia in recent months. Justice Minister Gia Kavtaradze stated on February 6 that while there was evidence, including testimonies from 450 deportees, stronger proof such as official documents or court rulings was needed to build a solid case. Between October 2006 and February 2007, over 2,300 ethnic Georgians were deported, with three dying in detention. Despite this, obtaining concrete evidence from Russian authorities was difficult. The government’s cautious approach, which signaled a shift from its earlier hard-line stance, raised concerns that Tbilisi might be leaning toward a more conciliatory relationship with Russia, especially after the return of Moscow's ambassador in January. The deadline to file the lawsuit was set for the end of March 2007. (https://civil.ge/archives/111923)
  • On February 16, 2007, the Georgian Parliament passed a resolution condemning Russia's actions against ethnic Georgians in the wake of a series of deportations, following a spy row between the two countries. The resolution followed the findings of a special parliamentary commission set up in October 2006 to investigate human rights abuses, which concluded that hundreds of Georgians had been illegally expelled from Russia due to their ethnicity. The commission’s report highlighted several cases, including four deported Georgians who died due to Russian authorities' negligence. The commission accused Russia of violating the deportees' fundamental rights, including their property rights, and recommended that the Georgian government pursue a lawsuit in the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). While the resolution urged the government to protect the deportees' rights in the ECHR, the decision to file a lawsuit remained uncertain. (https://civil.ge/archives/111941)
• On March 26, 2007, Georgia filed a lawsuit against Russia in the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). The case centers on the deportation of ethnic Georgians from Russia, which began in October 2006. Georgia accuses Russia of violating several provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights, including prohibition of collective expulsion, denial of the right to life, and ethnic discrimination. In response, Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Alexander Kaminin stated that the lawsuit would not contribute to normalizing relations between the two countries. The ECHR has not yet decided whether to accept the application. (https://civil.ge/archives/112150)
  • On March 26, 2007, Georgia filed a lawsuit against Russia in the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), seeking reimbursement for damages related to the deportation of over 2,000 ethnic Georgians from Russia since September 2006. The deportations followed escalating tensions between the two countries after a spy scandal. The lawsuit includes the cases of about 150 deportees, including three deaths due to alleged negligence by Russian authorities in providing medical care. The Georgian government claims Russia violated several provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights, including prohibition of collective expulsion, right to life, and protection of property. Georgia is seeking pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages for the victims, though it has not specified an amount. The Russian Foreign Ministry has dismissed the lawsuit, stating it will not help normalize relations between the countries. The ECHR is yet to decide on the admissibility of the case, which could set a precedent as it would be the sixth state vs. state case in the court’s history. (https://civil.ge/archives/112155)
  • In response to Georgia's decision to file an interstate lawsuit against Russia at the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), the Russian Foreign Ministry labeled the move as "unfriendly". The lawsuit, lodged on March 26, seeks pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages for the deportation of hundreds of ethnic Georgians from Russia since September 2006. The Russian Ministry denied all allegations, stating that Georgia's actions were part of an "anti-Russian propaganda" campaign aimed at securing foreign support for Tbilisi's policies in the Georgian-Abkhaz and Georgian-Ossetian conflicts. The Ministry further criticized Georgia for abandoning what seemed to be a path toward improving bilateral relations, warning that this lawsuit would negatively impact relations between the two countries. (https://civil.ge/archives/185509)

Diplomatic recall

• The spy row was followed by cutting of all aerial transportation, a full embargo on agricultural produce, and a diplomatic recall (Zourabichvili 305)

KAVADZE

• Mpscpw recalled its diplomatic staff from Tbilisi (73)
• Moscow suspended all transport and postal links (73)
• In January 2007, Gazprom doubled the price of gas imports to Georgia (73)
• Putin and MS met on the sidelines of the CIS informal summit of June 10, 2007. The meeting, according to Lavrov, "gives grounds to hope for the best", hinting at sanctions remove "if Georgia too decides to show goodwill and meet us halfway" (75)

PANFILOV

• The Russian embassy evacuated almost all its staff following the row (118)
• The Transportation Ministry announced cutting the transportation links (air, road, railway, sea), while the Communications Ministry announced cutting the postal links (118)
• On the Liliputin scandal. During a November 2008 deposition of Saakashvili at the investigative parliamentary commission on the war, MS vehemently denied having ever used any term disrepsecting or disparaging to any Russian leader (134)
  • Yet, this phrase is said to have shaped the tone of the relationship between the two leaders (134)
  • The phrase was widely publicized in Russian and Georgian opposition press, though with no evidence 134
  • Panfilov analyzies that the phrase was an invention to make Saakashvili look undiplomatic, contributing to his image of a hothead that led to the war (134-135)
  • The phrase was also shared in other countries' press using Russian media sources (134)
  • The phrase's origin finds its traces back to a South Ossetian radio program that claimed Saakashvili called him liliputin, back in July 2006 (135)
    • That phrase then found its way to Pravda on September 21 2006 during an interview with communist Panteleon Giorgadze (135)
  • On 18 December 2006, a French media outlet made this phrase popular by claiming - without a source - that Misha called Putin 'liliputin' after a meeting in Saint Petersburg (136)
  • Some versions claim that the phrase was used after their first meeting (136-137)
  • Part of the explanation was that Putin was mad at MS since that phrase was used (137)
  • It was also meant to discredit MS in the eyes of his Western partners at the height of the crisis (137)

IIFFMCG II

• The Russian ambassador returned to Tbilisi in January 2007 (22)
  • Some sanctions were also lifted (22)
• But it left the impression of irreversibly spoiled bilateral relations and revealed emotional and irrational scars in the mutual relationship. (22)

IIFFMCG III

• On December 6, 2006, the Duma adopted several statements on the occupied territories, including a recognition that the November elections in SO were held in full compliance with international principles and norms. (139)
  • This was despite the non-participation of ethnic Georgians in the referendum (139)
• In October 2006, Russia announced at the BSEC Ministerial and in November in Antalya at the ITU conference that it would not walk back its steps to unite the communications networks of the OTs and Russia (147)
• On December 22, the Russian Council passed a special statement on the recognition of Abkhazia and SO and called on the intl community to recognize the right to self-determination (157)
• Russia increased its investments in Abkhazia in 2006, including Yuri Luzhkov putting money for school repairs in Gali, Russian companies repairing local roads, arrival of Russian companies in the fruit, healthcare, communications sectors (166)

• In response to escalating tensions following the arrest of four Russian military officers on espionage charges in Georgia, Russia announced on September 28 that it has recalled its ambassador, Viacheslav Kovalenko, for consultations and initiated a partial evacuation of its citizens from Georgia due to security concerns. The Russian Foreign Ministry stated that this decision was made to ensure the safety of its diplomatic staff and their families, advising Russian citizens to avoid traveling to Georgia. In contrast, Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili dismissed Russia's evacuation as "hysteria," asserting that there is no threat to the families of Russian servicemen in the country. (https://civil.ge/archives/115448)
• In response to the arrest of four Russian military officers on espionage charges in Georgia, Russia has recalled its ambassador, Vyacheslav Kovalenko, for consultations and announced plans for a partial evacuation of its citizens from Georgia, citing increasing security threats. The Russian Foreign Ministry has recommended that its citizens avoid traveling to Georgia and has ceased issuing visas to Georgian citizens. Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili dismissed the evacuation as "hysteria," asserting that there is no threat to Russian families in Georgia and emphasizing the effectiveness of Georgia's counter-intelligence efforts. The Georgian Ministry of Internal Affairs presented audio and video evidence claiming that the arrested Russian officers were involved in a spy ring aimed at obtaining secret information. Meanwhile, discussions between U.S. Ambassador William Burns and Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Grigory Karasin highlighted the tensions, with Russia asserting that Georgia's actions threaten regional security and demanding the release of its citizens. Analysts suggest that Georgia's actions are part of a broader strategy to internationalize the resolution of its conflicts with Russia. (https://civil.ge/archives/115450)
• 1 October: The Georgian Foreign Ministry condemned Russia's invitation of South Ossetian and Abkhazian separatist leaders Sergey Bagapsh and Eduard Kokoity to a prominent economic event in Sochi, hosted by Russian President Vladimir Putin. Georgia sees this invitation as a clear signal of Russia's support for separatism, undermining Moscow’s role as a neutral mediator in Georgia's territorial conflicts. The ministry argued that Russia's actions underscore the need to reassess both the negotiation framework and peacekeeping efforts in Georgia, as they believe Moscow’s bias hampers conflict resolution. (https://civil.ge/archives/115487)
  • A skirmish on September 30 in the Zugdidi district, near the Abkhaz conflict zone, resulted in the death of one attacker and injuries to three Georgian policemen after unidentified armed men fired on a Georgian police post in the village of Shamgona. The Georgian Foreign Ministry attributed the attack to "Abkhaz separatists" and highlighted that it occurred within the operational zone overseen by Russian peacekeeping forces. (https://civil.ge/archives/115489)
• Abkhaz leader Sergey Bagapsh met with Russian President Vladimir Putin on September 30 in Sochi, according to the Abkhaz news agency Apsnipress. During the meeting, they discussed the situation in the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict zone. (https://civil.ge/archives/115494)
• The Russian Ministry of Transport has announced the suspension of all air, sea, railway, and land traffic with Georgia, citing debts owed by Georgian airlines for air traffic services as the primary reason. Russian Deputy Transport Minister Sergey Aristov noted that Georgian air companies have accumulated a debt of USD 3.6 million since 2001, leading to concerns about their bankruptcy. He also mentioned that similar issues exist regarding sea, land, and railway transport. However, officials in Tbilisi have stated that they have not received any official notification regarding this decision from the Russian authorities. (https://civil.ge/archives/115498)
• Authorities in the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia announced on October 2 that they are withdrawing from negotiations with Tbilisi. The Abkhaz leadership stated that their decision was prompted by Georgia's alleged violations of the 1994 Moscow ceasefire agreement, particularly concerning the presence of Georgian troops in the upper Kodori Gorge. Following this, South Ossetian leader Eduard Kokoity declared that Tskhinvali would also cease talks with Georgia, citing a lack of response from Tbilisi to recent proposals for dialogue and a Joint Control Commission meeting. (https://civil.ge/archives/115499)
• During a telephone conversation on October 2, Russian President Vladimir Putin and U.S. President George W. Bush discussed the escalating situation in Georgia. Putin emphasized that any actions by third parties perceived as supporting Georgia's "destructive policy" would be unacceptable and could threaten peace and stability in the region. (https://civil.ge/archives/115504)
• Starting October 3, Russia announced the suspension of air, sea, land, and postal links with Georgia, escalating tensions despite Georgia's recent handover of four Russian military officers accused of espionage. Russian officials cited the non-payment of approximately $3.6 million in air traffic service fees as the reason for cutting air traffic, while also indicating issues with postal services due to undelivered parcels. President Saakashvili condemned the actions as "uncivilized" but urged that Russia's pressure should not be overstated. The Russian Duma is also considering a draft law to ban money transfers from Russia to Georgia, which would impact many Georgians working in Russia. Saakashvili reassured that Georgia is prepared to implement measures to counteract the sanctions and emphasized the importance of dialogue over retaliation, a sentiment echoed by OSCE Chairman Karel De Gucht, who called for a resolution through talks rather than isolation. (https://civil.ge/archives/115511)
• On October 3, the Russian Ministry of Transport announced the suspension of air, sea, land, railway, and postal communications with Georgia. Russian officials attributed the decision to Georgian airlines' non-payment of air traffic service fees and reported issues with postal deliveries to Tbilisi. The cuts follow a series of previous sanctions, including bans on Georgian agricultural products and the closure of the only legal border crossing at Zemo Larsi. Despite these tensions, Georgian Airways reported that a scheduled flight from Tbilisi to Moscow was postponed. (https://civil.ge/archives/115509)
• Boris Grizlov, the Chairman of Russia's lower house of Parliament, stated on October 3 that despite Georgia's release of four Russian officers, discussions about potential sanctions against Georgia will continue. He expressed concern over the situation under President Saakashvili's administration and emphasized that any sanctions imposed by Russian authorities are aimed specifically at Saakashvili's regime rather than the Georgian population. Grizlov conveyed respect for the Georgian people, suggesting that it is their responsibility to choose their leadership. (https://civil.ge/archives/115515)
• During a press conference on October 3, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov stated that Russia would not resume transport communication with Georgia until the latter reassesses its hostile stance. He emphasized the need to support ordinary Georgian citizens while rejecting illegal financial activities that bolster Georgia's militarization. Lavrov accused Georgia of consistently anti-Russian actions, linked recent tensions—including the arrest of Russian military officers—to Georgia's growing ties with NATO, and dismissed the need for third-party mediation in Russo-Georgian relations, asserting that normalization requires frank dialogue and adherence to agreements. (https://civil.ge/archives/115520)
• On October 3, Georgian officials asserted that they would not obstruct Russian airlines from operating flights over Georgia, despite Russia's flight ban. Giorgi Karbelashvili, Chief of the Air Navigation Department, confirmed that Russian airlines were using Georgian airspace without interference. Additionally, Giorgi Mzhavanadze, head of the Georgian Civil Aviation Department, stated that there was no legal basis for suspending Georgian airline flights to Russia, noting that all necessary permits and licenses were in order. However, he mentioned that Aeroflot had canceled its scheduled Moscow-Tbilisi flights following a recommendation from Russia's civil aviation authority. (https://civil.ge/archives/115519)
• 3 October: Russia has presented a draft resolution to the UN Security Council urging Georgia to cease provocative actions in the breakaway region of Abkhazia, specifically targeting the recently established Tbilisi-backed government in upper Kodori Gorge. The resolution demands the suspension of this government, which is considered illegitimate by Abkhaz authorities, and calls for the withdrawal of Georgian troops from the area. In response, Georgian Ambassador to the UN, Irakli Alasania, criticized Russia for not taking a constructive role in resolving the conflict and highlighted that the Russian peacekeeping forces are undermining impartiality, effectively exacerbating tensions. He also condemned Russia's naval exercises near Georgia's maritime borders as a threat to regional stability and a violation of the UN charter. (https://civil.ge/archives/115526)
  • On October 4, 2006, U.S. Ambassador to the UN John Bolton announced that the United States would not support a Russian draft resolution concerning the situation in Abkhazia, describing it as "unfair and unbalanced." He criticized the resolution for not accurately reflecting the situation on the ground and stated that amendments would need to be made. The Russian proposal aimed to condemn Georgia's actions in Abkhazia, particularly regarding the deployment of a Tbilisi-backed government-in-exile in the upper Kodori Gorge and efforts to dismantle the current Russian-led peacekeeping operation. The UN Security Council was tasked with approving a new resolution by mid-October, as the mandate for the UN Observer Mission in Georgia was set to expire on October 15. (https://civil.ge/archives/115549)
• On October 4, 2006, President Vladimir Putin addressed senior Russian parliamentarians, cautioning against using a "language of provocations and blackmail" in discussions with Russia, specifically referencing Georgia. He expressed gratitude for the parliament's support of government actions aimed at protecting the rights and lives of Russian citizens abroad. Putin emphasized that the consolidation of society around these actions reflects widespread public support and would enhance the protection of Russian citizens internationally. He also affirmed that while the Russian economy would remain "open and transparent," there would be a need to regulate migration inflows. (https://civil.ge/archives/115530)
• On October 4, 2006, Russian parliamentarians in the Duma Council debated a proposal to escalate sanctions against Georgia by enabling the government to prohibit money transfers from Russia to Georgia. Some lawmakers, particularly from the Liberal Democratic Party, cautioned against imposing further measures, arguing that increased pressure would likely strengthen support for President Saakashvili ahead of local elections scheduled for October 5. MP Alexey Mitrofanov criticized the timing of the sanctions, suggesting that they could play into Saakashvili's political narrative. In contrast, members of the Communist Party called for harsher sanctions and criticized President Putin for continuing the withdrawal of Russian military bases from Georgia. (https://civil.ge/archives/115532)
• On October 4, 2006, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov informed OSCE Chairman-in-Office Karel De Gucht that there was no need for mediation from the OSCE or any third party to address tensions between Russia and Georgia. He asserted that the potential for improving relations was contingent upon the actions of Georgian President Saakashvili's administration, emphasizing the necessity for a significant shift in Georgia's anti-Russian stance. Lavrov also expressed gratitude for the OSCE's efforts in securing the release of four Russian military officers. (https://civil.ge/archives/115536)
• On October 9, 2006, Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili expressed his desire for improved relations with Russia, stating his readiness to meet with President Vladimir Putin at any time to address ongoing issues in a "bilateral format." While speaking with senior members of his ruling National Movement party, Saakashvili emphasized that Georgia does not have a dispute with the Russian people and described the anti-Georgian campaign in Russia as a significant problem not just for Georgia but for the entire world, particularly for Russia itself. He also clarified that estimates of one million Georgians living in Russia are exaggerated, asserting that the actual number is closer to 250,000 to 300,000, most of whom are Russian citizens of Georgian descent. Saakashvili offered Georgian citizenship to those individuals, welcoming them to live in Georgia. However, a senior Kremlin official responded that there was no need for high-level discussions at that time. (https://civil.ge/archives/185485)
• On October 10, 2006, Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili reiterated his readiness for bilateral talks with Russian President Vladimir Putin to address rising tensions, following Russia's rejection of international mediation. However, Moscow officials insisted that Georgia must first demonstrate a departure from its anti-Russian policies before high-level discussions could occur. Saakashvili also threatened to bring the cases of recently deported Georgians before the European Court of Human Rights, citing alleged violations by Russia, which Russian officials criticized as contradictory to the desire for dialogue. Additionally, Defense Minister Sergey Ivanov warned that Russia would respond to any military aggression from Georgia in South Ossetia or Abkhazia, echoing sentiments expressed by Modest Kolerov, a Kremlin official, who cautioned against escalating hostilities. (https://civil.ge/archives/111170)
• On October 17, 2006, Russian Deputy Interior Minister Arkady Edelev stated that Anzor Astemirov, an organizer of a militant attack in Nalchik in October 2005, has connections to foreign special services, implying external interference in the region. During a press conference, Edelev suggested that these services are instigating tensions in South Ossetia, Abkhazia, and the Trans-Caucasus, potentially escalating military confrontations in the area. His comments appeared to indirectly accuse the United States of encouraging Georgia to pursue military actions regarding its breakaway regions. (https://civil.ge/archives/111213)
• On October 18, 2006, Georgian Deputy Defense Minister Mamuka Kudava accused Russia of using its naval maneuvers in the Black Sea as part of an economic blockade against Georgia. Kudava described the planned maneuvers, which were officially notified to Georgia weeks prior, as a provocative action that encroached upon Georgia's economic zone. He highlighted concerns that these exercises would negatively impact Georgia’s trade and economic interests, specifically by restricting operations at crucial Black Sea ports such as Batumi, Poti, and Supsa. The Georgian Foreign Ministry had previously warned Russia against these maneuvers, citing their potential harmful consequences for Georgia. (https://civil.ge/archives/111225)
• On October 19, 2006, Georgian Foreign Minister Gela Bezhuashvili reaffirmed Tbilisi's readiness to engage in dialogue with Moscow to ease rising tensions between the two countries. He emphasized that Georgia sought a mutually acceptable outcome that would respect both its national interests and those of Russia. This statement followed a previous offer made by Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili on October 9, suggesting a meeting with Russia’s president to address disputes in a bilateral format; however, Russian officials rejected this proposal, insisting that Georgia first cease its "hostile actions" toward Russia. (https://civil.ge/archives/111232)
• Iran has expressed its willingness to mediate in the ongoing tensions between Russia and Georgia. Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki stated on October 22 that the Iranian government is ready to assist both countries in defusing their disputes, provided that both sides see the mediation as necessary. Mottaki made these comments following discussions with Georgian Foreign Minister Gela Bezhuashvili in Tehran. Notably, Russia has previously declined mediation proposals from Western nations. (https://civil.ge/archives/111251)
• Georgian Foreign Minister Gela Bezhuashvili and Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov are scheduled to meet for bilateral discussions in Moscow on November 1-2, as part of the Council of Foreign Ministers of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization (BSEC). The meeting date was confirmed during a phone call between the two ministers on October 24, during which they also addressed the state of bilateral relations between Georgia and Russia. Bezhuashvili is expected to engage in additional talks with other Russian officials during his visit. (https://civil.ge/archives/111268)
• During a nationwide Q&A session on October 25, Russian President Vladimir Putin addressed the tensions between Russia and Georgia, attributing them primarily to Tbilisi's attempts to forcibly regain control over the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. He reassured that Russia has no intention of expanding its territory or annexing these regions but emphasized concerns over Georgia's militarization and potential violent actions. Putin highlighted the historical context of the conflict, noting previous punitive operations by Georgia against Ossetians, and acknowledged the complexities of international law regarding territorial integrity and self-determination. He expressed a desire to improve relations with the Georgian people, while condemning the use of force as a solution to territorial disputes. Additionally, when discussing the anti-Georgian sentiments in Russia, Putin called for law enforcement to avoid discriminatory practices based on ethnicity and asserted that deportation measures were not selectively targeting Georgians, despite heightened attention due to the political climate. (https://civil.ge/archives/111272)
• Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Andrei Denisov announced on October 27 that the return of Russian Ambassador Viacheslav Kovalenko to Georgia is not currently being considered, citing a lack of conditions conducive to his return. This statement follows the partial evacuation of the embassy staff, including Kovalenko, on September 29 due to the arrest of four Russian military officers on espionage charges, although those officers were released on October 2. (https://civil.ge/archives/111273)
• On November 1, 2006, Georgian Foreign Minister Gela Bezhuashvili visited Moscow to meet Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, marking the first high-level diplomatic talks between Georgia and Russia since their relations deteriorated in September. The meeting, held on the sidelines of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization summit, aimed to address tensions, including Russian economic sanctions imposed on Georgia after Russia severed direct transportation links on October 3. Bezhuashvili, accompanied by State Minister Merab Antadze, emphasized Georgia’s willingness to consider Moscow's interests while advocating for the lifting of sanctions. Although Russian media reported that President Putin declined a meeting with Bezhuashvili, the Georgian Foreign Minister denied such plans had been proposed. Bezhuashvili's discussions also aimed to pave the way for a potential summit between Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili and President Putin, possibly during the CIS summit in Minsk later in November. Russian officials, however, stressed the need for Georgia to sign non-aggression agreements with Abkhazia and South Ossetia, a proposal Georgia has resisted, instead advocating for international peacekeeping forces. (https://civil.ge/archives/111320)
  • On November 1, 2006, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov expressed hope that his meeting with Georgian Foreign Minister Gela Bezhuashvili would help improve strained relations between Russia and Georgia. Lavrov acknowledged that ties were going through a challenging period and aimed for clearer understanding on steps to resolve the tensions. Bezhuashvili emphasized the importance of mutual respect and consideration of each country's interests, highlighting a desire to realign relations based on shared historical ties. Following the discussions with Lavrov, Bezhuashvili was also scheduled to meet Igor Ivanov, Secretary of Russia’s National Security Council, later that day. (https://civil.ge/archives/111326)
  • On November 1, 2006, Georgian Foreign Minister Gela Bezhuashvili and Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov held a tense but comprehensive discussion in Moscow, covering all major issues affecting Russian-Georgian relations. Bezhuashvili described the hour-and-a-half exchange as a "difficult conversation," expressing hope that the Russian side understood Georgia’s concerns and recognized the need to avoid adversarial tactics. The Russian Foreign Ministry later issued a brief statement confirming that the talks addressed bilateral relations and conflict resolution in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, emphasizing Russia’s conditions for normalizing ties, though specifics were not disclosed. This meeting, part of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation summit, marked the first high-level engagement between the two countries since tensions escalated sharply in late September. (https://civil.ge/archives/111327)
  • After his talks with Russian officials on November 2, 2006, Georgian Foreign Minister Gela Bezhuashvili reported that no significant progress was made, which he had anticipated. Despite the lack of concrete outcomes, he emphasized the value of maintaining dialogue, with plans for continued high-level discussions, including an anticipated meeting between Georgian President Saakashvili and Russian President Putin at the upcoming CIS summit in Minsk. Bezhuashvili highlighted Georgia’s insistence on a "two-way movement" in negotiations, suggesting that Russia acknowledged Georgia's stance. He expressed hope that the presidential meeting would allow for an open exchange to advance bilateral relations. (https://civil.ge/archives/111330)
• On November 2, 2006, South Ossetian leader Eduard Kokoity and Abkhaz leader Sergey Bagapsh met in Sokhumi to discuss cooperation and conflict resolution. In a joint communiqué, they proposed quadripartite talks involving themselves, along with Georgian President Saakashvili and Russian President Putin, to address ongoing tensions. This proposal referenced an earlier Russian-backed initiative for a similar meeting in Sochi, which Georgia had declined. Kokoity and Bagapsh emphasized that such talks could build trust and ensure adherence to past agreements. They also urged Georgia to sign non-aggression pacts with both regions without preconditions. Additionally, the leaders condemned Georgia’s establishment of a government-in-exile for Abkhazia in the Kodori Gorge and the planned "alternative elections" in South Ossetia, which they labeled as destabilizing moves. (https://civil.ge/archives/111331)
• The EU-Russia Partnership Council is set to discuss Georgia during its session in Brussels on November 3, as announced by the Foreign Affairs Ministry of Finland, which currently holds the EU presidency. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov will attend the meeting, which takes place ahead of the EU-Russian Summit scheduled for November 24 in Helsinki. (https://civil.ge/archives/111337)
• After the Permanent Partnership Council meeting of EU and Russian Foreign Ministers in Brussels on November 3, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov addressed the situation in Georgia, emphasizing the need for de-escalation in Russo-Georgian relations. He highlighted the importance of ceasing hostile rhetoric and provocations, in line with UN Security Council resolutions and previous agreements regarding the conflicts in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Lavrov expressed confidence that Georgian Foreign Minister Gela Bezhuashvili understood this necessity following their discussions in Moscow on November 1. (https://civil.ge/archives/111341)
• On November 9, 2006, the Georgian Foreign Ministry clarified that Foreign Minister Gela Bezhuashvili did not assert that Tbilisi anticipates military aggression from Russia. This statement followed a report by the Russian news agency RIA Novosti, which quoted Bezhuashvili as saying, “This threat exists definitely… The threat of attack exists,” during his visit to Paris. In response, the Georgian Foreign Ministry contended that Bezhuashvili's remarks had been misquoted, stating he had only indicated that he could not rule out any possibility of aggression from Russia and would address the issue with European colleagues. The ministry criticized the "irresponsible interpretation" of Bezhuashvili's comments as detrimental to the normalization of relations between the two nations. (https://civil.ge/archives/111371)
• Georgian Parliamentary Chairperson Nino Burjanadze traveled to St. Petersburg to attend the CIS Parliamentary Assembly session on November 15-16. During her visit, she is scheduled to meet with Sergey Mironov, the Chairman of the Council of Federation, which is the upper house of the Russian Parliament. Additionally, a meeting of the Caucasus Four, which includes the Parliament Speakers from Georgia, Russia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan, will take place on November 16 alongside the assembly. (https://civil.ge/archives/111405)
  • On November 15, 2006, during a meeting in St. Petersburg with Sergey Mironov, the Chairman of the Council of Federation (upper house of the Russian Parliament), Georgian Parliamentary Chairperson Nino Burjanadze called on Moscow to cease its "anti-Georgian activity." Burjanadze stated that Georgia's anti-Russian statements would stop once Russia halted its own actions against Georgia. She emphasized the need for Russia to engage with Georgia on equal terms and to respect its legal and fair interests, as she addressed reporters following the talks. Burjanadze is leading a Georgian parliamentary delegation attending the CIS parliamentary assembly, where she is scheduled to speak on November 16. (https://civil.ge/archives/185494)
  • On November 16, 2006, during the parliamentary assembly of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) in St. Petersburg, Georgian Parliamentary Chairperson Nino Burjanadze criticized the CIS, labeling it ineffective in addressing ongoing conflicts, particularly regarding Russian peacekeeping forces in Abkhazia, which she claimed were exacerbating the situation. She expressed frustration that the agenda did not address the tensions between Georgia and Russia, stating, "How can we speak about the effectiveness of this organization if the CIS does not undertake any measures to resolve tensions between the two countries?" Burjanadze also highlighted the challenges in justifying Georgia's continued membership in the CIS, despite internal calls for withdrawal, emphasizing that her presence at the summit represented Georgia's commitment to seeking diplomatic solutions within the organization. In response, Sergey Mironov, Chairman of the Russian Federal Council, remarked that Burjanadze's candid criticisms indicated the value of the CIS as a platform for airing grievances. (https://civil.ge/archives/111423)
  • On November 16, 2006, parliamentary speakers from Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Russia convened during the CIS Parliamentary Assembly in St. Petersburg, marking a meeting of the group known as the "Caucasian Four." Following the discussions, Sergey Mironov, the Chairman of the Council of Federation of Russia, indicated that the participants explored the possibility of creating new parliamentary mechanisms to address regional issues, although he did not provide specific details. The last session of this group had taken place in September 2005 in Moscow, with the next meeting planned for the following year in Tbilisi. During the summit, Georgian Parliamentary Chairperson Nino Burjanadze expressed disappointment that Boris Grizlov, Chairman of the State Duma, had again declined to meet with her, viewing this refusal as an unconstructive stance. Grizlov had previously canceled a scheduled meeting with Burjanadze in April 2006 during a Duma anniversary ceremony in St. Petersburg. (https://civil.ge/archives/111429)
• In his address to the European Parliament in Strasbourg on November 14, President Saakashvili emphasized Georgia's readiness to engage in a constructive dialogue with Russia, grounded in mutual respect. He acknowledged the challenges facing Georgia's Euro-Atlantic integration due to Russian pressure but affirmed that Tbilisi would remain committed to this path. Saakashvili expressed a desire to reduce tensions, stating, "It is time for diplomacy and discussion," and he reiterated Georgia's commitment to resolving secessionist conflicts through peaceful means, including the offer of broad autonomy to South Ossetia. He also expressed gratitude for the EU's solidarity in opposing the anti-Georgian campaign in Russia. (https://civil.ge/archives/111409)
• On November 15, 2006, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Grigory Karasin and U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Daniel Fried held discussions in Moscow regarding the resolution of the conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The Russian Foreign Ministry emphasized the importance of Georgia adhering to existing agreements and called for a rejection of any military resolution to the conflicts by Tbilisi. (https://civil.ge/archives/111417)
• On November 15, 2006, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Grigory Karasin met with British Ambassador to Russia Anthony Branton in Moscow, where they discussed the ongoing tensions in Russian-Georgian relations. The talks also covered the broader topic of conflict resolution in post-Soviet states, according to the Russian Foreign Ministry. (https://civil.ge/archives/111420)
• In an interview with the *Financial Times* published on November 17, 2006, Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili expressed his intent to deliver a conciliatory message to Russian President Vladimir Putin during their upcoming meeting at the CIS leaders' summit in Minsk at the end of November. Saakashvili emphasized the need to prevent further deterioration in relations and aimed to normalize ties with Russia, stating, "For us it is clear: we are not interested in escalating anything with Russia." He also highlighted Georgia's desire to be recognized as a small country with its own interests, rather than merely a pawn in the larger geopolitical landscape, asserting, "I don’t want to be a bastion for anyone." (https://civil.ge/archives/185493)
• On November 17, 2006, in Moscow, the leaders of breakaway regions Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Sergey Bagapsh and Eduard Kokoity, respectively, announced that they would only be prepared to resume talks with Tbilisi if the Georgian government agreed to sign a non-use of force agreement. Bagapsh emphasized that negotiations would not proceed unless Georgia withdrew its troops and the pro-Tbilisi government-in-exile from the upper Kodori Gorge in Abkhazia. Kokoity echoed this sentiment, stating that if Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili was willing to sign the proposed memorandum on non-resumption of hostilities, they would be ready to meet him at any time. However, the Georgian side maintained that it would only agree to such a non-use of force agreement after internationalizing the peacekeeping operations in the conflict zones of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. (https://civil.ge/archives/111436)
• Georgian Prime Minister Zurab Nogaideli will not attend the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) summit of heads of government scheduled for November 22, 2006, in Minsk, Belarus, according to his press office. The reasons for this decision have not been disclosed. However, officials confirmed that President Saakashvili still intends to participate in the CIS leaders' summit set for November 27 in Minsk. (https://civil.ge/archives/111456)
• On November 21, 2006, a Kremlin source reported that U.S. President George W. Bush and Russian President Vladimir Putin discussed the situation in Georgia during their talks in Hanoi, Vietnam. Bush reportedly inquired about the state of Russian-Georgian relations, to which Putin responded by highlighting actions taken by the Georgian authorities that he claimed hinder normal dialogue and contribute to tensions in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. The report indicated that Russia expressed concerns regarding what it termed the "massive militarization" of Georgia and the increases in Georgia’s defense budget. (https://civil.ge/archives/111469)
• On November 24, 2006, Georgian Vice-Premier Giorgi Baramidze departed for Minsk to attend a summit of Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) heads of government, replacing Prime Minister Zurab Nogaideli, who was visiting Turkey at the time. Baramidze's office announced that he would address the summit regarding the ongoing conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. (https://civil.ge/archives/111489)
• On November 24, 2006, Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili announced his upcoming visit to Minsk for the CIS summit on November 28, where he expressed uncertainty about a potential bilateral meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin. Saakashvili emphasized his intention to engage with other CIS leaders, highlighting the importance of these relationships alongside ties with Russia. He conveyed optimism regarding energy supplies for the winter, stating that Georgia is on track to export electricity for the first time in winter and that ongoing negotiations would ensure gas availability. Additionally, he dismissed concerns about the impact of Russia's embargo on Georgia, claiming it would ultimately strengthen the country's economy and humorously suggested that the embargo had been a successful operation by Georgian special services. (https://civil.ge/archives/111492)
• On November 24, 2006, EU foreign policy chief Javier Solana stated that the EU-Russian summit in Helsinki discussed various issues significant to both the European Union and the Russian Federation, including topics related to Georgia. However, no additional comments concerning Georgia were made during the joint news conference following the summit, which included Russian President Vladimir Putin, Finnish Prime Minister Matti Vanhanen, European Commission President José Manuel Barroso, and Solana himself. (https://civil.ge/archives/111493)
• On November 28, 2006, Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili traveled to Minsk to attend the CIS summit. Before his departure, Saakashvili emphasized the importance of Georgia's participation, despite the Commonwealth of Independent States' perceived ineffectiveness, stating that Georgia could not afford to ignore any platform for dialogue. While at the summit, he planned to engage in bilateral discussions with other CIS leaders, although it was uncertain whether he would meet with Russian President Vladimir Putin. (https://civil.ge/archives/111507
• On November 28, 2006, Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili attended the CIS summit in Minsk, Belarus, where he aimed to hold face-to-face discussions with Russian President Vladimir Putin, despite Russian officials indicating that no separate meeting would occur. Saakashvili expressed the necessity of engaging with the CIS, despite its ineffectiveness, and emphasized the importance of bilateral relations with other member states, including Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan. His comments were partly in response to opposition calls for Georgia to withdraw from the organization. Georgian Vice-Premier Giorgi Baramidze highlighted that even if a meeting with Putin did not take place, the summit could still yield positive outcomes for Georgia by showcasing its willingness to engage in dialogue. Meanwhile, in Riga, Latvia, Georgian Parliamentary Chairperson Nino Burjanadze participated in a NATO summit, where discussions focused on Georgia's aspirations for NATO membership and support for its territorial integrity. The contrasting significance of these two events was noted, with analysts suggesting that the NATO summit represented Georgia's future, while the CIS summit was seen as a reminder of its past challenges. (https://civil.ge/archives/111509)
• On November 28, 2006, during the CIS summit in Minsk, President Mikheil Saakashvili concluded his visit without a formal meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin, despite hopes for direct dialogue. However, Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev reported that the two leaders had a "very useful" exchange of opinions during a closed-door session, fostering optimism for improved relations. Nazarbayev, who chaired the summit, noted that discussions included the effectiveness of the CIS and the need for potential reforms by June 2007. While there was no official documentation regarding Georgia's withdrawal from the CIS, the summit highlighted Georgia's commitment to engaging in dialogue with Russia. Saakashvili reportedly held sideline meetings with the leaders of Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, reflecting Georgia's strategy to strengthen ties within the region. (https://civil.ge/archives/111515)
• On November 29, 2006, President Mikheil Saakashvili described his interaction with Russian President Vladimir Putin during the CIS summit in Minsk as “useful,” emphasizing the need for ongoing dialogue with Russia. Speaking in London, Saakashvili noted that the meeting was initiated by Georgia and addressed major issues, highlighting the importance of Georgia asserting its independence from Russian influence. While Putin confirmed their conversation, he did not elaborate, instead focusing on his discussions with the Moldovan president regarding the resumption of wine imports. Reports indicated that no formal, face-to-face meeting between the two leaders took place, despite Georgia's desire for bilateral talks. (https://civil.ge/archives/111516)
• According to the Russian daily *Kommersant* on November 29, 2006, the discussions between Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili and Russian President Vladimir Putin during the CIS summit in Minsk were marked by mutual accusations and failed to produce any tangible results. Saakashvili criticized the sanctions imposed by Russia on Georgia, deeming them inappropriate, while Putin defended the sanctions as justified, citing the capture and alleged mistreatment of Russian citizens in Georgia. Although the two leaders reportedly met face-to-face for about five minutes, Georgian media suggested that this encounter lasted significantly longer—approximately 40 minutes. Another Russian outlet, *Vedomosti*, described the meeting as unexpected, noting that officials had previously indicated that no separate meeting was scheduled between the two presidents. (https://civil.ge/archives/111520)
• Georgian Parliamentary Chairperson Nino Burjanadze, currently in Latvia, praised the recent meeting between Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili and Russian President Vladimir Putin as "very positive and important." She acknowledged that while it would be naive to expect all issues to be resolved from a single meeting, the fact that the two leaders exchanged views on critical topics and clarified their positions is significant. This comes after Saakashvili described his conversation with Putin at the CIS summit in Minsk on November 28 as "useful," despite Russian media reports suggesting that their discussions were characterized by mutual accusations. (https://civil.ge/archives/111521)
• On November 29, 2006, PACE monitors Matyas Eorsi and Luc Van den Brande called for "mutual respect" in Russo-Georgian relations during a press briefing in Moscow, following heightened tensions between the two countries. They urged Russian leaders to lift sanctions, end the transport blockade, and reinstate their ambassador in Tbilisi, while advising Georgia to improve diplomatic channels. Concerned about recent human rights abuses against ethnic Georgians, including Russian citizens, the monitors demanded investigations and accountability. They condemned rising xenophobia and racism, emphasizing that such behavior contradicts Council of Europe values. Their findings will be presented to the Monitoring Committee on December 13 in Paris. (https://civil.ge/archives/111538)
• On December 1, 2006, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Gregory Karasin stated that it was premature to consider the return of the Russian ambassador to Georgia, who had been recalled after Georgia arrested four Russian officers on spying charges. Karasin urged Georgian officials to approach bilateral issues with "respect" and avoid hostile rhetoric. On the same day, Russian Defense Minister Sergey Ivanov defended Russia's gas pricing for Georgia, asserting the rate of USD 230 per 1,000 cubic meters was commercially driven, unlike Armenia's lower rate due to its gas infrastructure agreements with Russia. Ivanov also justified Russia’s suspension of air links with Georgia due to Georgian airline debts and noted that tensions extended beyond the spy scandal, referencing past incidents of alleged Russian officer mistreatment by Georgian military police. (https://civil.ge/archives/111546)
• On December 4, 2006, Georgian Foreign Minister Gela Bezhuashvili addressed the OSCE Ministerial Council in Brussels, advocating for a shift from the Russian-led peacekeeping arrangements in South Ossetia and Abkhazia to reinvigorate stalled peace processes. He criticized Russia’s dominant role, calling it "biased and ineffective," and blamed the existing framework for perpetuating a "deteriorating status quo" marked by militarization, criminal activity, and human rights abuses. Bezhuashvili proposed involving the UN and OSCE as mediators, along with other international actors, to balance Russia's influence and establish a credible path forward. However, he later noted that Russia's objections prevented the Council from adopting a statement on Georgia, despite widespread support from other delegations. (https://civil.ge/archives/111559)
• On December 7, 2006, Russian President Vladimir Putin stated that no conflict exists between Russia and Georgia, asserting that mediation is unnecessary for improving relations. In an interview posted on the Russian President's official website, Putin criticized the Georgian government for allegedly escalating tensions by pursuing an "anti-Russian policy" characterized by accusations, provocations against Russian peacekeepers, and "spy-mania." He also condemned Georgia's military buildup, which he claimed endangers stability in the Caucasus and suggests intent for a "forceful solution" to the conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Putin suggested that EU representatives encourage Georgia to avoid actions that could justify military intervention in these regions. (https://civil.ge/archives/111575)
• On December 8, 2006, Georgia’s ruling National Movement party prevented a vote on an opposition-led proposal to withdraw from the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), frustrating opposition MPs. Citing parliamentary procedure, the ruling majority delayed the vote, prompting criticism from opposition lawmakers, who accused them of effectively opposing the motion. The opposition, led by the Democratic Front faction, softened its proposal by requesting that the President present withdrawal plans by February 15, 2007, but the ruling party still rejected it, with key leaders arguing that the timing was strategically unwise. They expressed concerns over losing beneficial trade agreements with CIS countries and emphasized that departure from the CIS should be carefully timed to ensure economic stability. This procedural tactic allowed the ruling party to delay addressing the CIS issue amid escalating tensions with Russia, leading to claims of inconsistency from opposition figures. (https://civil.ge/archives/111582)
• On December 10, 2006, the Russian Foreign Ministry summoned Georgian Ambassador Irakli Chubinishvili to protest Georgia's alleged obstruction of a military transit agreement between the two countries. Russia accused Georgia of ignoring requests to authorize flights for Russian Air Force personnel and cargo traveling to Russia’s 102nd military base in Gyumri, Armenia, between December 8 and 22. Russia argued that this action hindered both the operation of its military base in Armenia and the ongoing withdrawal of Russian bases from Georgian territory, calling it a "deliberate" move to escalate tensions. The transit agreement, signed on March 31, 2006, allows Russia to transport military goods through Georgia under strict conditions, including prior annual approval and prohibitions on transferring arms to third parties or transporting weapons of mass destruction. Georgia reserves the right to deny transit if it threatens national security or if the destination involves conflict zones. (https://civil.ge/archives/111588)
• On December 12, 2006, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Grigory Karasin met with EU Special Representative to the South Caucasus Peter Semneby in Moscow to discuss the conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The meeting focused on potential solutions for these disputes, as indicated by the Russian Foreign Ministry. (https://civil.ge/archives/111602)
• On December 19, 2006, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov urged the Georgian authorities to cease their anti-Russian policies and provide more positive prospects for relations between the two countries. He attributed the escalating tensions in Russia-Georgia relations to factors beyond the September arrests of four Russian officers in Georgia. Lavrov cited violations of agreements, mistreatment of Russian peacekeepers, provocations, and efforts to rally Western support against Russia as key elements of Tbilisi's current policy. (https://civil.ge/archives/111637)
• On December 20, 2006, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov stated that there were no signs indicating Georgia's readiness to improve relations with Russia, criticizing Tbilisi for neglecting its responsibilities in resolving the conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. He claimed that Georgia was establishing alternative structures to undermine the leadership in these breakaway regions and pointed out a fundamental difference in mentality between certain Georgian officials and their Russian counterparts, although he noted that this did not reflect the views of the Georgian and Russian peoples. Lavrov expressed concern that Georgia's pursuit of foreign support to justify what he termed an immoral and anti-Russian policy highlighted a troubling mindset among Georgian leaders. (https://civil.ge/archives/111646)
• On January 9, 2007, the breakaway Abkhaz authorities denied reports claiming they had refused to participate in a scheduled quadripartite meeting in Chuburkhinji, Gali district, set for January 11. Abkhaz Foreign Minister Sergey Shamba clarified that these meetings had not been held since November 2 due to the Georgian side's refusal to participate. The "Chuburkhinji sessions" are informal weekly talks involving representatives from Georgia, Abkhazia, Russian peacekeepers, and UN observers to address ongoing issues in the conflict zone. Shamba expressed support for resuming these discussions, which he described as effective in resolving specific issues. (https://civil.ge/archives/111731)
• On January 10-12, 2007, Renée van der Linden, President of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE), visited Moscow for discussions on Russo-Georgian relations. During his trip, he was scheduled to meet with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, the Speakers of the State Duma and Federation Council, Boris Grizlov and Sergey Mironov, as well as other Russian officials. The visit aimed to address and explore issues between Russia and Georgia. (https://civil.ge/archives/111733)

( Russian diplomat Ivan Volynkin stated on January 10, 2007, that while Russia is considering resuming visa issuance to Georgian citizens, no specific date has been set yet. This comment came in response to Georgian media reports speculating that visas would be resumed on January 12. Volynkin, one of the few diplomats remaining in the Russian Embassy in Tbilisi after the embassy staff was evacuated in September due to a spy scandal, clarified that the Russian Foreign Ministry had not confirmed any such date. Russia had halted issuing visas to Georgians on September 28, 2006, after the arrest of four Russian military officers on espionage charges.(https://civil.ge/archives/111728)

• On January 18, 2007, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced that Russia would send Ambassador Vyacheslav Kovalenko back to Tbilisi, marking a step toward restoring diplomatic relations with Georgia. This move follows a diplomatic rift that began in September 2006 when Georgia arrested four Russian military officers on espionage charges, prompting Russia to recall its Ambassador and sever all transportation and communication links. Putin acknowledged the historical ties between the two countries and emphasized the need for ongoing efforts to resolve bilateral issues. Georgian Foreign Minister Gela Bezhuashvili welcomed the decision, calling the previous Ambassador's recall unjustified and expressing readiness for improved cooperation between the nations. (https://civil.ge/archives/111777)
  • On January 18, 2007, Georgian Foreign Minister Gela Bezhuashvili expressed Tbilisi's approval of Russia's decision to return Ambassador Vyacheslav Kovalenko to Georgia. During a phone conversation with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, the two ministers discussed key bilateral issues and emphasized the importance of improving relations and enhancing cooperation between the two countries. (https://civil.ge/archives/111778)
• On January 19, 2007, the Russian daily *Kommersant* reported that the Kremlin decided to lift the sanctions imposed on Georgia in October 2006, after determining that the measures had failed to achieve their goals. According to the article, Russian officials concluded that the sanctions had actually reduced Georgia's dependency on Russia and damaged Russia's reputation both in Georgia and the West. The decision followed an analysis at a session of the Russian National Security Council, where it was acknowledged that the sanctions had not led to the fall of Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili's regime, and had instead boosted support for Georgia's NATO aspirations. This shift in policy came shortly after Russia announced the return of its Ambassador to Tbilisi, signaling potential steps toward restoring transport links with Georgia. (https://civil.ge/archives/111781)
• On January 19, 2007, René van der Linden, President of the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly (PACE), welcomed the return of Russian Ambassador Vyacheslav Kovalenko to Tbilisi. Van der Linden, who had discussed de-escalating tensions with Russian authorities during his visit to Moscow the previous week, saw the ambassador's return as a positive step. He emphasized that PACE is ready to assist further in this process. Russian President Vladimir Putin had announced on January 18 that Kovalenko would return to Tbilisi after being recalled nearly four months earlier due to a spy row. Kovalenko was expected to arrive in Tbilisi on January 22. (https://civil.ge/archives/111783)
• On January 22, 2007, the Bureau of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) decided not to hold urgent debates on Russo-Georgian tensions, as requested by the Georgian delegation. Konstantin Kosachyov, head of the Russian delegation, explained that the decision was made after Russia announced the return of its Ambassador to Tbilisi. Kosachyov stated that holding public discussions would have politicized the issue and potentially led to more mutual accusations. The PACE Bureau instructed two monitors to closely follow Russo-Georgian relations and report their findings in April if necessary. Giga Bokeria, head of the Georgian delegation, noted that the return of the Russian ambassador was seen as an initial step, with Russia given time to show further commitment to improving ties with Georgia before the next report. (https://civil.ge/archives/111790)
• On January 23, 2007, VimpelCom, a Russian telecommunications company, announced plans to launch a new mobile phone operator in Georgia under the brand name Mobitel. The company is currently finalizing its tariff policy and negotiating with fixed-line and mobile operators in the country. Mobitel will be Georgia's third mobile operator, joining the existing Geocell and MagtiCom, which dominate the market with 55% and 45% shares, respectively. VimpelCom's Sergey Avdeev believes the addition of a third operator will significantly alter the market dynamics, potentially leading to a decrease in customer numbers for the established companies and lower tariffs for consumers. VimpelCom purchased a majority stake in Mobitel in July 2006 and is investing in infrastructure to launch its services. (https://civil.ge/archives/111803)
• Georgian transport officials and executives from Georgian air carriers are set to visit Moscow on February 5-6, 2007, to discuss the potential resumption of air traffic between Georgia and Russia, according to Alexander Chkhikvadze, acting head of the Georgian transport regulation agency. Chkhikvadze stated that Georgian carriers are prepared to resume flights within ten days after receiving official approval from Russia. Air, sea, land, and railway links, as well as postal communication, were cut by Russia on October 3, 2006, following the release of four Russian military officers arrested in Georgia on espionage charges. Additionally, Georgian wine producers are seeking to meet with Russian Ambassador Vyacheslav Kovalenko to discuss the resumption of wine exports to Russia, which were banned in March 2006 due to health concerns. (https://civil.ge/archives/111810)
• On January 26, 2007, Georgian State Minister for Conflict Resolution Issues, Merab Antadze, met with Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Gregory Karasin in Moscow to discuss various matters concerning Russo-Georgian relations. The discussions also included topics related to the resolution of the Abkhaz and South Ossetian conflicts. During his visit, Antadze also held a meeting with Yuri Popov, Russia's chief negotiator for the South Ossetian conflict. (https://civil.ge/archives/111822)
• In an interview with Ekho Moskvy radio on January 27, 2007, Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili expressed Tbilisi's readiness for dialogue with Moscow to improve strained relations, acknowledging mistakes made by both sides. He emphasized that Georgia seeks to strengthen its independence without alienating its neighbors, urging Russia to accept and assist Georgia’s sovereignty. Saakashvili noted the harsh rhetoric from both sides in recent months, blaming contemporary politics for such tensions, but welcomed the recent de-escalation in rhetoric. He also stated that Georgia could only respond positively to Russia's decision to return its ambassador to Tbilisi, as it was Russia’s internal matter, and that Georgia remains open to dialogue. Furthermore, Saakashvili pointed out that Russia's economic sanctions, including the doubling of gas prices, had led Georgia to diversify its export markets and seek alternative energy sources, with 80% of its gas expected to come from Azerbaijan by early March. (https://civil.ge/archives/111826)
• On January 31, 2007, Russian Ambassador to Georgia Vyacheslav Kovalenko presented his credentials to President Mikheil Saakashvili, marking a step toward improving bilateral relations. Ambassador Kovalenko expressed Russia's commitment to a stable Caucasus and resolving regional conflicts, emphasizing cooperation between the two countries. President Saakashvili acknowledged the historical ties and mutual interests between Georgia and Russia, noting that recent de-escalation in rhetoric signaled a positive shift. He expressed hope for removing restrictions and deepening dialogue on various issues, including regional security. Kovalenko had been recalled by Russia in late September 2006 due to a spy dispute but was sent back to Tbilisi earlier in January 2007. (https://civil.ge/archives/111846)
• On January 31, 2007, Russian Ambassador to Georgia Vyacheslav Kovalenko presented his credentials to President Mikheil Saakashvili, signaling a potential shift in bilateral relations. Kovalenko, who had been recalled in September 2006 due to a spy dispute, emphasized Russia's interest in stabilizing the Caucasus and resolving conflicts fairly. In response, Saakashvili welcomed the return of the ambassador and noted that recent de-escalation in rhetoric showed "sobriety" in their relationship. He called for the resumption of transportation links between Georgia and Russia, which had been suspended in October 2006. Despite the positive tone, Kovalenko expressed dissatisfaction with Georgia’s continued anti-Russian rhetoric, citing the uranium smuggling case, and urged Tbilisi to avoid such actions to improve ties. Georgian Foreign Minister Gela Bezhuashvili, however, reiterated that Tbilisi sought to avoid politicizing the smuggling case and welcomed further cooperation between the two countries. (https://civil.ge/archives/111847)
• Alexander Chkhikvadze, the acting head of Georgia's transport regulation agency, traveled to Moscow from February 5 to 7, 2007, for discussions on resuming air traffic between Georgia and Russia. Chkhikvadze expressed optimism about reopening the route, which was cut by Russia on October 3, 2006, following Georgia's release of four Russian military officers whom it had accused of espionage. Despite the suspension of air, sea, land, rail, and postal links, Chkhikvadze noted that Georgian air carriers had managed to remain financially viable, even though Russian cities were key destinations prior to the suspension. (https://civil.ge/archives/111863)
• On February 5, 2007, EU foreign policy chief Javier Solana stated in an interview with Russian news agency Interfax that there had been "some improvement" in Russian-Georgian relations, particularly following Russia's decision to send its ambassador, Vyacheslav Kovalenko, back to Tbilisi. Solana, who was in Moscow with German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier and EU Foreign Commissioner Benita Ferrero-Waldner, emphasized the EU's support for the normalization of relations between the two countries, noting that it is in everyone's interest for Russia and Georgia to have "normal, friendly relations." (https://civil.ge/archives/185504)
• On February 5-6, 2007, negotiations between Georgia and Russia in Moscow over the resumption of air traffic failed to reach an agreement, though the talks were described as "positive." The discussions focused on a debt dispute, with Russian officials claiming that Georgia owed 3.5 million rubles (about USD 132,000) for unpaid navigation services provided to Georgian airlines in Russia. Both sides agreed to set up a working group to resolve the issue, and Russian Ambassador to Georgia Vyacheslav Kovalenko stated that air traffic could resume once the debt dispute was settled. (https://civil.ge/archives/111873)
• On February 6, 2007, Russian Ambassador to Georgia Vyacheslav Kovalenko outlined Moscow's conditions for improving bilateral relations with Tbilisi. He emphasized that Russia desires Georgia to be a neutral state, a stance that clashes with Georgia's NATO aspirations. Kovalenko also called for a reduction in anti-Russian rhetoric from Georgia, which he claimed had continued despite his recent return to Tbilisi. He stated that Russia supports Georgia's territorial integrity but with the protection of the interests of all peoples in the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Kovalenko also opposed linking the conflicts in these regions to Russia's WTO accession talks, stating that Georgia's internal disputes should not affect Russia's WTO negotiations. Additionally, he revealed plans to enhance humanitarian and cultural ties, including a potential Russian language institute in Tbilisi. (https://civil.ge/archives/111874)
• On February 23, 2007, Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili spoke about Russo-Georgian relations, noting that officials from both countries' Trade and Commerce Chambers would meet in Tbilisi in the coming months to discuss cooperation. He welcomed the restoration of contacts, but emphasized that strengthening Georgia as a strong state was his top priority. Saakashvili acknowledged the tensions and misunderstandings between the two countries but pointed to recent signs of reduced rhetoric. While he disagreed with Russian Ambassador Vyacheslav Kovalenko’s stance on Georgia’s neutrality, Saakashvili reaffirmed Georgia’s commitment to its NATO aspirations. He also praised Russian President Vladimir Putin as a "historic figure" and expressed support for Sochi’s bid to host the 2014 Winter Olympics, seeing it as a positive step for regional cooperation. (https://civil.ge/archives/185505)
• On March 15, 2007, Russia's VimpelCom launched a new mobile phone operator in Georgia under the Beeline brand. The company plans to compete with the two dominant Georgian operators, Geocell and MagtiCom, without engaging in a price war, opting instead for a promotional tariff. Beeline aims to capture 35% of the Georgian market by the end of 2007, initially providing services in Tbilisi and Rustavi, with plans to expand to Batumi by May and cover the entire country by 2008. VimpelCom acquired 51% of Mobitel, a Georgian mobile operator, in July 2006 for $12.6 million as part of its strategy to expand within the CIS region. Tbilisi Mayor Gigi Ugulava attended the launch event, emphasizing that business operates beyond political boundaries. (https://civil.ge/archives/112084)
• On March 15, 2007, Igor Sirtsov, head of the Russian Postal Service, indicated that Russia was interested in resuming postal communication with Georgia, which had been cut off in October 2006 due to a spy scandal. Sirtsov expressed hope that Georgia would be willing to negotiate the issue, noting that while political reasons played a role, Russia also had concerns about the quality of postal services in Georgia. Russia severed various transport and communication links, including postal services, after Georgia arrested four Russian military officers on charges of espionage. (https://civil.ge/archives/112093)
• On April 10, 2007, Russia and Georgia resumed the rail ferry service between the Georgian port of Poti and Kavkaz in Russia, a development welcomed by Russian Deputy Prime Minister Sergey Ivanov. Ivanov emphasized the service's immediate benefit for Armenia, as it would help alleviate the transport blockade affecting the country, allowing the ferry to carry 50 carriages at a time. This resumed connection comes after a 2006 blockade imposed by Russia, which had severed air, sea, land, and postal links with Georgia following the detention of Russian military officers by Tbilisi. (https://civil.ge/archives/112200)
• Georgian Interior Minister Vano Merabishvili responded sharply to Russian Deputy Prime Minister Sergey Ivanov's comments, urging Ivanov to "show more respect" when discussing Georgia. In an interview with the Financial Times on April 22, 2007, Ivanov criticized Georgia and Ukraine, claiming they undermine the concept of democracy. Merabishvili countered by pointing out that Georgia has more democracy than Russia, citing the absence of skinheads in Tbilisi, the safety of political opponents and journalists, and the lack of widespread corruption. He advised Ivanov to speak more respectfully about Georgia, given these positive aspects. (https://civil.ge/archives/112273)
• On May 10, 2007, the Georgian Foreign Ministry reported that two Russian planes violated Georgian airspace over the Stepantsminda district (formerly Kazbegi) around 12:30 pm local time. The planes entered 4 kilometers into Georgia and remained in Georgian airspace for four minutes. In response, Georgia sent a protest note to Moscow, demanding an explanation. However, Russia denied the accusation, with a Russian Air Force spokesperson stating that the planes did not violate Georgian borders. (https://civil.ge/archives/112366)
• On May 21, 2007, Georgia and Russia agreed to establish a regular rail ferry service between the Georgian port of Poti and Kavkaz in Russia, according to Irakli Ezugbaia, the chief of Georgian Railway, and his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Yakunin. The agreement was reached during a meeting of the Railway Transport Council of the Commonwealth of Independent States in Kazakhstan on May 19. While a rail ferry service had been initiated between the two ports in 2005, it had only operated on a limited basis. This new agreement aims to restore transport links between the two nations, after Russia severed all transport and postal communication with Georgia in October 2006. (https://civil.ge/archives/112422)
• On May 29, 2007, Russia partially resumed issuing visas to Georgian citizens after an eight-month suspension triggered by a spy row. Russian Ambassador to Georgia, Vyacheslav Kovalenko, stated that visas would be granted to individuals with family members in Russia or those with temporary residence rights. Georgian Foreign Minister Gela Bezhuashvili welcomed the decision as "positive" but noted it was a partial simplification, not the full resumption Georgia had requested. This move comes ahead of a potential meeting between the Russian and Georgian presidents at a CIS summit in St. Petersburg on June 10. The visa sanctions were part of broader measures that included cutting air, sea, land, and railway links between the two countries in October 2006. (https://civil.ge/archives/112455)
• On May 30, 2007, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Grigory Karasin and Georgian Deputy Foreign Minister Giorgi Manjgaladze held a telephone conversation to discuss preparations for a meeting between Russian President Vladimir Putin and Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili. The meeting is scheduled to take place on the sidelines of an informal CIS summit in St. Petersburg on June 10, 2007. (https://civil.ge/archives/112466)

Uranium smuggling affair

• On January 24, 2007, Georgian Interior Minister Vano Merabishvili revealed that authorities had foiled an attempt to smuggle 100 grams of uranium enriched to over 90%. The uranium was smuggled from Russia’s North Ossetian republic via the separatist-controlled South Ossetia region. The material, which was seized in Tbilisi after a Georgian undercover operation, was confirmed by the U.S. Energy Department’s National Nuclear Security Administration to be highly enriched uranium. Despite Georgia's request for Russian cooperation, Russia did not assist in the investigation. The smuggler, Oleg Khinsagov, was arrested and sentenced to eight and a half years in prison. U.S. Ambassador John Tefft emphasized that the incident highlights the international security threat posed by smuggling linked to Georgia's separatist regions. The United Nations' International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was set to release an official report on the case on January 26. (https://civil.ge/archives/111799)
• In a significant development, Georgian authorities have confirmed the arrest of Russian citizen Oleg Khintsagov and three Georgian accomplices involved in smuggling 100 grams of highly-enriched uranium from Russia via breakaway South Ossetia. The operation, dating back to January 31, 2006, was uncovered after Georgian undercover agents posed as buyers of radioactive material. The uranium, enriched over 90%, is considered nuclear-grade. Khintsagov was apprehended in Tbilisi while negotiating a USD 1 million deal. Despite confirming the material's enrichment with Russian authorities, Georgia's requests for cooperation have been met with little response, leading to accusations of non-cooperation from Russia. The Georgian Foreign Ministry emphasized the need for international monitors at the border between South Ossetia and Russia, which has been a hotspot for illicit activities. The case highlights concerns over security and the potential for weapons proliferation in the region. (https://civil.ge/archives/111813)
• On January 25, 2007, U.S. Department of State Spokesman Sean McCormack confirmed that highly enriched uranium seized in Georgia was analyzed by the FBI, which confirmed its dangerous nature. The case, involving Russian citizen Oleg Khintsagov and three Georgian accomplices, dates back to January 2006 when they were arrested in Tbilisi for smuggling 100 grams of uranium from Russia via breakaway South Ossetia. Although Georgia had kept the case confidential for a year, hoping to gather more details, it faced challenges due to Russia’s lack of cooperation. McCormack emphasized the importance of information-sharing among states to prevent nuclear smuggling, stressing the potential dangers of such materials falling into the wrong hands. He also noted that while only a small amount of uranium had been seized, the possibility of larger quantities being smuggled raised significant concerns for global security. Meanwhile, Georgian officials maintained that the case would not be politicized, viewing it as a matter of international security rather than state-sponsored activity. (https://civil.ge/archives/111815)
• On January 25, 2007, the breakaway region of Abkhazia denied allegations from the Georgian Foreign Ministry that it had been used as a route for smuggling radioactive materials from Russia into Georgia. This denial followed Georgia’s announcement that it had thwarted an attempt to smuggle 100 grams of highly enriched uranium from Russia via breakaway South Ossetia. In response, Abkhaz officials described the accusation as part of a campaign to discredit both Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Abkhaz Foreign Minister Sergey Shamba stated that the region is committed to regional security and strives to contribute positively to it. (https://civil.ge/archives/111817)
• On January 26, 2007, Georgian Prime Minister Zurab Nogaideli emphasized that the case of uranium smuggling, which involved the seizure of highly enriched uranium in Georgia in January 2006, should not be politicized. He stressed the importance of international cooperation, particularly between Georgia and Russia, to address the serious security threat posed by the incident. Nogaideli reiterated that Georgia is focused on collaborative efforts, not political statements, in dealing with the issue. The Georgian Foreign Ministry similarly affirmed on January 25 that the case, considered a significant international security concern, would not be politicized. (https://civil.ge/archives/111818)
• On January 26, 2007, Igor Shkabura, deputy director of Russia's Bochvar Inorganic Materials Institute, stated that it was impossible to determine the origin of the weapons-grade uranium seized in Georgia the previous year. He explained that the Georgian authorities only sent a small sample of the material to Russia, which did not provide enough information to identify its country of origin, as similar technologies for producing such materials exist in several countries. Shkabura also mentioned that Russian experts had requested additional samples from Georgia, but there had been no response. The uranium had been smuggled by a Russian citizen from North Ossetia to Georgia via the breakaway region of South Ossetia. (https://civil.ge/archives/111820)
• On January 26, 2007, Anatoly Zabrodin, a Russian border guard service official, renewed accusations that Chechen militants were still present in Georgia’s Pankisi Gorge, warning of the potential for these militants to infiltrate Russia. He noted, however, that no such infiltration attempts had been reported in 2005 or 2006. His remarks came after Georgia revealed that a Russian citizen had been arrested in Tbilisi for smuggling weapons-grade uranium. This accusation followed similar claims made by Russian officials in January 2006, when the Russian ambassador to Tbilisi stated that while the situation in Pankisi had improved, some militants remained in the area. Pankisi Gorge had been a point of tension in Russo-Georgian relations since the early 2000s, with Georgia admitting in 2002 that it had been a haven for militants, leading to joint anti-criminal operations, which officials claimed had ended by 2003. (https://civil.ge/archives/111821)
• On January 26, 2007, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov described the arrest of a Russian citizen in Georgia for attempting to sell enriched uranium as “a provocation.” Lavrov dismissed Georgian Interior Minister Vano Merabishvili's claims of Russian non-cooperation, stating that Russian experts from the FSB and Rosatom had visited Tbilisi and questioned Oleg Khintsagov, who was arrested for trying to smuggle 100 grams of weapons-grade uranium from Russia into Georgia via South Ossetia. Lavrov also criticized Georgia for not providing sufficient samples of the seized uranium, which hindered further investigation by Russian authorities, and expressed hope that the case wasn’t a politically motivated provocation. (https://civil.ge/archives/111823)
• On February 2, 2007, Georgian Foreign Minister Gela Bezhuashvili and U.S. Ambassador John Tefft signed an agreement to combat the trafficking of nuclear or radioactive materials in Georgia. This U.S.-Georgia collaboration aims to strengthen Georgia’s Nuclear Regulatory Agency, enhance border and maritime patrols, and support nuclear forensics. The U.S. Embassy hailed the agreement as a vital step in countering nuclear terrorism, following Georgia's recent interception of a uranium smuggling attempt from Russia via South Ossetia. Bezhuashvili emphasized the need for regional cooperation to prevent the spread of radioactive materials, noting particular challenges posed by abandoned radioactive sources and the lack of control over breakaway regions like Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which could be used as transit points for smuggling. (https://civil.ge/archives/111858)
• On August 16, 2007, the Georgian Ministry of Defense reported that radioactive material, believed to be Cesium, was discovered at the former Russian military base in Akhalkalaki, which had been officially handed over to Georgia in June 2007. Two separate samples were taken for analysis, but the ministry assured the public that there was no immediate threat. The discovery raised concerns about the safety and environmental conditions at the site, following the Russian withdrawal from the base. (https://civil.ge/archives/112868)

Russian shelling of the Kodori Gorge

• In his report to the UN Security Council on October 3, 2006, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan warned that the already tense situation between Georgia and Abkhazia could escalate further. He highlighted the increasing difficulty of reaching a negotiated solution to the conflict, as positions had become more polarized over the years, particularly following a large-scale operation in the Georgian-controlled upper Kodori Valley in July. Annan noted that the UN Observer Mission in Georgia had issued multiple violation reports concerning military activity by both sides, emphasizing the need for restraint and adherence to the 1994 Moscow Agreement. He recommended extending the UN Observer Mission's mandate for another six months, until April 15, 2007. (https://civil.ge/archives/115538)
• On October 18, 2006, the Parliament of the breakaway region of Abkhazia issued a statement urging the Russian leadership to recognize Abkhazia's independence and establish an "associated relationship" with the region. Alexander Torshin, the Vice-Speaker of Russia's Federation Council, indicated that the council would seriously consider the Abkhaz Parliament's appeal, emphasizing the need for a careful examination of the legal implications within the framework of Russian law. The Abkhaz Parliament asserted that Abkhazia is already de facto independent, urging Russia to formalize this status through recognition. (https://civil.ge/archives/111224)
• On October 23, military exercises involving 2,000 troops commenced in the breakaway region of Abkhazia, as reported by the Abkhaz news agency Apsnipress. Anatoly Zaitsev, the Deputy Defense Minister of Abkhazia, indicated that the first day of the exercises would focus on the mobilization of reserve troops. The specific location of the maneuvers was not disclosed. (https://civil.ge/archives/111255)
• On October 25, gunfire was directed near the location of Georgian Interior Minister Vano Merabishvili in the Tbilisi-controlled upper Kodori Gorge, according to Interior Ministry spokesman Shota Khizanishvili. Fortunately, no injuries were reported from the incident, which originated from the Abkhaz-controlled area of the gorge. Khizanishvili remarked that such incidents pose a threat to the ongoing peace process but did not provide further details regarding the shooting. (https://civil.ge/archives/111270)
• Georgian Interior Minister Vano Merabishvili reported that on October 25, the upper Kodori Gorge was shelled with three rocket shells fired from Abkhaz-controlled territories, landing approximately 1.5 kilometers from the village of Zemo Azhara. The incident coincided with President Putin's alarming comments regarding Georgia, which Merabishvili suggested may have provoked the attack by separatist forces. He described the shelling as a potential provocation by Abkhaz and Russian forces but indicated that it was difficult to determine if he was specifically targeted. The Abkhaz side denied responsibility, attributing the shelling to Emzar Kvitsiani, a wanted rebel warlord known for announcing a partisan warfare against Georgian governmental troops in the area. Merabishvili emphasized his regular inspections of the region and ongoing reconstruction efforts. (https://civil.ge/archives/111265)
  • The Georgian Foreign Ministry condemned the recent gunfire targeting Interior Minister Vano Merabishvili in the upper Kodori Gorge, expressing "deep concern" over the incident involving a GRAD missile system near Zemo Azhara village. While Merabishvili did not claim he was specifically targeted, he characterized the incident as a provocation against the local residents rather than a personal attack. The Ministry's statement labeled the shooting as a deliberate act intended to escalate tensions in the conflict zone, viewing it as an attempt to further the aggressive agenda of the Abkhaz side. (https://civil.ge/archives/111275)
  • Authorities in breakaway Abkhazia, led by Sergey Bagapsh, have denied allegations from Tbilisi that Abkhaz troops fired GRAD missiles into the Tbilisi-controlled upper Kodori Gorge on October 25. Bagapsh claimed that the incident was a provocation orchestrated by the Georgian side and emphasized that they had anticipated such actions, warning the international community in advance. He stated that Sokhumi would only resume talks with Tbilisi once Georgia withdraws its troops and the Abkhaz government-in-exile from upper Kodori Gorge. Bagapsh also cautioned foreign diplomats against engaging with representatives of what he described as the "puppet government" in the region. (https://civil.ge/archives/111276)
  • On November 1, 2006, the UN Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) reported findings from an investigation into an October 25 incident in which GRAD rockets hit the upper Kodori Gorge near Azhara, a region under Tbilisi’s control. Contrary to Georgian claims that the rockets were launched from the Abkhaz-controlled town of Tkvarcheli, UNOMIG concluded they were fired from the south of the impact sites, not from a mobile BM-21 launcher but likely from an improvised device along a ridge opposite Azhara. Abkhaz officials had denied involvement, and Russian peacekeepers questioned the reports, claiming no shelling was observed on October 25. UNOMIG’s findings, however, confirmed the presence of GRAD rockets, although their origin could not be definitively identified. (https://civil.ge/archives/111324)
  • On November 1, 2006, Abkhaz television aired a video message from Emzar Kvitsiani, a warlord wanted by Georgia, in which he claimed responsibility for the October 25 shelling of the upper Kodori Gorge, a Georgian-controlled area. Kvitsiani stated that the attack was a protest against the government of Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili, describing it as a "concrete act" against what he called a "fascist regime." This was Kvitsiani’s second video message; in September, he had threatened to begin partisan warfare in the gorge. Three GRAD rockets struck near the village of Azhara while Georgian Interior Minister Vano Merabishvili was in the area, although none exploded. Initially, Georgian officials blamed Abkhaz forces, but a UN investigation later concluded that the rockets were likely fired from an improvised launcher on a ridge near the impact sites, not from the Abkhaz-controlled Tkvarcheli district. (https://civil.ge/archives/111329)
• The breakaway region of Abkhazia is set to conduct large-scale military exercises from November 6 to 30, involving its air defense troops and air force, according to the Abkhaz news agency Apsnipress. Chief of staff Anatoly Zaitsev announced that these will be the first joint military maneuvers between air defense and air force units in the region, with approximately 600 servicemen expected to participate. Further details regarding the exercises have not been disclosed. (https://civil.ge/archives/111340)
  • On November 7, 2006, the UN Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) urged the authorities in breakaway Abkhazia to refrain from conducting joint air force and air defense exercises scheduled from November 6 to 30, citing concerns over the potential risks to civilian air traffic. The UN mission emphasized the importance of avoiding actions that could jeopardize the safety of civilian aircraft operations in the region. (https://civil.ge/archives/111354)
• On December 8, 2006, Abkhaz leader Sergey Bagapsh announced the suspension of border crossings with Georgia and threatened to cut power supplies from the Enguri hydro power plant to the Georgian region of Samegrelo in response to the arrest of Pridon Chakaberia, an Abkhaz official accused of drug trafficking by Georgian police in Zugdidi. Bagapsh claimed the arrest was politically motivated, aimed at intimidating the predominantly Georgian population in the Gali district, and accused the Georgian authorities of viewing local Georgians as enemies for cooperating with Abkhaz officials. The Abkhaz Foreign Ministry condemned Chakaberia's arrest and called for his immediate release, warning that such actions could escalate tensions further. (https://civil.ge/archives/111579)
• From February 19 to February 22, 2007, the breakaway Abkhaz armed forces held staff and command military exercises, involving two reserve brigades, according to the Apsnypress news agency. The exercises included shooting training for Abkhaz reserve troops on February 22 at the Gumista training ground. (https://civil.ge/archives/111954)
• Late on March 11, 2007, the Georgian-controlled villages of Chkhalta and Azhara in Abkhazia's upper Kodori Gorge were reportedly shelled, though no casualties were reported. Georgian officials alleged the attacks came from Abkhaz-controlled areas, with GRAD rockets reportedly landing near a school in Azhara. Additionally, Georgian sources claimed that Russian helicopters were observed flying over the gorge before the shelling. Malkhaz Akishbaia, head of the Abkhaz government-in-exile, suggested the rockets were fired from Tkvarcheli. Abkhaz officials denied these claims, with Abkhaz Foreign Minister Sergey Shamba describing the event as a routine clash between local militias led by Emzar Kvitsiani and Georgian forces. Similar incidents occurred in October, but UN observers had concluded that rockets then could not have originated from Abkhaz positions, instead identifying nearby hills as the launch sites. (https://civil.ge/archives/112052)
  • On March 12, 2007, Georgian Deputy Defense Minister Levan Nikoleishvili accused Russian helicopters of entering Georgian airspace from Russia and shelling the villages of Chkhalta, Gentsvisi, and Azhara in the upper Kodori Gorge, a Tbilisi-controlled area of breakaway Abkhazia. Georgian officials reported that GRAD rockets were fired at Azhara from the Abkhaz-controlled Tkvarcheli district, though no casualties were recorded. Russia swiftly dismissed these claims as a "provocation," with Russian Air Forces spokesman Col. Alexander Drobishevsky denying any involvement. The Abkhaz authorities also denied any connection to the incident. (https://civil.ge/archives/112050)
  • On March 12, 2007, Georgian officials accused Russian helicopters and Abkhaz forces of shelling Tbilisi-controlled villages in the upper Kodori Gorge, specifically targeting Chkhalta and Azhara. According to Deputy Defense Minister Levan Nikoleishvili, three Russian helicopters entered Georgian airspace, allegedly firing on the villages, though no casualties were reported. Malkhaz Akishbaia, head of the Abkhaz government-in-exile, claimed the attack was intended to intimidate locals and disrupt peace efforts. Both Russian and Abkhaz authorities denied involvement, labeling the accusations as provocations. Abkhaz Foreign Minister Sergey Shamba and leader Sergey Bagapsh attributed the incident to clashes between Georgian forces and local militias, possibly led by warlord Emzar Kvitsiani, who has denied involvement. Concurrently, a Georgian MI-24 helicopter en route to western Georgia crashed in Dusheti, killing three crew members, which Georgian officials linked to heightened tensions in the Kodori Gorge, attributing the crash to poor weather conditions. UN observers and Russian peacekeepers were expected to investigate the Kodori Gorge incident on March 12. (https://civil.ge/archives/112053)
  • On March 12, 2007, Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili convened an emergency session of the National Security Council to address reports of shelling in the Tbilisi-controlled upper Kodori Gorge in the breakaway region of Abkhazia. Saakashvili returned to Tbilisi from Kazakhstan, following a working visit to Japan, to participate in the discussions on the escalating situation in Kodori. (https://civil.ge/archives/112054)
  • Following an emergency National Security Council session on March 12, 2007, Georgian Foreign Minister Gela Bezhuashvili expressed his intention to discuss the recent shelling in the upper Kodori Gorge with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov by phone. Bezhuashvili also announced plans to inform the international community and Georgia’s partner countries about the incident. Additionally, President Saakashvili’s office intended to release a recorded address made during the session. Saakashvili had returned to Tbilisi earlier that day from Kazakhstan, following a working visit to Japan, to lead the council meeting on the Kodori crisis. (https://civil.ge/archives/112057)
  • On March 12, 2007, Georgian Parliamentary Chairperson Nino Burjanadze described the shelling of villages in the upper Kodori Gorge as a "well-planned provocation" aimed at undermining Georgia’s territorial integrity. She stated that Russian army helicopters, equipped with night-vision, crossed into Georgian airspace from Russia late on March 11 to carry out the attack. Burjanadze called on Russia to provide an explanation for the incident, emphasizing that while Georgia strives for peace and stability, it will not tolerate threats to its security. The Georgian State Minister for Conflict Resolution also condemned the shelling as a foreign military provocation intended to disrupt the peace process, highlighting the use of MI-24 and MI-8 helicopters in the attack. (https://civil.ge/archives/112059)
  • On March 12, 2007, Georgian Foreign Minister Gela Bezhuashvili expressed strong concern to Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov over the shelling of villages in the upper Kodori Gorge. Bezhuashvili shared evidence that army helicopters had entered Georgian airspace from Russia and carried out the attack. Tbilisi formally requested an explanation from Russia and urged an investigation into the incident by the UN Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG). The two foreign ministers agreed to revisit the matter after UNOMIG's findings on the shelling. (https://civil.ge/archives/112062)
  • On March 12, 2007, Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili called the shelling of villages in the upper Kodori Gorge a "dangerous provocation" aimed at destabilizing Georgia and the broader region. The Georgian Interior Minister, Vano Merabishvili, reported that on the night of March 11, three Russian MI-24 helicopters crossed into Georgian airspace from Russia's North Caucasus and fired at least 20 unguided missiles at several villages in the region. Saakashvili condemned the attack as part of a broader military operation and ordered Georgian forces to return fire if provoked. He also emphasized the need for Georgia to continue modernizing its military. The Georgian Foreign Ministry requested an investigation by the UN Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) and instructed Foreign Minister Gela Bezhuashvili to raise the issue with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov. Both Russia and the Abkhaz authorities denied involvement, calling the accusations a provocation. (https://civil.ge/archives/112063)
  • On March 12, 2007, the Russian Foreign Ministry commented on the March 11 incident in upper Kodori Gorge, stating that an investigation into the shootout observed by Russian peacekeepers and UN observers was underway. While Georgia claimed that Russian helicopters had shelled villages in the region, entering Georgian airspace from Russia at around 10:30 pm on March 11, the Russian Foreign Ministry denied the accusation, reaffirming that no Russian helicopters had flown in the area. The Ministry also suggested that the incident was a direct result of Georgia's actions the previous summer, when it sent troops to crack down on local militias and set up the headquarters of the "so-called Abkhaz government-in-exile." The Russian MFA emphasized the need for a security agreement between Georgia and Abkhazia to prevent further violence and called for Tbilisi to take a measured approach to the situation. (https://civil.ge/archives/112055)
  • On March 13, 2007, the U.S. Embassy in Tbilisi expressed deep concern over the reported shelling of villages in upper Kodori Gorge and condemned the act of violence. The embassy acknowledged that the UN Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) had dispatched a joint fact-finding team to investigate the incident and called on all parties to cooperate fully with the inquiry. It also urged restraint and calm from all sides, reaffirming U.S. support for Georgia's territorial integrity and the peaceful resolution of separatist conflicts. Georgia had claimed that at least three army helicopters entered Georgian airspace from Russia on March 11, shelling the area and causing damage to a building in Chkhalta, which housed both a local school and the headquarters of the Tbilisi-backed Abkhaz government-in-exile. Russian authorities denied involvement in the incident. Georgia's government, meanwhile, announced plans for the immediate reconstruction of the damaged building, and a joint fact-finding team was formed to investigate the matter. (https://civil.ge/archives/112068)
  • On March 13, 2007, Georgia’s Ambassador to the UN, Irakli Alasania, condemned the shelling of villages in upper Kodori Gorge, describing the attack as a deliberate provocation aimed at escalating tensions in the region. At a news conference in New York, Alasania emphasized that Georgia remains committed to the peace process despite the likelihood of further provocations, which he said could undermine the fragile stability and derail efforts toward a peaceful resolution of the conflict, particularly following the 2007 February Geneva talks. Georgia claimed that at least three army helicopters entered Georgian airspace from Russia on March 11 and shelled the area, though Russia denied involvement. A joint fact-finding team, comprising representatives from UN observers, Russian peacekeepers, and both Georgian and Abkhaz sides, arrived in Kodori on March 13 to investigate. Georgian officials speculated that the provocation might aim to create a negative atmosphere about security conditions in the region ahead of the UN Security Council's April session on Abkhazia. (https://civil.ge/archives/112072)
  • On March 14, 2007, President Mikheil Saakashvili visited the Tbilisi-controlled upper Kodori Gorge in breakaway Abkhazia, just days after the area was reportedly shelled by Russian army helicopters on March 11. During his two-hour visit, Saakashvili inspected the damage to the headquarters of the Abkhaz government-in-exile in the village of Chkhalta and met with the local population, reassuring them that the government would provide security and condemn the attack as an attempt to terrorize the residents. Malkhaz Akishbaia, head of the exiled Abkhaz government, reported that up to 25 rocket fragments had been recovered, claiming they proved the attack came from the air and land, with helicopters entering Georgian airspace from Russia. Both the Abkhaz and Russian sides denied involvement, and a joint fact-finding team launched an investigation. Georgian officials suggested the provocation aimed to create a negative atmosphere ahead of an upcoming UN Security Council session on Abkhazia in April. The U.S. Embassy in Tbilisi also expressed concern, condemning the violence and urging restraint. (https://civil.ge/archives/112075)
  • On March 14, 2007, President Mikheil Saakashvili visited Tbilisi-controlled upper Kodori Gorge, which had been reportedly shelled by Russian army helicopters just days earlier. During his two-hour visit, Saakashvili inspected the damage to the headquarters of the Abkhaz government-in-exile in Chkhalta and reassured local residents, pledging increased rehabilitation efforts in response to the "barbaric" attacks. He emphasized Georgia's resolve to defend the region, stating that any attempt to capture Upper Abkhazia would unite all of Georgia against it. He also criticized Russia's economic sanctions and vowed to strengthen Georgia’s economy and infrastructure despite external pressures. Georgian officials, including Malkhaz Akishbaia of the Abkhaz government-in-exile, claimed that up to 25 rocket fragments had been recovered from the gorge, supporting the allegation that the attack involved both land and air assaults by Abkhaz and Russian forces. Both Russia and Abkhazia denied any involvement. A joint fact-finding mission was initiated by UN observers, Russian peacekeepers, and representatives from Georgia and Abkhazia to investigate the incident, but no findings had been released by March 14. The U.S. Embassy expressed concern over the violence and called for restraint from all parties involved. (https://civil.ge/archives/112077)
  • On March 23, 2007, it was confirmed by both the Abkhaz and Georgian sides that a four-party joint fact-finding group (JFFG) would need to make an additional visit to the Tbilisi-controlled upper Kodori Gorge to finalize conclusions regarding the reported shelling on March 11. The JFFG, comprising UN observers, Russian peacekeepers, and representatives from both Georgia and Abkhazia, had already conducted an initial examination of multiple sites related to the incident between March 13-16. Tbilisi claims that at least three army helicopters from the Russian Federation entered Georgian airspace and shelled the upper Kodori Gorge, damaging administrative buildings. Additionally, Georgian officials allege that artillery fire from Abkhaz-controlled territories also targeted the area. The JFFG, which was established in January 2000, is tasked with investigating violations of the 1994 Moscow ceasefire agreement and seeks to reach a consensus among the four parties involved before making its final report. (https://civil.ge/archives/112117)
  • On March 11, 2007, the upper Kodori Gorge, controlled by Tbilisi, was shelled with Russian-made Ataka guided missiles, allegedly launched from Russian army helicopters, according to Interior Minister Vano Merabishvili. During an April 1 interview with Rustavi 2 TV, Merabishvili confirmed that missile fragments from 2005, available to the Russian military, were found in the gorge. He further briefed the National Security Council on March 12, reporting that three MI-24 helicopters entered Georgian airspace from Russia, firing at least 20 unguided missiles at administrative and police buildings. A joint investigation team of UN observers, Russian peacekeepers, and Georgian and Abkhaz representatives has since conducted fact-finding visits, though no conclusions have been released. (https://civil.ge/archives/112164)
  • On April 3, 2007, the UN Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) reported that the investigation into the March 11 shelling of the upper Kodori Gorge requires additional information to move forward. Tbilisi has alleged involvement of Russian helicopters and Abkhaz artillery in the attack. The Joint Fact-Finding Group (JFFG), led by UNOMIG and including Russian peacekeepers and representatives from both Georgian and Abkhaz sides, has conducted two investigative visits but has yet to release findings. The JFFG has gathered evidence from ordnance, conducted 17 crater analyses, and examined damage to the Chkhalta administration building. Consensus has been reached on some incident details, but further data is essential to complete the investigation. (https://civil.ge/archives/112190)
  • In a report to the UN Security Council on April 5, 2007, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon described the March 11 rocket attacks on Georgia’s upper Kodori Gorge as a "major setback" to peace efforts in Abkhazia, highlighting the incident as a stark reminder of the conflict’s risks and potential for violence. The Joint Fact-Finding Group (JFFG), including UNOMIG, Georgian, Abkhaz, and Russian peacekeeping representatives, has investigated but not yet disclosed findings. Ban noted progress in joint patrols by UN observers and Russian peacekeepers in the Kodori Gorge, observing reduced Georgian armed presence and no heavy weapons. Additionally, he welcomed the appointment of an international human rights officer in Gali, aimed at enhancing human rights support through training, legal aid, and awareness initiatives, coordinated with local NGOs in Gali and Sukhumi. This report is expected to inform a new Security Council resolution on Abkhazia, scheduled for April 10, with Georgian PM Zurab Nogaideli set to attend in New York. (https://civil.ge/archives/112198)
  • On April 13, 2007, the UN Security Council adopted a resolution on Abkhazia, urging Georgia to align the upper Kodori Gorge with the 1994 Moscow ceasefire agreement and calling on the Abkhaz side to show restraint regarding Georgian presence. The resolution extended UNOMIG’s mandate for six months, urging both sides to resume dialogue, address security concerns, and avoid actions obstructing peace. It condemned the March 11 attacks on Kodori Gorge, advocated improved conditions for IDPs and development, and called for the return of refugees, including those born post-hostilities. Georgia’s UN Envoy Irakli Alasania praised the resolution for recognizing Georgia’s territorial integrity and endorsing direct dialogue with Abkhazia. Meanwhile, Russia supported the resolution, emphasizing its alignment with Russian priorities and insisting on adherence to the Moscow agreement in Kodori Gorge. However, tensions arose when Abkhaz Foreign Minister Sergey Shamba was denied a U.S. visa to attend the session, prompting Russian objections. Alasania criticized Russia’s push for separatist representation at the UN, questioning Russia's impartiality in the conflict. (https://civil.ge/archives/112233)
• On March 11, 2007, a missile attack hit an administrative building in Chkhalta in the upper Kodori Gorge (Tbilisi-controlled area in breakaway Abkhazia), causing significant damage but no injuries. The UN Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) report suggested that Russian army helicopters could have been involved, as the anti-tank guided missile (ATGM) appeared to have been fired from the air. Witnesses reported helicopter activity between 9:10 pm and 10:50 pm, but no definitive evidence was found to confirm the helicopters’ involvement. The radar and air traffic records from Georgia showed helicopters approaching from the north, but Russia denied any involvement, claiming no Russian Air Force flights in the area. The report also clarified that Georgian MI-24 helicopters, which crashed on March 12, could not have been involved due to the timing and weather conditions. The investigation faced challenges in reaching consensus, with conflicting conclusions from the parties involved. (https://civil.ge/archives/112682)
  • On July 13, 2007, Georgian authorities appeared to downplay the findings of a UN Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) report regarding the March 11 attack on upper Kodori Gorge, which suggested the involvement of Russian army helicopters. While the report was viewed as a "diplomatic victory" for Tbilisi, senior Georgian lawmakers, including Davit Bakradze, emphasized the need for restraint and avoided exploiting it for political gain, stating that "political hysteria" would not be helpful. Bakradze noted that the incident could be revisited as a diplomatic tool in the future. The UNOMIG report also suggested artillery fire from Abkhaz-controlled territory but used inconclusive language, reflecting the sensitive nature of the issue. Nika Rurua, another Georgian lawmaker, argued that the report was a significant blow to Russia's international image. The report, despite its potential to fuel tension, received minimal media attention in Georgia, as officials opted for a cautious approach, avoiding premature diplomatic confrontations. (https://civil.ge/archives/112686)
  • On July 16, 2007, the Georgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs called for the establishment of a UN Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) observation post in the upper Kodori Gorge. The ministry argued that such an outpost would help prevent a recurrence of the March 11, 2007, attack on the Tbilisi-controlled region. The UNOMIG report, released on July 12, suggested that Russian army helicopters could have been involved in the attack, which also included artillery fire from Abkhaz-controlled territory. The Georgian Ministry emphasized that the report supported the claim of a sophisticated and well-planned provocation by Russia, and refuted Russian accusations that Georgia had been involved. It also criticized Russia for withholding air traffic control records and other crucial evidence. (https://civil.ge/archives/112699
  • On July 17, 2007, the U.S. State Department praised the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) for its investigation into the March 11, 2007, attack on upper Kodori Gorge, which involved artillery fire from Abkhaz-controlled territory and the possible involvement of Russian army helicopters. The U.S. condemned the attack on Georgian sovereign territory and emphasized the need for measures to prevent similar incidents in the future. The Georgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs had previously called for the establishment of a permanent UNOMIG observation post in the area to enhance security and prevent further attacks. The State Department also commended Georgia's restraint during the incident and urged both sides to engage in direct dialogue and follow recommendations for confidence-building measures, aimed at a peaceful resolution that respects Georgia's sovereignty and territorial integrity. (https://civil.ge/archives/112701)
  • On July 17, 2007, the Russian Foreign Ministry issued a statement dismissing the findings of the UN Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) report on the March 11, 2007 attack in upper Kodori Gorge, suggesting that the attack benefited Georgia. The UNOMIG report hinted at the possible involvement of Russian helicopters but did not confirm it, and Russia criticized the U.S. State Department for condemning the attack and praising Georgia's restraint. Moscow accused Tbilisi of deliberately escalating tensions to strengthen its control over the area, which had long been disputed. The Russian Ministry emphasized that the JFFG report found it difficult for helicopters to operate effectively in the challenging Kodori Gorge terrain but noted that the presence of helicopters during the attack was still a possibility, albeit inconclusive. Russia pointed out that the key issue was not the specifics of the attack but rather the Georgian interest in the incident, which it argued was intended to complicate the conflict further. (https://civil.ge/archives/112706)
  • On July 18, 2007, Georgian Prime Minister Zurab Nogaideli expressed surprise at Russia’s reaction to the UN Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) report on the March 11 attack in upper Kodori Gorge. Nogaideli noted that the report did not directly claim Russian helicopters were involved, yet Russia had reacted strongly, accusing Tbilisi of using the attack to its advantage. The Russian Foreign Ministry had previously stated that the attack "favored" Georgia, which led the prime minister to question the intensity of Russia’s response. (https://civil.ge/archives/112712)
  • On July 18, 2007, Sergey Shamba, the foreign minister of breakaway Abkhazia, rejected Tbilisi’s proposal for the establishment of a UN Observer Mission (UNOMIG) post in the upper Kodori Gorge. Speaking on Abkhaz TV, Shamba argued that Tbilisi sought the UN presence to "legitimize" its control over the region, which includes the Tbilisi-backed Abkhaz government-in-exile. He emphasized that Sokhumi would only consider the proposal if Tbilisi withdrew from the area. The Georgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs had called for the post to help prevent future attacks like the one on March 11, suggesting that it would include artillery locating radar and unmanned aircraft to monitor the airspace. (https://civil.ge/archives/112713)
  • On July 18, 2007, Nino Burjanadze, the Georgian Parliamentary Chairperson, responded to Russia’s hard-line reaction to the UN Observer Mission (UNOMIG) report on the March 11 attack in upper Kodori Gorge. Burjanadze claimed that Russia’s statement, which blamed Georgia for the attack, only incriminated itself. She said that Russia's response confirmed Georgia's suspicions, as the UNOMIG report had ruled out any Georgian involvement. This remark contrasted with the more restrained reaction from Prime Minister Zurab Nogaideli, who expressed surprise at Russia's response, noting that the report did not explicitly link Russian helicopters to the attack. (https://civil.ge/archives/112714)
  • On July 26, 2007, Irakli Alasania, Georgia’s ambassador to the UN, demanded that the UN Observer Mission (UNOMIG) reopen its investigation into the March 11 attack on upper Kodori Gorge, calling it “an act of war” against Georgia. Alasania criticized Russia's lack of cooperation, which he claimed hindered the investigation's completeness, particularly Russia's refusal to provide air traffic control records and trace rocket serial numbers. He stressed that if Russia continued obstructing the investigation, Georgia would find it difficult to accept Russia's role in the UN Secretary-General’s Group of Friends overseeing the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict. Davit Bakradze, Georgia's State Minister for Conflict Resolution, supported this call, warning that Russia's non-cooperation could jeopardize the security mechanisms in place for conflict resolution. (https://civil.ge/archives/112756)
  • On July 27, 2007, U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Mathew Bryza dismissed allegations that Georgia had shelled itself in the upper Kodori Gorge, calling them “ridiculous.” He compared these claims to the Sarajevo tragedy, emphasizing their lack of credibility. Bryza supported the UN Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) report, which suggested but did not definitively claim that Russian army helicopters might have been involved in the March 11 attack. He reiterated that Georgia was attacked and highlighted the need to resolve the issue to prevent future attacks. Bryza also endorsed UNOMIG’s recommendation to establish a patrol base in Azhara to monitor the area with advanced surveillance technology, though Sokhumi rejected the idea unless Tbilisi withdrew from the region. (https://civil.ge/archives/112764)
• On July 28, 2007, Peter Semneby, the EU’s Special Representative for the South Caucasus, commented on the March 11 attack on the upper Kodori Gorge, calling it “a very dangerous incident.” Semneby acknowledged that the UNOMIG report, released on July 12, did not provide a complete picture of the events but stated that it was clear enough to conclude that the attack was indeed very dangerous. The UNOMIG report suggested that Russian army helicopters might have been involved, though it did not make this claim definitively. (https://civil.ge/archives/112765)

Tensions in Abkhazia and South Ossetia

ASATIANI

• The SO presidential election of November 2006 saw an alternative poll won by The Salvation Union of SO and won by Sanakoyev. (475)
• Saakashvili appointed Sanakoyev as Head of the South Ossetian Provisional Administrative Entity (475)
• Sanakoyev then addressed the Georgian parliament in Ossetian, outlining his vision for a conflict resolution that earned praise from the State Dept but raised alarm in Tskhinvali (475)
• Tskhinvali responded by threatening to block traffic to ethnic Georgian villages and oust Sanakoyev's government by force (475)
• Russian officials were given high posts in the separatist regimes over the years preceding the war (477-478)
• In 2006, Russia had built a military base large enough to house 2,500 soldiers near Tskhinvali in violation of international law (478)

ZOURABICHVILI

• In July 2007, Georgian youths are arrested in Abkhazia for promoting Georgian propaganda (265)
• Georgian rhetoric severely increased at this incident (266)
  • Zourabichvili believes that the authorities hoped the kids would be killed, as to justify a new armed intervention into Abkhazia (266)
• The tensions coincided with an increase in Russian activity in the breakaway republics, including an increase in passportization and bilateral visits (303)
  • Russia engaged in a policy of creeping annexation during that time (303-304)
• The Okruashvili statement of spending the new year of 2007 in Tskhinvali was seen as a threat of invasion (305)
• Her analysis is that 2006 marked the end of progress toward conflict resolution and 2007 marked the first step toward open confrontation (306)n

• Tbilisi claimed having downed a Russian aircraft over Abkhazia in 2007. Moscow denied this. (Galeotti 124)
• In July 2007, two Russian peacekeepers were arrested in Zugdidi for being armed and wearing uniform outside of their jurisdiction. Russian media accused Georgia of being provocative and of "forcing them" to drink alcohol, an indication they were drunk (Panfilov 127)

KAVADZE

• In June 2007, Lavrov told Bildt that conflict resolution required "an environment of mutual trust and confidence building between the conflicting parties" (75)
  • He highlighted that while Russia recognised Georgia's territorial integrity, Russia's "deepest conviction" was that the establishment of an alternative administration in the conflict zone will only act as a irritant factor (75)

PAX GEORGIANA

• Shortly before the 2007 Abkhaz parliamentary elections, the Abkhaz de jure Culture and Education Ministry's youth group organized a protest by the Enguri Bridge to protest the elections (139)
• At the end of December 2006, Georgian law enforcement detailed Kachi Beria, the Head of Administration of the Village of Kvemo Barghebi (Gali) (139)
  • The detention leads to protests by villagers who block the Enguri Bridge, while the Abkhaz Militsiya is dispatched to the Lower Gali marshes to maintain order (139)
  • On December 28, two deployed Abkhaz militsiya members are killed, which leads to further militsiya dispatching in the Pirveli Otobaia and Meore Otobaia villages, representing the first Abkhaz armed presence in the Lower Gali marshes (139)7

ASMUS

• Russia had been using the occupied territories as blackmail for a long time. (72-74)
• In late October 2006, in a private meeting outside of Moscow, Putin told Rice that if MS dared to move against either territory, Russia would invade Georgia and would recognize both territories (73-74)
  • When Rice warned of a US response to Russia, Putin got mad and walked out (74)
• It seems that Okruashvili's departure in November 2006 coincided with a shift in Tbilisi's strategy, which moved to a use of soft power in South Ossetia (81)
  • The strategy was to use the porousness of the border and the intermingling of populations and to use soft power to appeal over the heads of the separatist leaders to the hearts and minds of the local population. (81)
  • That's when Project Sanakoyev was drafted up (82)
• Part of Project Sanakoyev was a "Disco for Peace" built at the end of a valley where Georgian and Ossetian youth could go dance (82)
• Gela Bezhuashvili was one of the administration members who worked hard to keep the line of comms open with Russia (83)
  • Bezhuashvili proposed MS to call Putin in June 2007 with a concrete plan to solve the SO conflict and that it should be first discussed at the FM level (83)
  • MS called and Putin agreed (83)
  • Bezhuashvili and Lavrov then talked over the phone and agreed to meet (83)
  • The meeting took place at the Ciragan Palace Kempinski hotel on June 24 in Istanbul for a private dinner. (83)
  • The Georgian proposal was to make Moscow the guarantor of peace, create a special travel regime between SO and NO, major joint energy development to sell electricity to Turkey and Armenia, and remain open minded on Russia's concerns for NATO (83)
    • Part of the plan was also replacing Kokoity and Sanakoyev with an internationally monitored elections open to all sides. (84)
    • The proposal was to be drafted in a treaty inspired by Kars Treaty (84)
    • Lavrov ended by promising to take the plan back to Putin without making a recommendation. Putin was to come to Istanbul the next day (84)
    • The next morning, the plan was leaked to Russian press. Lavrov was equally furious. Allegedly, according to Tbilisi, the plan was leaked by the FSB itself (84)
    • As a result of the leak, Kokoity strengthened his position immediately (84)
• Overall, Tbilisi believed that Tskhinvali could be solved a lot quicker than Abkhazia as the conflict had left less scars, was smaller, and was less strategic for Russia (85)
• In the summer of 2007, Saakashvili helped popularize a hit song about Georgians longed to regain Abkhazia (85)
• Georgian Airways planes were named after Abkhaz cities (85)
• Tbilisi never took the military option off the table in Abkhazia (85)

• Passportization radically increased in the OTs (IIFFMCG I 18)

IIFFMCG II

• In 2007, Russia paid residents of Abkhazia a total of 590 million rubles in pensions and another 100 million to South Ossetia (19)
• Russian political analysis claimed that Moscow was using economic means to try to caution Georgia against attempts to take back the unrecognized republics by force (19)
• An increasing amount of separatist officials and security forces were manned by Russian officials, such as the MOD of Abkhazia (Sultan Sosnaliev) and SO (Anatoly Barankevich) and the Chief of the Abkhaz General Staff 9gennadi Zaytsev) (19)
  • Russian journalist Julia Latynina once described the power elite in So as a joint business venture between KGB generals and Ossetian entrepreneurs using money allocated by Moscow for the fight against Georgia (19)
• In March 2007, Mi-24 helicopters bombed the Kodori and Chkhalta Valleys, and the Chuberi Pass. (24)
• In reply to Georgian accusations of military violations by the Russian side the Russian Foreign Ministry reported that in 2007 alone peacekeepers in Abkhazia claimed 158 instances in which Georgian warplanes allegedly flew over the security zone. (24)
• 23 January 2008 Report by the UN SG: "a widespread sense of uncertainty and alarm was fuelled throughout the period by an almost daily flow of inaccurate reports originating in the Georgian media and the Georgian authorities themselves. Such allegations have led to a growth in distrust and undermined security, ultimately increasing the chances of confrontation. There were also a growing number of such allegations levelled specifically at the CIS peacekeeping force. Those allegations proved mostly groundless." (196)

IIFFMCG III

• On March 11, 2007, from 2210 to 0000, the Kodori Gorge suffered from simulataneous artillery and air attacks. At least 17 BM-21 Grad type missiles were fired from the ground and at least one AT-9 Ataka type guided missile from the air. The target of the air-attack was the administration building in the village of Chkhalta. The targets of the artillery attack where the same building, the storehouse of oil and fuel materians, and the polie station in Ajara, The highly precise air attack by modern missiles, the night flight of helicopters in a mountaineous area and the massive artillery bombing indicate that wils was a well-organized and planned military operation which could have been conducted in this region only by Russian forces. (16)
• On 20 September 2007, a special task unit of the MIA of Georgia neutralized an armed grouping of 10 people in the Kodori Gorge which had planned an attack on the new road connecting Upper Abkhazia with the rest of Georgia (17)
  • The commander of the grouping and his deputy were killed in the exchange of fire. They were identified as Igor Muzavatkin (Vice-Colonel of the Russian Armed Forces, a former member of the CPF who served on the cract basis in the border troops division of the Abkhazian separatist security) and Artur Zorin (Major of Russian armed forces, also a former member of the CPF) (17)
  • Seven members of the subversive roup that identified themselves as members of the border troops division of the Abkhazian separatist security service, were arrested and later, as a gesture of good will, released and handed over to the Abkhazian separatist government (17)
• Russia built two new military bases in South Ossetia in 2007-2008 (one in Ugardanta and one northwest of Tskhinvali) (84)
  • The Bam base of Tskhinvali was started construction at the end of 2007 and ended before August 2008. Satellite images showed that the terrain of the base was being prepped in July 2007 (84)
  • The Ugardanta base's construction started in 2006 but construction itensified in the end of 2007 (84)
  • These two bases would house the Russians that went through the Roki Tunnel in the morning of August 7 (84)
  • These bases were built by Praktika LTD, a Russian construction company headed by Leonid Mikhailovich Vaganov, a former GRU officer (84)
  • Russia also helped SO build its own military infrastructure, including a tank battalion in Buzala (Java) and new HQs for the local KGB (85)
  • At the same time, SO's equipment was upgraded with Russian tanks, armored vehicles, military trucks, and modern ammunition (85)
  • There were confirmed reports of Russian military and poice specialists training and equipping South Ossetian militants (85)
• There was an increase in Russian staffing of separatist security structures during the crisis. Anatoly Barankevich was appointed as Secretary of the Security Council of SO in December 2006, Vasily Lunev as Minister of Defense of SO in March 2008, Andrey Laptev as MOD of SO in December 2006, Sergey Sarmatov as Chief of General Staff of SO in 2007, Boris Atoev as Chairman of the SO KGB in November 2006, his predecessor Nikolay Dolgopolov in March 2006, Vladimir Kotoev as Head of Government Protection Service in July 2007, Piotr Kamaev as Military Adviser to Kokoity in March 2007, Viktor Kniazev as Law Enforcement Adviser and Deputy Commander of the JPKF in January 2008, Sergey Shadrin, Kokoiyt's Security Adviser in April 2007 (himself a former Deouty Russian MIA), Aleksandr Shaposhnikov as Law Enforcement adviser to Kokoity and Deputy Commander of the JPKF in January 2007 (86-89)
• In Abkhazia: Aleksandr Pavliushko as Deputy MOD and former head of the Russian peacekeepers appointed in April 2008 (94-95)
• In September 2007, SO completed the construction of the 110 km Java-Tskhinvali electrotransmission line with RAO EES, a Russian state-owned company, to supply Tskhinvlali and ethnic Ossetian villages, while leaving aside Georgian settlements (153)
• By 2007, the huge increase in Russian equipment to the occupied territories meant that the sepaeatist arsenal included two new units of antiaircraft emplacement, and triple the amount of antitank grenade cup discharges, FAGOT antitank missile complex, howiters, a huge increase in the number of T-60 tanks in the Java region, 122-mm self-proplelled artillery equipment 2CI Gvozdika in Zivgomi. (154-155)
• On August 29, 2007, members of the NO peacekeeping beatallion in SO abducted two journalists from Rusatvi and Mze TV, who were released after OSCE involvement (195)
• ON Februar 3, 2007, David Sigua, chairman of the electoral commission in Gali, was abducted from his home by the Georgian Intelligence Services and his fate remains unknown to this day (578)

• Peter Semneby, the EU’s special representative to the South Caucasus, criticized the sharp rhetoric from Georgian officials regarding their plans to replace Russian-led peacekeeping operations in conflict zones. He noted that while Georgia’s efforts are legitimate, they are presented in a way that is “unnecessarily provocative” towards Russia. Semneby emphasized the need for Georgia to tone down its rhetoric and focus on confidence-building measures to facilitate real dialogue between Georgians, Ossetians, and Abkhaz. He mentioned that international pressure influenced President Saakashvili to moderate his speech at the UN General Assembly, leading him to avoid setting a timeline for the withdrawal of Russian peacekeepers. Semneby also pointed out that the absence of progress in Tbilisi’s peace plans is partly due to the removal of relatively moderate Georgian negotiators, such as Giorgi Khaindrava and Irakli Alasania, from key positions. (https://civil.ge/archives/115575)
• On November 6, 2006, authorities in breakaway South Ossetia accused Georgia of installing an air defense radar in the conflict zone, claiming it violates the 1992 ceasefire agreement. The South Ossetian Press and Information Committee reported that Russian peacekeeping forces confirmed the radar's presence near the village of Shavshvebi. However, the Georgian Ministry of Defense denied these allegations, according to Georgian media sources. (https://civil.ge/archives/111349)
• On November 23, 2006, a blast in Tskhinvali, the capital of breakaway South Ossetia, injured a 52-year-old woman named Deliza Shortava, who reportedly activated an explosive device after picking up a toy resembling a mobile phone. The explosion resulted in her losing her sight. South Ossetian officials labeled the incident a terrorist act allegedly orchestrated by Georgian saboteurs, prompting a public warning against picking up unfamiliar items. Additionally, the region's Interior Ministry announced that investigators are exploring the possibility that Shortava might have been involved in the incident herself, suggesting that the blast could have occurred while she was attempting to charge an explosive. (https://civil.ge/archives/111483)
• On December 4, 2006, Georgian police briefly detained two Russian peacekeepers near the village of Tirdznisi in the South Ossetian conflict zone for allegedly transporting smuggled goods, primarily food items. The Georgian Interior Ministry announced that the servicemen were released as a gesture of goodwill and handed over to the command of the Russian peacekeeping forces in the area. The detained soldiers were identified as members of Russia's North Ossetian peacekeeping battalion, but there was no immediate comment from either the Russian peacekeeping command or the South Ossetian authorities regarding the incident. (https://civil.ge/archives/111554)
• On December 6, 2006, Russia's State Duma passed two statements regarding the independence aspirations of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. The statement concerning Abkhazia urged the international community to recognize the region's independence and emphasized Russia's intention to strengthen ties with Abkhazia following a request from its parliament. It accused the Georgian government of exacerbating tensions and endangering Russian citizens in the area. Similarly, the statement on South Ossetia noted that the November 12 independence referendum demonstrated a clear desire for independence among its population and called for this sentiment to be acknowledged by the international community to promote human rights, peace, and stability. The Duma insisted that Russian policy should reflect the results of the referendum, asserting that it adhered to international legal standards. (https://civil.ge/archives/111569)
• On December 6, 2006, Georgian officials expressed concerns that Russia was preparing to recognize the breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia following statements passed by the Russian State Duma calling for such recognition. Although these statements are not legally binding, they reflect a strong consensus among Russian lawmakers about the independence aspirations of these regions. Influential Georgian lawmakers, including Givi Targamadze, warned that recognition by Russia would equate to a declaration of war against Georgia and could have disastrous consequences for Russia itself. Meanwhile, a large rally in Abkhazia demonstrated local support for independence, coinciding with the Duma's discussions. Georgian leaders, including Foreign Minister Gela Bezhuashvili and Parliamentary Chairperson Nino Burjanadze, condemned the Duma's actions, emphasizing the need for international support in response to what they termed unacceptable provocations by Russia. (https://civil.ge/archives/111570)
• On December 7, 2006, the Georgian Parliament unanimously condemned the Russian State Duma’s statements regarding Abkhazia and South Ossetia, labeling them as “extremely unfriendly” and a source of “deep concern.” The parliament asserted that these statements aimed to provoke Georgia and escalate tensions in the conflict zones while undermining Russia's role as an impartial mediator. Parliamentary Chairperson Nino Burjanadze emphasized the importance of unanimous support on such critical issues, and the Georgian Foreign Ministry echoed that the Duma's remarks further compromised Russia's credibility as a peacekeeper, urging the Russian government to avoid emotional reactions that could exacerbate already tense bilateral relations. (https://civil.ge/archives/111573)
• On January 15, two Russian peacekeepers were injured when their vehicle struck a mine in the South Ossetian conflict zone, near the village of Tliakana. The incident, described by the South Ossetian Foreign Ministry as "an act of sabotage," occurred during a routine patrol. The commander of the Joint Peacekeeping Forces, Marat Kulakhmetov, confirmed that the injuries were not life-threatening. Both Georgian and Russian sources reported the blast, highlighting the ongoing tensions and security risks in the region. (https://civil.ge/archives/111755)
  • Following the mine explosion on January 15 that injured two Russian peacekeepers in the South Ossetian conflict zone, Georgian State Minister for Conflict Resolution Issues, Merab Antadze, called for the "full demilitarization" of the area. He emphasized the need for immediate action to clear the region of illegal armed groups, which pose a danger to local safety and hinder economic rehabilitation efforts. Antadze reiterated that Georgia had raised the issue of demilitarization multiple times, and he rejected the South Ossetian authorities' claims that the incident was a Georgian act of sabotage, calling it misinformation aimed at misleading the international community and provoking fear among the local population. (https://civil.ge/archives/111765)
• On January 28, 2007, three South Ossetian militiamen were injured when their post on the southern outskirts of Tskhinvali was attacked by gunfire from the nearby Georgian village of Nikozi. The South Ossetian Press and Information Committee reported that the assault, which occurred at around 4:30 a.m. local time, involved mortar launchers and assault rifles, allegedly fired by a "saboteur squad" from the Georgian Defense Ministry. Local residents confirmed the use of heavy weapons during the incident. While Georgian peacekeeping battalion commander Mamuka Kurashvili confirmed the event, he denied any involvement by Georgia. South Ossetian leader Eduard Kokoity urged Georgia to halt provocative actions and resume negotiations. (https://civil.ge/archives/111825)
• On January 28, 2007, three South Ossetian militiamen were injured when their post on the southern outskirts of Tskhinvali came under heavy fire from the nearby Georgian village of Nikozi. The South Ossetian Press and Information Committee accused a "saboteur squad" from the Georgian Defense Ministry of carrying out the attack using mortar launchers and assault rifles. Local residents confirmed the use of heavy weapons, but Georgian peacekeeping commander Mamuka Kurashvili denied Georgian involvement. South Ossetian leader Eduard Kokoity called for Georgia to cease provocative actions and resume negotiations, while Georgian State Minister for Conflict Resolution Merab Antadze rejected the accusations, calling for peaceful dialogue in a bilateral format. Tbilisi had recently been pushing to dissolve the Joint Control Commission (JCC) and was refusing to participate in its sessions, although Antadze expressed willingness to attend informal discussions in Tbilisi or Tskhinvali. (https://civil.ge/archives/111829)
• On the night of February 1, 2007, a Georgian checkpoint near Ergneti, located in the South Ossetian conflict zone, came under mortar fire from the outskirts of Tskhinvali, according to the Georgian State Minister for Conflict Resolution Issues. Georgian forces reportedly returned fire, injuring one assailant. The South Ossetian Press and Information Committee confirmed the incident, asserting that the shooting began only after Georgian forces allegedly attacked from the villages of Nikozi and Ergneti. Marat Kulakhmetov, Commander of the Joint Peacekeeping Troops, stated that an investigation would clarify the origin of the attack. Just days earlier, on January 28, a similar skirmish injured three South Ossetian militiamen near Tskhinvali, with additional shooting reported near Ergneti on January 29, 2007. (https://civil.ge/archives/111849)
• On February 3, 2007, a shootout in the South Ossetian conflict zone left two civilians—an ethnic Georgian, Avtandil Longurashvili, from the Georgian village of Nikozi, and an ethnic Ossetian, Tamaz Margiev, from Tskhinvali—injured. The incident, which occurred around 10:30 pm Tbilisi time, saw both Georgian and South Ossetian officials blaming each other for initiating the attack. Georgian authorities claimed Tskhinvali forces launched a mortar assault on Nikozi, while South Ossetian reports alleged that Tskhinvali came "under heavy fire" from Georgian villages including Nikozi, Avnevi, Eredvi, and Ergneti. South Ossetian Interior Minister Mikhail Mindzaev stated that orders were given to target only the source of the incoming fire, avoiding village areas. This was the third such violent incident in a week, following earlier clashes on January 28, when three South Ossetian militiamen were injured, and on February 1, when another militiaman was wounded. (https://civil.ge/archives/111862)
• On March 15, 2007, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Grigory Karasin criticized the installation of "alternative" authorities by Tbilisi in conflict zones like Abkhazia and South Ossetia, calling such actions a "dangerous provocation." He referred specifically to Georgia's relocation of its Abkhaz government-in-exile to upper Kodori Gorge in September 2006, and the establishment of a Tbilisi-backed administration in South Ossetia, led by Dimitri Sanakoev, in November 2006. Karasin argued that these moves, particularly the promotion of Sanakoev's administration, were intended to undermine the existing separatist governments in both regions—Eduard Kokoity's South Ossetia and the Abkhaz leadership. He further suggested that the March 11 shelling incident in upper Kodori Gorge was a direct result of Tbilisi's actions, stating that the presence of a "virtual government" in the area had contributed to the tensions, describing it as an "irritant factor" that provoked a dangerous reaction. (https://civil.ge/archives/112083)
• In his annual state of the nation address on March 15, 2007, President Mikheil Saakashvili rejected the terms "Georgian-Abkhazian conflict" and "Georgian-Ossetian conflict," describing them as terms created by "silly and unaware people." He argued that there is no such thing as a "Georgian-Ossetian conflict," pointing out the complex history of Georgian and Ossetian relations, where several Georgian kings were of Ossetian descent. Saakashvili similarly refuted the term "Georgian-Abkhaz conflict," asserting that ethnic Abkhaz are the legitimate population of Abkhazia, despite the population displacement during the war. He criticized the existing Russian-led peacekeeping and negotiation processes as "discredited and ineffective," calling for a shift to more flexible formats with greater involvement from European institutions and the United States. Saakashvili emphasized that Tbilisi was ready to offer broad autonomy to both Abkhazia and South Ossetia, in line with European standards, and urged for patience and flexibility to avoid provocations and tensions. (https://civil.ge/archives/112088)
• An informal, informational session of the quadripartite Joint Control Commission (JCC) over the South Ossetian conflict took place in Istanbul from March 21-23, 2007. This session was intended to prepare for future discussions, following the plenary session held in Vladikavkaz, Russia’s North Ossetia, in October 2006. The JCC includes negotiators from Georgia, South Ossetia, Russia, and Russia's North Ossetia. However, Georgia had been refusing to participate in plenary JCC meetings, seeking to weaken the Russian-dominated negotiating framework. Instead, Tbilisi proposed a new Georgian-Ossetian bilateral format, with equal mediation from international actors like the United States, the EU, and Russia, a proposal strongly opposed by both Moscow and Tskhinvali. During the Istanbul session, the South Ossetian side hoped to negotiate terms with Tbilisi for the next plenary meeting. (https://civil.ge/archives/112124)
  • On March 23, 2007, Georgia announced that it was not opposed to hosting a plenary session of the Joint Control Commission (JCC) on South Ossetia in Tbilisi, but emphasized that several key issues must be addressed first. These included the creation of joint working groups to propose concrete measures for the demilitarization of the conflict zone and for enhancing cooperation between law enforcement agencies. The Georgian side stressed that any cooperation between Georgian and South Ossetian law enforcement could only be achieved through substantial steps towards demilitarization. Meanwhile, during the informal JCC session in Istanbul from March 21-23, South Ossetian negotiator Boris Chochiev raised concerns about the presence of approximately 250 Georgian police officers in Kurta, a Georgian village within the conflict zone that serves as the headquarters for the Tbilisi-backed South Ossetian administration led by Dimitri Sanakoev. (https://civil.ge/archives/112138)
  • On March 23, 2007, the Russian Foreign Ministry expressed appreciation for the results of an informal Joint Control Commission (JCC) session held in Istanbul on March 21-22, 2007, which brought together negotiators from Georgia, South Ossetia, Russia, and North Ossetia. The participants agreed to hold the next plenary session of the JCC in Tbilisi, though the specific terms and agenda would be determined through further consultations. However, the Georgian side stated that it was not opposed to hosting the session in Tbilisi but emphasized that important issues, such as demilitarization of the conflict zone and cooperation between law enforcement agencies, needed to be addressed first through joint working groups before the plenary session could take place. (https://civil.ge/archives/112139)
• On March 25, 2007, two Georgian servicemen were killed in a clash with South Ossetian forces near the village of Didmukha, approximately 20 kilometers from the breakaway region's capital, Tskhinvali. Reports differ on the incident's circumstances. According to the South Ossetian side, the clash occurred when Ossetian militiamen encountered a Georgian sabotage squad. However, Georgian authorities stated that the two servicemen were killed when their vehicle was ambushed by South Ossetian forces while conducting a routine patrol between the villages of Nikozi and Avnevi. (https://civil.ge/archives/112147)
  • On March 26, 2007, Georgian State Minister for Conflict Resolution Issues, Merab Antadze, described the March 25 attack on Georgian policemen in the South Ossetian conflict zone, which resulted in the deaths of two Georgians, as a "provocative act" aimed at escalating tensions rather than pursuing peace. Antadze accused Russian agents in South Ossetia of orchestrating the attack and stated that Georgia would not be deterred by such provocations, emphasizing its commitment to the peace process. He also noted that he had met with the head of the OSCE Mission in Georgia to demand an immediate assessment of the incident. Furthermore, Antadze called on all parties to sign a peace memorandum proposed by Tbilisi, which had been rejected by South Ossetia but supported by Dimitri Sanakoev, the Tbilisi-backed leader of South Ossetia's alternative government. (https://civil.ge/archives/112145)
• On March 27, 2007, Russia’s Foreign Ministry issued its Foreign Policy Review, describing the situation in Georgia as "explosive" and emphasizing tensions in the South Caucasus. The review criticized Georgia's leadership under Mikheil Saakashvili for fostering ethnic nationalism and working closely with Western countries, particularly the United States. Russia accused Georgia of attempting to undermine existing peacekeeping and negotiating frameworks, particularly in relation to the "frozen conflicts" in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The document also expressed concern that Georgia was using these issues to attract international attention, hoping to secure the status of both regions as integral parts of Georgia. Additionally, it criticized Georgia's anti-Russian media campaign and efforts to involve international organizations like the OSCE, EU, and NATO to further its agenda. Russia’s stance remained firm, asserting its interest in preventing actions that could harm Georgia’s long-term national interests while pushing for a resolution based on voluntary agreements between the conflicting sides. (https://civil.ge/archives/185510)
• On April 12, 2007, the Georgian State Minister for Conflict Resolution Issues condemned an April 11 shelling targeting the Georgian village of Kurta in the South Ossetian conflict zone, describing it as an attempt to escalate regional tensions and undermine the peace process. The attack, reportedly launched from the Ossetian village of Monastery, caused damage to a school building and nearby houses in Kurta, a village loyal to Tbilisi and home to the South Ossetian alternative government. Tbilisi refrained from retaliating, instead calling for urgent demilitarization of the region to remove illegal armed groups. (https://civil.ge/archives/112223)
• On April 19, 2007, Georgian State Minister for Conflict Resolution Issues Merab Antadze attended a Joint Control Commission (JCC) session in Tskhinvali to advocate for a peace memorandum aimed at non-use of force, demilitarization, and cooperation between Georgian and South Ossetian law enforcement in the South Ossetian conflict zone. The memorandum, which Tbilisi had first proposed at a March 22-23 JCC session in Istanbul and received OSCE support at the Ljubljana summit, emphasizes wide autonomy for South Ossetia and enhanced development opportunities through political negotiations. Despite international backing, the proposal was rejected by South Ossetian representatives, prompting Tbilisi’s warning that dismissing such internationally endorsed peace measures would undermine the conflict resolution process and obstruct peaceful settlement efforts. (https://civil.ge/archives/112256)
  • The April 19, 2007 consultative session of the Joint Control Commission (JCC) in Tskhinvali concluded without any progress, according to Georgian State Minister for Conflict Resolution Merab Antadze on April 20. Although initial agreements were made on demilitarization and law enforcement cooperation—prerequisites for a future plenary JCC session in Tbilisi—these were unexpectedly nullified during the talks. The key point of contention arose when the South Ossetian side demanded a reduction in Georgian checkpoints, a proposal the Georgian delegation declined, leading to a breakdown in negotiations. (https://civil.ge/archives/112267)
• On April 25, 2007, Georgia’s State Minister for Conflict Resolution Issues urged Russia to adopt a more constructive approach toward resolving conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, emphasizing the need for positive political will to achieve a comprehensive political solution. The statement followed remarks by Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Mikheil Kaminin, who criticized Georgia’s support for alternative governments in the breakaway regions and its NATO aspirations, arguing they undermined the peace process. Georgia responded by stressing its commitment to dialogue with all political forces in the region and defending its NATO aspirations as a sovereign choice, accusing Russia of trying to maintain the status quo and obstruct Georgia’s right to pursue its own geopolitical interests. (https://civil.ge/archives/112299)
• On April 26, 2007, a Georgian checkpoint near Nikozi in the South Ossetian conflict zone came under fire, though there were no casualties, as reported by the Georgian State Minister for Conflict Resolution Issues. The following day, the South Ossetian Press and Information Committee confirmed the incident but accused Georgia of firing from Nikozi at South Ossetian checkpoints near Gudjabauri. The Joint Peacekeeping Forces stationed in the region condemned the incident as a serious violation of the ceasefire agreement, further escalating tensions between the two sides. (https://civil.ge/archives/112309)
• On May 11, 2007, the authorities of South Ossetia announced the closure of roads leading to Georgian-controlled villages in the region, citing security concerns and the need to prevent provocations by the Georgian side and its appointed "puppet government" led by Dimitri Sanakoev. South Ossetia claimed that Georgia had increased its police forces, imposing humiliating security checks on ethnic Ossetians. The South Ossetian authorities stated that the roads would only be reopened if Georgia restored free movement and dissolved Sanakoev's administration. In response, Georgian Prime Minister Zurab Nogaideli declared on the same day that Tbilisi would not yield to "blackmail" and would continue its dialogue with Sanakoev, who had agreed to talks. (https://civil.ge/archives/112367)
• On May 19, 2007, an intensive exchange of fire involving mortars and grenade launchers broke out in the South Ossetian conflict zone. Both Georgian and South Ossetian sources reported the incident, with the South Ossetian side claiming that two residents of Tskhinvali were slightly injured by shelling. The exchange occurred between the areas of southern Tskhinvali and the Georgian villages of Ergneti and Kvemo Nikozi, with Georgian media reporting damage to several houses in the villages. Both sides blamed each other for initiating the violence. The Georgian government condemned the incident, calling for an international response, while reaffirming its commitment to avoiding an armed confrontation but emphasizing that it could not tolerate actions that endanger civilians in the region. (https://civil.ge/archives/112418
• On May 28, 2007, the Georgian side reported an intense shelling of the Georgian village of Tamarasheni in the South Ossetian conflict zone, allegedly by forces from South Ossetian-controlled areas. The attack involved the use of mortars and grenade launchers. In response, the South Ossetian Press and Information Committee claimed that Tskhinvali and the Ossetian village of Kverneti were shelled by the Georgian side overnight on May 29. In Tbilisi, opposition lawmakers, including Bidzina Gujabidze of the Conservative Party, demanded action against South Ossetian leader Eduard Kokoity, with Gujabidze calling for a special operation to capture him. Meanwhile, Giga Bokeria from the ruling National Movement party emphasized caution but affirmed the Georgian government's right to take action if the situation escalated. (https://civil.ge/archives/112457)
• On May 29, 2007, South Ossetian leader Eduard Kokoity met with Russian Ambassador to Georgia Vyacheslav Kovalenko in Tskhinvali to discuss the ongoing situation in the South Ossetian conflict zone. Kokoity expressed hopes for Russian involvement in advancing peace proposals and emphasized the need for unconditional negotiations to ease tensions. He attributed the current instability to the administrative entity led by Dimitri Sanakoev, appointed by Tbilisi, and stated that any attempts to divide the Ossetian population would fail. Kokoity endorsed a three-stage conflict resolution model that included confidence building, economic rehabilitation, and political negotiations, stressing that Tskhinvali sought peace, not escalation. (https://civil.ge/archives/112459)
• On June 4, 2007, South Ossetian leader Eduard Kokoity and Abkhaz leader Sergey Bagapsh pledged mutual support in the event of hostilities with Georgia, emphasizing their commitment to each other’s security. During a joint news conference in Moscow, they asserted that only formal recognition of their regions' independence could truly resolve their conflicts with Georgia. They also highlighted their interest in Kosovo's situation, noting that if Kosovo's independence set a precedent, they would push for "common standards" to be applied to similar conflicts, thereby strengthening their demands for independence. (https://civil.ge/archives/112483)
• On June 5, 2007, the Georgian Interior Ministry issued a stern warning to South Ossetian authorities, demanding the release of five Georgian citizens allegedly held as "hostages" by South Ossetian militias. According to the ministry, two Georgians were kidnapped by South Ossetian militiamen in Znauri District with ransom cited as the motive, while a South Ossetian special unit reportedly detained three more Georgians in Tskhinvali on June 3. The Georgian ministry demanded the immediate release of these individuals and the arrest of those responsible. In response, South Ossetian officials accused Georgian forces of abducting a South Ossetian citizen from Ergneti on June 4, escalating tensions between the two sides. (https://civil.ge/archives/112445)
  • On June 6, 2007, three Georgians detained by South Ossetian militias were released, though two others remain in custody. The three released individuals, detained three days earlier, reported to Georgian media that they were treated "well" during their detention in Tskhinvali. The Georgian Interior Ministry had previously issued a warning on June 5, threatening "appropriate measures" if all detained Georgians were not freed. However, the two Georgians detained on June 2 are still held by South Ossetian authorities. (https://civil.ge/archives/112495
• On June 9, 2007, a South Ossetian militiaman, Giorgi Tedeev, suspected of abducting two Georgians and stealing a car from Tbilisi, was killed in a shootout with Georgian police near the South Ossetian conflict zone. According to the Georgian Interior Ministry, Tedeev was killed following a police chase that ended in the village of Chorchana, Khashuri district. Another suspect, Arkadi Dzeranov, escaped to South Ossetian-controlled territory. However, the South Ossetian Press and Information Committee (PIC) reported that Tedeev was killed in Tsnelisi, Znauri District, and that a local resident was also injured. The Georgian Interior Ministry had previously warned of "appropriate measures" if the suspects were not handed over, following Tedeev’s alleged involvement in the May abduction. The PIC further claimed that Georgian special forces had an operation planned to "capture or liquidate" South Ossetian leader Eduard Kokoity, heightening tensions. (https://civil.ge/archives/112513
• On June 15, 2007, tensions escalated in South Ossetia as authorities in the breakaway region deployed forces to prevent the construction of a new road by Georgia near the village of Khetagurovo, west of the South Ossetian capital, Tskhinvali. The Georgian side had stationed up to 160 special-purpose troops at the border to build a direct link between the villages of Nikozi and Avnevi, bypassing South Ossetian-controlled areas. South Ossetian officials warned that the new road would have strategic military importance, potentially granting access to the Tskhinvali highway in the event of conflict. Russian peacekeeping troops were deployed to monitor the situation and prevent further provocations. The Georgian government argued that the road was necessary after South Ossetian forces blocked access to the western Georgian villages. (https://civil.ge/archives/112549)
  • On June 15, 2007, South Ossetian negotiator Boris Chochiev called for an immediate session of the Joint Control Commission (JCC) to address rising tensions in the region. In his letter to the other JCC participants—Georgia, Russia, and Russia’s North Ossetia—Chochiev expressed concerns over Georgia's construction of a new road and military fortifications near the conflict zone, which Tskhinvali believed could provide a military advantage in case of hostilities. Georgian Interior Minister Vano Merabishvili dismissed these concerns as "imaginary" and reassured that construction was continuing as planned. Merabishvili also met with the Commander of the Joint Peacekeeping Forces, Marat Kulakhmetov, but refused to meet South Ossetian Interior Minister Mikhail Mindzaev, further escalating the situation. (https://civil.ge/archives/112551)
• On June 19, 2007, at the GUAM summit in Baku, Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili declared that the "time is expiring" for South Ossetian secessionist leader Eduard Kokoity, announcing that Georgia would soon begin talks with Dimitri Sanakoev, head of the Georgian-backed provisional administration in South Ossetia, to define the region’s status within Georgia. Saakashvili emphasized that Georgia had the necessary resources to resolve the issue quickly and peacefully, offering autonomy to the Ossetian people but distancing from Tskhinvali's authorities due to their criminal past. The summit focused heavily on secessionist conflicts, with leaders of Azerbaijan and Moldova also highlighting the importance of territorial integrity and condemning separatism. Additionally, discussions on establishing a joint GUAM peacekeeping unit for the Georgian-Ossetian and Georgian-Abkhazian conflict zones were held, though no formal decision was made. (https://civil.ge/archives/112567)
• On June 22, 2007, President Mikheil Saakashvili of Georgia annulled an agreement signed between Russia and Georgia on December 23, 2000, which allowed for Russian investment in the economic rehabilitation of South Ossetia and cooperation on the return of refugees. The decree had actually been issued on April 20, 2007, but it was only revealed in June. The annulment reflects Georgia’s concerns over Russian activities in South Ossetia, particularly the construction of a gas pipeline linking South Ossetia to Russia's North Ossetia, which was undertaken without Georgia’s consent. (https://civil.ge/archives/112583)
• On June 22, 2007, authorities in breakaway South Ossetia condemned Tbilisi's annulment of an agreement with Russia on the economic rehabilitation of the conflict zone, calling it "yet another unfriendly move." The Agreement on Interaction in Rehabilitation and Return of Refugees, signed in December 2000, was annulled by a presidential decree on April 20, 2007, but the decision was only revealed in June. South Ossetia’s foreign ministry accused Tbilisi of failing to honor its commitments and expressed hope that Russia would continue funding rehabilitation programs in the region despite the annulment. The decision was seen as a response to Russian-backed projects in South Ossetia, including the construction of a gas pipeline linking South Ossetia to North Ossetia in Russia, which was done without Georgia's consent. (https://civil.ge/archives/112590)
• On June 28, 2007, two South Ossetian militiamen were severely injured when their post in Tskhinvali came under fire from the Georgian village of Tamarasheni in the early hours, with a sniper believed to be responsible. In a separate incident, a Georgian policeman was also injured on June 27, 2007. The same day, Russian peacekeeping troops prevented the Georgian side from resuming construction of a new road linking the Georgian villages of Nikozi and Avnevi. This road, at the center of renewed tension, is seen by the South Ossetian side as potentially giving the Georgians a military advantage if hostilities occur. Construction was halted on June 15 after South Ossetian forces deployed in the area, and Russian peacekeepers emphasized the need for a joint political decision before further construction could proceed to avoid escalating tensions. (https://civil.ge/archives/112610)
• On June 29, 2007, a South Ossetian militiaman was injured when Tskhinvali was hit by a mortar attack from the Georgian village of Kheiti in the early hours. The same night, the Ossetian village of Kokhati also came under fire from the Georgian village of Vanati. According to reports from Georgian media, the South Ossetian side had initially opened fire, escalating the tensions between the two sides. (https://civil.ge/archives/112614)
• On June 29, 2007, UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon made a surprise stopover in Tbilisi during his regional visit. He held meetings with President Saakashvili, Foreign Minister Gela Bezhuashvili, and Parliamentary Chairperson Nino Burjanadze. Although no public statements were made, discussions likely centered on the "frozen conflicts" and the UN’s potential role in resolving the Abkhaz conflict, as suggested by MP Nika Rurua. Ban Ki-moon had arrived in Tbilisi after a four-hour visit to Afghanistan. (https://civil.ge/archives/112609)
  • On June 29, 2007, Sokhumi (Abkhazia) agreed to resume quadripartite talks on security issues following a meeting in Bonn between the UN Secretary General’s Group of Friends (France, Germany, Russia, the UK, and the US) and representatives from Georgia and Abkhazia. The discussions, which had been suspended since November 2006, aim to address security, dialogue, and confidence-building measures in the Abkhaz conflict zone. The parties also agreed to cooperate on European Commission-funded rehabilitation programs and humanitarian initiatives. While differences remain, the talks marked progress in re-engaging dialogue. Sergey Shamba, Abkhazia's Foreign Minister, expressed satisfaction with the outcome, while Merab Antadze, Georgia’s State Minister for Conflict Resolution, reiterated Georgia's "three baskets" approach: security guarantees, refugee return, and economic rehabilitation. (https://civil.ge/archives/112618)
• On June 29, 2007, the Georgian Foreign Ministry condemned a meeting between South Ossetian secessionist leader Eduard Kokoity and Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, calling it a clear demonstration of Moscow's support for separatists in South Ossetia. The ministry stated that Russia's actions were counter-productive and undermined the peace process, urging Russia to foster a partnership with Georgia rather than support what it described as "criminal separatist regimes." This meeting came just two days after Russia reiterated its refusal to engage in talks with Georgia's provisional South Ossetian administration, led by Dimitri Sanakoev. (https://civil.ge/archives/112619
• On June 30, 2007, a shootout in the South Ossetian conflict zone left three people injured. The victims included 17-year-old Vakhtang Goglidze, who was wounded during shelling in the Georgian village of Tamarasheni. The shelling, which originated from the Ossetian villages of Kverneti and Tskhinvali, also injured Yuri Maisuradze and Asiat Biazrova, both residents of Tskhinvali. A house on Kutuzov Street in Tskhinvali was also destroyed by mortar fire. Dimitri Sanakoev, leader of the Tbilisi-loyal provisional South Ossetian administration, urged the Joint Peacekeeping Forces (JPKF) to take immediate action to ensure security in the region. (https://civil.ge/archives/112621)
• OSCE Chairman Miguel Angel Moratinos expressed deep concern on July 2, 2007, over escalating tensions in South Ossetia, highlighting recent sniper attacks that resulted in casualties among Georgian and Ossetian police, which he condemned as “totally unacceptable.” He urged both sides to fully utilize conflict resolution mechanisms and pursue dialogue. Tensions have been fueled by disputes over water access, with Georgian villagers protesting the secessionist capital Tskhinvali’s decision to block irrigation water supplies. This followed Tskhinvali’s claim of a continued potable water shortage, despite Georgia’s mid-June pipeline repairs. OSCE monitors face limited access, as Tskhinvali has barred them and Georgian officials from the crucial area around Java, where water issues persist. (https://civil.ge/archives/112617
• On July 6, 2007, the Georgian coast guard seized a Turkish vessel en route from Abkhazia, citing Georgian laws that deem marine activities in Abkhaz waters illegal. The vessel, flagged by Cambodia and carrying coal, was captured in Turkey's exclusive economic zone after a chase. Abkhaz authorities condemned the seizure as a “provocative” act. Georgian authorities recently auctioned off another seized vessel for GEL 163,000 (about USD 97,000) on July 5, following a similar incident in May. In total, 25 vessels have been detained in Abkhaz waters over the past two years, per the Georgian Border Police. (https://civil.ge/archives/112654
• On July 7, 2007, South Ossetia declined to attend a Joint Control Commission (JCC) meeting in Tbilisi, citing security concerns for its delegates, as announced by its Press and Information Committee. The JCC, which includes representatives from Georgia, South Ossetia, Russia, and North Ossetia, oversees the ceasefire in the conflict zone, though Georgia has criticized the JCC as “outdated” and “dominated by Russia,” advocating for European Union involvement to balance Russian influence. While the EU has approached the proposal cautiously, its representative Peter Semneby suggested that a new “political body” working alongside the JCC could enhance conflict resolution efforts beyond the JCC’s ceasefire mandate. (https://civil.ge/archives/112655)
  • On July 13, 2007, the Georgian government boycotted a Joint Control Commission (JCC) meeting in Tskhinvali, the capital of the breakaway South Ossetia region. The meeting was attended by negotiators from Russia, South Ossetia, and North Ossetia, but Georgia refused to participate. Earlier, Georgia had proposed hosting the JCC meeting in Tbilisi, but the South Ossetian side rejected this offer, citing "security concerns." Despite efforts by Russian negotiator Yuri Popov to persuade Georgia's State Minister for Conflict Resolution, Merab Antadze, to attend the meeting, Georgia remained firm in its decision. Popov expressed disappointment but emphasized the need for continued dialogue between the parties. (https://civil.ge/archives/112687
  • On July 14, 2007, authorities in Tskhinvali indicated their willingness to consider sending their chief negotiator to a Joint Control Commission (JCC) session in Tbilisi, but only if the meeting's agenda was agreed upon beforehand. This development followed a visit by Russian chief negotiator Yuri Popov to Tskhinvali on July 13, 2007, after the South Ossetian side had initially refused to travel to Tbilisi, citing "security concerns." An informal JCC session was held in Tskhinvali on July 13, with participants from Russia, South Ossetia, and North Ossetia, but the Georgian side boycotted the meeting. (https://civil.ge/archives/112691)
  • On July 16, 2007, Georgia proposed holding a plenary session of the Joint Control Commission (JCC) on South Ossetia at the OSCE office in Tbilisi on July 25-26, 2007. Tskhinvali has not yet responded to the proposal, but the chief negotiators from Russia, South Ossetia, and North Ossetia expressed positive reactions, stating they would attend, provided the meeting was "thoroughly prepared in advance." South Ossetian chief negotiator Boris Chochiev mentioned he would participate if the meeting was held at the Russian Embassy, as the South Ossetian side had previously refused to travel to Tbilisi due to security concerns. (https://civil.ge/archives/112697)
  • On August 9-10, 2007, Moscow is mediating talks for a session of the quadripartite Joint Control Commission (JCC) in Tbilisi, aiming to address tensions in South Ossetia. Russian chief negotiator Yuri Popov announced plans for shuttle diplomacy between Tbilisi and Tskhinvali from August 6 to August 8, as reported by RIA Novosti on July 31. Popov emphasized discussing measures to ease regional tensions. This meeting marks the first JCC session for Georgia’s new State Minister for Conflict Resolution Issues, Davit Bakradze, who expressed skepticism on August 1, citing unfulfilled agreements, including demilitarization. (https://civil.ge/archives/112781)
  • On August 3, 2007, South Ossetian leader Eduard Kokoity announced that Tskhinvali would not attend the Joint Control Commission (JCC) session scheduled for August 9-10 in Tbilisi, citing security concerns. Kokoity claimed to have “indisputable evidence” linking Georgia’s Interior Ministry to an alleged terrorist plot in Tskhinvali involving explosives. He suggested alternative venues for the JCC, including Moscow, Vladikavkaz, or Tskhinvali itself. Georgian State Minister for Conflict Resolution, Davit Bakradze, dismissed the allegations as unfounded, accusing Tskhinvali of using them as a pretext to avoid participating in the JCC talks. (https://civil.ge/archives/112797)
  • On August 6, 2007, Georgian State Minister for Conflict Resolution Issues Davit Bakradze criticized Tskhinvali’s refusal to attend the Joint Control Commission (JCC) talks scheduled for August 9-10 in Tbilisi, citing security concerns. The refusal highlighted, according to Bakradze, both Tskhinvali's lack of commitment to conflict resolution and Moscow's ineffectiveness as a mediator. Tskhinvali proposed holding the talks at the Russian embassy, while Georgia suggested the OSCE mission’s headquarters, leading to a deadlock. Bakradze emphasized the need for a new negotiating format, advocating for Georgia’s state commission on South Ossetia's status as a more effective mechanism. He also noted that Tbilisi has long sought to replace the Russian-dominated JCC format, which has failed to yield progress. Meanwhile, Russian negotiator Yuri Popov was set to hold separate talks with Bakradze in Tbilisi and South Ossetian negotiator Boris Chochiev in Tskhinvali. Chochiev expressed caution toward Bakradze, accusing him of promoting the Tbilisi-backed Sanakoev administration in South Ossetia. (https://civil.ge/archives/112802)
  • On August 8, 2007, Georgian State Minister Davit Bakradze stepped down as co-chairman of the Joint Control Commission (JCC) on South Ossetia, further signaling Tbilisi’s disenchantment with the JCC’s effectiveness. Bakradze was replaced by his deputy, Dimitri Manjavidze, in what Tskhinvali criticized as an effort to undermine the current negotiation framework. While Moscow and Tskhinvali continue to support the Russian-dominated JCC format, Georgia has long sought its replacement, arguing that it fails to deliver progress and perpetuates Russian influence in the process. (https://civil.ge/archives/112817)
  • On August 8, 2007, South Ossetian leader Eduard Kokoity expressed readiness to meet with Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili to sign a non-use of force treaty, aiming to guarantee peace between the Ossetian and Georgian peoples. Kokoity emphasized his respect for the Georgian people and a desire to ensure that hostilities would never resume. However, Georgia has resisted signing the treaty, citing concerns that Russia would be the sole guarantor of the agreement. President Saakashvili had previously stated in September 2006 that Georgia would only agree to such a treaty if the peacekeeping operation, currently led by Russia, were internationalized. Tbilisi has also refused a similar treaty with Abkhazia for the same reason. (https://civil.ge/archives/112821)
  • On August 8, 2007, South Ossetian authorities stated that they would attend a Joint Control Commission (JCC) session in Tbilisi in September if international security guarantees for their negotiators could be ensured. This marked a shift in their earlier refusal to participate in the August 9-10 JCC meeting, citing security concerns. The change came after Russian negotiator Yuri Popov held talks with South Ossetian officials, and the Russian side promised to facilitate discussions with international organizations and the Georgian side to develop acceptable security guarantees for South Ossetia. (https://civil.ge/archives/112826
  • On August 30, 2007, Georgian and Russian officials agreed to hold a plenary session of the Joint Control Commission (JCC) on South Ossetia in Tbilisi at the end of September. The agreement followed talks between Georgian officials, including Deputy Foreign Minister Giorgi Manjgaladze and State Minister for Conflict Resolution Davit Bakradze, and Russian representatives in Moscow. The Russian Foreign Ministry also warned Georgia against supporting the Tbilisi-backed South Ossetian provisional administration and undermining the Russian-dominated negotiation formats. This development came after Bakradze’s earlier move to replace himself with Dimitri Manjavidze as co-chair of the JCC, signaling Tbilisi's dissatisfaction with the body. Although an agreement was made, the actual plenary session in Tbilisi remains unlikely. (https://civil.ge/archives/112939)
• On July 8, 2007, Georgian officials accused Russian peacekeepers of blocking the only road connecting the Samegrelo region to the Zemo Svaneti region, which links Georgia to the upper Kodori Gorge in Abkhazia. The Georgian State Minister for Conflict Resolution’s office claimed that Russian forces had established an unauthorized checkpoint (Checkpoint 302) on the Samegrelo-Zemo Svaneti road, restricting movement of Georgian Interior Ministry personnel. Georgian authorities condemned this as “irresponsible and illegal,” asserting it hindered local administration and threatened the safety of residents, and demanded an immediate halt to these actions by the peacekeeping forces. (https://civil.ge/archives/112660)
• On July 9, 2007, Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov announced that the Moscow municipality would continue investing in Abkhazia, focusing on projects in energy and healthcare, following an agreement signed during Abkhaz leader Sergey Bagapsh’s visit to Moscow. Luzhkov emphasized the improvement in Abkhazia’s socio-economic situation and expressed support for the region, even suggesting that Abkhazia's participation would be essential for the 2014 Winter Olympics in nearby Sochi. In response, Tbilisi condemned these investments as illegal, with Georgian Foreign Minister Gela Bezhuashvili warning that assets purchased in Abkhazia would eventually be returned to their rightful owners. Georgian authorities are compiling a list of Russian organizations involved in such purchases, which include villas and a wine factory. (https://civil.ge/archives/112661
• On July 10, 2007, two Russian peacekeepers were briefly detained by Georgian police in Zugdidi after setting up an unauthorized checkpoint on a major road. The peacekeepers, part of the Russian contingent in the Abkhaz conflict zone, were reportedly stopping motorists and demanding documents. Georgian Interior Ministry sources claimed the soldiers were intoxicated. After their detention, the peacekeepers were released and handed over to their headquarters. (https://civil.ge/archives/112665)
• On July 11, 2007, Tbilisi accused Russian state agencies, officials, and private individuals of purchasing assets in the breakaway region of Abkhazia, including 31 properties such as holiday villas, sanatoria, and hotels. The Georgian Ministry for Refugees and Accommodation named several buyers, including the Russian Defense Ministry, oligarch Oleg Deripaska, and Krasnodar Governor Alexander Tkachev. Georgian Foreign Minister Gela Bezhuashvili condemned these transactions as illegal, warning that illegally purchased properties would eventually be returned to their rightful owners. The Georgian National Bank also planned to request the freezing of accounts linked to Russian buyers of Abkhaz assets. (https://civil.ge/archives/112672
  • On July 11, 2007, Tbilisi condemned Moscow’s decision to sign an agreement on economic cooperation with Abkhazia, calling it “an unfriendly” act. The Georgian government argued that the agreement violated a 1996 CIS decision prohibiting trade and economic relations with Abkhazia without Tbilisi’s approval. The agreement, signed by Abkhaz leader Sergey Bagapsh and Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov on July 9, includes investment projects in the energy and healthcare sectors. (https://civil.ge/archives/112675)
  • On July 31, 2007, Georgia issued a warning to foreigners against purchasing assets in its breakaway regions, emphasizing that any such transaction could lead to civil and potentially criminal liability. Giorgi Manjgaladze, the Georgian deputy foreign minister, stated that illegally acquired property would be returned to its legitimate owner once Georgia restores full jurisdiction over these territories. This warning follows a meeting with foreign diplomats on July 30, and is primarily aimed at Russia, which has been involved in purchasing assets in Abkhazia, including holiday villas, according to a document from the Georgian Ministry for Refugees and Accommodation. (https://civil.ge/archives/112774)
  • On July 31, 2007, Abkhaz officials dismissed Georgia's warnings against foreign investment in Abkhazia, asserting that Tbilisi lacks influence over the region's economy. Stanislav Lakoba, secretary of Abkhazia’s National Security Council, criticized Georgia's efforts as futile attempts to hinder Abkhazia’s economic progress. His remarks followed a statement by Georgia's deputy foreign minister, Giorgi Manjgaladze, cautioning foreigners, particularly Russians, against investing in Abkhazia. Kristian Bzhania, spokesperson for the Abkhaz leader, labeled Tbilisi’s warnings as mere propaganda disconnected from the reality on the ground. Georgian officials noted that Russian entities have acquired properties in Abkhazia, including holiday villas, as documented by the Ministry for Refugees and Accommodation. (https://civil.ge/archives/112782)
• On July 12, 2007, Georgian police detained two Russian reporters, Andrei Chistiakov and Igor Sturit, in the South Ossetian conflict zone. The journalists, working for Russia’s RTR television, were arrested near the Georgian village of Kurta while reporting on Russian peacekeepers. They had media accreditation from the Joint Peacekeeping Forces (JPKF), but Georgian police reportedly detained them without explanation. Tbilisi-based Rustavi 2 TV suggested the reporters were arrested for "unauthorized video recording." This incident highlights ongoing tensions and the difficulties faced by individuals crossing into Georgia via the Roki Tunnel, often considered an illegal route without Georgian border oversight. (https://civil.ge/archives/112679)
  • On July 12, 2007, Georgian police released two Russian reporters, Andrei Chistiakov and Igor Sturit, after detaining them in the South Ossetian conflict zone. The journalists, from Russia’s RTR television, were arrested for illegally crossing the Georgian border, as they lacked Georgian visas. The Georgian Interior Ministry stated that the reporters were handed over to the Russian embassy in Tbilisi as a "gesture of goodwill." This incident highlights the frequent issues with individuals entering Georgia via the Roki Tunnel, where no Georgian border controls are in place. (https://civil.ge/archives/112681)
• On August 1, 2007, South Ossetian security officers reportedly foiled a terrorist act in Tskhinvali, recovering two explosive devices near the headquarters of the Joint Peacekeeping Forces. According to the South Ossetian Press and Information Committee, two directional fragmentation mines (MONs) were discovered 200 meters from the peacekeeping base. Officials suggested that the explosives were intended to target an unnamed state official. (https://civil.ge/archives/112785
  • On August 3, 2007, South Ossetian authorities claimed that a terrorist plot targeting civilians and officials in Tskhinvali was uncovered with the help of a South Ossetian agent embedded in the Georgian secret service. Boris Attoev, head of South Ossetia’s KGB, alleged the plot was “authorized by Tbilisi” and disclosed by undercover officer Inal Kolyev, who claimed he planted the explosives under Georgian operatives’ orders. Georgian officials dismissed these allegations as propaganda, with Davit Bakradze, State Minister for Conflict Resolution, asserting that no explosives were confirmed by joint peacekeeper and OSCE reports. Bakradze accused Tskhinvali of using the claims to undermine upcoming JCC talks in Tbilisi on August 9-10, labeling them an attempt to escalate regional tensions. (https://civil.ge/archives/112795)
• From August 20-24, 2007, Abkhazia will conduct large-scale military maneuvers involving 6,000 reserve troops and aircraft, according to Zakan Nanba, the breakaway region's deputy defense minister. Announced on August 2 via the Abkhaz leader’s website, the exercises will take place in Ochamchire and the Tsebelda training ground, focusing on defensive operations in mountainous terrain. While the Tsebelda site is near the Upper Kodori Gorge, Nanba emphasized that the maneuvers are unrelated to the situation in the Tbilisi-controlled area. (https://civil.ge/archives/112790
  • On August 20, 2007, Abkhazia launched large-scale military maneuvers involving 6,000 servicemen, including four brigades, two regiments of reserve troops, and 12 military units. The exercises, which are taking place in Ochamchire and the Tsebelda training ground (near the Tbilisi-controlled Upper Kodori Gorge), were organized by the breakaway region's Deputy Defense Minister Zakan Nanba. Despite the proximity to the Upper Kodori Gorge, Nanba emphasized that the maneuvers were unrelated to the situation in the area controlled by Georgia. (https://civil.ge/archives/112879)
  • On August 22, 2007, Abkhazia accused Georgia of flying an unmanned reconnaissance plane into the Abkhaz-controlled lower Kodori Gorge, allegedly originating from the Tbilisi-controlled Upper Kodori Gorge. Stanislav Lakoba, Secretary of the Abkhaz National Security Council, also reported that unidentified Georgian aircraft had violated Abkhaz airspace over the Gali district. The Abkhaz Foreign Ministry condemned these actions, calling them provocations aimed at escalating tensions in the conflict zone. These allegations followed a claim by Georgia that Russian aircraft had flown over Upper Kodori Gorge on August 21. (https://civil.ge/archives/112897)

June 2007 Putin-Saakashvili summit

• On June 9, 2007, Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili traveled to St. Petersburg to attend an informal summit of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), which began on June 10. During his visit, he was scheduled to meet with Russian President Vladimir Putin. The Georgian Foreign Minister, Gela Bezhuashvili, commented that while the meeting itself was a positive step, he did not expect any significant outcomes from the talks. In addition to his meeting with Putin, Saakashvili also planned to meet with Turkmen President Gurbanguly Berdymukhammedov on the sidelines of the summit. (https://civil.ge/archives/112514)
• On June 9, 2007, ahead of a private meeting in St. Petersburg, Presidents Vladimir Putin and Mikheil Saakashvili exchanged remarks aimed at establishing a psychological advantage before their discussions. (https://civil.ge/archives/112516)
  • Putin began by addressing what he called Georgia's "electricity problems," referring to a brief power outage in Georgia caused by a damaged high-voltage line on June 8. This disruption was notable as uninterrupted electricity supply was one of the key achievements touted by Saakashvili’s administration. Putin expressed hope that Georgia’s electricity technicians would resolve the issue soon.
  • Saakashvili, in turn, steered the conversation toward "friendly relations based on mutual respect" and respect for each other's territorial integrity, hinting at his country's concerns about Russian support for separatist regions like Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
  • Putin, responding to a comment from Saakashvili about Russia’s stance on Kosovo at the G8 summit, emphasized Russia’s belief in the principle of territorial integrity and argued that Western support for Kosovo’s independence was dangerous, as it could set a precedent for other breakaway regions, particularly in the post-Soviet space, like Abkhazia and South Ossetia. He indicated that this issue would be discussed further during their meeting and at the upcoming informal CIS summit.
• After meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin on June 9, 2007, Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili expressed optimism, claiming that Russia had pledged to gradually lift its trade embargo against Georgia and would respect Georgia's territorial integrity. Saakashvili informed Georgian emigrants in St. Petersburg that Russia had committed to removing the imposed restrictions in stages, though he acknowledged that this would be a gradual and challenging process. (https://civil.ge/archives/112519)
  • Georgian Ambassador to Russia, Irakli Chubinishvili, and Foreign Minister Gela Bezhuashvili both confirmed that the meeting was constructive. Chubinishvili noted that Putin had recognized that there was no longer a political reason to maintain the economic sanctions against Georgia. However, Russian officials remained more cautious, suggesting that the lifting of sanctions depended on the "atmosphere" of bilateral relations and Tbilisi's willingness to take further steps.
  • The two leaders also discussed Georgia's strategic alignment with the West. Bezhuashvili reiterated that Georgia was committed to Euro-Atlantic integration, a path that could not be questioned. This aligns with Georgia's ambitions to strengthen ties with both NATO and the EU.
  • The issue of South Ossetia was also discussed, with differing interpretations from each side. Putin reaffirmed that Russia adhered to the principle of territorial integrity, though he also suggested a role for Russia in resolving the conflict in South Ossetia, a view that Saakashvili did not fully endorse.
  • The talks were preceded by a press exchange, where Putin mentioned Georgia’s recent electricity blackouts—a rare occurrence since Saakashvili took office—and hoped the issue would be resolved soon. Saakashvili, in response, emphasized the importance of friendly relations between the two countries, based on mutual respect.
  • Despite the relative cordiality, the psychological battle was evident, as both leaders attempted to gain the upper hand in framing the narrative of their talks. Putin highlighted the importance of Russia’s position on issues like Kosovo and its potential implications for regions like South Ossetia and Abkhazia, asserting that Western support for Kosovo’s independence could set a dangerous precedent.
• On June 14-15, 2007, Tbilisi hosted a meeting of the Chambers of Commerce from the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). The event attracted high-profile participants, including Evgeni Primakov, the Chairman of the Russian Chamber of Commerce and Industry, who arrived in Tbilisi on June 13. (https://civil.ge/archives/112542)
  • During the meeting, Primakov planned to discuss trade relations between Russia and Georgia, especially since Russia had imposed a trade embargo on Georgia the previous year. Primakov also intended to raise the issue of Russia's accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO). As a current WTO member, Georgia has the power to veto Russia's membership. In exchange for Georgia's approval, Russia is expected to legalize trade at border crossing points in the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, areas that Georgia considers part of its territory.
• On June 25, 2007, the Russian daily Kommersant reported that Georgia was seeking to convince Russia to stop supporting South Ossetian secessionist leader Eduard Kokoity. This would be discussed during a meeting between the foreign ministers of Georgia and Russia on the sidelines of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) summit in Istanbul. (https://civil.ge/archives/112591)
  • In exchange for Russia's withdrawal of support for Kokoity, Georgia was reportedly willing to back Russia's accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) and accept Russia as an "official guarantor" of South Ossetia's autonomous status. The report also claimed that Georgia might even agree to Russia's military presence within Georgian territory.
  • Both foreign ministers, however, dismissed these claims. Sergey Lavrov, the Russian Foreign Minister, stated that the allegations were not to be taken seriously, while Gela Bezhuashvili, the Georgian Foreign Minister, also emphasized that Georgia's policies were not influenced by media reports.
• Georgian Airways will begin Tbilisi-Moscow charter flights on July 3, 2007, following a verbal approval from the Russian civil aviation service. Official confirmation of the flights was expected by July 2. (https://civil.ge/archives/112620)
  • The airline will operate three charter flights per week, with tickets priced between USD 250-300, and these flights are planned to continue until early September. The decision to resume these flights came after requests from the Georgian Orthodox Church and the diplomatic missions of both countries.
  • However, regular flights between Georgia and Russia remain suspended. This suspension followed the October 2006 diplomatic crisis in which Russia severed air, sea, land, and railway links, alongside postal communication, after the arrest and expulsion of alleged Russian spies from Georgia. Despite the ongoing blockade, charter flights had still been arranged for certain holidays, including Christmas and Easter.
• On July 3, 2007, Georgian Airways failed to launch the planned Tbilisi-Moscow charter flights due to a lack of official confirmation from the Russian civil aviation service, despite previously receiving a verbal go-ahead on June 30. Georgian Airways’ representative, Aka Sanikidze, expressed disappointment on July 2, noting that Russia’s refusal to confirm the flights highlighted an unconstructive approach. This setback follows Russia's October 2006 decision to cut all air, sea, and land links with Georgia in response to alleged Russian spies being arrested and expelled. Despite the strained relations, charter flights between Tbilisi and Moscow had previously resumed briefly during the Christmas and Easter holidays. (https://civil.ge/archives/112623
  • On August 2, 2007, Tbilisi-Moscow charter flights will not resume before regular flights between the two countries, according to a spokesperson for the Russian embassy in Tbilisi. The failure to reach an agreement was due to Moscow’s demand that only Russian air carriers operate the charter flights. Additionally, Russia insisted that a $3 million debt owed by Georgian airlines for air traffic services must be cleared before Georgian carriers can operate on the route. However, Georgia denied the existence of any outstanding debt. (https://civil.ge/archives/112768)
• On July 4, 2007, President Saakashvili expressed “cautious optimism” about Russia potentially lifting some economic sanctions on Georgia, despite ongoing restrictions since October 2006 due to alleged espionage issues. In a Reuters interview, he mentioned that Georgia was in discussions with Russian officials to reintroduce Georgian products, like wine and mineral water, into the Russian market. Saakashvili highlighted that, despite these sanctions, Georgia experienced nearly 10% economic growth, viewing the sanctions as a “blessing in disguise” that had encouraged Georgian producers to diversify and modernize the economy. (https://civil.ge/archives/185523)
• On July 19, 2007, Russia announced it would ease visa restrictions for Georgian citizens, allowing visas for educational, business, working, and transit purposes, according to the Russian embassy in Georgia. The embassy highlighted this as a move toward stabilizing Russian-Georgian relations and expressed hope for reciprocal and constructive steps from Georgia. This easing follows Russia's October 2006 suspension of visas, along with other transport and communication links, after a diplomatic dispute. In May 2007, Russia had already partially reinstated visas for Georgians with Russian relatives. (https://civil.ge/archives/112719)
• A potential meeting between Russian President Vladimir Putin and Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili may occur in August 2007, according to Russian Ambassador to Georgia Vyacheslav Kovalenko, who mentioned ongoing discussions but offered no further specifics. Georgian State Minister for Conflict Resolution Davit Bakradze confirmed that consultations are underway to organize this meeting, although the exact timing remains undecided as of July 27. This meeting, if held, could be a significant step toward addressing tensions between the two nations. (https://civil.ge/archives/112762)
• The South Ossetia conflict could be resolved within months if Russia adopts a positive or even neutral stance, Georgian Parliamentary Chairperson Nino Burjanadze stated in an interview with Vremya Novostei on July 31, 2007. She expressed optimism due to Georgia's active efforts toward a political settlement that could satisfy all parties involved. While hopeful about South Ossetia, Burjanadze was more cautious regarding Abkhazia, suggesting a longer timeline for resolution. She also cautioned Russia against involving Abkhazia in preparations for the 2014 Winter Olympics in Sochi, warning against unilateral actions. (https://civil.ge/archives/112779)
  • On August 2, 2007, the Russian Foreign Ministry reiterated its firm stance on South Ossetia, rejecting media reports suggesting that Moscow was willing to abandon the secessionist authorities in exchange for control over the Enguri hydro power plant on the Abkhaz border. The Ministry dismissed such allegations as an attempt to create division between Russia, South Ossetia, and Abkhazia. Moscow emphasized that while it continued negotiations with Tbilisi on various issues, including conflicts, it had never considered compromising on "principled issues." The Georgian Foreign Ministry also dismissed these reports, calling them a "product of fantasy" and condemning such speculation. (https://civil.ge/archives/112792)
• On August 21, 2007, Gela Bezhuashvili, Georgia's Foreign Minister, confirmed that Tbilisi still sought to arrange a bilateral meeting between the Georgian and Russian presidents. Despite the August 6 missile incident, which had escalated tensions, Bezhuashvili stated that the issue of the meeting remained "on the agenda." Both Georgian and Russian officials had discussed the possibility of such a meeting earlier in July, although no exact date had been set. Bezhuashvili emphasized that Georgia was open to high-level talks to clarify the developments in their bilateral relations. (https://civil.ge/archives/112888)
• On September 6, 2007, Georgia strongly rejected Russia's claim that two militant suspects, killed in a clash in Karachay-Cherkessia, had infiltrated from Georgia. The Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) had alleged that the militants crossed into Russia from a "neighboring country" and were killed in a confrontation in the north Caucasus region. However, Georgia's Border Police dismissed the accusation as a provocation, stating that the incident took place 10 kilometers inside Russian territory, near the suspects' home village. Georgia argued that the Russian security services were attempting to blame Georgia for the unrest in the North Caucasus and the situation in the border areas, particularly with Abkhazia and the upper Kodori Gorge regions. (https://civil.ge/archives/112986)
• On October 5, 2007, President Mikheil Saakashvili announced that Georgia would not sign a concept paper outlining the development plans of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), stating that the organization had not produced any "positive norms" for Georgia. He criticized Russia for imposing a total trade and economic embargo on Georgia, hindering free movement of people, products, and services. Although Georgia maintained good relations with most CIS members, the unresolved issues with Russia led Saakashvili to express his frustration. He emphasized Georgia's readiness to engage in constructive dialogue with Russia but rejected the effectiveness of the CIS mechanisms. SaakashviliOn sought but failed to hold a bilateral meeting with Putin. (https://civil.ge/archives/113192)
• On October 16, 2007, Wimm-Bill-Dann Foods OJSC, a major Russian food producer, announced its acquisition of Georgian Foods Ltd, the third-largest dairy producer in Georgia. While the financial details were not disclosed, this acquisition marked Wimm-Bill-Dann's first production facility in the Caucasus. The company stated that the factory would not only serve the local Georgian market but also supply nearby countries, including Armenia and Azerbaijan. (https://civil.ge/archives/113258)

Tsitelubani incident

ZOURABICHVILI

• Happened on August 7, 2007 (266)
• The event featured Russian military jets flying above Georgian airspace and dropping a bomb in Georgian territory that did not explode (266)
• Camera crews record the crater left behind (266)
• Saakashvili travels to the site and accuses Russia of an act of war (266)
• Zourabichvili's questions (266-267)
  • Why was the President allowed to stand so close to the bomb site when the bomb had not been exploded yet
  • Why did the NSC not meet immediately
  • Why was the bomb control-exploded before the arrival of foreign experts
  • Why were the air radars shut off just during the Russian plane overflights?
• The government accused those who questioned the official version as "traitors"
• Investigations done by the Group of Friends, the OSCE confirmed that there indeed was a Russian overflight, but the origin of the bomb could not be determined (267)
• As a result of the incident, the Russians trivialized violations of Georgian national sovereignty (267)

• "Gas delivery manipulation, the regular violation of Georgian airspace, bombing adjacent to the breakaway regions, numerous provocative actions of Russian peacekeepers" became daily routine as a way to increase pressure on Georgia (Kavadze 73)

• On August 6, 2007, at approximately 1930, two Russian frontline SU-24 type aircraft violated Georgian airspace and fired a 1 ton precision guided antiradar missile X-58 that fell near Tsitelubani (17)
  • According to Georgian civil and military radar reports and miltiple eye witness accounts, the planes entered Georgian airspace at 1931 flying at low altitutde in a southerly direction over the SO before launching the missile at Tsitelubani. Georgian radars indicate that the planes took off from the Russian mase in Mozdok. It must be admitted that Georgian armed forces possess neither Su-24 planes nor X-58 missiles. (17)
  • No casualties took place as the missile failed to explode on impact (17)
  • The Georgian Government in cooperation with the OSCE and other members of the international community are still ivnestigating the incident as of the publication of the IIFFMCG rpeort (17)

• On August 7, 2007, Georgia's Interior Ministry accused Russia of violating Georgian airspace, stating that two Russian attack aircraft entered Georgian territory, with one firing an air-to-surface guided missile near Shavshvebi and Tsiteliubani in the Shida Kartli region, close to South Ossetia. The missile did not detonate, and no casualties were reported. Georgia's Interior Minister, Vano Merabishvili, confirmed the incident using air traffic records, which showed the jets came from Russia's Mozdok airbase. The missile was fired by a SU-24 attack aircraft, according to Georgian officials. Russia denied the allegations, stating no jets had violated Georgia's airspace. Following the incident, Georgia summoned the Russian ambassador and planned further diplomatic meetings. This incident follows a similar occurrence earlier in March, when Georgia accused Russian helicopters of firing on its territory, a claim Russia also denied. (https://civil.ge/archives/112807
• On August 6, 2007, South Ossetian secessionist leader Eduard Kokoity claimed that Georgian aircraft dropped two bombs in the conflict zone, one in South Ossetia and the other in Georgia's Gori district, to falsely implicate Russia. However, Russian officials stopped short of directly blaming Tbilisi. Marat Kulakhmetov, commander of the Joint Peacekeeping Forces in South Ossetia, confirmed peacekeepers had witnessed an aircraft firing a rocket, aligning with Kokoity's claim of bombings. Russian negotiator Yuri Popov suggested the aircraft was an SU-25, not an SU-24 as initially reported by Georgia. Russian Ambassador Vyacheslav Kovalenko denied Russia's involvement, pointing out that SU-type aircraft were also used by the Georgian air force. (https://civil.ge/archives/112806)
• On August 6, 2007, Georgia accused Russia of conducting an airstrike after two Russian attack aircraft allegedly violated Georgian airspace, with one firing an air-to-surface rocket in the Shida Kartli region, near South Ossetia. The rocket, which did not explode, landed around 80 km from the Russian border and about 65 km from Tbilisi. Georgian officials provided air traffic records and evidence to claim that the jets came from Russian territory and returned the same way. In response, Russia strongly denied the allegations, with the Russian ambassador in Tbilisi and other officials stating that Russian aircraft were not involved. South Ossetian leader Eduard Kokoity countered by alleging that Georgian planes dropped bombs in the area to incite blame on Russia. This incident contributed to heightened tensions between Georgia and Russia, adding to the ongoing conflict and distrust surrounding the region. (https://civil.ge/archives/112808)
• On August 6, 2007, Marat Kulakhmetov, the commander of the Joint Peacekeeping Forces in South Ossetia, gave a different account of an airstrike incident. While Georgia accused two Russian SU-24 attack aircraft of violating Georgian airspace and firing a guided rocket into Georgian territory, Kulakhmetov suggested that the aircraft actually came from Georgia. According to Kulakhmetov, the plane entered the conflict zone from the east, was fired upon by the South Ossetian militia near the village of Gromi, and then retaliated by firing a rocket before retreating back toward Georgian-controlled areas. He added that it was unclear what type of rocket was fired. This version of events contrasted sharply with Georgia's claims, escalating the tensions between Russia, Georgia, and the South Ossetian separatists. (https://civil.ge/archives/112810
• On August 7, 2007, Georgia briefed foreign diplomats on the alleged Russian airstrike that occurred the previous day, August 6, providing evidence such as photo documentation and air traffic records to support its claim that Russian aircraft were involved in the attack. The Georgian Foreign Ministry summoned the diplomats and after the meeting, the deputy foreign minister, Nikoloz Vashakidze, accompanied them to the site of the attack near Shavshvebi and Tsitelubani in the Shida Kartli region, close to South Ossetia. Vashakidze emphasized the significance of the international community's response, calling it a "test case" to prevent future incidents of aggression. Meanwhile, Russia continued to deny involvement in the airstrike. (https://civil.ge/archives/112811)
• On August 7, 2007, President Saakashvili of Georgia called for national unity and calm in response to the airstrike that occurred the day before. The attack, which involved an air-to-surface missile, hit Shida Kartli, a region near South Ossetia, but fortunately caused no casualties as the missile failed to explode. Saakashvili, who visited the site with foreign diplomats, emphasized the need for a strong international response, framing the incident as a broader threat to European security. Although Saakashvili did not directly accuse Russia, he linked the attack to broader regional tensions, citing past incidents like the March 11 assault on upper Kodori Gorge and the cyber attacks on Estonia. Georgia provided evidence, including air traffic records and photo documentation, suggesting Russian aircraft involvement. However, Russia denied the allegations, with officials stating that Georgian aircraft might have been responsible. South Ossetian leader Eduard Kokoity claimed that Georgia had staged the incident to incriminate Russia. Saakashvili, in a defiant statement, asserted that such attacks would not deter Georgia from its path of development and unity. (https://civil.ge/archives/112812)
• On August 7, 2007, Russia accused Georgia of orchestrating the August 6 airstrike near the South Ossetian conflict zone, suggesting that Tbilisi staged the attack to disrupt ongoing peace talks in the framework of the Joint Control Commission (JCC). According to Russia's Foreign Ministry, the aircraft involved was not an SU-24, as claimed by Georgia, but an SU-25, a type used by the Georgian airforce. The Russian Ministry suggested that such provocations occurred regularly to undermine peacekeeping and negotiating mechanisms that included Russia. (https://civil.ge/archives/112804
  • The attack, which Georgia attributes to Russian aircraft, involved the firing of an air-to-surface missile into Georgian territory. Moscow further speculated that Georgia was trying to sabotage the upcoming JCC meeting scheduled for August 9-10 in Tbilisi, which was cancelled after South Ossetia refused to attend due to security concerns. Tskhinvali, the capital of South Ossetia, wanted the meeting held at the Russian embassy, while Georgia proposed the OSCE mission's headquarters in Tbilisi. This diplomatic impasse gave Georgia the upper hand in the dispute over the negotiating format. Russia called for an immediate investigation into the incident, claiming it would expose the true perpetrators behind the attack.
• On August 7, 2007, opposition politicians in Georgia sharply criticized the government for its perceived failure to defend the country from the airstrike that occurred the previous day near South Ossetia. The attack, which Georgia attributes to Russian SU-24 aircraft, involved the firing of an air-to-surface missile into Georgian territory. Opposition lawmakers questioned the effectiveness of Georgia's defense budget, which amounted to GEL 955.3 million (USD 568.6 million) for 2007, arguing that the country should have been able to prevent foreign aircraft from violating its airspace. (https://civil.ge/archives/112814)
  • Mamuka Katsitadze, a lawmaker from the New Rights Party, expressed frustration over the failure to intercept the aircraft, highlighting that Georgia had recently invested in an Osa anti-aircraft system from Ukraine. Zviad Dzidziguri from the Conservative Party criticized the government for not downing the aircraft, suggesting that doing so would have exposed the true origin of the attack.
  • Former Foreign Minister and Georgia's Way Party leader, Salome Zourabichvili, questioned the role of Interior Minister Vano Merabishvili in addressing the incident instead of Defense Minister Davit Kezerashvili. Zourabichvili pointed out the lack of clarity about whether Georgian fighter jets had been scrambled to intercept the aircraft, suggesting that the defense sector’s funding could be seen as ineffective.
  • In a more provocative statement, Shalva Natelashvili, leader of the Labor Party, controversially speculated that Georgia's own air force might have been involved in the attack, suggesting that both Russia and President Saakashvili were "oppressors of the Georgian people" and potentially complicit in the incident.
• On August 8, 2007, the OSCE Chairman-in-Office, Miguel Angel Moratinos, expressed serious concern over the August 6 missile incident in the Shida Kartli region, near the South Ossetian conflict zone. Moratinos acknowledged that while no injuries were reported, the event raised significant concerns. He emphasized the importance of obtaining accurate and urgent information about the incident's circumstances. (https://civil.ge/archives/112815)
  • Moratinos urged all parties involved to handle the situation with restraint, underscoring the need for careful consideration due to the seriousness of the event. The OSCE was actively seeking further details and hoped to receive a thorough report on the facts surrounding the missile strike.
  • On August 8, 2007, Miguel Angel Moratinos, the OSCE Chairman-in-Office and Spanish Foreign Minister, called for a thorough investigation into the August 6 missile incident in Georgia. He emphasized that the investigation should involve all parties implicated in the event and expressed the OSCE’s readiness to cooperate within its mandate. Moratinos also urged restraint from all parties to avoid escalating tensions and stressed the importance of a cooperative approach in resolving the situation. (https://civil.ge/archives/112827
    • Moratinos held discussions with both Georgia's Foreign Minister Gela Bezhuashvili and Russia's First Deputy Foreign Minister Andrei Denisov about the incident. Meanwhile, Georgia announced its intention to form an international group of experts to investigate the missile strike. Bezhuashvili invited international partners to send military, aviation, or other relevant experts to assist in examining the evidence gathered by Georgia, signaling an openness to a collaborative inquiry into the matter.
• On August 8, 2007, the Georgian Foreign Ministry announced that a preliminary investigation into the August 6 airstrike near Shavshvebi and Tsiteliubani in the Shida Kartli region had determined that a Russian-made Raduga Kh-58 anti-radar missile was used in the attack. According to Georgian officials, the missile was launched from a Russian SU-24 attack aircraft, which Georgia does not possess. Georgia's military uses SU-25 aircraft instead. (https://civil.ge/archives/185526
  • The missile, known by its NATO classification as the AS11 Kilter, is equipped with a 140-kg TNT/RDX warhead and has a length of 4.80 meters, a diameter of 0.38 meters, and a launch weight of 640 kg. While the missile did not explode upon impact, it was fired in an area close to the breakaway region of South Ossetia, about 80 kilometers from the Russian border and 65 kilometers from Tbilisi.
  • The Georgian Foreign Ministry condemned the attack as an "undisguised aggression" and a "gross violation" of Georgia's sovereignty.
• On August 8, 2007, Georgian Foreign Minister Gela Bezhuashvili held a series of telephone discussions with his counterparts from six EU member states to brief them on the August 6 missile strike near the South Ossetian conflict zone. The strike involved an air-launched missile hitting open ground southeast of South Ossetia. (https://civil.ge/archives/112816)
  • Bezhuashvili spoke with the foreign ministers of Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Sweden, Bulgaria, and Spain, the latter of whom also held the rotating chairmanship of the OSCE. Additionally, he communicated with Manuel Lobo Antunes, Portugal's first deputy foreign minister, as Portugal held the EU Presidency at the time.
  • The Georgian foreign minister urged his European counterparts to provide an appropriate response to the "outrageous use of force" against Georgia's sovereignty.
• On August 7, 2007, U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Mathew Bryza condemned the attack on Georgian sovereign territory, stating that the U.S. rejects any such actions. Bryza emphasized that while it was too early to determine the perpetrators of the August 6 missile strike near South Ossetia, there was no evidence to suggest that Georgia had targeted itself in the attack, refuting Russian claims to the contrary. (https://civil.ge/archives/112819)
  • Bryza criticized the rhetoric suggesting that Georgia staged the attack, calling it unhelpful and inflammatory. He further praised Georgia’s response to the incident, describing it as "laudable" and "measured", urging all parties involved to maintain calm and restraint in the situation.
  • On August 8, 2007, the U.S. Department of State condemned the August 6 rocket attack on Georgia, calling for urgent clarification of the facts surrounding the incident. In a statement, the U.S. praised Georgia's restraint in the face of the airstrike and urged all parties involved to cooperate with the investigations led by both the Georgian government and the OSCE. (https://civil.ge/archives/185527)
    • During a press briefing, Sean McCormack, the State Department spokesman, stated that while the U.S. was still gathering details, any violation of sovereign territory was unequivocally condemned. The U.S. also called for increased OSCE monitoring in South Ossetia and for international monitoring of the Roki Tunnel, which links South Ossetia with North Ossetia in Russia. Georgia has long argued that the tunnel is a hub for arms trafficking and smuggling.
    • Furthermore, the U.S. reaffirmed its support for Georgia's efforts to determine South Ossetia’s status within Georgia's internationally recognized borders, though both Russia and the South Ossetian authorities have declined to participate in discussions about the region's future.
• On August 7, 2007, Davit Bakradze, Georgia’s State Minister for Conflict Resolution, stated that the August 6 airstrike had undermined Russia’s role as a mediator in the South Ossetian conflict. He expressed that, following the missile attack, it was difficult to imagine continuing talks with Russia as a mediator, given the act of aggression it had carried out against Georgia. Bakradze’s comments highlighted the growing tension between Georgia and Russia, particularly regarding Russia's involvement in peace efforts. (https://civil.ge/archives/112820)
• The Georgian press on August 8, 2007, raised questions about the motives behind the August 6 airstrike on Georgian territory. The daily 24 Saati suggested that the attack could be linked to large-scale Russian military maneuvers in Russia's North Ossetian Republic. It questioned whether the strike was part of those exercises or if there were other reasons behind it. The paper also noted that the international community had not responded decisively to a previous air attack on the Kodori Gorge in March, partly due to inconclusive investigations. (https://civil.ge/archives/112818
  • Another Georgian newspaper, Rezonansi, speculated that the airstrike could have been intended to sabotage a potential meeting between Russian President Vladimir Putin and Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili, as discussions had been underway for such a summit in August.
  • Additionally, there was speculation that Georgia's air defense radar station near Shavshvebi might have been the target, although Marat Kulakhmetov, the Russian commander of the Joint Peacekeeping Forces in South Ossetia, dismissed this theory, stating that if the radar had been the target, the missile would have hit it directly. He also suggested that the missile had not exploded intentionally.
• On August 8, 2007, new reports suggested that the missile involved in the August 6 airstrike on Georgia might have been jettisoned rather than fired by the attacking aircraft. According to sources close to the investigation, including a Georgian Interior Ministry official, the Russian SU-24 aircraft came under fire from South Ossetian militias using a Strela shoulder-launched anti-aircraft missile. To evade the missile, the pilot reportedly jettisoned the missile it was carrying, explaining why the missile did not explode upon landing in the Shida Kartli region, near Shavshvebi and Tsiteliubani. (https://civil.ge/archives/112822)
  • This aligns with a statement from Marat Kulakhmetov, the Russian commander of the Joint Peacekeeping Forces in the region, who confirmed that the aircraft had been fired upon by South Ossetian militiamen, although he did not specify the weapon used.
  • The Georgian authorities had originally stated that the missile was a Raduga Kh-58 anti-radar missile, which was equipped with a 140-kg TNT/RDX warhead. Georgia condemned the attack as a gross violation of its sovereignty, labeling it as "undisguised aggression".
• On August 8, 2007, Georgia's Foreign Minister Gela Bezhuashvili announced that Tbilisi was seeking an emergency session of the UN Security Council to discuss the August 6 airstrike on Georgian territory. Georgia accused Russia of violating its airspace with a Russian SU-24 aircraft that dropped a guided missile near the breakaway South Ossetia region. The Georgian Foreign Ministry maintained that this attack was a "gross violation" of Georgia's sovereignty. (https://civil.ge/archives/112824
  • Bezhuashvili emphasized that Georgia’s claims were supported by a report from a joint fact-finding team involving experts from Georgia, Russia, South Ossetia, and OSCE observers, who confirmed that the aircraft had come from the north, near the Russian border. Although the report had not yet been made publicly available, Bezhuashvili indicated that it would help corroborate Georgia’s position.
  • In addition to seeking a UN Security Council session, Georgia called for further investigations into the incident, particularly the location where a second missile reportedly landed on South Ossetian-controlled territory.
  • Bezhuashvili also outlined plans to create an international group of experts to further investigate the attack, inviting military, aviation, and other experts from partner countries, particularly those in the EU. Georgia was in ongoing consultations with various international counterparts, including officials from the EU, the US, and Russia.
  • Meanwhile, Russia's Foreign Ministry condemned the incident, calling it a provocation aimed at destabilizing the relationship between the two countries and increasing tensions in the South Ossetian conflict zone.
• On August 8, 2007, Shalva Natelashvili, leader of the opposition Labor Party in Georgia, accused President Mikheil Saakashvili’s administration of orchestrating the August 6 airstrike. Natelashvili claimed that the government staged the attack to shift public focus away from its controversial actions and onto patriotic themes. He further suggested that the authorities might have sought to provoke a conflict to consolidate power. (https://civil.ge/archives/112825)
  • Natelashvili warned that such "games" with bombs could lead to a real Russian attack on Georgian territory.
  • In response, Kote Gabashvili, a lawmaker from the ruling National Movement party, dismissed these claims, stating that Georgia had faced many traitors throughout its history, implying that such accusations were unfounded and politically motivated.
• The August 6 missile incident involving Georgian airspace has raised significant concerns and calls for thorough investigations. A joint monitoring team consisting of OSCE observers and Joint Peacekeeping Forces (JPKF) personnel conducted an investigation into the missile strike, which was claimed by Georgia to have been carried out by a Russian SU-24 Fencer aircraft. According to a radar print-out shown to the team, an aircraft entered Georgian airspace near Stepantsminda, located near the Russian border, and exited 10 minutes later. The missile dropped in the area near Shavshvebi and Tsiteliubani villages, located about 65 km from Tbilisi. (https://civil.ge/archives/112830)
  • The monitoring team's report confirms that only one aircraft was involved in the incident and that it launched a rocket after entering Georgian airspace. Personnel from nearby observation posts reported seeing the aircraft launch a missile before turning and heading back north-east. However, there were additional reports of a second missile launch, which caused further confusion.
  • Some sources suggest the aircraft may have been attacked by South Ossetian militias, who allegedly fired a Strela shoulder-launched anti-aircraft missile, causing the pilot to jettison rather than fire the missile. The South Ossetian side denied these claims, insisting their forces were only armed with light weapons.
  • In response, Georgian authorities have emphasized the need for an international investigation into the event, and Georgia's Foreign Minister Gela Bezhuashvili expressed that the joint report supported Georgia's claim of Russian involvement. To ensure transparency, Georgia has proposed the establishment of an international group of experts to further investigate the incident.
  • The OSCE and U.S. State Department have both called for a thorough investigation, with the U.S. emphasizing the need for cooperation from all parties involved. Meanwhile, Georgia has pushed for an urgent session of the UN Security Council to discuss the incident and conduct a high-level investigation.
  • Tensions remain high, with Russia suggesting the missile strike was a provocation aimed at undermining Russo-Georgian relations, further complicating the already delicate political landscape surrounding the South Ossetian conflict
• In response to the August 6 missile incident, Eduard Kokoity, the South Ossetian secessionist leader, has called for the immediate provision of an air defense system to Russian peacekeepers stationed in the South Ossetian conflict zone. Kokoity argued that this would prevent any future incursions by aircraft, similar to the one that violated Georgian airspace. (https://civil.ge/archives/112832)
  • Kokoity continued to assert that the incident involved a Georgian attack aircraft, not a Russian one, and claimed that two rockets were dropped during the event. He urged the Russian Federation to equip its peacekeeping forces with the necessary air defense capabilities to protect them from potential threats.
  • This request comes amid growing tensions over the missile strike and differing narratives regarding its origin and the parties involved.
• Tbilisi has stated that the possibility of holding a session of the Joint Control Commission (JCC) on South Ossetia will "largely depend" on the outcome of the investigation into the August 6 missile strike. If it is confirmed that Russia was involved in the attack, the legitimacy of Russia's role as a mediator in the conflict resolution process would be seriously undermined, according to the statement from Georgia's State Ministry for Conflict Resolution Issues. (https://civil.ge/archives/112831)
  • Tbilisi has demanded an international probe into the missile incident, which involved a Russian SU-24 aircraft allegedly violating Georgian airspace and dropping a missile near South Ossetia. Georgia's position suggests that further cooperation with Russia in the current negotiating formats could be unlikely if Moscow's involvement is confirmed.
  • Meanwhile, authorities in South Ossetia expressed readiness to attend the JCC session in September, contingent on receiving appropriate security guarantees.
• On August 9, Georgia officially requested that Russia provide air traffic records to assist in the investigation of the August 6 missile incident. The Georgian Foreign Ministry confirmed this request, with Deputy Foreign Minister Nikoloz Vashakidze making the request during a phone conversation with his Russian counterpart, Grigory Karasin. (https://civil.ge/archives/112835)
  • Georgia claims that a Russian SU-24 aircraft violated its airspace and dropped a Raduga Kh-58 anti-radar missile near the villages of Shavshvebi and Tsiteliubani in the Shida Kartli region, close to South Ossetia. Despite this, Russia has denied any involvement, labeling the incident as a Georgian provocation.
  • Additionally, Georgia has expressed its intention to establish a group of international independent experts to investigate the incident. Nino Kajaia, a Foreign Ministry spokesperson, stated that Georgia is actively working with its partner countries to form this investigative group
• On August 9, the UN Security Council decided to delay Georgia’s request for an emergency debate on the August 6 missile strike. The Council members stated they needed more information before taking any action. Pascal Gayama, the Council President and representative of the Congo Republic, emphasized that the Council would await the results of ongoing inquiries, particularly the one being conducted by the OSCE. (https://civil.ge/archives/112837
  • Irakli Chikovani, Georgia’s deputy representative to the UN, expressed that the Security Council should condemn the attack on Georgia's sovereign territory. Georgia is pushing for the UN to oversee the investigation into the incident to ensure greater legitimacy and international support.
• On August 10, Georgia accused Russian peacekeepers of fabricating evidence to deflect blame for the August 6 missile incident. Georgia claimed that Russian peacekeepers conducted unauthorized additional monitoring on August 8 in an attempt to undermine the findings of a previous joint investigation by the OSCE and JPKF observers. (https://civil.ge/archives/112838
  • The original investigation, based on eyewitness testimonies and air traffic records, supported Georgia’s allegations that a Russian aircraft violated Georgian airspace. However, the Russian-led peacekeepers reportedly interviewed several residents of Armazi, a South Ossetian village outside the JPKF’s responsibility zone, who claimed to have seen an aircraft coming from the east instead of the north-east as most eyewitnesses reported. This action was viewed by Georgia as a violation of the peacekeepers’ mandate.
  • In response, Georgia refused to sign the Russian-led report and condemned the Russian peacekeepers' actions as politically motivated and aimed at spreading disinformation.
• On August 10, 2007, Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili made a public statement emphasizing that Georgia was not in a state of war with Russia despite recent tensions following the August 6 missile incident. He clarified that Georgia's response to the event would be one of calm and unity, and he expressed a willingness to meet with Russian President Vladimir Putin to discuss the situation. Saakashvili criticized opposition figures who had attacked the government for not defending the country against the airstrike, dismissing them as "fools." (https://civil.ge/archives/185528)
  • He also highlighted Georgia's military modernization efforts, stating that Georgia was upgrading its forces to Western standards and planning to procure fighter aircraft. Despite these military upgrades, he stressed that Georgia's main goal was to avoid large-scale conflict, cooperate with the West, and integrate into NATO. While he expressed a desire for cooperation on security issues with Russia, he made it clear that Georgia would not tolerate actions that threatened its stability.
  • Saakashvili also criticized Russian officials, particularly military figures, for making provocative statements about the missile incident, including claims by General Yuri Baluyevsky that the incident was a Georgian provocation. Saakashvili described these remarks as signs of weakness, asserting that Georgia was no longer a country that could be easily undermined.
  • He also pointed out the international attention that the missile strike had garnered, contrasting it with previous incidents where Georgia had faced military aggression without similar global support. Saakashvili noted that a group of independent experts from countries like Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and the U.S. was on its way to investigate the missile strike.
• On August 10, 2007, the Portuguese EU Presidency issued a statement calling for a rapid, thorough, and independent investigation into the August 6 missile incident that occurred near the village of Tsitelubani, close to the South Ossetian conflict zone. The EU emphasized the need to clarify and verify the facts surrounding the event and urged all parties involved to avoid actions that could escalate the situation. (https://civil.ge/archives/112833)
  • While the U.S. State Department strongly condemned the missile attack, the EU's stance was more cautious and reserved, opting for an approach that prioritized investigation and de-escalation.
• On August 11, 2007, Sergey Ivanov, Russia's First Vice-Premier, dismissed the August 6 missile incident in Georgia as a poorly staged "theatrical show." He claimed the incident was intended to disrupt the Joint Control Commission (JCC) session, which had been scheduled for August 9-10 but was canceled after the South Ossetian side refused to participate due to security concerns. (https://civil.ge/archives/112844)
  • Ivanov pointed out inconsistencies in the handling of the missile site, suggesting that if it had been a real missile or bomb, the area would have been sealed off much more extensively, not just within a two-to-three meter radius. He labeled it a "theatrical show" aimed at achieving specific political goals, noting that similar incidents had occurred before and might continue in the future.
  • On August 13, 2007, Georgian officials strongly condemned remarks made by Sergey Ivanov, Russia's First Vice-Premier, who had referred to the August 6 missile incident as a "theatrical show" staged by the Georgian authorities. (https://civil.ge/archives/112846)
    • Kote Gabashvili, a lawmaker and chairman of the Georgian parliament's Foreign Affairs Committee, called Ivanov’s statement "immoral" and "full of cynicism."
    • In a stronger response, Davit Bakradze, Georgia’s State Minister for Conflict Resolution, criticized Ivanov for continuing an alleged tradition of making anti-Georgian comments. He also invoked a historical reference to the 1999 apartment bombings in Russia, which some suspected were staged by the Russian FSB to justify the war in Chechnya. Bakradze implied that, unlike Russia, Georgia does not engage in such actions, condemning Ivanov’s remarks as part of an ongoing effort to discredit Georgia.
    • On August 13, 2007, Georgian Interior Minister Vano Merabishvili responded to Sergey Ivanov's dismissal of the August 6 missile incident as a “theatrical show” staged by Georgia. Using a Russian expression meaning “raving nonsense,” Merabishvili rejected Ivanov's claims. The phrase “Bred sivoy kobyly” translates literally to “delirium of a grey horse,” which is a Russian idiom for utter nonsense. (https://civil.ge/archives/112851)
      • Ivanov had made his remarks on August 11, accusing Georgia of staging the incident. Merabishvili's retort was supported by Kote Gabashvili, a senior Georgian lawmaker, who labeled Ivanov’s comments as “immoral” and “full of cynicism.” Additionally, Davit Bakradze, the Georgian state minister for conflict resolution, pointed out that unlike Russia, Georgia did not engage in acts like planting bombs in apartment buildings, referring to the controversial 1999 bombings in Russia, which some alleged were orchestrated by the FSB to justify the war in Chechnya.
• On August 13, 2007, a group of foreign experts from Lithuania, Latvia, Sweden, and the United States arrived in Georgia to investigate the August 6 missile incident in the village of Tsitelubani, located near the South Ossetian conflict zone. (https://civil.ge/archives/112848)
  • The Georgian Interior Ministry confirmed that the experts had already visited the incident site and were shown air traffic records related to the event. Shota Utiashvili, the head of the Interior Ministry's analytical department, expressed confidence in the group, describing them as “very professional” and anticipating that they would reach a “competent conclusion.”
  • The team included specialists in radar and munitions, as confirmed by the U.S. embassy in Tbilisi.
  • In addition, Georgian Foreign Minister Gela Bezhuashvili sought EU involvement in the investigation. He spoke with Peter Semneby, the EU's special representative for the South Caucasus, and also reached out to Finland’s Foreign Minister Ilkka Kanerva, inviting Finland to contribute experts to the investigation.
  • On August 13, 2007, Georgian Foreign Minister Gela Bezhuashvili met with the ambassadors from France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, requesting their countries to send experts to join the investigation into the August 6 missile incident. At that time, experts from Lithuania, Latvia, and the United States were already in Georgia, with American experts specializing in radars and munitions. (https://civil.ge/archives/112852
    • Bezhuashvili also reached out to Peter Semneby, the EU Special Representative to the South Caucasus, calling for the EU's active involvement in the probe. Additionally, he contacted Finland's Foreign Minister Ilkka Kanerva to encourage Finland’s participation in the investigation.
• On August 15, 2007, Georgia announced that Russia would send a group of 25 military experts to Tbilisi on August 16 to assist in the investigation of the August 6 missile incident. The probe, already joined by international experts from Latvia, Lithuania, Sweden, and the United States, was part of the Independent Inter-Governmental Expert Group (IIEG) tasked with ensuring an impartial review. Georgia maintained that its air traffic records showed a Russian SU-24 aircraft had violated Georgian airspace and dropped a Raduga Kh-58 missile near the South Ossetian conflict zone, while Russia denied involvement. Georgia’s Foreign Ministry welcomed Russia’s cooperation but insisted that all data, including Russia's radar records, undergo international examination for an unbiased investigation. The incident continued to generate significant international attention, with Russia rebutting claims made in a Washington Post editorial suggesting Russian culpability. (https://civil.ge/archives/112858)
• On August 15, 2007, the International Group of Experts (IGE) investigating the August 6 missile incident concluded that an unidentified aircraft entered Georgian airspace from Russia and made three passes near the town of Stepantsminda. While the IGE could not identify the aircraft’s type or origin, Georgia claimed it was a Russian SU-24 attack aircraft. The IGE confirmed that a Kh-58 anti-radar missile, designed in Russia, was dropped near Tsitelubani, and noted that Georgia’s Air Force does not operate aircraft capable of launching this missile. The report also highlighted that the IGE could not verify claims of a second missile impact in South Ossetia or reports of a MANPADS being fired at the aircraft. The IGE's findings supported Georgia's evidence, and Davit Dondua, a Georgian Foreign Ministry representative, stated that the OSCE would send a Special Representative to investigate further. Meanwhile, Russia announced that a group of 25 military experts, led by Igor Khvorov, would arrive in Tbilisi on August 16 to participate in the investigation. (https://civil.ge/archives/112861
• On August 15, 2007, Irakli Alasania, Georgia's UN envoy, reiterated Georgia's request for the UN Security Council to discuss the August 6 missile incident, during a meeting with Secretary General Ban Ki-moon in New York. Alasania briefed Ban Ki-moon on new developments in the case, including a report issued on August 15 by the International Group of Experts (IGE), which confirmed that an unidentified aircraft had entered Georgian airspace from Russia. Although the Security Council had previously stated it needed more information, Gela Bezhuashvili, Georgia's Foreign Minister, announced that a briefing would be given to the Security Council on August 16. (https://civil.ge/archives/112863)
• On August 16, 2007, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov accused Georgia of using the August 6 missile incident for international political propaganda. Lavrov claimed that Georgia had exerted significant efforts to influence global public opinion while excluding Russia from the narrative. He expressed hope that the Russian military experts arriving in Tbilisi on August 16 would bring the issue to a resolution. Meanwhile, Givi Targamadze, a lawmaker from Georgia's ruling National Movement party, acknowledged the involvement of Russian experts but asserted that an international group of experts had already provided convincing findings. Targamadze suggested that the only remaining task for the Russian experts was to determine which Russian military official should be held accountable for the incident. (https://civil.ge/archives/112867)
• On August 17, 2007, Russia blocked a UN Security Council statement that would have condemned the August 6 missile incident, despite U.S. backing. Hedi Annabi, a senior UN peacekeeping official, briefed the council about the incident on August 16, but Russia opposed issuing a formal statement. U.S. envoy Jackie Sanders expressed disappointment, emphasizing the importance of a statement, but Russia’s U.N. Ambassador Vitaly Churkin argued that it was "premature" for the council to take a stance, as more information was needed. Georgia had requested action, claiming a Russian aircraft violated its airspace and dropped a missile, but the council had previously stated on August 9 that more details were necessary before considering an emergency debate. (https://civil.ge/archives/112869)
• On August 16, 2007, Russia presented Georgia with air radar records that it claimed disproved Georgia’s accusations regarding the August 6 missile incident, stating that no evidence was found to implicate Russia. However, Georgian officials reported that they had not received any concrete information from the Russian side. Valery Kenyakin, a special envoy for the Russian Foreign Ministry, asserted that the radar records showed no indications of Russia's involvement, while Russian Air Force Chief Igor Khvorov echoed the claim, stating that Georgia had not provided sufficient evidence. Georgian Deputy Defense Minister Batu Kutelia downplayed the joint investigation, stating that two previous investigations, including one by an International Group of Experts, had already confirmed that the missile was dropped by an aircraft originating from Russia. Despite this, Kutelia indicated that the meeting with the Russian delegation aimed to gather further details on secondary matters, such as the aircraft's origin and mission. On August 17, the Russian experts inspected the missile incident site at Tsitelubani and planned to visit the Georgian Interior Ministry to review over 6,000 missile fragments. (https://civil.ge/archives/112870)
• On August 17, 2007, the U.S. Embassy in Tbilisi supported Georgia's version of the August 6 missile incident, confirming that a military aircraft had crossed into Georgian airspace from Russian territory. The embassy described this as an incursion and endorsed the findings of the International Experts Group (IEG), which included experts from Latvia, Lithuania, Sweden, and the United States. The U.S. embassy called the IEG report "important" and "credible," praising Georgia’s transparency in cooperating with the investigation. Additionally, the embassy urged the international community to support confidence-building measures in South Ossetia and to pursue a peaceful political resolution based on an autonomous South Ossetia within a unified Georgia. The statement came ahead of a Russian experts' press conference, where further denials of Russia’s involvement were expected. The U.S. Embassy reiterated its support for Georgia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. (https://civil.ge/archives/112871)
• On August 17, 2007, Georgia’s Deputy Defense Minister, Batu Kutelia, accused Russia of fabricating evidence related to the August 6 missile incident. He criticized the Russian military experts' findings, stating that the information provided was fragmentary and suggested that an aircraft had not even flown over the area. Kutelia argued that this was a clear attempt to fabricate evidence and declared that Georgia saw no value in continuing consultations with the Russian side. He emphasized that Georgia now expected the international community to politically assess the violation of its airspace and the bombing of its sovereign territory. Meanwhile, Georgian Prime Minister Zurab Nogaideli reiterated that the situation was clear, asserting that a Russian aircraft had bombed Georgian territory and called for an appropriate response from both Russia and the international community. (https://civil.ge/archives/112872)
• On August 17, 2007, Russian military experts, after examining evidence related to the August 6 missile incident in Georgia, concluded that the incident was fabricated. The Russian delegation, led by Lt. Gen. Igor Khvorov, held a press conference in Tbilisi where they argued that no Russian aircraft had crossed into Georgian airspace on the day in question. They dismissed the Georgian air traffic records, claiming that they were inconsistent with reports from peacekeeping forces in the South Ossetian conflict zone and suggested that the Georgian records were manipulated. (https://civil.ge/archives/112873)
  • The Russian team also questioned the authenticity of the missile fragments found at the incident site, claiming that they were not consistent with a Raduga Kh-58 anti-radar missile, and suggested that some fragments were from different, older rockets. Furthermore, they alleged that the crucial evidence, such as the rocket's serial number and detonator, had been destroyed by Georgian authorities, casting doubt on the investigation's integrity. They even implied that the incident had been staged and that the rocket debris had been planted at the site.
  • In contrast, Georgia’s Deputy Defense Minister Batu Kutelia dismissed the Russian investigation, arguing that it was politically motivated and emphasizing that two other investigations—one by Georgia itself and another by the International Experts Group (IEG)—had already confirmed that the missile had come from Russia and hit Georgian territory. The IEG’s findings, backed by the U.S. embassy in Tbilisi, were considered credible, supporting Georgia's version of the events.
  • The diplomatic standoff continued, with Russia rejecting the international findings and accusing the International Experts Group of political bias, while Georgia called for international support to address the violation of its airspace and the missile attack.
• On August 17, 2007, the OSCE Chairman-in-Office, Miguel Angel Moratinos, appointed Miomir Zuzul, the former Croatian foreign minister, as his personal representative to investigate the August 6 missile incident between Georgia and Russia. Zuzul was tasked with traveling to both Georgia and Russia to gather information about the incident. He was to be accompanied by Arturo Perez Martinez, the charge d’affaires of the Spanish Permanent Mission to the OSCE. The OSCE's involvement aimed to provide an independent review of the situation amid growing tensions and differing accounts between the two nations. (https://civil.ge/archives/112874)
  • On August 20, 2007, Miomir Zuzul, the special representative of the OSCE Chairman-in-Office, Miguel Angel Moratinos, arrived in Georgia to investigate the August 6 missile incident. Zuzul, a former Croatian foreign minister, had been appointed by the OSCE Chairman-in-Office for this specific task the previous week. (https://civil.ge/archives/112803)
    • During his visit, Zuzul met with officials from the Georgian Defense Ministry and Davit Bakradze, the state minister for conflict resolution. He was also scheduled to meet with Georgian Foreign Minister Gela Bezhuashvili on August 21. As part of his fact-finding mission, Zuzul was expected to travel to Moscow later that week.
  • On August 23, 2007, Miomir Zuzul, the special representative of the OSCE Chairman-in-Office, Spanish Foreign Minister Miguel Angel Moratinos, visited Moscow to discuss the August 6 missile incident in Georgia. The Russian Foreign Ministry briefed Zuzul on its stance regarding the incident and shared the findings of its investigatory group, which had been in Georgia on August 16-17. The Russian side maintained its focus on identifying the organizers of the alleged provocation, which it claimed was aimed at disrupting Russian-Georgian dialogue and escalating conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. (https://civil.ge/archives/112900
• On August 17, 2007, Grigory Karasin, the Russian deputy foreign minister, met with Walter-Jurgen Schmid, the German ambassador to Russia, and Phillip Lefaur, the French charge d’affaires in Moscow, to discuss the August 6 missile incident in Georgia. During the meeting, the Russian side informed the diplomats about its efforts to investigate the incident. The Russian military experts, after reviewing evidence over two days, concluded that the evidence provided by Georgia was likely fabricated and suggested that the incident may have been staged. This diplomatic engagement marked a significant moment in the ongoing international dispute over the missile attack. (https://civil.ge/archives/112875)
• On August 18, 2007, a team of British, Estonian, and Polish experts arrived in Tbilisi to investigate the August 6 missile incident in Georgia. The British ambassador in Tbilisi, Denis Keefe, expressed hope for a quick and thorough investigation. The Estonian Foreign Ministry confirmed the dispatch of two experts: one in radar systems and the other in air forces. Estonian Foreign Minister Urmas Paet underscored the significance of ensuring that the investigation be conducted under the guidance of an international organization. (https://civil.ge/archives/112876)
  • This new team marked the second international probe into the incident. The first investigation, carried out by the International Group of Experts (IGE), had already determined that an unidentified aircraft entered Georgian airspace from Russia, dropped a Kh-58 anti-radar missile, and then returned to Russia. Conversely, a separate group of Russian military experts rejected Georgia’s account, asserting that the incident had likely been staged.
  • At the same time, Russian deputy foreign minister Grigory Karasin remarked that the missile incident was not in Russia’s interest, as it primarily benefited those who aimed to disrupt Russia-Georgia relations.
• On August 21, 2007, a report on the August 6 missile incident was submitted by a group of European experts to the Georgian Foreign Ministry. The experts, who were from the United Kingdom, Estonia, and Poland, had been investigating the incident since August 18. (https://civil.ge/archives/112883
  • The findings were discussed in a meeting between Georgian Foreign Minister Gela Bezhuashvili and the British ambassador in Tbilisi, Denis Keefe, on August 21. This investigation was the second international probe, following the earlier work by the International Group of Experts (IGE) from Latvia, Lithuania, Sweden, and the United States. The IGE's report concluded that an unidentified aircraft had entered Georgian airspace from Russia, dropped a Kh-58 anti-radar missile, and then returned to Russia.
  • In contrast, a separate investigation by a group of Russian military experts on August 16-17 denied Georgia’s claims, suggesting the incident had been staged and finding no evidence to support the IGE’s conclusions.
  • On August 21, 2007, a report by European experts investigating the August 6 missile incident in Georgia concluded that Russia was involved in the attack, contradicting Moscow's claims of non-involvement. The experts confirmed that Georgia's airspace was violated three times by aircraft flying from Russia, and that a Kh-58U anti-radar missile, a Russian-made weapon, was fired at a Georgian radar site near Gori. The missile impacted Georgian territory about 5 km short of the radar after the radar crew turned off the transmitter to protect it, causing the missile to miss its target. The report also criticized Russia for only providing secondary radar data, while primary radar data was essential for a full investigation. Additionally, the experts stated that Georgia's SU-25 aircraft could not have operated the missile, further supporting the conclusion that the missile came from Russian aircraft. (https://civil.ge/archives/112881
• On August 21, 2007, Russia's UN ambassador, Vitaly Churkin, claimed that both the March 11 helicopter attack on Kodori Gorge and the August 6 missile incident near the South Ossetian conflict zone were fabricated by the Georgian authorities. Speaking at a press conference in New York, Churkin reiterated findings from the Russian investigatory group, which suggested that Georgia had staged the missile incident and fabricated evidence. He argued that Russia had nothing to gain from such an attack, while Georgia's claims appeared to align with a broader agenda to escalate tensions regarding Russian peacekeeping roles in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Churkin also dismissed the theory that the missile was aimed at a Georgian radar near the impact site, stating that Russian aircraft would not have needed to cross the border to target the radar. Despite these claims, Georgian authorities and the second international investigatory group, made up of British, Estonian, and Polish experts, maintained that Russia was involved in the incident. Georgia’s ambassador, Irakli Alasania, was expected to hold a news conference on August 22 to respond to Churkin's allegations and present the findings of the international experts. (https://civil.ge/archives/112884)
  • On August 22, 2007, Georgia's Deputy Foreign Minister Merab Antadze criticized Russia's "Soviet-style, reckless diplomacy" in attempting to shift the blame for the August 6 missile incident away from itself. This came in response to Russian UN Ambassador Vitaly Churkin, who claimed that Georgia had staged the missile incident to discredit Russia. Antadze stated that the findings of two separate international investigatory groups had given Georgia hope that the issue would be discussed in major international forums, including the United Nations. (https://civil.ge/archives/112887)
• On August 22, 2007, the Georgian Foreign Ministry reported that two violations of Georgian airspace occurred in the Upper Kodori Gorge on August 21 at 6:46 pm local time. The aircraft, which reportedly came from Russia, were tracked flying five kilometers into Georgian airspace at an altitude of 4,000 meters and a speed of 470-490 km/h. It was unclear whether one or two aircraft were involved, and the type of aircraft (helicopter or plane) was not specified. Russia strongly denied the allegations, with Russian Air Force aide Alexander Drobishevsky stating that no Russian aircraft were near the Georgian border on that date. (https://civil.ge/archives/112890
  • On August 23, 2007, Russian Army Chief of Staff Gen. Yuri Baluevsky dismissed Georgia’s claims of Russian aircraft violating Georgian airspace over Kodori Gorge on August 21, calling the allegations the result of "hallucinations." The Georgian authorities had reported two airspace violations over Tbilisi-controlled upper Kodori Gorge in Abkhazia, stating that the aircraft flew five kilometers into Georgian airspace at 4,000 meters in height and a speed of 470-490 km/h. Baluevsky's comments further intensified the diplomatic dispute, with Russia denying the accusations. (https://civil.ge/archives/112895)
• On August 22, 2007, Georgia's UN Ambassador Irakli Alasania called for an international response to the August 6 missile incident, urging preventive diplomacy to prevent future occurrences. He stated that Russia's motives included intimidating Georgia, assessing its military readiness, and testing the international community’s support for Georgia's democracy. He also accused Russia of attempting to dominate the region. Alasania presented findings from two western expert groups, confirming that at least one Russian aircraft fired a missile into Georgian territory and returned to Russia. He criticized Russia’s refusal to cooperate and block the issue at the UN Security Council, accusing Moscow of trying to cover up its involvement. Alasania dismissed the Russian claim, made by Vitaly Churkin, that Georgia staged the incident, calling it absurd. (https://civil.ge/archives/112891)
• On August 23, 2007, Georgian forces in upper Kodori Gorge reportedly shot down an aircraft. The type of aircraft was not immediately identified, as it crashed in a remote area, and it remains unclear whether it was a Russian or Abkhaz aircraft. At the time, Abkhaz forces were conducting military maneuvers in the region, which involved helicopters and aircraft. (https://civil.ge/archives/112905
  • Conflicting reports emerged about the crash site. One witness stated that the aircraft crashed in the Lata Gorge in Abkhaz-controlled territory, while others claimed it crashed in a Georgian-controlled area. Due to the remoteness of the location, it was difficult to reach the crash site.
  • Both Russia and Abkhazia dismissed the incident, calling it a provocation.
  • On August 25, 2007, the Georgian Interior Ministry issued a statement regarding reports of an unidentified aircraft that may have been downed in the upper Kodori Gorge. According to the ministry, there were violations of Georgian airspace on August 20, 21, and 22, with warning shots fired to stop the aircraft's overflight. However, the exact details surrounding the alleged downing of the aircraft remained unclear. (https://civil.ge/archives/112909)
    • Reports first emerged on August 24 from Rustavi 2 TV, suggesting that a Russian aircraft had been shot down by Georgian forces on August 23. This was later corrected by an Interior Ministry spokesman, who clarified that the violation had occurred on August 22. Witnesses reported seeing black smoke rising from the crash site, but the wreckage had not been located due to the remoteness of the area.
    • It was also unclear whether the aircraft belonged to Russia or Abkhazia, as Abkhaz forces were conducting military maneuvers near the region at the time. Russian officials dismissed the incident as a provocation, and the Abkhaz side also denied involvement.
  • On August 25, 2007, Anatoly Zaitsev, the Chief-of-Staff of the Abkhazian armed forces, reported that an unidentified aircraft had crashed in the Kodori Gorge after entering Abkhaz airspace from the Black Sea on August 22. Zaitsev stated that the aircraft, which appeared to be losing altitude, was observed by his team and left behind a smoke trail. The crash site was reported to have black smoke rising from the ground. (https://civil.ge/archives/112911)
    • Zaitsev speculated that the plane was neither Russian nor Georgian, but possibly an American spy plane, though he noted that no shots had been fired at the aircraft. The Georgian Interior Ministry confirmed that Georgian forces in the upper Kodori Gorge had fired warning shots when the aircraft violated Georgian airspace on the same day.
    • While the Georgian authorities sent a team to investigate the crash, it remained unclear whether the plane was shot down or simply crashed due to other reasons.
  • On August 25, 2007, the Abkhazian authorities added a new twist to the mysterious plane crash in the Kodori Gorge. According to Abkhaz Foreign Minister Sergey Shamba and Anatoly Zaitsev, the chief-of-staff of the Abkhazian armed forces, an aircraft had crashed in the gorge on August 22, but it was neither a Russian nor Georgian plane. Zaitsev initially suggested that it was likely an American reconnaissance aircraft, though he later denied making this statement. Shamba, on the other hand, suggested it was a Georgian aircraft. (https://civil.ge/archives/112912)
    • Zaitsev claimed he had witnessed the aircraft flying into Abkhaz airspace from the Black Sea and reported seeing it losing altitude and leaving a smoke trail. Abkhaz personnel at the Kodori Gorge observation post also saw the aircraft, followed by an explosion and a glow. However, no wreckage was found, despite a search of the area.
    • The Georgian Interior Ministry had previously confirmed that Georgian forces fired warning shots at the aircraft after it violated Georgian airspace, but there was no definitive conclusion on whether the plane had been downed. The incident took place during a time when Abkhaz forces were conducting military maneuvers near the gorge.
    • On August 25, 2007, Abkhaz leader Sergey Bagapsh stated that no aircraft wreckage had been found in the lower Kodori Gorge, despite the claims of an aircraft crash. Bagapsh confirmed that Abkhaz forces had combed the area, but no signs of a crash were discovered. (https://civil.ge/archives/112908)
      • Earlier that day, Abkhaz authorities had claimed that an aircraft had crashed in the upper Kodori Gorge, which was under Georgian control, and they suggested it was a Georgian aircraft. However, the Georgian Interior Ministry confirmed that its forces had fired warning shots at an aircraft that violated Georgian airspace from Russia on August 22. A team was sent to investigate the possible crash site in the upper Kodori Gorge.
  • On August 25, 2007, the search for the allegedly crashed aircraft in upper Kodori Gorge was underway but had yielded no results, according to Shota Utiashvili, the Georgian Interior Ministry's chief of the analytical department. He confirmed that the search was ongoing despite difficult terrain, and no confirmation could be made yet about whether the aircraft had indeed crashed. (https://civil.ge/archives/185530)
    • The search was triggered by Georgia's claims that unidentified aircraft, allegedly from Russia, violated Georgian airspace over Kodori Gorge on August 21–22, prompting Georgian forces to fire warning shots. The Abkhaz side later claimed that the aircraft had crashed in the gorge, but they added that they had found no wreckage after combing the area. Abkhaz leaders suggested it was a Georgian aircraft, though the Georgian Interior Ministry has not confirmed this.
    • Despite initial reports of black smoke being seen at the crash site, no wreckage had been found due to the remoteness of the location. The situation was further complicated by Abkhaz and Georgian officials giving conflicting statements on the incident, with some suggesting it could have been a U.S. reconnaissance plane.
  • As of August 27, 2007, there was still no confirmation regarding the crash of an aircraft in upper Kodori Gorge. Despite ongoing search efforts, no new evidence had emerged. Shota Utiashvili, an official from the Georgian Interior Ministry, stated that the operation would continue, but the timeline for resolution remained unclear. (https://civil.ge/archives/112917
    • Meanwhile, Anatoly Zaitsev, the chief of the breakaway Abkhaz armed forces, mentioned that an investigation was still underway and expressed hope for clarity in the coming days. The Abkhaz authorities maintained their claim that the crashed aircraft was a Georgian plane.
    • Georgia, for its part, had reported multiple violations of its airspace by unidentified aircraft from the Russian side in the upper Kodori Gorge on August 21, 22, and 23. The Georgian Interior Ministry confirmed that it responded by firing warning shots during the incident on August 22, but there was no official confirmation of a crash.
  • As of August 28, 2007, the plane crash mystery in the upper Kodori Gorge remained unresolved, with both Abkhaz and Georgian sides providing conflicting reports. (https://civil.ge/archives/112924))
    • The Georgian Interior Ministry continued its search for evidence, but the difficult terrain in the area made it challenging to confirm if a crash had occurred. Shota Utiashvili, head of the ministry's analytical department, reported no new developments in the search and was unsure when it would conclude.
    • Confusion surrounded the details of the incident from the outset. Witnesses initially claimed to have seen black smoke coming from the crash site in Abkhaz-controlled territory. However, later reports suggested the crash was in Georgian-controlled upper Kodori Gorge. Despite Georgia's confirmation that warning shots were fired at the aircraft, officials did not confirm shooting down the aircraft. They speculated that the fire caused by ordnance from the aircraft might have been mistaken for a crash.
    • Abkhaz officials initially denied the overflight but later suggested that a Georgian aircraft had crashed after flying from the Black Sea into Abkhazia. The situation became more complicated when Russian news agencies reported that Anatoly Zaitsev, the chief of the Abkhaz armed forces, speculated that it could have been a U.S. reconnaissance plane, a claim he later denied, reiterating it was a Georgian aircraft.
    • As of the latest updates, the Abkhaz investigation into the crash continued, with Zaitsev stating that clarity would come in a few days. However, Georgian media had stopped covering the incident, with little follow-up or new information. The mystery of the crash continued to be a source of speculation.
• On August 24, 2007, the Russian Foreign Ministry accused pro-NATO factions within Georgia of fabricating the August 6 missile incident. According to Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Grigory Karasin and special envoy Valery Kenyakin, the missile incident was orchestrated by these forces to escalate tensions with Russia and promote Georgia’s potential membership in NATO. The Russian officials claimed the incident was a provocation staged by these groups to damage Russian-Georgian relations. (https://civil.ge/archives/112907)
  • Kenkyakin, who was part of the Russian investigative team, presented military-technical data during a meeting with German and French ambassadors, which allegedly proved the incident had been staged. This claim aligns with Russia's ongoing narrative of opposing Georgia's NATO ambitions.
  • Following the missile incident, NATO offered to share air radar data with Georgia, a gesture that Georgian authorities expected to occur within the year.
• On August 25, 2007, Georgia's Foreign Ministry issued a statement expressing serious concern over Russia's actions in the region, warning that these "destructive acts" could destabilize the entire Caucasus. The ministry highlighted the large-scale military exercises conducted by Abkhaz separatists, which involved combat helicopters, planes, and 6,000 soldiers, with direct Russian military assistance. (https://civil.ge/archives/112910)
  • Georgia's government called on Russia to stop its support for the separatist regime in Abkhazia, especially military aid. Furthermore, Georgia urged the UN Secretary General’s Group of Friends on Georgia (which includes France, Germany, Russia, the UK, and the US) to take a stronger stance against the actions of the separatists and demand that Russia cease its "destructive acts" toward Georgia.
  • The situation was considered alarming, particularly due to the unprecedented violations of Georgian airspace by Russian military aircraft.
• On August 28, 2007, Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili revealed that a Russian missile had targeted a Georgian air defense radar near the South Ossetian conflict zone on August 6. The missile was reportedly fired by a Russian aircraft that had intruded into Georgian airspace. (https://civil.ge/archives/112918)
  • Speaking at the Sioni Cathedral in Tbilisi, Saakashvili referred to the missile attack as part of a series of events where Georgia had been protected by the Virgin Mary. He drew parallels between this and past moments of crisis, such as the 2003 Rose Revolution, the 2004 ousting of Aslan Abashidze in Adjara, and even an incident in 2005 when a grenade failed to detonate during a visit by U.S. President George W. Bush.
  • Saakashvili emphasized the miraculous nature of the missile's failure to explode, framing it as a sign of divine protection in Georgia’s struggles.
• On August 29, 2007, Georgia released 15 Russian peacekeepers who had been arrested earlier that week. The servicemen were detained by Georgian police after their truck crashed into a minivan outside their designated operational zone in the Abkhaz conflict zone. (https://civil.ge/archives/112927
  • The Russian Defense Ministry confirmed the release and suggested that the incident was part of a deliberate Georgian provocation. According to Vyacheslav Sedov, a spokesman for the ministry, the arrest was an attempt to discredit Russian peacekeepers and possibly pave the way for their expulsion from the region.
• On August 31, 2007, the breakaway region of South Ossetia announced a ban on its citizens traveling to Georgia proper, effective from September 1. The measure was taken under the pretext of protecting South Ossetians from alleged provocations orchestrated by the Georgian side. (https://civil.ge/archives/112941)
  • Mikhail Mindzaev, South Ossetia's Interior Minister, claimed that Tbilisi was planning to disrupt South Ossetia's independence day celebrations, scheduled for September 20. He alleged that Georgian authorities were preparing to blackmail South Ossetians visiting Georgia, with the risk of detention and manipulation involving drugs to force cooperation.
  • To reinforce the ban, South Ossetian militiamen were placed on high alert, although the measures were set to be lifted after the independence day celebrations.
• On August 29, 2007, Lt. Gen. Igor Khvorov, the chief of staff of the Russian Air Force, reiterated the Russian position on the August 6 missile incident, suggesting that the missile attack was a staged provocation against Russia. He stated that there was no need to "search for an enemy in the north," referring to Russia, and that the real provocateur should be found elsewhere. (https://civil.ge/archives/112928)
  • Khvorov, who had been part of a Russian military team investigating the incident, claimed that the missile did not originate from an aircraft, but was instead planted at the scene near the South Ossetian conflict zone. He further criticized two international investigation teams, which included Western military experts, stating that their findings were politically motivated. These teams had suggested that a Russian aircraft had entered Georgian airspace, dropped an anti-radar missile, which failed to detonate, and then returned to Russia.
  • In contrast, Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili had earlier stated that the target of the missile was a Georgian air defense radar station, located 5 kilometers from the crash site.
• On August 31, 2007, Eduard Kokoity, the leader of the breakaway South Ossetian region, announced that he would request the Russian Federation to deploy an air defense system for the Russian peacekeepers stationed in the South Ossetian conflict zone. Kokoity cited the August 6 missile incident as the reason for the request, stating that such a system would prevent further provocations by Georgia. He argued that if Russian peacekeepers had access to air defense systems, it would resolve issues related to unidentified aircraft over South Ossetia. (https://civil.ge/archives/112943)
• On August 30, 2007, two servicemen from Russia’s North Ossetian peacekeeping battalion in the South Ossetian conflict zone, Tariel Khachirov and Vitaly Valiev, were sentenced to two months of pre-trial custody by a court in Mtskheta, Georgia. They had been arrested on August 29 and charged with the illegal detention of four Georgian journalists and three others, including a 13-year-old boy, in late August 2007. While Russian and South Ossetian authorities demanded their release, the Georgian Interior Ministry insisted that their detention was lawful, and their release was impossible. The Georgian government also rejected accusations that the men were North Ossetians, stating they were South Ossetians, and recruitment of locals for peacekeeping was forbidden by existing agreements. (https://civil.ge/archives/112942)
• On September 3-4, 2007, OSCE Chairman-in-Office Miguel Angel Moratinos, also Spain's Foreign Minister, visited Georgia to meet with President Saakashvili, Prime Minister Zurab Nogaideli, and Parliamentary Chairperson Nino Burjanadze, among others. The visit followed his trip to Moscow to discuss the August 6 missile incident with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov. Earlier, in mid-August, Moratinos had appointed Miomir Zuzul as his personal representative to investigate the missile incident. (https://civil.ge/archives/112952
• On September 3, 2007, the Russian Foreign Ministry demanded the immediate release of two Russian peacekeepers, Tariel Khachirov and Vitaly Valiev, arrested by Georgian police on August 29 in the South Ossetian conflict zone. The men were charged with the illegal detention of four Georgian journalists and others, including a 13-year-old boy, on August 26-27, and sentenced to pre-trial custody on August 30. Russia claimed their arrest violated the 1994 protocol, which grants peacekeepers jurisdiction under their own states, while Georgian authorities argued the detainees were South Ossetian residents, contravening recruitment rules, and dismissed Russia’s demands as politicization of a criminal case. (https://civil.ge/archives/112958)
• On September 4, 2007, OSCE Chairman-in-Office and Spanish Foreign Minister Miguel Angel Moratinos held talks with Georgian leadership, following his arrival in Tbilisi late on September 3. Moratinos met with key officials, including Deputy Foreign Minister Nikoloz Vashakidze and State Minister for Conflict Resolution Davit Bakradze, with discussions focused on the August 6 missile incident, which Georgia claims was an act of Russian aggression. Talks were expected with President Saakashvili, Parliamentary Chairperson Nino Burjanadze, and Prime Minister Zurab Nogaideli. Moratinos had previously appointed Miomir Zuzul, ex-Croatian foreign minister, to investigate the incident, and Tbilisi sought OSCE condemnation of Russia’s actions. Russia denied involvement, suggesting the incident was staged by Georgia to discredit Moscow. (https://civil.ge/archives/112961)
• On September 4, 2007, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Grigory Karasin met with U.S. Ambassador to Russia William Burns to discuss the August 6 missile incident in Georgia. The Russian Foreign Ministry reported that Karasin briefed Ambassador Burns on the state of Russo-Georgian relations and shared the findings of a Russian investigatory group that had visited Georgia on August 16-17 to investigate the missile incident. This meeting reflects the growing international attention on the event, with the U.S. seeking clarity on the situation. (https://civil.ge/archives/112966)
• On September 4, 2007, Miguel Angel Moratinos, the OSCE Chairman-in-Office and Spanish Foreign Minister, announced that the OSCE Permanent Council would discuss the August 6 missile incident in Georgia during a session on September 6. Miomir Zuzul, appointed by Moratinos as his personal envoy, was tasked with investigating the incident and would present his findings after visiting Tbilisi and Moscow. (https://civil.ge/archives/112969)
  • Moratinos stated that the report would be "very objective" and would reflect all involved parties' views. However, Georgian officials were skeptical, fearing the report would not point directly to Russia, which Georgia had hoped for. Additionally, Moratinos confirmed that the OSCE would continue efforts to improve relations between Russia and Georgia, with both countries showing interest in resolving the crisis, though Russia preferred bilateral talks without international involvement.
• On September 5, 2007, the OSCE Chairman-in-Office's spokesperson, Manuel Cacho, clarified that the upcoming OSCE report on the August 6 missile incident would not be able to conclusively identify how the missile ended up on Georgian territory. Cacho emphasized that "things are not black and white" in this case. (https://civil.ge/archives/185531)
  • Georgia accused Russian jets of violating its airspace and launching an anti-radar rocket, a claim supported by two international expert groups. However, a Russian investigation denied the violation, asserting that Georgia had planted the missile to implicate Russia.
  • The OSCE's appointed envoy, Miomir Zuzul, had visited both Tbilisi and Moscow and was scheduled to present his findings to the OSCE Permanent Council on September 6, although the report was not expected to assign clear blame.
• On September 5, 2007, Georgia indicated mixed signals regarding the Joint Control Commission (JCC) meeting over South Ossetia. Davit Bakradze, the Georgian state minister for conflict resolution, announced that a JCC plenary session was planned for the end of September in Tbilisi, possibly at the OSCE mission headquarters. However, he also expressed that Georgia may boycott the session unless Russia answered several key questions, including those about the August 6 missile incident. (https://civil.ge/archives/112974)
  • Georgia also criticized a Russian statement recognizing Eduard Kokoity as the "president of the South Ossetian Republic," calling it a barrier to the JCC's convening. Tbilisi had been avoiding the JCC for some time, questioning its fairness due to the Russian-led nature of the body, which also includes North Ossetian and South Ossetian negotiators. Despite an agreement with Russia to hold the session in Tbilisi, observers were skeptical that it would take place as planned.
• On September 5, 2007, Davit Bakradze, the Georgian state minister for conflict resolution, criticized the South Ossetian secessionist authorities for their recent ban on travel to Georgia. The ban, which took effect on September 1, was enforced by South Ossetia to protect its citizens from alleged provocations by Georgia ahead of the region's independence day on September 20. (https://civil.ge/archives/112976)
  • Bakradze argued that this move would only further isolate the people of South Ossetia from their needs and demonstrated the repressive nature of the local authorities under Eduard Kokoity. He suggested that the travel ban would expose the South Ossetians to the reality of their current leadership, making it easier for them to choose between Kokoity’s regime and the alternative offered by the Tbilisi-backed South Ossetian provisional administration, led by Dimitri Sanakoev.
• On September 6, 2007, Miomir Zuzul, the OSCE Chairman-in-Office’s personal envoy, reported on the August 6 missile incident at a press conference in Vienna. Zuzul described the incident as "extremely dangerous and worrying," but acknowledged that it was difficult to determine exactly what happened. His findings, presented to the OSCE Permanent Council, revealed a lack of consensus among expert reports on the matter. (https://civil.ge/archives/112987)
  • Two Western expert groups supported Georgia's version, claiming that Russian aircraft had violated Georgian airspace and launched a guided anti-radar missile. However, Russian military experts suggested the missile incident was staged by Georgia to discredit Russia.
  • Zuzul emphasized that the OSCE did not aim to act as a prosecutor or judge. He also highlighted the need for the OSCE to establish rapid response mechanisms to prevent and address future incidents like this one. His report proposed the possibility of a special representative for the Chairman-in-Office to be deployed swiftly in case of a crisis. While the report's preventative measures were made public, the rest remained confidential.
• On September 7, 2007, a blast occurred north of the capital of breakaway South Ossetia, Tskhinvali, injuring a man named Igor Kokoev, 24. The incident involved an explosive device, which the South Ossetian Press and Information Committee reported was triggered when Kokoev found a mobile phone on the ground. Upon hearing it ring and attempting to pick it up, the phone exploded. (https://civil.ge/archives/112991
  • The South Ossetian authorities, particularly the Interior Minister Mikhail Mindzaev, labeled the explosion a terrorist act masterminded by Georgia. He claimed it was part of a broader attempt by Georgia to destabilize the region ahead of South Ossetia's independence day celebrations, set for September 20. The details surrounding whether the phone had been used to detonate the device or was the device itself remained unclear.
  • On September 7, 2007, a blast in the South Ossetian capital of Tskhinvali injured a 24-year-old man, Igor Kokoev, who was reportedly hurt by an improvised explosive device hidden inside a mobile phone. The device detonated after Kokoev picked up the phone, which had rung when he found it on the ground. South Ossetian authorities labeled the incident a terrorist act allegedly orchestrated by Georgia to destabilize the region before the independence celebrations on September 20. (https://civil.ge/archives/112997)
    • In response, Georgian officials strongly rejected these accusations, calling them provocations and disinformation. Davit Kezerashvili, Georgia's defense minister, dismissed the claims as baseless, while Davit Bakradze, the Georgian state minister for conflict resolution, insisted that Georgia had no involvement in such acts. Nika Rurua, a Georgian parliament deputy, predicted more provocations as tensions rose with the nearing independence day, but advised not to overreact.
    • In a separate development on the same day, the South Ossetian authorities alleged that a Georgian army helicopter had flown over the South Ossetian-controlled village of Tsinagari, further inflaming the situation.
• The OSCE (Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe) chose not to proceed with further investigations into the August 6 missile incident, which saw Georgia claim that a Russian aircraft had dropped a guided anti-radar missile deep into Georgian territory near the South Ossetian conflict zone. (https://civil.ge/archives/112992)
  • Following discussions at the OSCE Permanent Council on September 6, 2007, Miomir Zuzul, the OSCE's special envoy, reported that conflicting expert opinions made it difficult to determine exactly what happened. While some Western experts supported Georgia’s version of the incident, suggesting that a Russian aircraft had intruded into Georgian airspace, Russian military experts argued that Georgia had staged the incident to discredit Russia.
  • The United States strongly supported Georgia, urging the OSCE to invite experts for further discussions and for a third-party investigation. However, Russia opposed any additional OSCE involvement, emphasizing that the issue should be addressed bilaterally between Georgia and Russia.
  • Despite calls for a broader investigation, OSCE representatives, including Zuzul, suggested that the organization should focus instead on creating rapid-response mechanisms for future crises. The European Union was more cautious, acknowledging the work of the experts but not directly endorsing Georgia's version of events. Additionally, they expressed support for increased OSCE presence in the South Ossetian conflict zone, though this was unlikely due to Russian objections.
• On September 11, 2007, Russian peacekeepers detained two Georgian citizens at the Megvrekisi observation post in the South Ossetian conflict zone and transported them to Tskhinvali, the capital of the breakaway South Ossetia region. Georgian State Minister for Conflict Resolution, Davit Bakradze, demanded their immediate release, condemning the detentions as illegal. Bakradze also accused the peacekeepers of insulting the detainees and claimed they had no authority to stop locals and check their documents at the observation post, which was intended only for monitoring purposes. (https://civil.ge/archives/113016
  • The Georgian government called for the creation of a joint investigative group to probe the incident and hold those responsible accountable.
  • On September 12, 2007, Russian peacekeepers released the two Georgian citizens who had been detained the previous day at the Megvrekisi observation post. The Georgian government had been demanding their release. (https://civil.ge/archives/113018
    • According to the Command of the Joint Peacekeeping Forces, the two men had been detained and taken to Tskhinvali because they refused to provide their documents. The South Ossetian Press and Information Committee labeled the Georgians' actions as a provocation against the peacekeepers.
    • However, the Georgian side maintained that the detention was illegal, and that the peacekeepers had no authority to check the documents of locals at the observation post.
• On September 13, 2007, the Russian Foreign Ministry demanded the unconditional release of two Russian peacekeepers, Tariel Khachirov and Vitaly Valiev, who had been detained by Georgian police on August 29. The two men, who served in the Russian peacekeeping battalion in the South Ossetian conflict zone, were charged with illegally detaining Georgian journalists and others. They had been placed in pre-trial custody in Georgia, with their detention lasting since August 30. (https://civil.ge/archives/113030)
  • The Russian Foreign Ministry emphasized that Georgia would bear full responsibility for any negative consequences in bilateral relations. Despite repeated diplomatic protests from Russia and requests for consular access, the peacekeepers remained in custody without an explanation from Georgia about what Russia described as the violent treatment of its servicemen.
  • On September 14, 2007, Georgia rejected Russia's claims that Tariel Khachirov and Vitaly Valiev, two peacekeepers arrested in the South Ossetian conflict zone on August 29, were Russian citizens. The Georgian Foreign Ministry clarified that the two men were Georgian citizens, dismissing Russia's demands for their unconditional release as unfounded. (https://civil.ge/archives/113039)
    • The ministry expressed concern that certain elements within Russia might be using this incident to escalate tensions in the South Ossetian region and further deteriorate Georgia-Russia relations. This response followed Russia’s warning that Georgia would bear responsibility for any negative consequences if the peacekeepers were not released.
• On September 26, 2007, a shootout occurred in the South Ossetian conflict zone, during which mortars and artillery were reportedly used. The clash resulted in one female resident of Tskhinvali being slightly injured. Both the South Ossetian authorities and Georgia confirmed the incident, with Georgia accusing South Ossetian forces of initiating the attack. The gunfire was concentrated in the southern suburbs of Tskhinvali, and Georgian-controlled villages, including Nikozi and Ergneti, were targeted. (https://civil.ge/archives/113118
  • The firefight lasted about an hour and ended when Eduard Kokoity, the leader of South Ossetian secessionists, ordered heavy armor to be deployed in the city but later canceled the order after the fighting ceased. This incident occurred during the visit of Yuri Popov, the chief Russian negotiator on South Ossetia, who was holding talks in Tbilisi and was scheduled to meet in Tskhinvali on September 27. Popov's visit aimed to organize a plenary session of the Joint Control Commission (JCC) in Tbilisi later that year.
• In September 2007, it was confirmed that a plenary session of the Joint Control Commission (JCC) on South Ossetia would be held in Tbilisi in late October. This decision followed discussions between Dimitri Manjavidze, Georgia's deputy state minister for conflict resolution, and Yuri Popov, the Russian chief negotiator for South Ossetia. Popov expressed optimism after consultations in both Tbilisi and Tskhinvali, where the South Ossetian side indicated their willingness to participate in the meeting. (https://civil.ge/archives/113142
  • However, Georgia had long been critical of the JCC, viewing it as an outdated and unfair Russian-led body, which includes negotiators from Georgia, Russia, North Ossetia, and South Ossetia. In August 2007, Georgia had already downgraded its participation in the JCC, replacing State Minister Davit Bakradze with his deputy Dimitri Manjavidze. The last plenary session had been held in Vladikavkaz in North Ossetia the previous year.
• On October 10, 2007, French President Nicolas Sarkozy raised the issue of the August 6 missile incident in Georgia with Russian President Vladimir Putin. In an interview with Le Monde, Sarkozy expressed his concerns, stating that he believed the missile incident was “not a good initiative,” although he did not know who was responsible. He also emphasized that while he did not believe in a return to the Cold War, such actions could lead to tensions and decisions harmful to Russia and its partners. Sarkozy’s comments were seen as a warning to Russia about engaging in "off-limits military actions" towards Georgia. (https://civil.ge/archives/113233)
• On October 17, 2007, the OSCE Forum for Security Co-operation (FSC) discussed the August 6 missile incident involving Georgian airspace. Experts from seven western countries (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Sweden, the UK, and the US) supported Georgia’s version of events, stating that at least one aircraft from Russia had entered Georgian airspace and dropped a guided anti-radar missile. In contrast, Russian military experts argued that the incident was staged by Georgia to discredit Moscow. The discussions were seen as a chance for all parties to express their views, though Russia continued to deny involvement, while western experts reaffirmed their findings. The OSCE's Permanent Council had previously discussed the incident, with the US strongly backing Georgia, while the EU took a more neutral stance and Russia aimed to limit the international response. (https://civil.ge/archives/113273)
• On October 22, 2007, it was announced that the Joint Control Commission (JCC) on South Ossetia would hold its plenary session in Tbilisi on October 23-24, marking the first such meeting in over a year. The session is seen as a potential shift in Georgia’s approach to the Russian-dominated negotiation format. During the talks, Georgia plans to focus on issues like the demilitarization of the region, the disarmament of illegal armed groups, and control over the Roki Tunnel, which is a key route for smuggling weapons. In contrast, South Ossetia aims to secure a non-use-of-force agreement, and will also raise concerns about the arrest of ethnic Ossetians by Georgian police, including a recent case involving Ivan Bestaev. The JCC, which includes negotiators from Georgia, South Ossetia, Russia, and North Ossetia, has faced challenges, with Georgia attempting to reduce its involvement in the body, especially after the August 6 missile incident. Despite these tensions, Georgia’s State Minister for Conflict Resolution, Davit Bakradze, is expected to attend the session. (https://civil.ge/archives/113296
  • On October 23, 2007, negotiators from Georgia, South Ossetia, Russia, and North Ossetia met in Tbilisi for the first time in over a year to hold a plenary session of the Joint Control Commission (JCC). During the meeting, Georgia emphasized its priority of demilitarizing the region, disarming illegal armed groups, and preventing arms trafficking. Specifically, Georgia’s state minister for conflict resolution, Davit Bakradze, advocated for two key measures: controlling the Roki Tunnel (which links South Ossetia to Russia) and establishing an observation post at Didi Gupta village to monitor arms trafficking. Meanwhile, the South Ossetian side aimed to secure an agreement on the non-use of force, hoping for a formal commitment from both South Ossetian leader Eduard Kokoity and President Saakashvili. However, Georgia refused to sign such an agreement until peacekeeping operations and the negotiation format were internationalized. The meeting also highlighted ongoing tensions, including the recent arrest of ethnic Ossetians by Georgian police, with the South Ossetian negotiator Boris Chochiev accusing Georgia of undermining talks. Despite these challenges, the session marked a new phase in the OSCE’s involvement in the peace process, with Terhi Hakala attending as the new head of the OSCE Mission in Georgia. (https://civil.ge/archives/113301)
  • After the first day of Joint Control Commission (JCC) talks in Tbilisi on October 23, 2007, there were mixed reactions regarding the discussions. Georgia’s chief negotiator, Dimitri Manjavidze, expressed optimism, stating that the sides were close to agreeing on placing an observation post at Didi Gupta, a village located at the northern edge of the South Ossetian conflict zone. This proposal, which aims to prevent arms trafficking, has received support from Russia, North Ossetia, and the OSCE. However, Russian chief negotiator Yuri Popov remained cautious, noting that no concrete agreement had yet been reached, though he remained hopeful for progress on October 24. Meanwhile, South Ossetian negotiator Boris Chochiev declined to comment on the discussions. A key point of disagreement remained South Ossetia's push for a non-use of force agreement, which Georgia rejected, arguing it was premature without prior demilitarization measures, including control of the Roki Tunnel. Another contentious issue was the role of Dimitri Sanakoev, leader of the Tbilisi-backed South Ossetian provisional administration. While Georgia wanted to involve Sanakoev in the talks, South Ossetia dismissed him as a “puppet” of Tbilisi. (https://civil.ge/archives/113308
  • The Joint Control Commission (JCC) on South Ossetia resumed talks in Tbilisi on October 24, 2007, after a break of over a year. The focus of the session was to agree on a final protocol outlining the sides' positions on future negotiations. Russian chief negotiator Yuri Popov expressed cautious expectations, noting that no concrete results were anticipated, but emphasized the importance of future progress in subsequent meetings. Georgian chief negotiator Dimitri Manjavidze reported that the sides were close to an agreement on placing an observation post at Didi Gupta, a strategic location on the northern edge of the South Ossetian conflict zone, which Georgia sees as crucial to prevent arms trafficking. However, South Ossetia remained hesitant to approve the plan. Another point of contention was the non-use of force agreement pushed by South Ossetia, which Georgia opposed without prior demilitarization steps, such as control of the Roki Tunnel. Additionally, Tbilisi-backed Dimitri Sanakoev, leader of the provisional South Ossetian administration, was excluded from the talks by Tskhinvali, with Russia siding with Tskhinvali's view that Sanakoev was not a legitimate party to the conflict. (https://civil.ge/archives/113312
  • After two days of Joint Control Commission (JCC) talks on South Ossetia, Georgian chief negotiator Dimitri Manjavidze declared the sessions to be ineffective, blaming the South Ossetian side for the lack of progress. Manjavidze criticized the Russian-led negotiating format, asserting that the failure to reach agreements on demilitarization issues made continuing the JCC pointless. On the other hand, South Ossetian negotiator Boris Chochiev blamed Georgia’s refusal to sign a non-use of force agreement, citing past statements by Georgian officials about potential military actions. Despite the lack of concrete results, Russian negotiator Yuri Popov remained optimistic, expressing hope that the existing negotiation format would continue, warning that halting talks could send an alarming signal. (https://civil.ge/archives/113318)
  • Following two days of talks in Tbilisi as part of the Joint Control Commission (JCC), Davit Bakradze, the Georgian State Minister for Conflict Resolution, expressed frustration over the lack of progress. He acknowledged that although Georgia was willing to continue participating in the JCC, it would not undermine the existing format but would focus more on alternative approaches that could yield concrete results. Specifically, Bakradze pointed to the Georgian state commission and the Tbilisi-backed South Ossetian provisional administration, which he believed offered more promising paths toward conflict resolution. (https://civil.ge/archives/113321)
    • The talks, which took place on October 23-24, revolved around several issues, including the establishment of an observation post at Didi Gupta, located at the northern edge of the South Ossetian conflict zone. The Georgian side hoped this post would help prevent arms trafficking and serve as a first step toward demilitarization. However, South Ossetian negotiator Boris Chochiev rejected the proposal, insisting that Didi Gupta was vital for South Ossetia's control.
    • Another contentious issue was the status of the South Ossetian provisional administration led by Dimitri Sanakoev, which Georgia sought to have internationally recognized but faced opposition from both Tskhinvali and Russia. South Ossetia's demand for a non-use of force agreement was also a major point of disagreement, with Georgia arguing that such an agreement would be meaningless without concrete demilitarization steps.
    • Despite efforts by Georgia to be constructive, Bakradze blamed South Ossetia and Russia for the failure to reach any agreements, dismissing the JCC as superficial and ineffective in resolving the conflict.

September 2007 Kodori clash

• On September 20, 2007, Sergey Bagapsh, the leader of Abkhazia, accused Georgia of aggression after a group of armed Georgians reportedly entered Abkhazia and attacked conscripts at a training camp, resulting in two deaths and several injuries. The whereabouts of additional servicemen from the Tkvarcheli district were also unknown. Bagapsh threatened to take appropriate measures in response, while the Georgian side had yet to comment on the incident. (https://civil.ge/archives/185533
• On September 20, 2007, Vano Merabishvili, Georgia's Interior Minister, reported that Georgian police had repelled an attack by Abkhaz special forces near a road construction site in Upper Kodori Gorge, which is Georgian-controlled territory in Abkhazia. According to Merabishvili, two Abkhaz soldiers were killed and six were captured. The attackers did not have identification documents. The incident was believed to be an attempt to sabotage the strategically significant road, which would connect Georgia proper to the gorge during winter months. (https://civil.ge/archives/185534
  • In contrast, Abkhaz authorities claimed earlier that Georgian forces had attacked a conscript border guard training camp in the Tkvarcheli district of Abkhazia, which borders Kodori.
  • On September 20, 2007, a violent clash occurred between Georgian forces and Abkhaz militiamen in the Upper Kodori Gorge, a region controlled by Georgia but claimed by the breakaway Abkhazia. The incident resulted in two Abkhaz militiamen being killed, at least one injured, and six others captured by Georgian forces. (https://civil.ge/archives/113070)
    • The location and nature of the conflict remain disputed. Georgia claims that its forces successfully repelled an Abkhaz attack near a road under construction in the gorge. The Abkhaz side, however, asserts that Georgian forces attacked an Abkhaz border guard training camp in the nearby Tkvarcheli district, deep within Abkhaz-controlled territory.
    • Georgian Interior Minister Vano Merabishvili described the incident as an attack by saboteurs and claimed the Georgian forces had successfully eliminated the infiltrators. In response, Abkhaz leader Sergey Bagapsh condemned the attack and requested that UN observers and Russian peacekeepers investigate the incident. Despite the clash, Georgian officials emphasized their commitment to a peaceful resolution of the conflict, though they vowed to respond firmly to any further provocations.
  • Following a shootout on September 20, 2007, in which two Abkhaz troopers were killed and six others captured, the Abkhaz military was placed on alert. Kristian Bzhania, a spokesperson for Abkhaz leader Sergey Bagapsh, stated that reinforcements and possibly heavy armor would be sent to the Tkvarcheli district in response to the incident. (https://civil.ge/archives/113069)
    • The Georgian government claims that its police successfully repelled an Abkhaz special operations platoon, which was attempting to sabotage a strategically important road under construction in Kodori Gorge. In contrast, Abkhaz authorities argue that Georgian forces attacked an Abkhaz border guard training camp in the Tkvarcheli district, at least 10 kilometers away from the road construction site.
    • This escalation led to a heightened military presence in the area as both sides prepared for further confrontation.
  • On September 21, 2007, Rustavi 2 TV reported that four of the six militiamen captured by Georgian forces after a clash in Kodori Gorge on September 20 were Russians, with the remaining two being ethnic Abkhazians. The report also stated that one of the two killed in the incident was Russian. (https://civil.ge/archives/113072)
    • The clash occurred in the upper Kodori Gorge, which is controlled by Georgia. Georgian authorities claimed that their forces had intercepted a group of saboteurs attempting to destroy a road under construction in the area. However, Abkhaz authorities contended that Georgian forces attacked a border guard training camp in the Tkvarcheli district, located further inside Abkhazia.
    • Georgian Foreign Minister Gela Bezhuashvili called for resuming bilateral talks with the Abkhaz to defuse the growing tensions, suggesting that a third party might be trying to disrupt dialogue between the two sides.
  • On September 21, 2007, President Saakashvili praised the Georgian Interior Ministry for successfully repelling a group of saboteurs in Abkhazia's upper Kodori Gorge and instructed law enforcement to adopt an even tougher response if similar incidents occurred. The clash on September 20 resulted in the deaths of two Abkhaz militiamen, with six others captured. Georgian authorities claimed the group, armed with assault rifles and grenade launchers, was attempting to sabotage a strategic road under construction. However, the Abkhaz side insisted Georgian forces had attacked an Abkhaz border guard training camp. Saakashvili referred to the attackers as “terrorists”, emphasizing that Georgia would respond to provocations but remained committed to peaceful dialogue. He also warned that any attempts to turn Georgia into a permanent conflict zone would be met with force, recalling a Russian-backed helicopter attack earlier in March 2007. (https://civil.ge/archives/113076
  • On September 21, 2007, Guram Gumba, the head of Abkhazia's parliamentary committee for foreign affairs, called for "tough measures" in response to what he described as Georgian provocations in the Tkvarcheli district. Gumba claimed the recent attack on Abkhaz border guards, which resulted in two deaths, two injuries, and the capture of seven militiamen, was a consequence of Sokhumi’s failure to retaliate to Georgian actions. While Georgia asserted that it had intercepted a group of Abkhaz saboteurs in the Kodori Gorge, Gumba argued that Georgia’s militarization, aided by Western powers, was increasing regional insecurity and could lead to war. He warned that Abkhazia’s moderate stance had allowed Georgia’s threats to evolve into real dangers to their security (https://civil.ge/archives/113077
  • On September 21, 2007, the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) began investigating an armed clash that occurred between Abkhaz and Georgian forces on September 20, which resulted in two Abkhaz militiamen being killed, two injured, and seven captured. The UN Secretary-General called for all parties to exercise maximum restraint to avoid further escalation. Meanwhile, Georgia's representative to the UN, Irakli Alasania, claimed that an Abkhaz militant group had infiltrated Georgian-controlled areas of upper Kodori Gorge for a reconnaissance mission aimed at sabotaging a strategic road under construction. (https://civil.ge/archives/113078)
  • On September 21, 2007, the Russian Foreign Ministry blamed Georgian saboteurs for an armed clash between Georgian and Abkhaz forces that occurred on September 20. Russia supported Sokhumi's version of events, claiming that Georgian forces attacked an Abkhaz anti-terrorist unit's base near Tkvarcheli, leading to the deaths of two Abkhaz militiamen, the injury of two others, and the capture of seven. The Georgian Interior Ministry reported that the clash involved an Abkhaz sabotage unit infiltrating Georgia-controlled upper Kodori Gorge on a reconnaissance mission. (https://civil.ge/archives/113082)
  • On September 21, 2007, Russia's Foreign Ministry supported Sokhumi's version of events, blaming Georgian saboteurs for an attack on an Abkhaz anti-terrorist unit's base near Tkvarcheli on September 20. The clash resulted in two Abkhaz militiamen killed, two injured, and seven captured. Georgia claimed the incident occurred on its side of the border, near a strategic road under construction in upper Kodori Gorge, aimed at linking Abkhazia with Georgia proper. Meanwhile, Abkhaz and Russian sources maintained the clash took place within Abkhaz-controlled territory, fueling further tensions. The UN Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) began investigating the incident, and a Joint Fact-Finding Group was formed, though past investigations had often been inconclusive. (https://civil.ge/archives/113080)
  • The September 20, 2007 clash between Abkhaz and Georgian forces in upper Kodori Gorge sparked a new round of tensions between Tbilisi and Sokhumi, making resuming talks even less likely. Abkhaz leader Sergey Bagapsh declared that Abkhazia would eventually reclaim upper Kodori Gorge, which had been under Georgian control since last summer. In response, Georgian President Saakashvili called the attack a provocation by “saboteurs” and vowed a stronger response. Georgian officials accused Abkhazia of aggression, while Abkhaz officials suggested that they had the means to escalate military operations but would act only in emergencies. Talks between the two sides had been suspended for over a year, with Sokhumi insisting on preconditions like the withdrawal of Georgian forces from the area. Despite these tensions, Georgia maintained its stance that it would never relinquish control of Abkhazia. (https://civil.ge/archives/113079)
• On September 20, 2007, four armed and masked men stole equipment meant for a new Abkhaz TV station in Zugdidi district, near the Georgian-Abkhaz border. The equipment, intended to serve the predominantly Georgian-populated Gali district of Abkhazia, was seized from a vehicle, with the Abkhaz authorities accusing the Georgian side of being behind the theft. Ruslan Kishmaria, the Abkhaz envoy in Gali, confirmed the robbery, calling it more than a typical crime. Despite the theft, Kishmaria assured that the TV station would still begin broadcasting on September 24, 2007, with equipment donated by Conciliation Resources, a London-based NGO. (https://civil.ge/archives/113081)
• On September 23, 2007, seven Abkhaz militiamen, captured during the September 20 clash between Georgian and Abkhaz forces, were sent to two-month pre-trial detention by the Georgian authorities. The clash resulted in the deaths of two Abkhaz militiamen and injuries to two others, while the Abkhaz armed forces remained on high alert in response to the incident. (https://civil.ge/archives/113083)
• A joint monitoring operation by Russian peacekeepers and UN observers on September 24, 2007 reportedly confirmed that the September 20 clash occurred on Abkhaz-controlled territory, supporting Sokhumi's claim that the confrontation resulted from a Georgian saboteur infiltration. Two Abkhaz militiamen were killed, two injured, and seven captured. Russian peacekeeper commander Sergey Chaban stated that the clash took place 700 meters from the administrative border between Abkhazia and Georgia, backing Sokhumi's version of the events. However, no official confirmation was available from the UN Observer Mission in Georgia at the time. (https://civil.ge/archives/113088)
• The UN Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) confirmed on September 24, 2007 that its probe into the September 20 clash between Georgian forces and Abkhaz militiamen is still ongoing. This statement contradicted earlier reports from Russian peacekeepers that a joint investigation had concluded the clash took place on Abkhaz-controlled territory, leading to two Abkhaz casualties. The UNOMIG clarified that the fact-finding into the incident, including its location, was still in progress. A quadripartite Joint Fact-Finding Group (JFFG), led by UNOMIG, was conducting the investigation. (https://civil.ge/archives/113090)
• On September 24, 2007, Sergey Bagapsh, the leader of Abkhazia, accused the UN Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) of distorting the facts about the September 20 clash between Georgian forces and Abkhaz militiamen. Bagapsh claimed that the UN observers were attempting to portray the clash as occurring on Georgian-controlled territory. He also stated that UNOMIG had been restricted from visiting the scene of the clash without an Abkhaz or Russian peacekeeper escort. (https://civil.ge/archives/113092)
  • Bagapsh described the clash as an act of terrorism, alleging that two Abkhaz militiamen were executed after being beaten, with one stabbed and the other shot in the head. He further labeled Georgia as a terrorist state and an aggressor that could provoke a large-scale war. The clash had resulted in two Abkhaz fatalities, two injuries, and seven captives, with no Georgian casualties. The incident occurred shortly after Abkhaz border guards returned to their camp following a training exercise.
• On September 24, 2007, Sergey Bagapsh, the leader of Abkhazia, called on Thomas Hammarberg, the Council of Europe’s (CoE) Commissioner for Human Rights, to intervene and facilitate the release of seven Abkhaz border guards who were captured by Georgia following the September 20 clash. Bagapsh noted that Hammarberg had previously facilitated the release of a Georgian prisoner, Levan Mamasakhlisi, from an Abkhaz prison in 2007. (https://civil.ge/archives/113091
  • Bagapsh expressed that discussions were ongoing with the CoE Commissioner and other international organizations to resolve the issue. He emphasized the importance of protecting the human rights of Abkhaz border guards, just as human rights activists had done for Georgians in similar situations.
• On September 25, 2007, Sergey Lavrov, the Russian Foreign Minister, accused Georgia of avoiding talks about the conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Lavrov said that Georgian Foreign Minister Gela Bezhuashvili had canceled a scheduled meeting with him in New York during the UN General Assembly to avoid discussions about these regions. According to Lavrov, no alternative meeting was proposed by Georgia, which he found concerning, especially in light of Georgia's actions in the two regions. (https://civil.ge/archives/113099)
  • Lavrov also referred to the September 20 clash in Abkhazia, where two Abkhaz militiamen were killed and seven captured by Georgian forces. He claimed that the militiamen had surrendered, but were later executed, including one who was stabbed and another shot at close range. Lavrov expressed hope that the UN Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) would draw impartial conclusions from the investigation into the incident.
  • Furthermore, Lavrov criticized Georgia's refusal to sign a non-resumption of hostilities agreement, questioning whether Georgia was truly committed to a peaceful resolution of the conflicts. He also condemned Georgia's actions regarding South Ossetia, particularly the promotion of Dimitri Sanakoev, a leader of the Tbilisi-backed South Ossetian administration.
• In his speech at the UN General Assembly on September 26, 2007, Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili strongly criticized Russia for its role in exacerbating separatist conflicts in Georgia, particularly in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Saakashvili condemned Russian actions for inciting and supporting separatist movements, which he argued required a strong response from the international community. (https://civil.ge/archives/113119)
  • Saakashvili specifically took aim at Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, who had accused Georgian forces of executing two Abkhaz militiamen in the aftermath of a clash on September 20. Saakashvili rejected these accusations, asserting that one of the killed men was a Russian lieutenant colonel, who had been involved in organizing separatist activities in Georgia. He questioned why a senior Russian officer was operating in Georgian territory, accusing Russia of supporting subversive activities in Georgia.
  • Additionally, Saakashvili highlighted the construction of a Russian military base in Java, a South Ossetian town outside the designated conflict zone, accusing Russia of undermining peace efforts. He claimed Georgia had evidence, including video footage, showing Russian assistance in this illegal construction, which he said was happening under the nose of international monitors.
  • Regarding the situation in South Ossetia, Saakashvili introduced Dimitri Sanakoev, the head of a Tbilisi-backed South Ossetian provisional administration, asserting that Sanakoev had been democratically elected by the people of South Ossetia. He urged the international community to support this initiative as an opportunity for peace.
  • Saakashvili also criticized the United Nations for failing to resolve the conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, particularly the issue of displaced persons. He called for a comprehensive review of the peace process, which he described as stagnant and unproductive, and demanded that the current Russian-led peacekeeping operation be replaced with a more neutral and competent force.
  • Finally, Saakashvili urged the resumption of direct dialogue between Tbilisi and Sokhumi (the capital of Abkhazia) without preconditions, offering security, autonomy, and constitutional protections to the Abkhaz people under international guarantees.
• On September 27, 2007, Georgian Foreign Minister Gela Bezhuashvili and Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov held a meeting in New York to address issues in their bilateral relations. The discussions focused on the longstanding problems between the two countries, particularly the South Ossetian conflict. (https://civil.ge/archives/113132)
  • After the meeting, Lavrov announced that both sides had agreed to hold a session of the Joint Control Commission (JCC) in October, aiming to resume talks on resolving the South Ossetian conflict, which had been suspended for some time.
  • Bezhuashvili, in turn, emphasized Georgia's stance on the involvement of Russia in supporting separatism in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. He expressed the Georgian government's strong opposition to Russian political, financial, and military backing for the separatist movements in these regions.
• The Foreign Ministry of Abkhazia criticized President Saakashvili’s speech at the UN General Assembly on September 28, 2007. They accused him of attempting to mislead the international community. The ministry specifically opposed Saakashvili's calls for replacing Russian peacekeeping forces with what it described as "so-called ‘independent’ and ‘unbiased’ forces," warning that such actions would stall the peace process and hinder efforts to improve relations between Abkhazia and Georgia. (https://civil.ge/archives/113140)
  • The Abkhaz Foreign Ministry also claimed that Georgia was not willing to recognize its own mistakes or take responsibility for the conflict. They argued that Georgia was deliberately destabilizing the situation and was not open to a peaceful resolution. Additionally, they criticized Saakashvili's dismissal of UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon's recommendations as "amoral and meager" and accused Georgia of reinforcing its military presence in the Upper Kodori Gorge, potentially escalating tensions further.
• On October 3, 2007, Abkhaz leader Sergey Bagapsh issued a warning regarding unauthorized flights over Abkhazia's airspace. He stated that Abkhazia would not guarantee the security of flights unless prior notification was provided to the authorities in Sokhumi. Bagapsh highlighted the increasing number of unidentified aircraft conducting reconnaissance missions over the region, and declared that the Abkhaz Defense Ministry would take measures to prevent such flights. In a letter to the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), UN Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG), and the Russian peacekeeping forces, Bagapsh also argued that Georgian air controllers should not manage international civil flights over Abkhazia, as the Abkhaz air control center at Sokhumi airport was fully capable of handling them. (https://civil.ge/archives/113177)
• On October 8, 2007, UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon reported to the UN Security Council about the ongoing investigation into the September 20 clash between Abkhaz and Georgian forces. The clash resulted in the deaths of two Russian officers on contract with the Abkhaz and the capture of seven Abkhaz militiamen by Georgian forces. The incident occurred outside the area of responsibility of the UN Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) and Russian peacekeeping forces. Ban Ki-moon emphasized that it was too early to assign responsibility and noted that UNOMIG was conducting independent fact-finding. In response, the Secretary General recommended international monitoring of the areas between the conflict zone and Kodori Gorge, including the use of unmanned aerial vehicles and artillery radar. The report also highlighted a relative improvement in security in the Gali sector, though volatility remained. It further stressed the need for dialogue between the Abkhaz and Georgian sides to address security and humanitarian issues, suggesting that such a dialogue could lead to a comprehensive political settlement. The report also recommended extending the UNOMIG mandate until April 15, 2008, with a new UN Security Council resolution expected on October 15, 2007. (https://civil.ge/archives/113212
• On October 10, 2007, Abkhazia expressed its support for the recommendation made by UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon to expand the zone of responsibility of the UN Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) and Russian peacekeepers. This recommendation, issued on October 8, called for international monitoring of areas between the conflict zone and Kodori Gorge, including the use of unmanned aerial vehicles and artillery radar, in response to the September 20 clash that occurred outside UNOMIG's and the Russian peacekeepers' area. Sergey Shamba, the Abkhaz foreign minister, stated that the proposal aligned with Abkhazia's interests and would help improve security in border areas with Georgia. The UN Security Council is expected to pass a new resolution on October 15, which will include the extension of the UNOMIG mandate. (https://civil.ge/archives/113220)
• On October 11, 2007, the UN Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) confirmed the Abkhaz version of the September 20 clash between Abkhaz and Georgian forces, which resulted in the death of two Russian officers and the capture of seven Abkhaz militiamen. The incident, which took place near Mount Bokhundjara in Abkhazia, was a point of contention between Tbilisi and Sokhumi, with differing claims about the location and intent of the forces involved. The UN report, based on DNA analysis and witness testimonies, suggested that the clash occurred on the Abkhaz side of the border but also indicated that the Abkhaz militiamen may have been operating inside Georgian-controlled territory prior to the event. The report noted that the two Russian officers had likely been executed, as they died from gunshot wounds at close range. Tensions over the incident were fueled by contrasting accusations from Russia and Georgia, both of which extended the dispute to the UN General Assembly. In light of the findings, UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon had recommended expanding international monitoring in the Kodori Gorge area. The UN Security Council is set to adopt a new resolution on October 15, with discussions about including provisions related to Kodori's security, which Georgia insists should reflect progress made since the 1994 Moscow Ceasefire Agreement. (https://civil.ge/archives/113240)
• On October 12, 2007, Vitaly Churkin, Russia's ambassador to the UN, demanded punishment for those responsible for the "gangster-style execution" of two Abkhaz militiamen on September 20. This followed an interim report by UN observers, which confirmed the Abkhaz version of events, stating that the incident occurred on Abkhaz-controlled territory and that the two Russian officers, contracted by Abkhaz forces, were killed with automatic weapons at point-blank range. Churkin insisted there was enough evidence to suggest that the Abkhaz did not return fire and called for the release of seven captured Abkhaz militiamen. Meanwhile, Sokhumi welcomed the UNOMIG report, viewing it as impartial and emphasizing that the Abkhaz officers were attacked on Abkhaz territory. Sergey Shamba, the Abkhaz foreign minister, expressed confidence that the report would aid efforts to gain international support for the release of the detained Abkhaz soldiers. (https://civil.ge/archives/113232)
• On October 18, 2007, a clash occurred between Abkhaz and Georgian forces, resulting in the death of an Abkhaz militiaman and the injury of a Georgian policeman. The two sides provided conflicting accounts of the incident, which took place on October 17. According to the Georgian Interior Ministry, the clash was the result of an attempted smuggling operation involving a stolen car from Tbilisi. During the confrontation, one Georgian criminal suspect was captured, one Abkhaz criminal suspect was killed, and another escaped. Vano Merabishvili, the Georgian interior minister, described the incident as an encounter where the Abkhaz criminals opened fire. On the other hand, the Abkhaz side claimed that a group of Georgian saboteurs attacked an Abkhaz border guard checkpoint near the village of Tagiloni, leading to the capture and eventual death of an Abkhaz border guard officer, Manuchar Arshba. Ruslan Kishmaria, the Abkhaz envoy, warned that Georgia’s actions could escalate the situation, drawing parallels to the September 20 clash, and cautioned that attempts to "de-freeze" the conflict could lead to dangerous consequences. (https://civil.ge/archives/113277)
• On October 25, 2007, Sergey Shamba, the Abkhaz foreign minister, clarified that the visit of Georgian State Minister Davit Bakradze to Sokhumi did not signal the resumption of official talks between Georgia and Abkhazia. The meeting, also attended by Jean Arnault, the UN Secretary General’s Special Representative to Georgia, aimed to address recent issues, particularly those raised in the UN Security Council’s resolution on Abkhazia and the recommendations from the UN Secretary General’s Group of Friends of Georgia. Shamba emphasized that while the visit marked the end of a long pause in direct communication, Sokhumi had previously tied the resumption of dialogue to preconditions, including the withdrawal of Georgian forces and the Abkhaz government-in-exile from the upper Kodori Gorge. (https://civil.ge/archives/113328)
• On October 25, 2007, Georgia agreed to release seven Abkhaz militiamen who had been captured during the September 20 clash between Abkhaz and Georgian forces. The agreement was reached following talks between Georgian State Minister Davit Bakradze and Abkhaz Foreign Minister Sergey Shamba in Sokhumi. The release was described as a gesture of Georgia's goodwill and will be facilitated by the UN once formalities are completed. Bakradze stated that the militiamen would be returned to Abkhazia within the week. Shamba called the agreement a "serious step forward" and expressed hope that this cooperation could lead to progress in resolving the broader Georgian-Abkhaz conflict, despite the current stagnation in negotiations. (https://civil.ge/archives/113329)
• On October 25, 2007, senior Georgian and Abkhaz officials resumed high-level talks in Sokhumi after over a year of stalled diplomacy. The meeting between Davit Bakradze, Georgia's State Minister for Conflict Resolution, and Sergey Shamba, Abkhazia's Foreign Minister, marked a significant step forward in the tense relationship between the two sides. (https://civil.ge/archives/113330)
  • One of the main outcomes of the talks was Georgia's decision to release seven Abkhaz militiamen who had been captured during a September 20 clash. The militiamen will be freed on October 27, and the UN will facilitate the transfer. Bakradze called the release a goodwill gesture, aiming to improve the general climate between Georgia and Abkhazia. He hoped it would contribute to future cooperation and negotiations. The clash had also resulted in the deaths of two Russian officers reportedly contracted by Abkhazia, further complicating the situation.
  • Additionally, the two sides agreed to resume the Chuburkhinji Sessions, quadripartite talks that had been suspended since November 2006. These talks, traditionally held in the Gali district, involved Georgian and Abkhaz representatives, Russian peacekeepers, and UN observers. They were aimed at addressing security concerns, refugee returns, and socio-economic issues. The Chuburkhinji Sessions were seen as a constructive way to address the ongoing tensions in the region.
  • The meeting in Sokhumi also highlighted the continued challenges and disagreements between the sides. While Shamba acknowledged the progress made, he stated that the negotiating process was still facing stagnation. Both sides recognized the importance of cooperation in the Gali district to maintain a stable situation, despite the ongoing obstacles.
  • This meeting was seen as a conciliatory step in the wake of a war of words following the September 20 clash. Bakradze's visit to Sokhumi was his first in a long time, and he made an effort to respect Abkhaz culture by greeting the local journalists in Abkhaz, despite not speaking the language.
  • The talks, though not indicating an immediate resumption of full negotiations, signaled a willingness to engage in dialogue and work toward reducing tensions, marking a potential turning point in the conflict.
• On October 27, 2007, Georgia released seven Abkhaz militiamen who had been captured during a September 20 clash between Georgian and Abkhaz forces. The release followed a court decision in Tbilisi, where the militiamen were handed five-year suspended sentences. The UN observers facilitated the transfer of the militiamen. (https://civil.ge/archives/113339)
  • The release was a significant development following talks between Georgian State Minister for Conflict Resolution, Davit Bakradze, and Abkhaz Foreign Minister, Sergey Shamba, on October 25 in Sokhumi. During these talks, Bakradze had expressed that the release was a goodwill gesture aimed at fostering better relations between the two sides.
  • The September 20 clash had also resulted in the deaths of two Russian officers reportedly contracted by Abkhazia.

Ganmukhuri incident

ZOURABICHVILI

• Zourabichvili questioned the official version of events, criticized the Saakashvili administration's hawkish reaction, and the American support for Tbilisi (98)
• In the summer of 2007, the Georgian government had designed plans to establish in Ganmukhuri, at the Abkhaz ABL, a youth patriotic camp, despite concerns for safety (268)
  • The Ganmukhuri camp was criticized by both UNOMIG and the Group of Friends (268)
• Though the camp was empty on October 30, Georgian police posts manned because of the creation of the camp, were assaulted and four police officers are beaten (268-269)
  • President Saakashvili arrives on the scene in half an hour, along with the MIA, MOD, the Mayor of Tbilisi, camera crews including women, and civilian-clothed Kalashnikov-carrying security forces that point their weapons to Russian peacekeepers and make them walk back (269)
  • This episode will be featured continuously on Georgian television as propaganda (269)
  • The propaganda was supposed to imply a Russian retreat (269)
• Zourabichvili believes the event was coordinated with Russia (269)

IIFFMCG II

• In response to the incident, the Georgian NSC authorized the MFA to redouble efforts toward internationalization of the peacekeeping operation (17)
• But Brussels was largely opposed to any attempts at changing the peacekeeping format (18)

IIFFMCG III

• According to Tbilisi, in December 2007, Russian peacekeepers delivered armored vehicles and ammunitions to the Abkhaz armed forces. These arms and ammunitions were allocated by the mountain fighters brigade in Tsebelda (188)
  • Back on March 26, 2006, Russian peacekeepers claimed having lost weapons and ammo at the Gudauta base, which ended up in Abkhaz hands (188)
• The Ganmukhuri camp was opened by MS on May 26, 2007 and soon became a thorn for Abkhazia (576)
  • Sokhumi claimed the camp was a staging operation for provocation and sabotagee against Abkhazia (576)

• On January 5, 2007, a Georgian policeman was killed and another injured in an attack on a police checkpoint in the village of Ganmukhuri, located within the Abkhaz conflict zone. This incident, reported by Georgian television stations Rustavi 2 and Mze, marks a recent escalation in violence in the region, following the killings of two prominent Abkhaz warlords serving in the Gali district police in late December. In response to those December incidents, Abkhaz militia forces had been deployed in the Gali district, which has a significant Georgian population. (https://civil.ge/archives/111722)
  • On January 5, 2007, Abkhaz officials refuted reports from Georgian media claiming that an Abkhaz militia attack had led to the death of a Georgian policeman and injury of another at a police post in Ganmukhuri, located in the Abkhaz conflict zone. Laurens Kogonia, the Abkhaz police chief in Gali district, stated that the Georgian policeman’s death occurred during a clash with Georgian criminal groups in Georgia's Zugdidi district, not due to an Abkhaz militia attack. Ruslan Kishmaria, the Abkhaz leader’s envoy in Gali, dismissed the Georgian reports as provocations intended to escalate tensions, asserting that the Abkhaz side had no involvement in the incident, according to the Apsnipress news agency. (https://civil.ge/archives/111723)
  • On January 5, 2007, the Georgian government condemned a pre-dawn attack on a police checkpoint in Ganmukhuri, describing it as a "well-planned provocation" and "terrorist act" that highlighted the "inefficiency and ignorance" of Russian peacekeepers in the Abkhaz conflict zone. The attack, which reportedly involved up to seven Abkhaz militiamen, resulted in the death of 30-year-old Georgian policeman Piruz Sharia and the injury of another officer. The Georgian government called on the UN Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) to investigate the incident and to assess the actions of Abkhaz authorities in Sokhumi, whom they accused of undermining the peace process. In contrast, Abkhaz officials denied involvement, claiming the incident was due to a clash with a Georgian criminal group in the Zugdidi district. (https://civil.ge/archives/111724)
  • Following the January 5, 2007, attack on a Georgian police checkpoint in Ganmukhuri, Tbilisi escalated its criticism of Russian peacekeeping forces, accusing them of failing to prevent the incident in the Security Zone they control. The Georgian Foreign Ministry labeled the attack as a “well-planned and deliberate act of provocation,” accusing the Russian peacekeepers of violating the ceasefire by not fulfilling their mandated responsibilities. Georgian Deputy Foreign Minister Giorgi Manjgaladze met with UN Observer Mission officials and diplomats from the UN Secretary General’s Group of Friends on Georgia, urging them to investigate and respond to the incident. Georgian Interior Minister Vano Merabishvili inspected the site, attributing the attack to members of the Abkhaz anti-terrorist center and demanding that Abkhazia hand over the suspects. Abkhaz officials, however, denied involvement, claiming Georgian special services staged the attack to justify a possible escalation. Georgian authorities have since increased security, planning to equip police in the conflict zone with night-vision goggles. (https://civil.ge/archives/111726)
  • On January 7, 2007, the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) issued a statement condemning the January 5 attack on a Georgian checkpoint in Ganmukhuri, which resulted in the death of one policeman and injury of another. UNOMIG called for the perpetrators to be apprehended and brought to justice, noting this incident was the third recent violent event undermining security in the region, following the December 25 and 26 killings of two Abkhaz warlords in the Gali district. Emphasizing the need for both sides to prevent further escalation, UNOMIG committed to increasing patrols and assisting in clarifying the incidents to support stability in the conflict zone. (https://civil.ge/archives/111730)
  • On January 10, 2007, the Georgian Coast Guard detained two fishing vessels, one Russian and one Ukrainian, in the Abkhaz section of Georgia's territorial waters, according to Georgian Border Police commander Badri Bitsadze. Georgian law deems any maritime activity in Abkhaz waters illegal, as the ports and waters of the Abkhaz Autonomous Republic are officially closed. Six Russian crew members and ten Ukrainian crew members were arrested, facing charges for border violations and illegal fishing. This incident marks the 22nd detention of vessels in the Abkhaz coastal area over the past two years, as reported by Georgian authorities. (https://civil.ge/archives/111689)
    • On January 12 and 13, 2007, a court in the Georgian town of Poti sentenced the captains of two fishing vessels, Sergey Ribkin of the Russian vessel *Grot* and the captain of the Ukrainian vessel *SAVOR-2*, to two months of pre-trial detention. Both vessels had been detained by the Georgian Coast Guard on January 10 for violating Georgia's territorial waters and engaging in illegal fishing in the Abkhaz region. The rest of the crew members from both vessels were released on bail. The Russian Foreign Ministry expressed concern, urging Georgia to show restraint and release the Russian captain. (https://civil.ge/archives/111749)
• On May 26, 2007, President Mikheil Saakashvili attended the opening of a ‘patriotic camp’ for teenagers in the village of Ganmukhuri within the Abkhaz conflict zone. The camp, located less than half a kilometer from Abkhaz-controlled territories, is part of a state-sponsored initiative launched in 2005 to instill a patriotic spirit in youth. Saakashvili emphasized that the camp is inclusive, open to ethnic Georgians as well as Armenians, Azerbaijanis, Jews, Greeks, Ossetians, and Abkhazians from towns such as Ochamchire, Gagra, and Gudauta. He stressed Georgia’s multi-ethnic nature and urged the Abkhaz to recognize the opportunity for self-identity within a democratic Georgia. However, the initiative faced criticism from opposition figures like Salome Zourabichvili, who argued that it posed unnecessary risks to the teenagers. (https://civil.ge/archives/112448)
• On July 24, 2007, there was mixed political reaction to the UN Secretary General’s recent report on Abkhazia, particularly regarding the call for Georgia to remove a state-sponsored patriotic youth camp in the village of Ganmukhuri, located near Abkhaz-controlled territory. Pikria Chikhradze, an opposition lawmaker, criticized the camp as a PR stunt that had become a source of international criticism. Salome Zourabichvili, former foreign minister, also lamented the negative impact on Georgia's international standing. On the other hand, Giorgi Tsagareishvili, another opposition figure, dismissed the UN’s recommendation, asserting Georgia’s sovereignty to establish camps anywhere within its territory. Kote Gabashvili, from the ruling National Movement party, downplayed the UN report, calling it a tactical move to appease Russia. Meanwhile, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Yakovenko expressed approval, highlighting Georgia's violations of the separation of forces agreement. (https://civil.ge/archives/112739)
  • On July 24, 2007, Sergey Shamba, the foreign minister of Abkhazia, expressed full satisfaction with the UN Secretary General’s recent report on the region. He stated that the report addressed key issues Sokhumi had raised during the Group of Friends meeting in Bonn in June. The report, released on July 23, urged both Tbilisi and Sokhumi to avoid actions that could reignite hostilities and called on Georgia to relocate a patriotic youth camp from the Abkhaz conflict zone. While Sokhumi welcomed this call, it ignored the report's recommendation to establish a UN observation post in upper Kodori Gorge, insisting it would only consider it if Georgia withdrew from the area. (https://civil.ge/archives/112741)
• On September 6, 2007, Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili criticized the UN for its "amoral and meager recommendations" in dealing with the Abkhazian conflict. This followed a UN Secretary-General's report urging Georgia to remove a youth camp near the Abkhaz border, which Saakashvili rejected. He emphasized that the ethnic cleansing of Georgians in Abkhazia during the early 1990s was a crime, and instead of offering "friendly advice," the international community should focus on ensuring the return of internally displaced persons (IDPs) to all parts of Abkhazia, not just Gali. Saakashvili also warned Russia against buying land in the region, stating that Georgia would confiscate such assets. He stressed the need for national unity to strengthen the country. (https://civil.ge/archives/112988)
• On October 30, 2007, a shootout occurred between Georgian Interior Ministry forces and Russian peacekeepers near the Ganmukhuri village in the Abkhaz conflict zone. The Georgian Ministry of Internal Affairs accused the Russian troops of entering Georgian-controlled territory, taking several Georgian policemen hostage, and beating them. In response, Georgian forces were placed on high alert. However, Russian commander Sergey Chaban claimed the peacekeepers had detained five Georgian policemen who were allegedly threatening to shoot at Russian troops and burn their equipment, and the detainees were later handed over to the Georgian side. (https://civil.ge/archives/113360)
• On October 30, 2007, Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili declared Sergey Chaban, the commander of Russian peacekeepers in the Abkhaz conflict zone, an "undesirable person" in Georgia and demanded he leave the country immediately. This statement came after an incident in Ganmukhuri, where Russian peacekeepers allegedly intruded into Georgian-controlled territory, detained Georgian policemen, and caused tensions. Saakashvili, addressing Russian troops in Ganmukhuri, emphasized that Sokhumi was part of Georgia, and warned that further provocations would not be tolerated, adding that the Georgian authorities would soon announce a stance on the fate of Russian peacekeepers. (https://civil.ge/archives/113361
• On October 30, 2007, tensions in the Abkhaz conflict zone eased when Russian peacekeepers released several Georgian policemen they had detained earlier in the day. According to Sergey Chaban, commander of the Russian peacekeepers, his troops were ready to hand over the four detained policemen, but the Georgian authorities delayed the process for two and a half hours. Chaban claimed that the situation was resolved only after President Saakashvili arrived in Ganmukhuri, as local authorities had refused to accept the release until then, likely due to higher-level instructions. (https://civil.ge/archives/113362)
• On October 30, 2007, tensions in the Abkhaz conflict zone escalated when Russian peacekeepers detained Georgian policemen in the village of Ganmukhuri, on the border with breakaway Abkhazia. The incident began when Russian peacekeepers, backed by armored vehicles, surrounded a patriotic camp in the village and detained several Georgian officers. Georgian authorities quickly put their forces on high alert, reporting that the peacekeepers had intruded into Georgian territory and brutally beaten the detained officers. The situation escalated into a standoff, with Georgian and Russian forces pointing guns at each other. President Saakashvili arrived at the scene, demanding the immediate release of the officers and accusing the peacekeepers of violating their mandate by attacking Georgian police. He also declared that Sergey Chaban, the commander of the Russian peacekeepers, was "undesirable" in Georgia and should leave. Russian peacekeeper commander Sergey Chaban provided a different version, claiming that the Georgian police had provoked the incident by threatening to shoot and burn Russian vehicles. The crisis was resolved only after Saakashvili intervened, with the Georgian policemen being released after several hours of delay. Meanwhile, Abkhaz leader Sergey Bagapsh warned of reinforced Abkhaz checkpoints to prevent provocations, accusing Georgia of obstructing peacekeepers' patrols. (https://civil.ge/archives/113363)
• Senior Georgian officials have strongly condemned the October 30 Ganmukhuri incident as a "Russian-masterminded provocation." Davit Bakradze, Georgia's state minister for conflict resolution, accused Russia of demonstrating a lack of interest in a peaceful resolution to the Abkhaz conflict, warning that such provocations could have severe consequences, for which Russia would bear full responsibility. Givi Targamadze, chairman of the parliamentary defense and security committee, described the incident as highly dangerous, capable of escalating tensions into an armed confrontation, but praised the Interior Ministry's special troops for their swift and effective response. Meanwhile, Nika Rurua, a deputy of the ruling party, suggested that the incident was part of a broader pattern of provocations, even linking it to recent actions by Georgia's opposition parties. Despite the tensions, Rurua emphasized that Georgia's strength would prevent any external aggression from succeeding. (https://civil.ge/archives/113364)
• Sergey Chaban, the commander of Russian peacekeepers in Abkhazia, has defiantly rejected Tbilisi's demand for his expulsion following the Ganmukhuri incident. Valery Evnevich, deputy chief of Russia's land forces overseeing peacekeeping operations, stated that Chaban would remain in his role, citing the mandate of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and the decision of its heads of state regarding his appointment. However, Gela Bezhuashvili, Georgia's foreign minister, countered that Chaban's presence was "illegal", since Georgia had not approved his appointment at the recent CIS summit. President Saakashvili reiterated his strong stance, declaring that Chaban must leave Georgia, emphasizing that Sokhumi, the capital of breakaway Abkhazia, is also part of Georgia. (https://civil.ge/archives/113366)
• In response to the Ganmukhuri incident, President Saakashvili convened an emergency session of Georgia’s National Security Council (NSC) on October 30, 2007. During the session, Saakashvili expressed his alarm over the actions of Russian peacekeepers, describing their attack on a Georgian police unit at the Ganmukhuri camp as "absolutely unacceptable" and a "criminal attack." He highlighted the heroic efforts of Ema Gogokhia, a Rustavi 2 journalist who managed to preserve footage of the incident despite facing physical confrontation with Russian soldiers. Saakashvili emphasized that the camp would remain in place, reinforcing its security and expanding it in the future. He also affirmed that Russian peacekeepers would not intimidate Georgia into relocating the camp. Additionally, he declared General Chaban—commander of the Russian peacekeepers—an undesirable person in Georgia and reiterated that he should leave Sokhumi, the capital of the breakaway Abkhazia region, which Saakashvili insisted was also part of Georgia. Finally, Saakashvili committed to strengthening efforts to return internally displaced persons to Abkhazia and vowed that no force would prevent Georgia from pursuing its territorial integrity. (https://civil.ge/archives/113365)
• Following the Ganmukhuri incident on October 30, 2007, Georgian lawmakers from the ruling party announced that the Georgian Parliament would soon deliberate the "reasonability" of ending the Russian peacekeeping operation in the Abkhaz conflict zone. This statement was made after a confrontation between Russian peacekeepers and Georgian interior ministry forces, during which four Georgian police officers were detained and beaten. Givi Targamadze, the chairman of the parliamentary defense committee, referred to the incident as a "large-scale and well-organized attack" on the Georgian police post, and said the issue of ceasing the peacekeeping operation would be discussed in Parliament. However, the possibility of ceasing the Russian peacekeepers' mandate would be addressed thoroughly and without emotion, according to Nika Rurua, Targamadze’s deputy. This discussion comes after the July 2006 resolution, in which the Parliament had already called for the immediate suspension of Russian peacekeeping operations and the withdrawal of Russian forces from Georgian territory. President Saakashvili echoed this sentiment in the National Security Council, recalling the Parliament's earlier resolution but refraining from directly ordering the peacekeepers' withdrawal at that time. (https://civil.ge/archives/113367)
• On October 31, 2007, senior Georgian lawmakers announced that a decision had been made to cease the mandate of Russian peacekeepers in the Abkhaz conflict zone. While the date for their withdrawal would be determined after consultations with Georgia’s international partners, the decision itself had already been finalized. Nino Burjanadze, the Parliamentary Chairperson, confirmed this, stating that the exact timing would be communicated once agreements with allies were made to avoid surprises. Similarly, Giga Bokeria, a key member of the ruling party, echoed that the decision was made, and further discussions would ensure that Western allies were informed ahead of time. (https://civil.ge/archives/113372)
  • The announcement followed consultations between Parliament and the cabinet ministers, including Gela Bezhuashvili (Foreign Minister), Davit Kezerashvili (Defense Minister), and Vano Merabishvili (Interior Minister). The decision came in the wake of the Ganmukhuri incident, where tensions between Russian peacekeepers and Georgian forces escalated.
  • In July 2007, Georgia's Parliament had already passed a resolution calling for the suspension of peacekeeping operations in both Abkhazia and South Ossetia, but no concrete actions had been taken until this point, drawing criticism from opposition groups. At the meeting, officials emphasized that while withdrawing the peacekeepers was not Georgia's original goal, the Russian peacekeepers had become biased, siding with separatists and exacerbating instability rather than maintaining peace.
  • Giga Bokeria stressed that the process to remove the peacekeepers was a sovereign decision of Georgia, and the peacekeepers would be given a one-month notice to leave once the official withdrawal date was determined.
  • Russian peacekeepers, numbering over 2,000, had been deployed in Abkhazia since 1994 under the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), following a ceasefire agreement. Initially stationed to ensure peace and assist in the return of refugees, their mandate had been extended every six months. Russian President Putin had previously agreed with Georgian President Shevardnadze in 2003 that the peacekeepers could remain until one of the parties demanded their withdrawal, which Georgia has now done.
  • In South Ossetia, a different peacekeeping arrangement had been in place, involving a Joint Peacekeeping Force (JPKF) with Russian, Georgian, and Ossetian troops. This force had also been modified over time, including the removal of law and order responsibilities in 1997.
  • Georgian officials now face the challenge of withdrawing from these agreements, particularly the 1992 Sochi Agreement regarding South Ossetia, which would result in the dissolution of the Joint Control Commission (JCC) overseeing the peacekeeping operations there.
• On October 31, 2007, the Georgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs summoned Russian Ambassador Vyacheslav Kovalenko to express their strong protest over the Ganmukhuri incident, which had occurred the day before. According to Georgia's Foreign Ministry, the incident was an unprovoked attack by Russian peacekeepers on a Georgian police post in Ganmukhuri, located in the Abkhaz conflict zone. During the altercation, five Georgian police officers were reportedly beaten. (https://civil.ge/archives/113371)
  • The Georgian Ministry condemned the actions of the Russian CIS peacekeepers, describing them as "arbitrary acts of adventurism" and urged Russia to cease these reckless acts that were escalating tensions in the region. The Ministry warned that such actions could lead to unintended consequences.
  • In response, Ambassador Kovalenko told reporters that the Russian peacekeepers were conducting a routine monitoring mission when the Georgian police officers allegedly provoked the incident. According to Kovalenko, one of the Georgian officers acted aggressively and threatened the peacekeepers, which led to a life-threatening situation for them. As a result, the decision was made to disarm the Georgian officers involved in the confrontation.
• On October 31, 2007, Grigory Karasin, the Russian Deputy Foreign Minister, instructed the Russian peacekeepers in Abkhazia and South Ossetia to "show restraint and keep calm" in response to continuing provocations by Georgia. The Russian Foreign Ministry reported that Karasin held separate phone conversations with the commanders of Russian peacekeeping forces in both regions—Sergey Chaban in Abkhazia and Marat Kulakhmetov in South Ossetia. (https://civil.ge/archives/113374)
  • The Russian peacekeeping commanders reassured Karasin that their actions were in line with their mandates, and their primary goal was to stabilize the situation in these conflict zones. This statement came after the Ganmukhuri incident, where Russian peacekeepers clashed with Georgian police.
  • Meanwhile, Georgia's government had already made the decision, after consultations, to demand the withdrawal of Russian peacekeeping troops from Georgia's conflict zones, though the exact dates for the withdrawal were to be determined following further consultations with Georgia’s western allies.
• On October 31, 2007, Irakli Alasania, Georgia's Ambassador to the UN, stated that there was political pressure from the Georgian Parliament on the government to implement a resolution passed in July 2007, which called for the withdrawal of Russian peacekeeping troops from Abkhazia and South Ossetia. This issue was brought back into focus after the Ganmukhuri incident.(https://civil.ge/archives/113375
  • Alasania explained that Georgian defense, interior, and foreign ministers had met with senior lawmakers on the same day to discuss the matter. He emphasized that the Parliament had already instructed the government to begin procedures to withdraw the peacekeepers, but now the government faced internal debates on how to proceed with the timing and execution of the decision.
  • At a press conference in New York, Alasania described the Ganmukhuri incident as an unprovoked attack by Russian peacekeepers on a Georgian police unit guarding a patriotic camp in the Abkhaz conflict zone. He also showed video footage that captured Russian peacekeepers detaining and beating five Georgian police officers.
• On November 1, 2007, Sergey Shamba, Abkhaz foreign minister, warned that withdrawing Russian peacekeeping troops from the Abkhaz conflict zone could trigger a new large-scale war in the South Caucasus. His remarks followed demands from Georgia’s ruling National Movement Party to implement a parliamentary resolution from the prior year calling for the peacekeepers’ removal. Shamba argued that such a decision required international consensus, particularly from the Council of CIS Heads of States, which he claimed opposed such "dangerous" actions. Criticizing the international community, Shamba accused it of enabling militarization in the region by arming Georgia, creating a “chain reaction” that risked escalating into renewed armed conflict. He described this approach as highly irresponsible and fraught with severe consequences. (https://civil.ge/archives/113378)
• On November 1, 2007, the Russian Foreign Ministry accused Georgia of using incidents like the October 30 clash in Ganmukhuri to divert attention from internal political turmoil, including anti-government protests and President Saakashvili's declining popularity. The ministry described the Ganmukhuri incident as a provocation by Georgian authorities to stir tensions for domestic political gains. According to Russia, Georgian police tried to obstruct Russian peacekeepers monitoring the area, leading to their detention. Georgian forces reportedly fired on a Russian helicopter providing support, with a bullet hitting its undercarriage. Despite the provocations, Russian peacekeepers refrained from using arms, adhering to their mandate. The ministry dismissed Georgia’s demand to replace Russian peacekeeping commander Sergey Chaban, stating that such decisions fall under the jurisdiction of the Council of CIS Defense Ministers, which was scheduled to meet on November 27 in Astana. (https://civil.ge/archives/113385)
• On November 2, 2007, Georgian television began broadcasting a promotional TV spot titled “Georgia will not step back,” depicting the October 30 Ganmukhuri incident. The footage showed Russian peacekeepers detaining and allegedly beating five Georgian policemen, followed by President Saakashvili confronting a Russian officer on-site. The clip ends with Georgian police and civilians pushing back Russian peacekeepers, who ultimately retreat. Saakashvili reiterated his condemnation of the incident during a November 1 international conference in Tbilisi, calling it a “provocative and bandit attack.” Displaying the footage at the event, Saakashvili argued it demonstrated Russian misconduct in Georgia's conflict zones and refuted claims that Georgia was intentionally provoking tensions to draw international attention. (https://civil.ge/archives/113389
• On November 27, 2007, Russian Defense Minister Anatoli Serdyukov announced that the mandate of Sergey Chaban, the Russian commander of peacekeeping forces in Abkhazia, had been extended by the Council of Defense Ministers of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), despite Tbilisi’s demands for his removal. Serdyukov acknowledged that Chaban would be replaced “in the near future,” citing Georgia's "special position" as a factor in the decision. The move followed the October 30 Ganmukhuri incident, after which President Saakashvili labeled Chaban an “undesirable person” and called for his expulsion. Serdyukov defended the peacekeepers, stating they were performing their duties effectively. (https://civil.ge/archives/113646)
  • On November 27, 2007, Georgian Foreign Minister Gela Bezhuashvili criticized the CIS Council of Defense Ministers’ decision to re-endorse Sergey Chaban as commander of Russian peacekeepers in Georgia, calling it “illegal” and beyond the council's authority. He argued that the CIS Foreign Ministers’ Council is the proper body to make such decisions and noted that Georgia, not being part of the defense council, does not recognize its actions. Bezhuashvili dismissed the move as an attempt to “mislead the international community” and reaffirmed Georgia’s stance that Chaban was “unacceptable.” The decision came after the October 30 Ganmukhuri incident, prompting President Saakashvili to label Chaban an “undesirable person.” Russian Defense Minister Anatoli Serdyukov defended the peacekeepers' performance but acknowledged that Chaban would be replaced “in the near future” due to Georgia’s opposition. (https://civil.ge/archives/113648)
• On December 12, 2007, the UN Secretary General’s spokesperson reported that UNOMIG (the UN Observer Mission in Georgia) had been unable to confirm recent allegations of a military build-up in Abkhazia. The Georgian government had accused Russia of deploying additional military troops and hardware to the breakaway region, claiming it was done under the guise of rotating peacekeepers. On the other hand, the Abkhaz side raised concerns over a potential Georgian military build-up in the upper Kodori Gorge, which is under Georgian control. (https://civil.ge/archives/113763)
  • Despite these conflicting reports, Ban Ki-moon, the UN Secretary General, noted that the UN observers had been conducting daily verifications but had not been able to substantiate the claims. The statement also emphasized the Security Council’s resolution from October 15, urging all parties to address each other's security concerns and refrain from violence or provocative actions, including political rhetoric, while adhering to previous ceasefire agreements.

Georgian political crisis and alleged Russian involvement

ASATIANI

• Badri Patarkatsishvili funded all major opposition parties and their activities on the condition of their unity, bringing an end to their fragmentation (475)
• Patarkatsishvili was the sole owner of Imedi TV, which was the main PR arm of the opposition (475-476)
• Mass protests began in October 2007 calling for the repeal of a parliamentary resolution scheduling the parliamentary elections at the same time as the presidential polls in January 2009 (476)
  • They were asking for parliamentary polls in the spring of 2008, which was constitutionally prescribed (476)
• As Saakashvili refused to budge, the protests grew into a general call for his resignation and the abolition of the presidency (476)
• Some opposition MPs started a hunger strike (476)
• On November 7, police used tear gas and water canons to disperse the protests and by the end of the day, law enforcement raided Imedi, shutting the broadcast down. (476)
• At night on Nov 7, Noghaideli proclaimed a state of emergency to maintain constitutional order (476)
• These events were met as a sign of democratic backsliding by much of the international community (476)
• Saakashvili resigned the next day and called snap elections. The state of emergency was lifted (476)

• Saakashvili has maintained that the November 2007 and ensuing events were part of a plan by the "Soviet oligarch" Badri Patarkatsishvili to overthrow him (Glucksmann 140-148)

ASMUS

• Moscow was estimated to have poured millions of dollars into antigovernment activities and increased its covert activities in Georgia after the espionage scandal (72)
• In the summer of 2007, Asmus recalls a European intelligence officer confirming "one Russian attempt after another to interfere in Georgian politics" (72)

IIFFMCG II

• The report clearly states that one of the aims of the deportations of 2006 and sanctions was to cause anti-government protests in Georgia, which failed (22)
• In Georgia allegations of Russia’s spy activities and its “long arm” reaching into Georgian domestic affairs continued in subsequent years and played a prominent role in government attacks on opposition forces in the domestic political crisis, after the spy scandal (22)
• During the 2007 crisis, Georgia’s Interior Ministry released footage of what it said were negotiations between several opposition leaders and Russian intelligence agents. (23)
• According to Temur Yakobashvili, then a Georgian political analyst, “Russian spies are trying to influence domestic developments… Russians are not even hiding that they are seeking a regime change in Georgia by manipulating domestic political developments and influencing various political movements and leaders.” (23)
• Russia always denied this involvement allegation (23)
• DeWaal's statement: “On the domestic political scene, there’s no real basis to say that the Russians are strongly involved. If you look at the Georgian opposition, most of them are just as anti-Russian as the government…It’s obviously convenient for President Saakashvili to blame Russia in a time of crisis. I think this is a card that can be overplayed, and I think many citizens are getting a bit fed up with that.” (23)
• The Georgian finger-pointing at Moscow was only part of a broader pattern in post-Soviet societies, as Sergei Markedonov put it. “Many Russian politicians are genuinely convinced that the West is to blame for everything: the West caused the Orange Revolution, the West caused the Rose Revolution, the West demolished the Soviet Union. Georgian authorities are using exactly the same method. Only here, evil Russia replaces the evil West. Georgia, Russia, and many post-Soviet countries share a like mentality. Only the enemy changes.” (23)

• The prison riot of March 2006 in which several inmates died, claimed to have started over the Justice Ministry's planned reforms to separate criminal bosses from other inmates, s=happened on March 27 (https://civil.ge/archives/110214)
  • Following the riots, oppo groups called for the resignation of prison chief Bacho Akhalaia (https://civil.ge/archives/110218)
  • Energy Minister Gilauri found links between the prison riot and the damage of a power line in Kodori on the same day (https://civil.ge/archives/110221)
  • Burjanadze claimed that the prison riot was aimed to trigger "massive destabilization" (https://civil.ge/archives/110222)
  • Saakashvili, while not naming Russia, compared the prison riot to the 91-92 coup in a National Security Council session, while a formal government report confirmed that the prison riot was aimed to trigger nationwide destabilization (https://civil.ge/archives/110228 https://civil.ge/archives/110223)
• Badri Patarkatsishvili announced openly opposing the government on MArch 29, 2006 (https://civil.ge/archives/110249)
  • He was praised by the Republican, Conservative, Labor, and New Rights parties (https://civil.ge/archives/110252)
• 5 May: President Saakashvili urged the Georgian people to unite in the face of increasing pressure from Russia, emphasizing the need for resilience and strength. Drawing a parallel with Lithuania, which has also faced Russian pressure, Saakashvili noted that Lithuania is now thriving economically. He expressed confidence that Georgia could endure pressure more effectively than Lithuania due to its established economic foundation. (https://civil.ge/archives/110525)
• 17 June: On June 17, Georgian Interior Minister Vano Merabishvili announced that his deputy, Amiran Meskheli, met with a representative of the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) to hand over evidence related to a failed assassination attempt on MP Koba Davitashvili, an opposition leader. (https://civil.ge/archives/110874)
  • Georgian officials indicated that the assassination attempt was aimed at discrediting the Georgian President and leadership, portraying them as persecutors of political opponents.
  • Merabishvili identified the suspect as Giorgi Kurtaev, who allegedly traveled to Tbilisi from Vladikavkaz in the Russian North Ossetian Republic on May 18, via the breakaway South Ossetian capital Tskhinvali, for surveillance. He returned to Vladikavkaz using the same route after a few days.
  • Kurtaev returned to Tbilisi on May 28 and began tracking MP Davitashvili.
  • The Interior Minister noted that Kurtaev, a Russian citizen residing in Vladikavkaz, was originally from Georgia and had lived in Rustavi, near Tbilisi, for 16 years.
  • Merabishvili emphasized the need for transparency in the investigation and stated that Tbilisi had requested assistance from the FBI.
  • Investigators briefed MP Koba Davitashvili on the details of the case on June 17. Davitashvili described the assassination attempt as a “large-scale provocation” against Georgia and expressed relief at having survived.
  • On June 8, Davitashvili reported that an unknown "young person" was planning to kill him, noting that this individual spent two days outside his apartment building and fled only when neighbors confronted him on June 7. The suspect reportedly fired twice from a silenced weapon, injuring one of Davitashvili's neighbors. The suspect left behind a small bag containing a photograph of the lawmaker.

• Parliamentary Confrontation: The Georgian Parliament's 2006 resolution regarding Russian peacekeepers has intensified tensions between the ruling authorities and the opposition, with the latter continuing its boycott of parliamentary sessions. Opposition leaders dismissed the resolution as “empty paper” and an ineffective PR move, claiming it did not warrant an end to their boycott of parliamentary sessions. Giga Bokeria, a prominent MP from the ruling party, accused opposition factions of trying to instill frustration in society. He suggested some opposition members had ties to Moscow and were driven by hatred towards the government. (https://civil.ge/archives/111113)
• Ahead of the 2006 local elections, Saakashvili accused certain political parties and media outlets within Georgia of being "allies" of Russia, particularly those spreading negative narratives about the government's handling of the grape harvest. (https://civil.ge/archives/115210)
• Labor Party Leader’s Accusations: Shalva Natelashvili, leader of Georgia’s opposition Labor Party, accused U.S.-funded organizations of attempting to manipulate the upcoming October 5 local elections in favor of President Saakashvili's party. Natelashvili named several U.S. institutions, including USAID, the National Democratic Institute, the International Republican Institute, and the Millennium Challenge Account, alleging they aim to falsify election results. This follows prior criticisms from Natelashvili, who in July criticized U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Matthew Bryza, accusing him of biased support for Saakashvili and undermining Georgian democracy. He urged the U.S. to remove Bryza to improve U.S.-Georgia relations. (https://civil.ge/archives/115233)
• On August 9, 2007, Tbilisi Mayor Gigi Ugulava condemned Georgian opposition figures who claimed that the August 6 air attack was orchestrated by the Georgian government. Ugulava, a key ally of President Saakashvili, labeled them as traitors, stating that such accusations were unfounded, especially since international consensus pointed to the attack originating from the north, with Russia being the only neighbor in that direction. His comments were a direct response to opposition leader Shalva Natelashvili of the Labor Party, who alleged that the Georgian authorities staged the incident to distract from internal problems and possibly provoke a war. Similar accusations were made by Irina Sarishvili, leader of the Imedi Party, which had ties to the exiled former security chief Igor Giorgadze. (https://civil.ge/archives/112829)
• On September 28, 2007, Russian President Vladimir Putin commented on the political unrest in Georgia following the arrest of former Defense Minister Irakli Okruashvili and subsequent protests. He stated that the situation was an "internal Georgian matter" but expressed hope that the mass protests would remain peaceful. Putin urged both sides to demonstrate political maturity and avoid any violence or casualties. He also remarked that while Georgia's democracy had Western approval, he would not want Russia to adopt a similar system. These comments were made during a press conference in Sochi. (https://civil.ge/archives/113143)
• On September 29, 2007, Georgia's opposition parties, encouraged by a large turnout at a recent protest rally, announced plans to expand their campaign across the country. This came after the arrest of former Defense Minister Irakli Okruashvili. Tens of thousands of people gathered outside Georgia’s Parliament on September 28, marking the largest anti-government protest since 2003. Protesters called for Okruashvili’s release, early parliamentary elections, and the removal of the presidency. (https://civil.ge/archives/113145)
  • Tina Khidasheli of the Republican Party described the movement as an "electoral revolution," with the goal of changing the country’s political trajectory. Opposition leaders, including Salome Zourabichvili, insisted that the protests were not about uniting behind Okruashvili, but rather about protecting democracy.
  • The government, however, dismissed the protests, with Gigi Ugulava, the Mayor of Tbilisi and close ally of President Saakashvili, accusing the opposition of blackmail. He defended Okruashvili’s arrest, stating that it was based on solid evidence of his criminal activities, including allegations of bribery, money laundering, and negligence as Defense Minister. Ugulava emphasized that the authorities were committed to fighting corruption.
• On September 29, 2007, Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili broke his silence regarding the accusations made by his former ally and ex-Defense Minister Irakli Okruashvili. Saakashvili expressed personal disappointment, stating that Okruashvili knew his allegations were lies. He emphasized that the accusations against him and his government of engaging in corrupt, clan-based deals were entirely unfounded, and that such practices were in direct opposition to his values. (https://civil.ge/archives/113141)
  • Saakashvili stressed that the judicial process must take its course without any interference from him, as per the Georgian Constitution. He assured that justice would prevail for those who violated the law, regardless of their statements.
  • In defending his administration, Saakashvili highlighted his humble beginnings, recalling how he had only 100 Lari in his pocket when leaving the government of Eduard Shevardnadze, contrasting that with claims of corruption. He also reaffirmed his commitment to the rule of law and the prevention of untouchable figures in Georgia. Saakashvili concluded by asserting that while Georgia offered freedom of the press and free speech, it would not allow blackmail by those with questionable motives.
• On September 29, 2007, Georgian business and media tycoon Badri Patarkatsishvili spoke to the Russian daily Kommersant about his relationship with Irakli Okruashvili, the former Defense Minister of Georgia. Patarkatsishvili described his relationship with Okruashvili as "absolutely normal" and "good," asserting that Okruashvili was a trustworthy person, given his top-level government experience. (https://civil.ge/archives/113147)
  • Patarkatsishvili also commented on the ongoing protests in Georgia, declaring his support for the people and expressing shared views with Okruashvili, particularly regarding the restoration of Georgia's territorial integrity. Both men believed that the process should take into account the economic interests of all parties involved.
  • The interview came shortly after Okruashvili's arrest, following his explosive claims, including suggesting that President Saakashvili wanted to eliminate Patarkatsishvili in the same way former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri was killed. When asked about his fears of returning to Tbilisi, Patarkatsishvili admitted he was afraid, but insisted that he would return to Georgia to maintain his self-respect.
  • Patarkatsishvili also discussed his alignment with Okruashvili's stance on the breakaway regions of South Ossetia, where Okruashvili had proposed a plan for a small-scale operation to reclaim the region, a plan that President Saakashvili had refused to authorize.
• On September 29, 2007, Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili responded to the allegations made by his former ally, Irakli Okruashvili, who had accused the president and his government of corruption and other serious charges. Saakashvili dismissed Okruashvili's claims as false and asserted that the former defense minister's arrest was part of the government’s anti-corruption efforts, not politically motivated. (https://civil.ge/archives/113148)
  • Saakashvili emphasized his commitment to the rule of law, stating that "there are no untouchables" and that everyone must face justice if they violate the law. He also defended Georgia’s free press, noting that people could express their views freely, but those with clean consciences could not be blackmailed by false accusations.
  • In a public speech later that day, while not mentioning Okruashvili by name, Saakashvili alluded to the situation, reinforcing the idea that Georgia's unity could not be broken by external enemies or internal traitors. He warned that the destabilization of the country, as seen in the early 90s, was caused by internal divisions and "traitors" whose ambitions led to the secession of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
  • Saakashvili’s remarks reflected his firm stance against disunity, framing the situation as one of national strength versus betrayal. He highlighted the government's dedication to a united Georgia and its resilience against attempts to weaken the state.
• On September 29, 2007, Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili strongly reacted to remarks made by Russian President Vladimir Putin regarding democracy in Georgia. In his response, Saakashvili did not name Putin directly but referred to him as "my Russian friend" and expressed anger over Putin's comments about Georgia's political situation, particularly concerning the potential for civil unrest. (https://civil.ge/archives/113150
  • Saakashvili emphasized key differences between Georgia and Russia, particularly regarding democracy and press freedom. He pointed out that Georgia boasts a free press where citizens can criticize the government openly, in stark contrast to Russia, where such freedoms were severely restricted. He also highlighted the lack of press freedom in Russia and criticized the state's handling of journalists, citing the assassination of journalist Anna Politkovskaya in Moscow and the safety of journalists in Georgia.
  • The Georgian president also compared the handling of protests, claiming that in Georgia, citizens could peacefully express their views without fear of state repression, unlike in Russia, where even small gatherings were met with heavy military force. He stressed Georgia’s commitment to fighting corruption, contrasting the Georgian system with Russia’s, which he described as rife with corruption despite the country’s vast oil resources.
  • Saakashvili further criticized Russia’s policies towards Georgia, particularly the wine embargo imposed by Russia, which he suggested was an attempt to manipulate Georgia's internal politics. He rejected the notion that Georgia was susceptible to civil unrest due to economic hardships, framing Georgia's resilience as a victory over external manipulation.
  • In his statement, Saakashvili reaffirmed Georgia's strength in maintaining a stable, democratic system despite external pressures, asserting that the country would continue to resolve its internal issues through democratic means and legal transparency.
• On October 1, 2007, Giga Bokeria, a key figure from Georgia's ruling National Movement party, urged opposition parties to completely distance themselves from all pro-Russian political groups. This statement followed the formation of a special committee by eight opposition parties on September 29, 2007, aiming to organize protests for the release of ex-Defense Minister Irakli Okruashvili, early parliamentary elections, and election code changes. The committee included parties such as the Republican Party, Conservative Party, and others, but explicitly excluded Irina Sarishvili’s Party of Hope due to its ties with Moscow-based Igor Giorgadze, wanted for an assassination attempt on former President Shevardnadze. While welcoming this exclusion, Bokeria criticized the opposition for continuing to cooperate with other pro-Russian groups like Shalva Natelashvili’s Labor Party and the National Forum, urging a consistent stance against Russian-leaning forces. (https://civil.ge/archives/113156)
• On October 1, 2007, Boris Gryzlov, Chairman of Russia's State Duma, announced plans to adopt a statement on October 2 condemning Georgia's government as an "anti-democratic regime", citing the arrest of ex-Defense Minister Irakli Okruashvili. Gryzlov claimed the actions of the Georgian government demonstrated authoritarianism. Georgian lawmakers, both from ruling and opposition parties, dismissed the criticism as ironic, pointing out the absurdity of Russian MPs lecturing Georgia on democracy. (https://civil.ge/archives/113161)
• On October 2, 2007, the Russian State Duma adopted a statement condemning Georgia's authorities for their "anti-democratic policy" and expressing support for the Georgian opposition. The statement also criticized the U.S. Department of State for its "unconditional support" of the Georgian government. Citing concerns over freedom of speech, human rights, and democratic norms in Georgia, the statement was linked to the arrest of ex-Defense Minister Irakli Okruashvili, as noted by Boris Gryzlov on October 1. Georgian lawmakers, including Vice-Speaker Mikheil Machavariani and opposition member Mamuka Katsitadze, dismissed the move as "pure cynicism", pointing out that Russia lacks the moral authority to criticize democracy given its own track record. (https://civil.ge/archives/113165)
• On October 2, 2007, Davit Usupashvili, leader of the opposition Republican Party, warned that anti-Americanism could rise among Georgians if the U.S. continues its "blind support" for certain figures in the Georgian administration. Usupashvili, along with opposition leaders Salome Zourabichvili and Konstantine Gamsakhurdia, had visited Washington the previous week and discussed Georgia's political developments, including the arrest of ex-Defense Minister Irakli Okruashvili, at the Nixon Center on September 28. Usupashvili revealed that U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Mathew Bryza acknowledged the recent events in Georgia were a "mistake" and noted that pragmatic officials in the U.S. administration recognized the risk of Georgia’s "success story" turning into a failure. (https://civil.ge/archives/113164)
• On October 2, 2007, Giga Bokeria, a senior ruling party lawmaker, urged opposition groups to sever ties with all “pro-Russian parties,” specifically the Labor Party and National Forum, criticizing the opposition's willingness to “make a deal with the devil” to oust the government. The opposition dismissed this as an attempt by the ruling party to deflect attention from Georgia’s political crisis, sparked by the arrest of ex-Defense Minister Irakli Okruashvili. While the opposition umbrella organization excluded Irina Sarishvili’s Party of Hope over ties to Moscow-linked Igor Giorgadze, the ruling party called their continued cooperation with other allegedly pro-Russian groups “inconsistent.” The Labor Party faced allegations of being Russian-leaning after leader Shalva Natelashvili claimed Georgia staged the August 6 missile incident, while the National Forum drew criticism for its skepticism of NATO integration. Concurrently, the Russian State Duma’s condemnation of Georgia’s government as “anti-democratic” was met with bipartisan Georgian ridicule as “ironic.” Opposition figures like Mamuka Katsitadze cautioned that Russian critiques bolstered government rhetoric, while Tina Khidasheli argued the opposition must continue challenging authorities regardless of Russian statements. (https://civil.ge/archives/113168)
• On October 4, 2007, President Mikheil Saakashvili publicly criticized Interior Minister Vano Merabishvili for allowing Iason Chikhladze, a former Defense Ministry official with top secret procurement information, to flee to Russia. Chikhladze, accused of misuse of power and embezzlement in connection with charges against ex-Defense Minister Irakli Okruashvili, escaped to Russia via Turkey using a fake passport. Saakashvili expressed alarm that an individual privy to sensitive Defense Ministry procurement details was now in Moscow, potentially in contact with the FSB (Russia's Federal Security Service). The President questioned how Chikhladze, despite a criminal background, attained a high-level role and called the situation within the Defense Ministry “alarming and unpleasant.” While Saakashvili stressed his remarks were not a “personal reprimand” of Merabishvili, he labeled the incident a “bitter lesson” for the government. (https://civil.ge/archives/113186)
• On October 7, 2007, Ilia II, Patriarch of the Georgian Orthodox Church, proposed considering the establishment of a constitutional monarchy, citing the enduring dream of restoring the Bagrationi royal dynasty, which ended with Russia's annexation of Georgia in 1801. Speaking during his sermon at the Holy Trinity Cathedral in Tbilisi, he noted that current conditions might enable this vision to materialize. The remarks occurred during a period of political tension, as ten opposition parties advocated for abolishing the presidency and creating a parliamentary system. Ilia II emphasized that decisions about Georgia's governance should be made by its people, resisting external pressures dictating a presidential or parliamentary model. (https://civil.ge/archives/113202
  • On October 12, 2007, President Mikheil Saakashvili jokingly responded to the idea of restoring a constitutional monarchy in Georgia, claiming that it would be beneficial for him personally, as his grandmother was a descendant of the Bagrationi royal family. He quipped that with a monarchy, decisions could be made based on family traditions, eliminating the need for elections. However, Saakashvili quickly clarified that he was joking, remarking that it was unfortunate he had to clarify it due to the opposition's lack of humor. (https://civil.ge/archives/113248))
    • This comment came amid discussions in Georgia about the potential restoration of a constitutional monarchy, a proposal raised by the Patriarch Ilia II of the Georgian Orthodox Church, which is scheduled to be debated in parliament on October 25, 2007.
• On October 9, 2007, former Defense Minister Irakli Okruashvili was released on GEL 10 million bail after retracting earlier allegations against President Mikheil Saakashvili and pleading guilty to charges of extortion and negligence. His sudden change in stance led to accusations that he had been coerced, which the government denied, citing a medical evaluation that found his health “satisfactory.” Meanwhile, the ruling authorities escalated attacks on Badri Patarkatsishvili, a media and business tycoon, accusing him of using the opposition and his Imedi Media Holding to destabilize Georgia. Opposition leaders, undeterred by Okruashvili’s reversal, vowed to continue their protests, emphasizing unresolved issues like the deaths of Zurab Zhvania and Sandro Girgvliani. Economy Minister Giorgi Arveladze accused Patarkatsishvili of turning Imedi into a propaganda tool, while ruling party MP Giga Bokeria dismissed claims of persecution against him. Imedi TV reported growing governmental pressure, including efforts to impeach Patarkatsishvili from the Georgian National Olympic Committee (GNOC). This heightened confrontation reflects deep political and media tensions in Georgia. (https://civil.ge/archives/113218)
• On October 11–12, 2007, Rustavi 2 TV, a prominent Georgian media outlet, aired allegations implicating business tycoon Badri Patarkatsishvili and his former associate Boris Berezovsky in a series of high-profile crimes, including murders in Russia. The report specifically mentioned the 1995 assassination of Vlad Listyev, a Russian journalist and ORT TV executive, as well as claims of involvement in other crimes. (https://civil.ge/archives/113247)
  • Rustavi 2 further alleged Patarkatsishvili's attempts to dominate the Georgian media market and linked him to the 2001 security raid on Rustavi 2's office, purportedly orchestrated with the then-Interior Minister Kakha Targamadze. In addition, the station accused Patarkatsishvili of connections to a failed assassination attempt on businessman Joni Gigani and the 2002 murder of Kakhi Asatiani, head of Georgian Airways. Patarkatsishvili was alleged to have sought control of the airline, with the Asatiani family suggesting links to former President Shevardnadze’s circle.
  • These claims, broadcast on a pro-government channel, indicate escalating efforts by the authorities to discredit Patarkatsishvili amid political tensions in Georgia.
• On October 15, 2007, President Mikheil Saakashvili delivered a bold speech in the eastern Georgian province of Kakheti, drawing historical parallels to rally support against mounting opposition pressure and a Russian economic embargo. In his speech, Saakashvili invoked the Persian shahs of the 18th and 17th centuries to attack Russian President Vladimir Putin and Badri Patarkatsishvili, a business tycoon and media mogul, linking them to historical figures associated with Georgia's oppression and betrayal. (https://civil.ge/archives/113256)
  • Saakashvili first addressed the wine embargo imposed by Russia, claiming that Kakheti, a region crucial for Georgian winemaking, had "not knelt down" despite the economic pressure. He mocked Russian leaders and called on Putin and the Russian sanitary inspection to visit the vineyards to witness Georgia’s resilience. He denounced the opposition's portrayal of despair among Georgian winegrowers, accusing them of staging protests to create a sense of hopelessness.
  • Turning to history, Saakashvili compared Putin to the 18th-century Agha Mohammad Khan, the Persian shah who invaded Georgia, and Patarkatsishvili to Markozashvili, a historical Georgian traitor who betrayed the king in the face of invasion. He described the current political conflict as a repeat of past betrayals, with figures like Patarkatsishvili, who owns the opposition-linked Imedi TV, spreading discontent in Georgia. Saakashvili referred to Putin as the “modern Shah Abbas”, referring to the Persian monarch notorious for his invasions of Georgia, symbolizing Russia's current attempts to undermine Georgian independence.
  • Saakashvili ended his speech by asserting that Georgia had never been stronger, citing a professional army, efficient state structures, and a growing economy as evidence of the country’s resilience against external and internal threats.
• On October 17, 2007, Badri Patarkatsishvili, a Georgian business and media tycoon, outlined his political priorities in a written document circulated through InterPressNews. This announcement came on the same day that a coalition of ten opposition parties unveiled their own policy manifesto, signaling his central role in the ongoing political standoff between the Georgian government and opposition. (https://civil.ge/archives/113276)
  • In his four-page document, Patarkatsishvili proposed several significant changes to Georgia's governance structure. He suggested that Georgia should become a federal state, with central authorities limited to defense and the economy, while regional governments would handle other matters. He also advocated for a shift from the current presidential system to a parliamentary system with a two-chamber parliament. Additionally, Patarkatsishvili expressed support for the idea of a constitutional monarchy proposed by Patriarch Ilia II, acknowledging that it deserved public attention.
  • Regarding foreign policy, Patarkatsishvili declared that Georgia's approach should be pragmatic, guided by national interests rather than alliances or friendships. He stated that Georgia has no friends, only interests, emphasizing a balancing act between Russia and the United States. While acknowledging the geographical proximity and aggression of Russia, he also recognized the strength and friendship of the United States, though its distance posed limitations. He further argued that Georgia’s integration into NATO and the EU should align with its own interests but should not come at the expense of others.
  • This stance highlighted Patarkatsishvili's focus on a more independent and balanced foreign policy, seeking to navigate between Russia's proximity and power, and the strategic alliance with the U.S.
• On October 24, 2007, Modest Kolerov, the head of the Russian Presidential Administration’s Department for Inter-Regional and Cultural Ties with Foreign Countries, was fired by President Vladimir Putin. Kolerov, known as Russia’s chief ideologist and spin-doctor for relations with former Soviet republics, had been tasked with countering the "color revolutions" in countries like Ukraine and Georgia, which had ousted entrenched governments through peaceful protests. (https://civil.ge/archives/185543)
  • Kolerov, who had previously led the Regnum news agency, was reportedly dismissed due to his "excessive radicalism" in handling relations with neighboring states, which failed to yield positive results. According to Kommersant, the Kremlin was dissatisfied with Kolerov’s efforts, which had included active involvement in regions such as Georgia, Transdnistria, and Estonia. However, these actions did not lead to improved relations with Russia.
• On October 28, 2007, Badri Patarkatsishvili, a business and media tycoon, publicly pledged to finance the campaign of ten opposition parties in Georgia, supporting their efforts to hold parliamentary elections in April 2008 instead of later that year. In a written statement, Patarkatsishvili emphasized his intention to fund the opposition’s protest rallies, ensuring they were conducted in a "civilized manner." The opposition had planned a major rally in Tbilisi on November 2, following protests in various provinces. (https://civil.ge/archives/113346
  • While there had been rumors of Patarkatsishvili already providing financial backing to the opposition, his statement marked a rare instance in Georgia where a financier openly declared support for political movements. His media holding, Imedi, which included both TV and radio stations, had already dedicated significant airtime to promoting the opposition's message.
  • Patarkatsishvili expressed concerns that the country was approaching a political crisis, urging the government to recognize its responsibility in preventing any provocations that could escalate beyond constitutional bounds. He also highlighted the opposition's financial struggles, which could hinder their ability to organize the rallies effectively.
  • He fully endorsed the joint manifesto of the opposition, which outlined a broad set of political demands, including the call for parliamentary elections in spring 2008, reforms to the electoral system, the release of political prisoners, and greater reforms to governance, judiciary, and media rights.
  • The statement, made while Patarkatsishvili was in London, followed his release of a document on October 17 detailing his political priorities. On October 10, he had hinted that the "difficult situation" in Georgia could prompt him to become directly involved in politics.
• On October 28, 2007, Badri Patarkatsishvili issued a statement expressing his concern over Georgia's political situation, describing the country as being on the brink of a serious political crisis due to the escalating protest rallies and the actions of politicians that had further strained tensions. Patarkatsishvili emphasized the responsibility of both the government and opposition to prevent provocations that could lead to unconstitutional developments, which would harm the Georgian people. (https://civil.ge/archives/113347)
  • He pointed out that the opposition's lack of finances could be a major obstacle in organizing peaceful protests, which could contribute to dangerous outcomes. To address this, Patarkatsishvili announced that he would provide financial assistance to the National Council of Unified Public Movement, the group coordinating the opposition's campaign, to help ensure the civilized management of the protest rallies.
  • Patarkatsishvili reiterated his full support for the manifesto of the ten opposition parties, which outlined their demands for reforms and the release of political prisoners, and he expressed his belief that the opposition would remain united in its goals. He concluded by stating that he shared these principles as a Georgian citizen, and that the opposition’s demands reflected the needs and aspirations of the Georgian people.
• On October 29, 2007, Gigi Ugulava, the Mayor of Tbilisi and a close associate of President Mikheil Saakashvili, dismissed the idea that Badri Patarkatsishvili could successfully stage a coup in Georgia. Ugulava firmly stated, “His putsch will not work in Georgia,” mocking Patarkatsishvili's efforts to influence Georgian society. He pointed out that despite Patarkatsishvili’s attempts to control sectors like sports, business, and culture, the businessman had only managed to buy the opposition. (https://civil.ge/archives/113351)
  • Ugulava went further to draw a comparison between Patarkatsishvili and Sergo Orjonikidze, a historical figure who led the Bolshevik invasion of Georgia in 1921. He likened Patarkatsishvili to Orjonikidze, calling him a traitor to Georgia, referencing Patarkatsishvili's gray mustache in contrast to Orjonikidze’s dark one.
  • Patarkatsishvili had recently announced that he would finance the opposition's campaign for holding parliamentary elections in April 2008, rather than the scheduled date of late 2008. He pledged to fund peaceful protests aimed at pressuring the government. In response, Davit Gamkrelidze, leader of the New Rights Party, praised Patarkatsishvili’s commitment to financing the opposition, emphasizing that the use of legal money in the campaign was a positive step, in contrast to foreign interference.
  • On October 25, 2007, both South Ossetian and Russian officials warned that Georgia might resort to military action in an effort to divert attention from its internal issues. (https://civil.ge/archives/113325)
    • Eduard Kokoity, the leader of the separatist South Ossetian government, stated that the Georgian authorities were attempting to resolve their domestic problems by escalating tensions with South Ossetia and Abkhazia. He mentioned a conversation with Abkhaz leader Sergey Bagapsh, during which they discussed planned provocations by Georgia in early November.
    • Meanwhile, Russia’s ambassador to the EU, Vladimir Chizhov, echoed similar concerns. In an interview with the Financial Times, Chizhov warned that Georgia's increasingly tense domestic political situation might lead the government to use force to distract from internal issues, particularly regarding Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
    • Despite these warnings, Georgia’s State Minister for Conflict Resolution, Davit Bakradze, reaffirmed on October 24 that Tbilisi remained committed to peaceful conflict resolution. On October 25, Bakradze traveled to Sokhumi, the capital of Abkhazia, for talks with Abkhazia’s foreign minister, Sergey Shamba. This visit marked the resumption of high-level discussions between Georgia and Abkhazia, which had been stalled for over a year due to disagreements over conditions for dialogue, such as the withdrawal of Georgian forces from the upper Kodori Gorge in Abkhazia
• On November 1, 2007, President Mikheil Saakashvili declared that despite ongoing “attacks and provocations,” Georgia would remain committed to its path of progress and development. Speaking at the inauguration of a new railway station connecting Tbilisi airport to the city, Saakashvili emphasized that infrastructure projects—including hospitals, schools, railways, and airports—would continue, ensuring better living conditions for Georgian citizens. He characterized the provocations as attempts to derail Georgia’s progress but vowed to persevere. A day earlier, on October 31, in Kutaisi, Saakashvili announced a large-scale rehabilitation project for the city’s historic areas, reinforcing his administration’s focus on modernization and growth. (https://civil.ge/archives/113382)
• On November 2, 2007, Georgian business tycoon Badri Patarkatsishvili emphasized his commitment to peacefully confronting the authorities through political means, including elections. Speaking to Imedi TV upon his return to Tbilisi from London, he stressed the importance of adhering to constitutional and Western values during opposition protests, assuring his efforts would focus on ensuring protests remain civilized. Patarkatsishvili reiterated his support for opposition forces but stated he likely would not attend the rallies himself. Earlier, on October 28, he had pledged financial support for opposition demonstrations conducted in a “civilized manner” and transferred management of his shares in Imedi media holding to News Corporation partners for a year. On November 2, a large banner near the parliament depicted a cartoon of Patarkatsishvili as a puppet master controlling opposition leaders, labeled “Badrionetebi,” combining his name with "marionettes" to mock his involvement. (https://civil.ge/archives/113387)
• On October 17, 2007, a ten-party opposition coalition in Georgia presented four key demands to President Mikheil Saakashvili and Parliamentary Chairperson Nino Burjanadze: (https://civil.ge/archives/113397)
  1. Rescheduling parliamentary elections to spring 2008 instead of late 2008, opposing a December 2006 constitutional amendment that extended the current Parliament's term and reduced the President's term by several months.
  2. Creating new election administrations with representatives from political parties, citing concerns over the Central Election Commission’s (CEC) alleged bias under its head, Levan Tarkhnishvili, whom the opposition linked to the ruling party.
  3. Reforming the majoritarian election system to replace the current winner-takes-all approach with a system allowing voters to elect individual candidates irrespective of party affiliation.
  4. Releasing “political prisoners” and “prisoners of conscience,” specifically mentioning opposition figure Irakli Batiashvili, whose seven-year sentence for aiding a rebel warlord was criticized as unjustified and based on insufficient evidence by Public Defender Sozar Subari.
• On November 3, 2007, the ten-party opposition coalition escalated its demands by calling for President Mikheil Saakashvili’s resignation during the second day of protests outside the Parliament in Tbilisi. This marked a significant shift from their previous “moderate demands,” which included holding parliamentary elections in spring 2008, reforming the election code, and releasing political prisoners like Irakli Batiashvili. Opposition leaders, including Levan Gachechiladze, Shalva Natelashvili, and Davit Berdzenishvili, declared “Georgia without Mikheil Saakashvili” as their new slogan, accusing the president of corruption and avoiding elections. Protesters chanted “Go Away” and “Resign,” expressing broad dissatisfaction. Opposition figures noted they initially aimed to manage public demands for Saakashvili’s resignation in a measured way but concluded it was time to align with the people's will. Despite windy weather, thousands gathered for the rally, with Imedi TV broadcasting the event live. (https://civil.ge/archives/113402
• On November 2, 2007, three Russian SU-24 (Fencer) aircraft allegedly violated Georgian airspace over the Stepantsminda district in the northern mountainous region, according to Irakli Gogava, Georgia’s chief of staff of the armed forces. The accusation, reported by Rustavi 2 TV on November 4, was firmly denied by Russian air force spokesman Alexander Drobishevsky, who called the claims “groundless.” The incident added to the ongoing tensions between Georgia and Russia. (https://civil.ge/archives/113409
• In a televised interview on November 4, 2007, President Mikheil Saakashvili addressed the ongoing protests and political unrest in Georgia, acknowledging that protest rallies are part of a functioning democracy but criticizing the opposition's use of what he called a "factory of lies" aimed at destabilizing the country. He emphasized the Russia factor, stating that the protests were part of a broader attempt by Russian oligarchs to create turmoil in Georgia ahead of Russia's 2008 presidential elections. Saakashvili explained that his decision to hold parliamentary elections in late 2008 instead of spring was driven by Russia's embargo and the risks of potential confrontation between Russia and Georgia, particularly in light of Kosovo's potential recognition and Russia’s possible recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Despite criticism, he defended the government's actions, including its handling of the economy, which was on track to grow by 14% in 2007, and reaffirmed his commitment to territorial integrity and tackling unemployment. (https://civil.ge/archives/113412)
• In his televised interview on November 4, 2007, President Mikheil Saakashvili discussed the ongoing protests and their external implications, particularly highlighting Russia’s influence. He accused certain political groups of spreading "lies" to destabilize Georgia, drawing parallels to similar tactics used against Boris Yeltsin in the 1990s. Saakashvili framed the protests as part of a Russian-backed effort to create the impression that Georgia, a symbol of democratic progress in the post-Soviet space, was weakening. He stressed that the protests were being broadcast by Russian media to undermine Georgia's success and discourage democratic movements in other former Soviet republics. Saakashvili defended Georgia’s progress, emphasizing the nation’s resilience against Russian pressures, and noted that despite challenges, Georgia would continue its development path regardless of external opposition. (https://civil.ge/archives/113418)
  • In a 2007 interview, President Mikheil Saakashvili discussed the challenges and progress in Georgia following the Rose Revolution. He acknowledged ongoing unemployment and price hikes, exacerbated by global inflation, but emphasized the creation of new jobs and industrial growth, particularly in sectors like mining and manufacturing. Saakashvili pointed to major strides in infrastructure, education, and healthcare, asserting that Georgia had transformed from a state plagued by corruption and poverty to one with modern services and an effective government. A key focus was Russia, as Saakashvili rejected Russian influence over Georgia, highlighting the country’s need for self-reliance and military strength. He underlined the importance of armed forces to secure Georgia's territorial integrity against external threats, particularly from Russia, and rejected critiques of Georgia's defense spending. Saakashvili concluded by stressing that Georgia’s future depended on continued reform and resistance to forces that sought to return the country to chaos and foreign domination.
  • In a 2007 interview, President Mikheil Saakashvili addressed the ongoing protests in Georgia, highlighting both social and political demands. He dismissed concerns that these protests would lead to instability, noting that Georgia had evolved into a stable state with clear goals and strong international standing. Saakashvili pointed to Russian involvement in stirring unrest, suggesting that Moscow aimed to exploit Georgia's internal turmoil for its own political gains, especially ahead of its 2008 elections. He accused Russian-backed forces of attempting to undermine Georgia's sovereignty, particularly in the context of the territorial integrity issue involving Abkhazia and South Ossetia. While discussing the protests’ demands, Saakashvili explained that election reforms were underway, including lowering the election threshold and introducing state financing for political parties to reduce oligarchic influence. He also emphasized the need for territorial integrity to secure Georgia's future, warning that Russian threats would persist as long as the secessionist regions remained unresolved. He concluded by reaffirming that the internal threats from Russia could not be easily removed but would require ongoing vigilance and unity.
  • In the interview, President Mikheil Saakashvili addressed concerns about Georgia's territorial integrity and its future political challenges, stating that significant progress in resolving these issues could be made by autumn 2008. He mentioned that ongoing efforts, such as the activities surrounding Dimitri Sanakoev and the South Ossetian conflict, were part of Georgia's strategic efforts to regain control over its breakaway regions. Saakashvili emphasized that external threats, especially from Russia, were ever-present, particularly with Kosovo's recognition and Russia's NATO opposition looming large. However, he was optimistic that Georgia’s path toward NATO membership and its internal stability would remain unaffected by external pressures. (https://civil.ge/archives/113418)
  • "It is not occasional and we should think about it that during these protest rallies the Russian televisions – televisions of the country with 140-million population, as if nothing else is happening in the world – broadcasts live the protest rallies in Tbilisi. Let’s think about why this happens – this happens because they consider Georgia as a symbol of democracy and democratic development which may take place in the post-Soviet space regardless of the empire’s threats."
• On November 6, 2007, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov declined to comment on Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili’s claims that Moscow may be orchestrating troubles in Georgia for its internal purposes, calling the accusations "farce." Lavrov stated, "It is obvious for everyone that actions undertaken by the Georgian leadership are embraced by farce" and expressed concern over the situation in Georgia. At the same time, Sergey Mironov, the chairman of Russia’s upper house of parliament, also chose not to comment on Saakashvili's statements but indicated that protest rallies in Georgia could potentially expand to other cities. (https://civil.ge/archives/113424)
• On November 7, 2007, the Georgian Interior Ministry (MIA) released audio and video recordings, claiming that certain opposition leaders were cooperating with Russian counter-intelligence services. The tapes featured phone conversations involving Shalva Natelashvili (Labor Party), Levan Berdzenishvili (Republican Party), and Giorgi Khaindrava (Equality Institute), allegedly speaking with individuals identified as Russian intelligence operatives. In one conversation, Natelashvili discussed political plans with a man named Sokolov, who was linked to Russian intelligence. Another conversation featured Berdzenishvili discussing Georgia's stance on the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Additionally, a hidden camera video showed Khaindrava meeting with a Russian counter-intelligence agent, and another video showed Tsotne Gamsakhurdia, the brother of Konstantine Gamsakhurdia of the Freedom Party, meeting a Russian diplomat in Tbilisi. In a separate recording, Tsotne Gamsakhurdia warned his brother that the opposition could lose momentum after a large protest outside the parliament on November 2, 2007. (https://civil.ge/archives/113447)
• On November 7, 2007, ruling party MPs accused opposition leaders of committing crimes against the state following the release of audio and video recordings by the Interior Ministry. These materials allegedly showed Levan Berdzenishvili, Giorgi Khaindrava, Konstantine Gamsakhurdia, and Shalva Natelashvili cooperating with Russian counter-intelligence services. Levan Bezhashvili, chairman of the parliamentary committee for legal issues, stated that the recordings revealed a series of criminal acts, including a coup attempt and calls for the violent overthrow of the government. He called on law enforcement to take action against the individuals involved. Givi Targamadze, chairman of the parliamentary committee for defense and security, described the opposition as cooperating with Georgia's "enemy" and using protesters for their political aims. Giga Bokeria, a prominent ruling party lawmaker, also emphasized the seriousness of the alleged crimes, expressing confidence that law enforcement would take appropriate legal action. Meanwhile, opposition leaders, undeterred by the accusations, continued to call for protest rallies, with thousands gathering on Rike, near the Parliament. (https://civil.ge/archives/113448
• On November 7, 2007, Georgia recalled its ambassador to Russia, Irakli Cbubinishvili, for consultations due to recent developments in the country. This move followed Georgian officials accusing some opposition leaders of collaborating with Russia's counter-intelligence service. Additionally, Georgia's Foreign Ministry summoned Russia's ambassador to Georgia, Vyacheslav Kovalenko, over the issue. Meanwhile, riot police in Tbilisi used tear gas and water cannons for the second time that day to disperse a renewed protest rally, after earlier clashes outside the parliament. Thousands of protesters had gathered at Rike, several kilometers away from the parliament, continuing their demonstrations. (https://civil.ge/archives/113453)
• On November 7, 2007, President Mikheil Saakashvili made a statement expressing his deep concern about the escalating situation in Tbilisi, where protests had been ongoing for several days. He emphasized that the right to demonstrate was vital and should be protected, but condemned the blockage of Rustaveli Avenue by protesters and supported the police's decision to restore traffic. Saakashvili also warned that Georgia was under significant pressure, particularly from Russia, whose counter-intelligence had been increasing its efforts to destabilize the country by supporting radical opposition groups. He highlighted that Russian oligarch Badri Patarkatsishvili had openly called for the overthrow of the government. Saakashvili stressed that allowing these forces to destabilize Georgia would jeopardize the nation's future and its territorial integrity. He called for the protesters to disperse and announced that several Russian diplomats had been declared "undesirable persons" and should leave Georgia soon. (https://civil.ge/archives/113452)
• On November 7, 2007, President Mikheil Saakashvili addressed the nation, claiming that the recent unrest in Georgia was orchestrated by Russia and executed with the help of certain radical opposition parties. Saakashvili explained that for months, intelligence had indicated that Russia was preparing to destabilize the country and that an alternative government was being set up to overthrow his administration. He referred to taped evidence released by the Georgian Interior Ministry, which allegedly showed some opposition leaders, including Levan Berdzenishvili and Shalva Natelashvili, cooperating with Russian counter-intelligence. He accused Russia of intensifying its operations in Georgia and using friendly oligarchs to finance and implement the unrest. Saakashvili also announced that several Russian diplomats were declared "undesirable persons" and ordered to leave the country. Despite the turmoil, Saakashvili called for dialogue with opposition parties not involved in the unrest, asserting his belief in their patriotism. He defended the police's actions in dispersing the protesters, claiming they provoked the clashes by blocking major roads. Finally, he warned that the Georgian authorities would take all necessary measures to restore order and protect the country's democracy. (https://civil.ge/archives/113454)
• On November 8, 2007, Georgia declared three Russian diplomats persona non grata and ordered their expulsion. This included Russian Ambassador Ivan Volinkin, Councilor Pavel Solomatin, and Third Secretary Kurenkov. The move followed accusations from President Saakashvili that Russian diplomats were involved in "subversive activities" against Georgia, particularly in the context of unrest involving opposition leaders. The Georgian Interior Ministry had released audio and video material suggesting that opposition figures were cooperating with Russian counter-intelligence. In response, the Russian Foreign Ministry dismissed the allegations as a "provocation" and warned Georgia against blaming external forces. They also called on those with influence over Tbilisi, including the United States, to caution Georgia against further escalation. U.S. State Department spokesman Sean McCormack expressed concern but refrained from commenting directly on the situation. (https://civil.ge/archives/113463)
• In his November 7, 2007 televised address, President Mikheil Saakashvili expressed deep concern over the unrest in Tbilisi and the broader political crisis in Georgia. He framed the situation as a clash between democratic principles and external forces seeking to destabilize Georgia, particularly through involvement from Russia. Saakashvili explained that the unrest, which had begun with peaceful demonstrations, escalated into violent confrontations after some opposition groups blocked streets and clashed with law enforcement. (https://civil.ge/archives/113464)
  • The president also revealed that Russian intelligence had been involved in attempts to undermine Georgia's government. He referenced intelligence reports indicating that Russia had been financing and coordinating with radical opposition groups, particularly to disrupt Georgia's political stability. He pointed to a series of video materials broadcast by Georgian media, showing opposition figures interacting with Russian diplomats, which were presented as evidence of Russian subversive activities. He also cited comments from Russian officials, including Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, who had expressed support for the protesters and indicated plans for further unrest in Georgia.
  • Saakashvili accused Russian oligarchs of inciting actions aimed at overthrowing the Georgian government, aligning them with the broader strategy of external interference. He called this a deliberate attempt to derail Georgia’s democratic development and its pursuit of economic growth, noting that the country was experiencing positive economic growth and receiving significant international investments.
  • In response, Saakashvili took several measures, including expelling Russian diplomats suspected of engaging in espionage and subversive activities. He also announced the recall of the Georgian ambassador from Russia for consultations, signaling the severity of the situation and Georgia’s determination to defend its sovereignty. Saakashvili made it clear that Georgia would not allow foreign influence to derail its democratic process or its territorial integrity, particularly in the context of growing tensions over Abkhazia and South Ossetia, regions with strong Russian involvement.
  • In the context of Russia, Saakashvili framed the situation as part of a broader geopolitical struggle, with Russia's actions aiming to destabilize Georgia and prevent its integration into European and NATO structures. He warned that if such forces were allowed to succeed, Georgia would face irreversible consequences for its democratic future and territorial integrity.
• In response to the recent unrest in Georgia, Russia expressed deep concern over what it described as human rights violations in the country. During a November 8, 2007 news conference, Mikhail Kaminin, a spokesperson for the Russian Foreign Ministry, criticized the Georgian government for its handling of the protests, accusing it of excessive force against demonstrators and the arrest of opposition figures and human rights activists. Kaminin also condemned the banning of free media and the reported beating of foreign reporters by Georgian riot police during the November 7 protests. (https://civil.ge/archives/113478
  • Kaminin called on international bodies such as the UN, OSCE, and the Council of Europe, as well as human rights organizations, to pressure Tbilisi to cease the violence and resolve the crisis through constitutional means. He highlighted an incident where two Russian reporters were injured during the police crackdown and demanded that the Georgian authorities investigate the matter and hold the responsible parties accountable.
  • Despite the criticism, Kaminin stressed that Russia was not an enemy of Georgia, and that it considered itself a friend of the Georgian people. This statement appeared to position Russia as a concerned party in the crisis, while indirectly supporting the opposition's view of Saakashvili's government as undemocratic and repressive.
• In response to Georgia's decision to expel three Russian diplomats, Russia announced on November 8, 2007, that it would expel three Georgian diplomats. This move was a direct retaliation for Georgia's earlier expulsion of Ivan Volinkin, the Russian ambassador to Georgia, along with Councilor Pavel Solomatin and a third embassy official, Kurenkov. (https://civil.ge/archives/113481)
  • The Georgian Foreign Ministry had accused these diplomats of engaging in "subversive activities" against Georgia, a claim supported by President Saakashvili in a televised address. The diplomatic expulsions marked a further deterioration in relations between the two countries amidst rising tensions surrounding protests and political unrest in Georgia.
• On November 8, 2007, it was reported that Georgian opposition leaders might be questioned by the police regarding their alleged ties to Russian intelligence services. (https://civil.ge/archives/113482)
  • The Georgian Interior Ministry had recently released audio and video evidence, which purportedly showed opposition figures, including Levan Berdzenishvili (Republican Party), Giorgi Khaindrava (Equality Institute), Konstantine Gamsakhurdia (Freedom Party), and Shalva Natelashvili (Labor Party), meeting with operatives from the Russian intelligence services.
  • MP Kalandadze, deputy chairperson of the parliamentary committee for legal issues, stated that these opposition leaders would be interrogated "as witnesses" to their involvement. He also suggested that the level of responsibility of each individual might differ, implying that further actions could be taken depending on the outcomes of the questioning.
• On November 8, 2007, Shalva Natelashvili, the leader of Georgia's Labor Party, was formally charged with espionage and conspiracy to overthrow the government. These charges were based on evidence obtained through surveillance of Russian embassy employees in Tbilisi, who Georgian authorities identified as Russian intelligence operatives. (https://civil.ge/archives/113485)
  • The Georgian police had already conducted searches of Natelashvili’s apartment and the Labor Party headquarters, seizing unspecified documents. Natelashvili’s whereabouts were unknown at the time.
  • Additionally, Tsotne Gamsakhurdia, the brother of Konstantine Gamsakhurdia (leader of the opposition Freedom Party), faced similar charges. Authorities presented audio and video recordings showing Natelashvili and Gamsakhurdia meeting with Russian embassy personnel, as well as phone conversations involving opposition figures discussing the November 2, 2007 protest outside Parliament. These recordings were used to suggest the opposition’s involvement in a Russian-backed plot to destabilize Georgia.
  • While Levan Berdzenishvili (Republican Party) and Giorgi Khaindrava (Equality Institute) were also implicated through intercepted phone calls with a Russian intelligence operative, no formal charges were brought against them at that time. However, they were expected to be questioned as witnesses.
• On November 8, 2007, in a televised address, Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili reflected on recent political unrest in Georgia and announced a snap presidential election for January 5, 2008. Saakashvili framed the unrest, particularly the events of November 7, 2007, as an attempted coup against Georgia, spurred by foreign forces seeking to destabilize the country. (https://civil.ge/archives/113486)
  • He stated that the actions of protesters and opposition figures were part of a larger conspiracy aimed at undermining Georgia's democratic system and sovereignty, which he compared to past Russian-backed uprisings in Estonia and Vilnius. He insisted that the government was not protecting its own power, but rather defending Georgia's democracy and statehood. Saakashvili described how the unrest had caused damage to Georgia's international standing but asserted that the country had to show resilience in the face of such destabilizing efforts.
  • In a clear response to international pressures, particularly from Russia, Saakashvili highlighted the necessity of preserving Georgia's independence and rejecting foreign interference. His call for snap elections was framed as an opportunity for the Georgian people to demonstrate unity and democratic commitment, despite the opposition's actions. He criticized political opponents who had, according to him, sought to use the crisis to gain power through non-democratic means.
  • Saakashvili's address included a call for international observers to ensure that the elections were free and transparent, emphasizing that Georgia would remain firm in its pursuit of democracy and sovereignty, especially in light of Russian influence in the region. He promised that the state of emergency, imposed following the unrest, would soon be lifted and that the restrictions on political activities would be removed, signaling a return to normalcy.
  • In his speech, Saakashvili also proposed a plebiscite to determine the timing of parliamentary elections, further asserting that the Georgian people, not political factions, should decide. This was framed as a direct challenge to Russia's influence, aiming to solidify Georgia’s future as a strong, democratic state.
  • By calling early elections, Saakashvili aimed to reassert his mandate and position Georgia firmly against external pressures, particularly from Russia, which had been critical of Georgia's sovereignty and alignment with Western institutions.
• On November 9, 2007, the Georgian Prosecutor’s Office announced that Badri Patarkatsishvili, a prominent business tycoon and media mogul, was suspected of conspiring to overthrow the government. The Deputy Chief Prosecutor, Nika Gvaramia, revealed that Patarkatsishvili would be summoned for interrogation as a suspect in the alleged coup plot. The formal decision to label him a suspect was made on November 7, though the announcement was delayed until two days later. (https://civil.ge/archives/185546)
  • Patarkatsishvili, who had publicly pledged to finance anti-government protests in the preceding months, was not in Georgia at the time of the announcement, raising questions about his involvement in the unrest. His absence from the country suggested that he may have been attempting to avoid prosecution amidst the escalating political tensions.
• On November 9, 2007, Grigory Karasin, the Russian Deputy Foreign Minister, stated that relations between Russia and Georgia had entered a "sharp crisis" due to Georgia's accusations against Russia. Specifically, Georgia had blamed Russia for allegedly supporting opposition politicians involved in a plot to overthrow the government. Karasin made this comment during a meeting with the Georgian counterpart, Nikoloz Vashakidze, in Moscow. (https://civil.ge/archives/113502)
  • In addition to these political tensions, the Russian Foreign Ministry expressed concern about the treatment of Russian journalists in Georgia, particularly during the November 7 protests in Tbilisi. Several journalists from Russian TV stations, including Russia Today, Ren TV, and NTV, were reportedly physically assaulted, leading to further diplomatic friction. Furthermore, the Russian Ministry criticized Georgian cable networks for limiting access to Russian TV channels, while BBC World, CNN International, and EuroNews were also unavailable in some parts of Tbilisi for two days.
• On November 10, 2007, the Georgian authorities softened their stance toward Shalva Natelashvili, the leader of the opposition Labor Party, who had been facing charges of espionage and conspiracy to overthrow the government. President Mikheil Saakashvili announced that Natelashvili would not be arrested and would be free to run for the presidency in the January 2008 election. This decision followed a statement from the General Prosecutor's Office that instead of formal charges, investigators would treat Natelashvili as a witness in the case. (https://civil.ge/archives/113514
  • Earlier, on November 9, the prosecutor's office had accused Natelashvili of espionage and plotting to overthrow the government. However, the shift in the authorities' approach signaled a change in tone.
  • The news came amid reports from Labor Party activists who claimed that Natelashvili had been injured by tear gas during the November 7 unrest when riot police clamped down on protests. The Labor Party also mentioned that Natelashvili had sought U.S. asylum for his family, alleging political persecution from Saakashvili's government due to his presidential ambitions.
  • Despite rumors of Natelashvili fleeing to Russia, his party denied this and stated that he was still in Georgia. President Saakashvili, in a public comment, sarcastically remarked that Natelashvili was hiding "in a cellar" and requesting not to be arrested. Saakashvili then reassured him, saying the authorities would not arrest him, signaling a more lenient approach toward the opposition leader.
• On November 12, 2007, Georgia accused Russia of escalating tensions in the Abkhazia region by deploying additional military hardware and troops. According to Davit Bakradze, the Georgian state minister for conflict resolution, Russia had sent at least 200 additional soldiers, mostly ethnic Chechens, along with several military vehicles and weapons. These included five T-72 battle tanks, five GRAD multiple rocket launchers, five armored vehicles, and seven howitzers, all deployed in Ochamchire, a city in the disputed region. (https://civil.ge/archives/113526
  • Bakradze characterized this deployment as a provocative act aimed at escalating tensions and destabilizing the region, suggesting that Russia believed it was an opportune moment to further its longstanding objectives in Abkhazia. He firmly rejected Russia’s actions, calling the increase in military presence "absolutely illegal", and warned that Georgia would respond to any attempts to occupy its territory with severe consequences. This was a direct statement of defiance, asserting that Georgia's statehood and strength were intact despite external pressures.
• On November 12, 2007, Nino Burjanadze, the Speaker of the Georgian Parliament, expressed firm opposition to Russian provocations, particularly in light of the recent Russian military deployment in Abkhazia. In response to Georgia’s accusation that Russia had sent additional troops and military hardware, including T-72 tanks, GRAD rocket launchers, and Chechen soldiers, Burjanadze stated that Georgia would not yield to such provocations and would continue to defend its national interests. (https://civil.ge/archives/113528)
  • Burjanadze accused Russia of exploiting the political instability in Georgia, a situation that she claimed Russia itself had contributed to. However, she emphasized that Georgia sought to resolve conflicts peacefully and through political means, but would resist any efforts aimed at dismembering Georgia or recognizing Abkhazia's independence. She also rejected recent remarks by Moscow's mayor, Yuri Luzhkov, who had called for Abkhazia's recognition. Burjanadze questioned why Russia, which had internal conflicts with regions like Chechnya and Dagestan, should advocate for the separation of Georgia while denying similar rights to its own minority regions.
• On November 12, 2007, Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili revealed that Russian President Vladimir Putin had personally threatened to impose a "Cyprus model" on Georgia during a meeting at the CIS summit in Minsk the previous year. Saakashvili recounted this conversation in a speech, following discussions about Russia's recent military activities in Abkhazia, including the deployment of T-72 tanks and Chechen fighters. (https://civil.ge/archives/113530
  • Saakashvili explained that the "Cyprus model" referenced by Putin was a threat to divide Georgia into two parts, similar to how Cyprus was split following the 1973 Greek political turmoil, which distracted the Greek government and allowed the Turkish invasion, leading to the island's division. Putin's implication was that Russia would exploit Georgia's internal instability to achieve a similar outcome, particularly in the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
  • Saakashvili forcefully rejected this notion, declaring that despite the challenges and international damage caused by Russia's actions, Georgia would not be split. He assured that Georgia's security forces were fully mobilized to defend its territorial integrity and respond to any provocations, regardless of the upcoming presidential elections. He also warned Russia to remove its forces from Abkhazia and cease any efforts to destabilize Georgia.
• On November 13, 2007, Givi Targamadze, a senior Georgian lawmaker and chair of the parliament's Defense and Security Committee, issued strong warnings regarding Russia's increasing military presence in Abkhazia. Targamadze emphasized that if Russia were to recognize Abkhazia as an independent state, Georgia would consider it a declaration of war and would respond with resistance, stating, "we will accept this challenge." (https://civil.ge/archives/113540)
  • This warning was prompted by reports that Russia had deployed additional military forces to Abkhazia, including 200 soldiers (primarily ethnic Chechens) and heavy weaponry such as T-72 tanks, GRAD rocket launchers, and howitzers. The Georgian Defense Ministry expressed concern over these moves as part of Russia's broader efforts in the region.
  • In response, Matthew Bryza, the U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs, confirmed that the United States had raised concerns about the Russian troop presence with Moscow, urging Russia to uphold Georgia's territorial integrity. Although Bryza was cautious about confirming the exact details of the Russian military activities, he expressed skepticism that Russia intended to destabilize Georgia. He also criticized recent statements from Russian officials, particularly Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov, calling for the recognition of Abkhazia's independence, describing these calls as "reckless" and "dangerous."
  • Targamadze's statements highlighted Georgia's firm resolve to resist any efforts to recognize Abkhazia as an independent entity, warning of grave consequences if Russia pursued such a course.
• On November 15, 2007, the Russian Foreign Ministry issued a statement accusing the Georgian leadership of fostering "Russophobia" ahead of the January 5 presidential elections in Georgia. The ministry claimed that Georgian authorities were using anti-Russian rhetoric as a political tool to maintain power, describing the upcoming elections as a "farce" designed to prevent opposition unity and manipulate public perception in light of the violence that occurred during the November 7 unrest in Tbilisi. (https://civil.ge/archives/113560)
  • The statement criticized the Georgian government for stoking fears of espionage and Russian interference. It referenced the expulsion of Russian diplomats earlier in the week, accusing Georgia of using baseless espionage charges as part of a broader anti-Russian narrative. The Russian Foreign Ministry described the Georgian government’s claims about Russian military activity in Abkhazia as "fairy tales", particularly mocking President Saakashvili for alleging the presence of Russian tanks and military hardware in the region. The ministry denied these claims, stating that UN observers had found no evidence to support the Georgian allegations.
  • Further, the Russian Foreign Ministry ridiculed Saakashvili's statements, suggesting he had become detached from reality and was inventing "dangerous threats" for political gain. It compared the president's rhetoric to something out of a James Bond novel, implying that his portrayal of Russia as an existential threat was more fiction than fact. The ministry also rejected any foreign interference in Georgia’s internal matters, suggesting that it was inappropriate for other countries, such as the U.S., to offer political advice to Georgia’s government.
  • This statement from Moscow marked an escalation in the ongoing war of words between Russia and Georgia, with both sides accusing each other of spreading misinformation and engaging in provocative behavior ahead of Georgia's critical elections.
• On November 16, 2007, Nika Gvaramia, the deputy chief prosecutor of Georgia, revealed that two security firms linked to the business tycoon Badri Patarkatsishvili were involved in an attempt to establish an "illegal armed group". Gvaramia disclosed that Giorgi Beridze, the head of both firms—International Guard Organization and League for Professional Guard—was arrested on November 13. Authorities found a significant cache of weapons in Beridze's apartment during the arrest. (https://civil.ge/archives/113571)
  • The investigation revealed that Beridze had directed one of his employees, Zurab Metreveli, to recruit former security service officers to form the armed group. This operation was allegedly coordinated by Sasha Maisuradze, who was responsible for Patarkatsishvili’s personal security and also worked as a consultant for Imedi TV. Both Metreveli and Beridze were subsequently arrested in connection with the plot.
• On November 17, 2007, Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili delivered strong remarks in the eastern region of Kakheti, targeting his political opponents, particularly business tycoon Badri Patarkatsishvili and opposition presidential candidate Levan Gachechiladze, who also owns a wine company. (https://civil.ge/archives/113573)
  • In a passionate speech to a crowd in Kvareli, Saakashvili criticized Patarkatsishvili's alleged efforts to manipulate Georgian public opinion. He declared that those who sought to "buy" the Georgian people or deceive them with lies would fail, asserting that the people of Georgia would not be swayed. He also referred to Patarkatsishvili’s role in a propaganda campaign, which included a controversial TV segment showing a winegrower cutting down his vines in Kakheti due to the Russian embargo. Saakashvili claimed that this scene was staged to sow hopelessness and unrest among the population, accusing Patarkatsishvili of orchestrating the fake event for his own benefit.
  • Saakashvili also addressed the state of Georgian winemaking, particularly the challenges posed by Russia's trade embargo. While praising some companies like Teliani Valley for successfully diversifying their markets, he criticized Georgian Wines and Spirits, owned by Levan Gachechiladze, for allegedly sending different quality wines to different markets. He recounted his experience in Japan, where he tasted a wine from Gachechiladze's company, which he found to be of poor quality when he had tried it earlier in Moscow. This, he argued, showed the need for maintaining high standards across all markets.
  • Lastly, Saakashvili emphasized the government's actions in response to the November 7 unrest in Tbilisi, claiming that it had prevented Georgia from descending into chaos. He framed the situation as a choice between moving forward towards the future or regressing to the instability of the early 1990s, asserting that his government had made the necessary decisions to restore order and prevent a return to disaster.
• On November 17, 2007, President Mikheil Saakashvili defended the practice of phone tapping by Georgian law enforcement, asserting that all such activities were carried out legally and within the bounds of the law. He emphasized his commitment to privacy rights, but argued that individuals engaged in criminal activity or attempting to harm the country should not be surprised if their actions were exposed. While opponents accused authorities of fabricating or selectively editing conversations to incriminate targets, Saakashvili suggested convening a commission with civil society to review the process and ensure transparency. (https://civil.ge/archives/113576
• Abkhazia held military exercises from November 19-21, 2007, according to Apsnypress news agency. The Abkhaz mountain rifle battalion conducted drills at the Tsebelda training ground, located near the Tbilisi-controlled Upper Kodori Gorge. Reserve troops and heavy armament were mobilized from the west of Abkhazia to the site, and live shooting was scheduled for November 20. Abkhaz leader Sergey Bagapsh announced plans for the armed forces to transition to a volunteer, professional army in the following year. (https://civil.ge/archives/113578)
• The Georgian Public Broadcaster (GPB) aired a documentary on November 20, 2007, presenting the official narrative of the November 7 unrest. The documentary claimed that the anti-government demonstrations were part of a Russian-backed coup attempt, financially supported by Badri Patarkatsishvili and incited by Imedi TV, co-owned by Patarkatsishvili. It also suggested that opposition leaders with alleged ties to Russian intelligence were involved, and that the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) coordinated the operation. The film also highlighted ex-Defense Minister Irakli Okruashvili as a key figure in a planned military mutiny that was foiled in September. The documentary was rebroadcast by Rustavi 2 and Mze TV later that day. (https://civil.ge/archives/113593)
• On November 21, 2007, Russia accused Georgia of failing to honor its commitment to initiate talks on the establishment of a joint anti-terrorist center in Batumi, a former Russian military base. According to a Russo-Georgian agreement ratified by the Georgian parliament in April, Georgia pledged to set up the center, utilizing personnel and infrastructure from the recently vacated Russian base. Despite Russia having fulfilled its part of the agreement, including withdrawing military forces, the Russian Foreign Ministry claimed Georgia was uncooperative. The Ministry also pointed out that Russian peacekeepers remain stationed in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which Russia sees as an impediment to those attempting to escalate tensions in these regions under the guise of peace efforts. (https://civil.ge/archives/113598
• On November 22, 2007, Sergey Bagapsh, the leader of breakaway Abkhazia, announced that polling stations would be set up in Abkhazia for residents who hold Russian passports to participate in Russia’s parliamentary elections in December. The Abkhaz news agency Apsnipress reported that Bagapsh held a meeting with his cabinet to discuss the organization of elections in the region. Similar preparations are also being made in South Ossetia, which has already led to protests from Tbilisi. (https://civil.ge/archives/113614
  • On November 28, 2007, Russian passport holders in the breakaway region of Abkhazia began voting in Russia's parliamentary elections. Polling stations were set up in the Gali, Tkvarcheli, and Gulripshi districts of Abkhazia, even though Russia's official polling day is December 2. Additional polling stations were scheduled for Ochamchire district on November 29, and Gudauta, Sokhumi, and Gagra on November 30, with final stations open in Sokhumi and Gagra on December 2. Over 1,600 voters in Tkvarcheli and 300 voters in Gali, a predominantly ethnic Georgian area, participated in the vote. (https://civil.ge/archives/113662
• On November 26, 2007, Georgia announced that it would hold a plebiscite on NATO membership on January 5, alongside early presidential elections and a plebiscite regarding the timing of parliamentary elections. Ivane Noniashvili, a spokesman for the president's office, stated that voters would be asked whether they wanted Georgia to become a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Voters will also be asked when they prefer parliamentary elections to be held, either between October 1, 2008, and December 31, 2008, or in the spring of 2008. The decree authorizing the plebiscites was signed by Mikheil Saakashvili before he stepped down as president. The plebiscites are nonbinding but can be called by the president on significant state issues. (https://civil.ge/archives/113633
• On November 29, 2007, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Yakovenko claimed that Russian peacekeeping troops in the Abkhaz and South Ossetian conflict zones were the only barrier preventing Georgia's military actions. He accused Tbilisi of signaling its preference for forceful methods rather than peaceful resolutions to the conflicts. Yakovenko referenced the November 7 events in Georgia, suggesting that President Saakashvili was willing to use force against his own people. He also criticized Georgia for refusing to continue negotiations in line with international agreements. (https://civil.ge/archives/113667)
• On November 30, 2007, during a meeting at the OSCE Ministerial Council in Madrid, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov stated that improving Georgian-Russian relations required Georgia to cease its anti-Russian rhetoric, which he deemed the main hindrance to progress. Georgian Foreign Minister Gela Bezhuashvili countered that Georgia's rhetoric was a response to Russia's policies and was not anti-Russian but against Russia's actions toward Georgia. The discussion also centered on economic sanctions imposed by Russia on Georgia, with Lavrov claiming Georgia should also address its own issues rather than blame Russia. Bezhuashvili called for changes in the conflict resolution frameworks in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, criticizing Russia's presence at the Gudauta military base in Abkhazia and challenging Russia's handling of the anti-terrorist center agreement. The talks also involved Russian parliamentary elections being held in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, further straining ties. (https://civil.ge/archives/185551
• Gia Maisashvili, a presidential candidate and leader of the Party of Future, announced on November 30, 2007, that he would support Mikheil Saakashvili in a potential second-round run-off against Badri Patarkatsishvili, whom he referred to as an "oligarch." Despite disagreeing with Saakashvili, Maisashvili stated that if the choice came down to Saakashvili or Patarkatsishvili, he would back Saakashvili, seeing the oligarch as the worse option. Maisashvili's comments were prominently featured in the Georgian Public Broadcaster's evening news. A former economist at Enron, Maisashvili had previously been involved with Saakashvili during the Rose Revolution but later parted ways. He founded the Leadership School and the Government of the Future movement before establishing his own political party, the Party of Future, in July. (https://civil.ge/archives/113674
• Mikheil Saakashvili, a presidential candidate in Georgia, emphasized the importance of the January 5, 2008 presidential elections in determining the country's reunification and economic future during a campaign event on December 1, 2007, in the Varketili suburb of Tbilisi. At a pop concert supporting his reelection, Saakashvili reiterated his commitment to ensuring the return of internally displaced persons (IDPs) to Abkhazia, promising conditions for safe and dignified returns within months, as stated earlier on November 28, 2007. He dismissed claims of waning public support, citing large crowds at his events, and also highlighted key promises: raising pensions to at least USD 100 per month, introducing state-funded rent allowances for underprivileged students in Tbilisi, and granting state scholarships to 1,000 students for foreign universities. During his campaign, including a stop in Samegrelo on December 1, Saakashvili expressed confidence in gaining a new mandate, vital for reuniting the nation and fulfilling his pledges. (https://civil.ge/archives/113681
• On December 2, 2007, Boris Gryzlov, leader of Russia's ruling United Russia party and former State Duma speaker, announced that the newly elected Russian parliament would likely discuss recognizing the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in January 2008, citing referenda held in 1999 and 2006. Despite Georgia's objections, Russia held parliamentary elections in the two breakaway regions, where United Russia received 92% of votes in South Ossetia. South Ossetian leader Eduard Kokoity expressed hopes for continued integration with Russia. Georgian officials, however, warned that such recognition would be tantamount to a declaration of war and vowed to use all constitutional means to safeguard the country’s territorial integrity, emphasizing their preference for a peaceful resolution while leaving open the possibility of reevaluating their stance if Russia moved forward. (https://civil.ge/archives/113673)
• On December 3, 2007, Nino Burjanadze, acting president of Georgia, announced her decision not to congratulate Russia's ruling United Russia party on its December 2 electoral victory, citing Boris Gryzlov's remarks about the potential recognition of Abkhaz and South Ossetian independence. Gryzlov, a senior party official, stated that the newly elected Duma would likely consider the issue in January 2008, raising serious concerns in Tbilisi. In a televised address, Burjanadze called for an appropriate response from the international community and emphasized Georgia's interest in maintaining normal relations with Russia, but noted that such statements severely strained efforts toward mutual respect and equality. (https://civil.ge/archives/113686)
• On December 3, 2007, Levan Gachechiladze, the nine-party opposition coalition’s presidential candidate, presented the "major principles" of his program, pledging to detail it further in a 200-step, 200-day plan. Key priorities include abolishing the presidency to establish a parliamentary system, potentially incorporating a constitutional monarchy to prevent power centralization. Gachechiladze emphasized building a European-style democratic state, granting special status to the Georgian Orthodox Church, and fostering tolerance for minorities. Economically, he proposed boosting small and medium businesses, reclaiming illegally sold national wealth, creating independent arbitration and anti-monopoly agencies, and raising pensions to a subsistence level. In foreign policy, he prioritized NATO and EU membership, mending ties with Russia while protecting national interests, withdrawing from the Commonwealth of Independent States, and seeking Russia’s legal recognition as a party in the Abkhaz and South Ossetian conflicts. He advocated peaceful conflict resolution via civil and economic integration programs within Georgia. (https://civil.ge/archives/113687)
  • He said that granting special status for the Georgian Orthodox Church would be a priority. “Georgia which is Georgian, and neither American nor Russian, and which aspires to European-style statehood is the priority. I am making a special focus on ‘the Georgian approach’ in my program and that is why I think that our Church’s special status is very important,” Gachechiladze said. He did not, however, outline what this “special status” would entail.
  • In foreign policy issues, Gachechiladze said Georgian membership of NATO and the European Union was his “preference and ambition.” He added, however, that Saakashvili’s “unprincipled and incorrect” policy towards Russia should be changed in order to normalize ties with Moscow. This, he said, however, must be based on Georgia’s national interests.
  • He also said that Georgia should undertake measures aimed at “the legal recognition of Russia as a side” in the Abkhaz and South Ossetian conflicts.
• On December 4, 2007, Nino Burjanadze, acting president of Georgia, announced that Russian election observers would not be invited to monitor the January 5, 2008 presidential elections. In an interview with Vremya Novostei, she noted that Russia had not invited Georgian monitors for its own elections and questioned the objectivity of potential Russian observers, citing concerns over Russia’s lack of interest in Georgia’s stability and welfare. Georgia also chose not to invite the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) as a whole but extended invitations to certain CIS member states with friendly relations. To ensure transparency, Tbilisi has invited the OSCE and other international organizations to send a large number of observers. (https://civil.ge/archives/113692)
• On December 4, 2007, Mikheil Saakashvili, campaigning for re-election in the January 5, 2008 presidential elections, expressed confidence that the South Ossetian conflict would be resolved within months. Speaking to students at Tbilisi State University, Saakashvili likened the secessionist regime in Tskhinvali to a "loose tooth ready for removal," citing precise information to support his claim. He credited Georgia’s enhanced capacity to counter "provocations" for the recent calm in South Ossetia and warned of a ten-fold response to any aggression. While he asserted that South Ossetia’s resolution was imminent, protests outside the event criticized the exclusion of dissenting voices from the meeting. Saakashvili also reiterated his earlier pledge from November 28, 2007, to ensure the safe return of internally displaced persons (IDPs) to Abkhazia in collaboration with the international community. (https://civil.ge/archives/113693
• On December 4, 2007, Sergey Bagapsh, the leader of Abkhazia, stated that Georgia’s lack of strong democratic institutions threatens regional stability, highlighting the pattern of regime changes through revolutions. Bagapsh, speaking at a press conference in Sokhumi, emphasized that stability in Georgia aligns with Sokhumi’s interests but warned of potential provocations ahead of Georgia's January 5 presidential elections and the anticipated resolution of the Kosovo impasse. He also announced plans to tighten security at the border with Georgia starting December 8, 2007, to address these concerns. (https://civil.ge/archives/113694
• In an article titled A Free Georgia, published in the Wall Street Journal on December 6, 2007, presidential candidate Mikheil Saakashvili defended his administration's actions during the November 7 protests. He justified breaking up the demonstrations, citing "extra-constitutional threats" that endangered national security, including calls to storm the parliament, accusations of government aggression against a central cathedral by Imedi TV, and evidence of subversive foreign intelligence activities. Saakashvili acknowledged that the decision to impose a state of emergency and shut down Imedi TV, which he accused of broadcasting inflammatory reports, frustrated Western allies but argued it was necessary to prevent escalating violence and instability. He reaffirmed Georgia's commitment to building a European democracy despite these challenges. (https://civil.ge/archives/113710)
• The controversy over Badri Patarkatsishvili’s financial involvement in Georgia's presidential election campaign intensified on December 6-8, 2007, with accusations exchanged between the ruling party and the nine-party opposition coalition. Opposition candidate Levan Gachechiladze stated on December 6 that he welcomed Patarkatsishvili’s financial support, prompting the ruling party to allege a secret deal offering Patarkatsishvili the prime ministership in exchange for “dirty money.” The opposition countered, accusing the ruling party of hypocrisy, highlighting projects previously funded by Patarkatsishvili’s money that ex-President Mikheil Saakashvili publicly endorsed, such as the Ilia Chavchavadze Museum and Mtatsminda Amusement Park. On December 8, opposition politicians who met with Patarkatsishvili in London pledged to unite against election rigging and to work toward free and transparent elections, with coordination among opposition campaigns. (https://civil.ge/archives/113733)
• On December 10, 2007, acting Georgian President Nino Burjanadze accused Russia of deploying additional troops and military equipment to the Abkhaz conflict zone and urged Moscow not to "exploit" Georgia's ongoing election process for political advantage. While Russia claimed the movements were routine troop rotations, Georgian officials disputed this, categorizing it as an unauthorized military buildup. Burjanadze also reiterated Georgia’s demand for the removal of Russian peacekeeping commander Sergey Chaban, calling on the CIS peacekeeping forces to address the issue if they respect Georgia’s sovereignty. Despite Georgian objections, the CIS Council of Defense Ministers had re-endorsed Chaban’s role on November 27, 2007. (https://civil.ge/archives/113738)
• On December 9, 2007, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov denied allegations made by Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili, who claimed that Russian President Vladimir Putin had threatened to impose "the Cyprus model" on Georgia, effectively splitting the country. In an interview with a Cypriot news agency, Lavrov stated that Putin had never made such a threat, suggesting that Saakashvili could "deny his own allegation himself." This statement came in response to Saakashvili's remarks from November 12, 2007, where he accused Russia of attempting to divide Georgia. (https://civil.ge/archives/113740
• On December 14, 2007, Georgia demanded accountability for Russian peacekeepers after an incident at the Enguri bridge, a crossing point on the border with the breakaway region of Abkhazia. The confrontation occurred when a group of Georgian journalists attempted to film leaflets that read “We will be back,” which were reportedly placed at the site. The peacekeepers allegedly blocked the journalists' efforts, leading to a scuffle and the damage of some equipment. (https://civil.ge/archives/113774)
  • Davit Bakradze, Georgia’s state minister for conflict resolution, condemned the actions of the Russian peacekeepers, calling for their punishment. He accused the peacekeepers of showing bias and not maintaining the impartiality required for their role in the conflict zone, further exacerbating tensions between Georgia and Russia over their involvement in the region.
• On December 16, 2007, a bomb explosion in Tskhinvali, the capital of the breakaway South Ossetia region, resulted in the death of a South Ossetian militiaman, Mairbek Khuriev, and left two others, Erik Dudaev and Felix Bolatayev, seriously injured. The attack, which occurred while the men were in a car, was reportedly caused by a remote-controlled explosive. (https://civil.ge/archives/113790)
  • The South Ossetian authorities labeled the explosion a "terrorist act" and accused Georgia of being behind it. They suggested that Dudaev was the intended target of the attack. In contrast, the Georgian government denied any involvement, instead suggesting that the incident was linked to a criminal feud rather than a politically motivated assault. Additionally, Georgia criticized the fact that neither the OSCE nor the Joint Peacekeeping Forces were permitted to inspect the scene, raising concerns about transparency in the investigation.
• Irina Sarishvili was one of the candidates and she was the only one calling for neutrality (https://civil.ge/archives/113819)
• Natelashvili was allowed to run despite open charges of espionage and conspiracy to overthrow (https://civil.ge/archives/113823
• On December 24, 2007, Valery Gelbakhiani, the head of Badri Patarkatsishvili's presidential campaign headquarters, was declared a suspect in a conspiracy to overthrow the government. The allegations stemmed from an investigation launched after Irakli Kodua, the head of the Interior Ministry’s Special Operations Department, claimed that Gelbakhiani and Marina Gabunia, a former judge, had attempted to bribe him to participate in a plot to disrupt the upcoming election and trigger mass unrest across Georgia. (https://civil.ge/archives/113842)
  • The investigation, based on covert recordings of two meetings between Gelbakhiani and Kodua, revealed plans to undermine the election by creating a false impression of vote rigging and inciting violent protests. In the conversations, Gelbakhiani allegedly mentioned organizing paid activists to create chaos, with a goal of attracting 200,000 people to the streets. He also referred to the opposition presidential candidate Levan Gachechiladze and his team, signaling some level of coordination.
  • Gelbakhiani denied the charges, claiming that the video recordings were edited and stating that his intent was simply to ensure cooperation with the Interior Ministry to avoid the disruption of post-election protests. He also admitted to consulting with Patarkatsishvili in London, but denied any involvement in a conspiracy to overthrow the government.
  • Since Gelbakhiani is a member of Parliament, he enjoys immunity from prosecution, meaning any potential arrest would require a vote by his fellow lawmakers.
• On December 24, 2007, Badri Patarkatsishvili, a presidential candidate, denied Georgian authorities' claims that he and his associates were plotting a coup, labeling the accusations a provocation. The authorities had implicated Valery Gelbakhiani, head of Patarkatsishvili’s campaign, in a conspiracy to incite unrest and create the appearance of election rigging. Patarkatsishvili confirmed meeting Irakli Kodua, a senior official in the Interior Ministry, but claimed it was a staged provocation by the government, which he documented with audio and video recordings. Gelbakhiani also acknowledged the meeting but denied the charges, suggesting the video had been edited and stating his goal was to prevent disruptions during protests after the January 5 election. Opposition leaders dismissed the accusations as a government distraction, while Zurab Tkemaladze of the Industrialist Party called for an impartial investigation. (https://civil.ge/archives/113850 )
• On December 24, 2007, Nino Burjanadze, acting president of Georgia, made a televised statement addressing the recent allegations of a coup plot. She asserted that there was a serious threat against Georgia's state security, which had existed and still persisted. Burjanadze emphasized the government's commitment to ensuring free and fair elections on January 5, insisting that no one would be allowed to manipulate the public's right to vote. She accused certain forces of trying to destabilize the country, likening their actions to the unrest of the early 1990s, and warned that anyone using illegal methods to destabilize the country would be held accountable. Burjanadze further vowed that a thorough and objective investigation would be conducted into the allegations and that the results would be shared transparently with the public and international community. She urged all political forces and citizens to refrain from actions that could lead to unrest and bloodshed, calling on everyone to recognize their shared responsibility to protect the country's stability and democracy. (https://civil.ge/archives/113851)
• On December 25, 2007, the General Prosecutor's Office of Georgia released a 25-minute extract from a covertly recorded audio tape of a conversation between Badri Patarkatsishvili, a business tycoon and presidential candidate, and Irakli Kodua, head of the Interior Ministry’s Special Operations Department. The tape, recorded on December 23 at Patarkatsishvili’s mansion in Surrey, England, was made with the collaboration of British secret services. During the conversation, Patarkatsishvili discussed plans to create division within the ruling Saakashvili government and claimed that Mikheil Saakashvili was losing international support, relying only on U.S. officials Mathew Bryza and Daniel Fried. They also discussed strategies for post-election actions, including the neutralization of Interior Minister Vano Merabishvili, and even the potential use of an injection to incapacitate him. Financial aspects of the plan were also discussed, with Patarkatsishvili agreeing to provide USD 100 million for the operation. The release of this tape followed the Patarkatsishvili campaign’s own release of footage and statements, adding to the tense political climate as Georgia approached its January 5 elections. (https://civil.ge/archives/113860)
• On December 26, 2007, Marina Gabunia, a former judge, was remanded in custody for two months by Tbilisi City Court after being charged with involvement in a conspiracy to overthrow the Georgian government. Gabunia is accused, alongside MP Valery Gelbakhiani, a close associate of presidential candidate Badri Patarkatsishvili, of attempting to bribe Irakli Kodua, the head of the Interior Ministry’s Special Operations Department, to participate in the alleged plot. Gelbakhiani, who has fled the country, expressed a willingness to testify if granted a meeting with EU or UN representatives. The investigation, initiated on December 17, claims that Gabunia and Gelbakhiani attempted to incite unrest and destabilize the country. Gabunia was not granted bail due to her refusal to cooperate with the investigation. (https://civil.ge/archives/113868)
• On December 26, 2007, U.S. Ambassador to Georgia John Tefft addressed the recent release of tapes implicating presidential candidate Badri Patarkatsishvili and some of his associates in a coup plot. While refraining from commenting on the specifics of the recordings, Ambassador Tefft described the situation as serious. He emphasized the importance of free and fair elections, asserting that the Georgian people must be able to vote without coercion or intimidation. He also expressed confidence in the international monitoring of the January 5, 2008 elections, particularly the involvement of the ODIHR and OSCE, which are recognized for their high standards in election oversight. (https://civil.ge/archives/113870)
• On December 27, 2007, Badri Patarkatsishvili announced his withdrawal from the Georgian presidential race. In a written statement, he explained that opposition leaders had called for both him and President Mikheil Saakashvili to exit the election, and he decided to meet that demand. Patarkatsishvili emphasized that his decision was driven by a commitment to the country's interests, rather than his own, and expressed confidence that Saakashvili's regime would eventually be defeated. His decision came amid escalating political turmoil, including the release of audio and video tapes implicating him in a coup plot, which he denied, stating his actions were intended to protect his supporters. The political environment was further strained by the temporary suspension of broadcasts by his television station, Imedi TV, which was also caught up in the controversy. (https://civil.ge/archives/113894)
• On December 28, 2007, Mikheil Saakashvili, the incumbent president and re-election candidate, stated that if re-elected, Georgia would achieve NATO membership and work towards reuniting the country. During a live appearance on Rustavi 2 TV, Saakashvili expressed confidence in Georgia joining NATO during his second term but acknowledged that European Union membership would not be achieved immediately. He emphasized Georgia’s ambition to move closer to European structures and to shed its image as a "second-rate country." He also declared his intention to leave a reunited Georgia for his successor. (https://civil.ge/archives/113897)
• Kodua-Patarkatsishvili transcript: https://civil.ge/archives/113830
• On December 29, 2007, Rustavi 2 TV aired a special primetime segment titled P.S., which featured three separate reports, totaling 25 minutes, about the alleged foiled coup attempt by business tycoon Badri Patarkatsishvili. The show, which discussed newly released audio and video tapes implicating Patarkatsishvili in a coup plot, claimed that Patarkatsishvili planned to use his political influence, including the nine-party opposition coalition, as a power base. The tapes suggested Patarkatsishvili had offered USD 100 million to a top Interior Ministry official to orchestrate post-election unrest and "neutralize" Interior Minister Vano Merabishvili. The reports included statements from ruling party lawmakers, such as Givi Targamadze, who claimed that the coup plan involved seizing key government buildings and forcing Saakashvili to flee the country. The segment also discussed Patarkatsishvili’s shifting political alliances, including failed attempts to use former Defense Minister Irakli Okruashvili and later Irakli Kodua, an alleged government mole. The final report delved into Patarkatsishvili's controversial past, linking him to Russia and the notorious businessman Boris Berezovsky. (https://civil.ge/archives/185563)
• On January 1, 2008, presidential candidate Mikheil Saakashvili delivered his live New Year address from Chkhalta in the Tbilisi-controlled upper Kodori Gorge of breakaway Abkhazia, emphasizing the region's significance. His was the only presidential address aired live on Georgian TV before the New Year, followed by messages from Patriarch Ilia II and acting President Nino Burjanadze. Saakashvili expressed solidarity with Abkhazian residents, promising a return to their homes in regions like Sokhumi and Gulripshi, and assured displaced persons of eventual resettlement in Abkhazia. He also extended New Year wishes to all ethnic groups in Georgia, highlighting their unity as integral parts of the Georgian people. (https://civil.ge/archives/113821)
• On January 2, 2008, presidential candidate Irina Sarishvili urged the opposition to unite behind a single candidate to challenge Mikheil Saakashvili in the upcoming January 5 election. Speaking at a press conference, Sarishvili emphasized that the opposition could still reach an agreement by the following evening and expressed her willingness to withdraw in favor of a unified candidate. The opposition vote was fragmented among Levan Gachechiladze, backed by a nine-party coalition; Davit Gamkrelidze of the New Rights Party; and Shalva Natelashvili of the Labor Party, with other underdog candidates like Giorgi Maisashvili also expected to draw votes. Business tycoon Badri Patarkatsishvili announced his intent to withdraw but would delay officially notifying the Central Election Commission (CEC) until January 4, 2008, just a day before the election. (https://civil.ge/archives/113916)
• On January 2, 2008, presidential candidate Irina Sarishvili warned against voting "yes" in the January 5 plebiscite on NATO membership, arguing it would mean abandoning Georgia’s lost territories and risking involvement in a potential war with Iran due to U.S.-Iran tensions. Sarishvili, leader of the Party of Hope, also stated that a favorable vote would not guarantee NATO membership and reiterated her stance on neutrality, positioning herself as the only candidate advocating for Georgia’s non-alignment. (https://civil.ge/archives/113917)
• On January 3, 2008, Giorgi Zhvania resigned as head of Badri Patarkatsishvili’s election campaign, citing the tycoon’s reversal of his decision to withdraw from the presidential race. Zhvania, brother of late PM Zurab Zhvania, expressed disapproval, stating that he had supported Patarkatsishvili’s earlier withdrawal due to public doubts about the candidate’s reputation. Zhvania argued that these concerns had not changed. On the same day, Patarkatsishvili announced his intention to remain in the race, asserting his determination to continue his campaign for the presidency. (https://civil.ge/archives/113925)
• On January 3, 2008, Labor Party leader and presidential candidate Shalva Natelashvili announced his intention to offer the role of Prime Minister to tycoon Bidzina Ivanishvili if elected. While Ivanishvili, a philanthropist ranked 167th on Forbes’ 2007 billionaire list with a net worth of USD 4.7 billion, has avoided politics, Natelashvili urged him to engage in consultations with opposition parties to form a national coalition government. Natelashvili’s proposal marked a departure from his 2006 criticism of Ivanishvili for allegedly financing Mikheil Saakashvili’s administration. Additionally, Natelashvili pledged to establish a commission, chaired by MP Gia Meparishvili, to pursue constitutional reforms aimed at abolishing the presidency. (https://civil.ge/archives/113928)
• On January 3, 2008, Badri Patarkatsishvili retracted his earlier decision to withdraw from the presidential race, vowing to continue his campaign to build a democratic Georgia. In a written statement, he accused authorities of fabricating evidence linking him to a coup plot and criticized the government’s handling of the elections, claiming any high result for Saakashvili would signify fraud. Patarkatsishvili pledged to spend GEL 1.5 billion of his own money on social programs, including covering gas and electricity bills. His remarks about a phone call with Patriarch Ilia II led to a rebuttal from the Georgian Orthodox Church, which denied supporting any political force. After partial airing of his video address on Georgian TV, Patarkatsishvili accused broadcasters of censorship and reiterated concerns about democratic standards, likening the campaign to Pakistan’s tumultuous political environment. He also alleged an assassination plot involving Georgian authorities and Chechen warlords. (https://civil.ge/archives/113931)
• On January 4, 2008, Abkhaz official Ruslan Kishmaria denied Georgian media reports claiming attacks and intimidation against ethnic Georgians in the Gali district of the breakaway region. Georgian outlets alleged that local Abkhaz officials were intimidating Georgians and that at least seven Georgian-owned houses had been burned down. The Georgian Foreign Ministry, on January 3, accused Abkhaz authorities of conducting raids to intimidate residents and discourage their participation in Georgia’s January 5 presidential election. Kishmaria, speaking to the Abkhaz news agency Apsnipress, refuted these claims, asserting that the situation in Gali was calm and that residents were preparing for Orthodox Christmas on January 7, 2008. (https://civil.ge/archives/113941)
• On January 4, 2008, acting President Nino Burjanadze warned of attempts to escalate tensions in conflict zones on the eve of Georgia's presidential election. Referring to alleged threats from Abkhaz authorities that ethnic Georgians in Gali would face repercussions if they participated in the January 5 election, Burjanadze stated such actions were unsurprising but temporary obstacles. She expressed confidence that the "right choice" in the election would lead to Georgia regaining its territorial integrity, ensuring unrestricted movement for its citizens. Georgian media reported intimidation of Gali residents by Abkhaz officials to prevent them from traveling to Zugdidi to vote, a claim denied by Abkhaz authorities as “misinformation.” (https://civil.ge/archives/113943)
• On January 6, 2008, the Russian Foreign Ministry condemned Georgia's January 5 presidential election, labeling it neither free nor fair. The ministry cited alleged violations, including misuse of administrative resources, pressure on opposition candidates, and restricted access to financial and media resources, all occurring in a campaign initially launched during a state of emergency. Russia criticized ex-president Mikheil Saakashvili’s declaration of victory based on exit polls before official results were announced, calling it premature. Saakashvili, addressing supporters, had claimed a first-round victory while pledging to await the Central Election Commission’s results. Moscow also dismissed U.S. Congressman Alcee L. Hastings' positive assessment of the election as superficial. (https://civil.ge/archives/113998
• On January 10, 2008, Georgian authorities charged business tycoon and former presidential candidate Badri Patarkatsishvili with conspiring to overthrow the government and planning two separate terrorist acts, including one targeting a government minister. The General Prosecutor’s Office also froze his bank account at Standard Bank and summoned him for questioning. Patarkatsishvili had previously been implicated in a coup plot after the release of video and audio recordings in December, where he allegedly offered USD 100 million to an Interior Ministry official to "neutralize" the Interior Minister. Patarkatsishvili admitted to offering money but claimed it was to prevent violence during potential post-election protests. Despite the controversy, he received almost 7% of the vote in the January 5, 2008 presidential election. (https://civil.ge/archives/114033)
• Davit Gamkrelidze, the leader of the opposition New Rights Party and presidential candidate, strongly criticized the United States and international observers for endorsing Georgia’s January 5, 2008 presidential election, calling their support “cynical” and harmful to their credibility. He expressed disappointment with the U.S. Department of State's statement, which claimed the election met democratic standards, arguing it undermined both U.S. reputation and Georgian attitudes towards the West. Gamkrelidze warned that this would alienate the Georgian public from pro-Western ideals, especially given the close association between Mikheil Saakashvili's regime and NATO membership support. He also highlighted that support for NATO had declined sharply in public opinion polls, linking it to the public’s growing dissatisfaction with Saakashvili’s leadership. Gamkrelidze’s remarks reflect his frustration with the international community's failure to acknowledge what he viewed as an undemocratic election process, and his concern that U.S. endorsement of the election undermines its moral authority in Georgia. (https://civil.ge/archives/114043)
• On January 15, 2008, Badri Patarkatsishvili, the Georgian business tycoon and presidential candidate, was remanded in custody for two months in absentia by the Tbilisi City Court. Patarkatsishvili faced serious charges from the General Prosecutor's Office, including conspiracy to overthrow the government and plotting two separate terrorist acts, one allegedly targeting a government minister. (https://civil.ge/archives/114086
  • His lawyer, Shalva Shavgulidze, stated that they would appeal the ruling in the Court of Appeals and maintained that the charges were politically motivated. Shavgulidze explained that Patarkatsishvili could only be placed on a wanted list if the Court of Appeals upheld the decision, and that extradition requests could only follow at that point. The defense argued that the charges were initiated after Patarkatsishvili's announcement of his political ambitions, suggesting a political motive behind the legal action.
• On January 22, 2008, Valery Gelbakhiani, a member of parliament and former head of Badri Patarkatsishvili's presidential campaign, was officially charged with conspiring to overthrow the Georgian government. The General Prosecutor's Office confirmed the charges and notified the Georgian Parliament, where Gelbakhiani enjoys immunity from prosecution unless stripped by fellow lawmakers. (https://civil.ge/archives/114140
  • Gelbakhiani had been declared a suspect in the conspiracy since December 2007, after the Interior Ministry’s Special Operations Department (SOD) head, Irakli Kodua, informed investigators about an alleged bribery attempt involving Gelbakhiani and a former judge, Marina Gabunia, who sought Kodua's participation in the conspiracy. A secretly recorded video was also released, showing Gelbakhiani discussing plans for post-election unrest.
  • Gelbakhiani, who had fled the country, expressed willingness to testify but only if granted a meeting with representatives from the EU or UN.

Attempts at defusion

ZOURABICHVILI

• Zourabichvili met with Lavrov on the day after the presidential inauguration in 2008 (121)
• Lavrov told SZ that NATO went against Russia's interests, and Moscow would not allow Georgia to adhere, language that was much stronger than before. Lavrov accused Gerogia of not having fulfilled past agreements (121)

ASMUS

• In the fall of 2007, Bezuashvili and Lavrov met on the sidelines of the UNGA in New York and talked openly about the growing tension between Russia and Georgia, the risk that their countries might be headed toward war (85)
  • Lavrov told Bezhuashvili that Russia would never let Georgia join NATO (85)

IIFFMCG II

• The year 2008 began with Mikheil Saakashvili’s re-election to his second presidential term with 53.4 % of the vote. As four years before, both Georgian and Russian officials expressed a desire to improve their bilateral relations. In his inaugural address on 20 January 2008, reelected President Saakashvili offered to “extend the hand of partnership and cooperation to Russia.” (29)
• In his first news conference he invited President Putin to visit Georgia and added that “one of my main regrets is that during my first presidential term relations with Russia were spoiled”. (29)
• The Russian Government reacted by sending Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov to President Saakashvili’s inauguration, contrary to expectations that Moscow would boycott this ceremony in Tbilisi or send a low level delegation. Foreign Minister Lavrov was the highestranking Russian Government official to visit Georgia since the spy scandal in 2006. (29)
• On 21 February, Presidents Putin and Saakashvili met in the Russian presidential residence NovoOgaryovo. President Saakashvili expressed his interest in achieving at least a limited reconciliation. At the summit, the two sides agreed to re-establish direct civilian air links. Reportedly there were talks of a joint control of borders on the Psou river and at the Roki tunnel, which provoked protests from the leaders of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. (29)
• On February 14, 2008, NATO SG received an official request from MS to invite Georgia to participate in a MAP at the upcoming NATO Summit in Bucharest on April 3 (44)
• According to Tskhinvali, Kokoitu sent a letter on January 28, 2008 an officiel letter to Saakashvili proposing a joint meeting beyween the sides with the attendance of the OSCE CHairman in Office. Tbilisi ignored it (194)
  • On March 15, MS officially rejected the idea of such a meeting (194)
• On March 4, 2008, Georgia withdrew from the quadrilateral negotiations proess brokered by the OSCE, denouncing the Dagomys agreement (194)
• Mikheil Saakashvili stated that he had deliberately avoided speaking about Russia during his re-election campaign, despite the issue being a potential vote catcher. He explained, "I refused to use that card" because it was the responsible thing to do, acknowledging that Russia is a sensitive issue for Georgia. Saakashvili expressed hope to resume dialogue with Russia and normalize relations, proposing an invitation to Russian President Vladimir Putin to his inauguration. This shift in tone contrasted with his earlier accusations, following the November 7 unrest, where he blamed Russia for orchestrating the protests and expelled three Russian diplomats from Georgia. (https://civil.ge/archives/114023
• Georgian Prime Minister Lado Gurgenidze announced on January 9 that Georgia is willing to engage in talks with Russia about lifting the embargo on Georgian wine and mineral water. His comments came after Russia’s chief sanitary inspector, Gennady Onishchenko, called for discussions on the issue, although he had not received a response from Georgia. The embargo, imposed by Russia last spring, was officially justified by health safety concerns, but Tbilisi views it as politically motivated, aimed at applying economic pressure on Georgia. (https://civil.ge/archives/114026)
• Russia's ambassador to Georgia, Vyacheslav Kovalenko, stated on January 9 that Russia is willing to improve relations with Georgia but expects "concrete steps" from Tbilisi first. While Mikheil Saakashvili expressed hope for dialogue and normalization of ties, Kovalenko emphasized that Russia had heard many promises and now sought actions to back those words. The ambassador reiterated Russia's desire for Georgia to become a neutral state, which conflicts with Georgia’s aspirations for NATO membership. Kovalenko made these remarks after meeting with Labor Party leader Shalva Natelashvili, who also supports improving relations between the two countries. n(https://civil.ge/archives/114029
• On January 12, Mikheil Saakashvili reiterated Georgia's desire to improve relations with Russia, expressing hope that President Putin would attend his inauguration, scheduled for January 20 or 21. Saakashvili emphasized that relations between the two countries should be "unfrozen" and noted the importance of "heating up" their ties, as current relations were not normal. Reflecting on his first term, Saakashvili expressed regret over the damaged relations with Russia but refrained from assigning blame, focusing instead on resolving the issue and moving forward. (https://civil.ge/archives/114054)
• On January 13, Abkhaz leader Sergey Bagapsh ruled out any possibility of talks with Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili. Bagapsh stated that while dialogue might have been possible with another president, discussions on the political status of Abkhazia were not an option under Saakashvili. He emphasized that the January 5 election in Georgia, in which Saakashvili was re-elected with 53.47% of the vote, held no significance for Abkhazia, as it was conducted in a neighboring state. (https://civil.ge/archives/114068
• Russian authorities have received an official invitation to attend the inauguration of President-elect Mikheil Saakashvili, as reported by RIA Novosti. The invitation was extended to President Putin, although it remains uncertain whether he will attend. This came after Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov stated earlier that no official invitation had been received. Saakashvili had expressed on January 12 that Georgia sought to improve relations with Russia and would welcome Putin's presence at the inauguration, scheduled for January 20. (https://civil.ge/archives/114085)
• Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov stated on January 15 that if Georgia were to join NATO, Russia would need to reassess its security arrangements. Lavrov emphasized that while the decision is ultimately for the Georgian people to make, such a move would force Russia to reconsider its security strategy under the new conditions. He also reminded that Georgia had previously pledged not to allow foreign military bases on its territory in exchange for the Russian withdrawal from military bases in the country. Lavrov reiterated Moscow's preference for Georgian neutrality, which conflicts with Tbilisi's NATO aspirations. A plebiscite held alongside the presidential election on January 5 showed that 72.5% of voters supported Georgia's NATO membership. (https://civil.ge/archives/114089
• Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov will attend the presidential inauguration of Mikheil Saakashvili on January 20, according to the Georgian Foreign Ministry. Saakashvili had previously expressed that Georgia sought to improve relations with Russia, and he also mentioned that he would be pleased if President Putin were to attend the event. (https://civil.ge/archives/114091)
• Georgia is ready to invite Russia's competent commission to assess the quality of Georgian wine and mineral water in Georgia, aiming to reopen the Russian market. The proposal, which was handed over to Russia's ambassador in Tbilisi, Vyacheslav Kovalenko, follows a request from Russia's chief sanitary officer, Gennady Onishchenko, earlier in January. While Russia cited health safety concerns for the ban, Tbilisi argues that it was a political move aimed at applying economic pressure on Georgia. (https://civil.ge/archives/114093)
• Russian President Vladimir Putin congratulated Mikheil Saakashvili on his re-election, expressing hope for constructive developments in relations between their countries. Saakashvili, who has emphasized Georgia's desire to improve ties with Russia, had invited Putin to his January 20 inauguration, but the Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov will attend instead. (https://civil.ge/archives/114099
• On January 20, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov met with Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili following his presidential inauguration. They discussed taking concrete steps to improve relations between their countries. Saakashvili emphasized the importance of rebuilding ties with Russia, expressing a desire to move beyond past conflicts and work towards cooperation. Lavrov acknowledged the challenges but noted that both sides were willing to move from words to actions. After the meeting, Georgian Prime Minister Lado Gurgenidze expressed cautious optimism about the future of Georgian-Russian relations. Lavrov also met with opposition leaders before leaving Tbilisi. (https://civil.ge/archives/114129)
• INAUGURATION SPEECH: ·Four years ago I stood before you and extended my hand in friendship and cooperation to our neighbors and colleagues in Russia. Today I do the same once again. The path of transformation is never an easy one. It means finding the power not only to change on the inside, but to change as well on the outside. It is my hope that together with our friends in Russia, we can walk down this path of change together-in a spirit of mutual respect, camaraderie and shared gains. (https://civil.ge/archives/114132)
  • ·We will start building a Georgia without poverty. We will continue strengthening our security and unity. We will reach out to Russia, to invite better relations. We will continue our progress toward NATO and the European Union.
• On January 22, Georgian acting Foreign Minister Gela Bezhuashvili announced that Tbilisi would develop a "road map" to improve relations with Russia over the coming weeks. He emphasized Georgia's willingness to compromise, but clarified that it would not sacrifice its national interests. Bezhuashvili outlined that reciprocal steps were needed, including the removal of obstacles such as the economic embargo and the opening of borders. This announcement came after Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov met with Georgian officials following Saakashvili's inauguration and confirmed an agreement on taking concrete steps toward improving bilateral relations, though he did not provide specific details. (https://civil.ge/archives/114136)
• On January 23, South Ossetian leader Eduard Kokoity called for talks with Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili, requesting OSCE and Russia to mediate the meeting. Kokoity outlined three key issues for discussion: the demilitarization of the conflict zone, including a non-use of force agreement; economic rehabilitation; and the political status of South Ossetia. He proposed the creation of a "Zone of Economic Preference", which would include both South Ossetia and areas of Russia’s North Ossetia and Georgia’s Gori region. Georgian officials, including Davit Bakradze, responded cautiously, stating that high-level talks would only occur if South Ossetia was genuinely committed to resolving the conflict. Kokoity also emphasized South Ossetia’s willingness to continue discussions under the Joint Control Commission (JCC) framework and compared South Ossetia’s situation to Kosovo, asserting it had stronger legal grounds for recognition. (https://civil.ge/archives/114141
• On January 23, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov urged Georgia to demonstrate its commitment to resolving the conflicts with Abkhazia and South Ossetia by signing non-use of force agreements with the breakaway regions. Lavrov emphasized that Russia had been consistently calling on Georgia to adopt such declarations, particularly with South Ossetia, under the OSCE initiative. However, Georgian Minister Davit Bakradze rejected this proposal, explaining that Georgia would not sign a declaration that implied recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states. He insisted that any agreement must be framed as part of Georgia's internal conflict, focusing on the peaceful restoration of territorial integrity. Bakradze also stated that any treaty should include provisions for the return of displaced persons to these regions. Previously, Georgia had expressed willingness to sign a non-use of force declaration, but only if Western powers, not Russia, acted as guarantors. (https://civil.ge/archives/114142
• On January 23, Irakli Chubinishvili, Georgia's ambassador to Russia, resigned, as confirmed by the Georgian Foreign Ministry. While there has been no official announcement, it is widely expected that Erosi Kitsmarishvili, the founder and former owner of Rustavi 2 TV, will be appointed as his successor. Kitsmarishvili, who sold his shares in the TV station in 2004, had a brief tenure as a consultant at the Georgian Public Broadcaster (GPB) in 2007 before resigning due to a fallout with GPB Director-General Tamar Kintsurashvili. (https://civil.ge/archives/114144)
• On January 23, Tbilisi denied reports that the Abkhaz coast guard had opened fire on two Georgian coast guard vessels in the Abkhaz section of Georgia’s territorial waters. Tbilisi officials labeled these reports as misinformation. According to Apsnipress, Kristian Bzhania, a spokesperson for the Abkhaz leader, claimed the Georgian vessels left Abkhaz territorial waters after being fired upon off the coast of the Gali district, warning that tougher measures would be taken next time. However, the Georgian Border Police stated there were no Georgian vessels in the area at the time. (https://civil.ge/archives/114149)
• On January 24, President Mikheil Saakashvili expressed his approval of a statement by Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov in which Russia reaffirmed it had no intention of recognizing the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Saakashvili welcomed this shift in Russian policy, saying it could lead to more constructive relations and noting that if such statements had been made earlier, many issues could have been resolved more easily. (https://civil.ge/archives/114154)
  • Saakashvili also expressed hope that Russia would play a constructive role in resolving Georgia’s separatist conflicts. He reiterated that Georgia does not divide its people along ethnic lines and emphasized the importance of removing barriers between regions. Saakashvili called for openness, allowing people in regions like Tskhinvali and South Ossetia to integrate freely into Georgian society, stressing that this would help quickly resolve other issues.
• On January 25, 2008, President Mikheil Saakashvili spoke to a group of Russian journalists in Strasbourg, discussing the state of Russo-Georgian relations. While he refrained from making bold predictions, he noted positive signs in the relationship, recalling an early "honeymoon period" in 2004 when relations began well but later deteriorated. He acknowledged the many false starts in their interactions, making it difficult to be overly optimistic about the future. (https://civil.ge/archives/114165)
  • Saakashvili mentioned his discussions with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov during Lavrov's visit to Tbilisi on January 20, following Saakashvili’s re-election. Saakashvili found the talks constructive, particularly appreciating Lavrov's assurance that Russia had no intention of recognizing Abkhazia or South Ossetia, even in the event of Kosovo's independence. He emphasized the importance of this statement for improving the bilateral relationship.
  • Saakashvili also indicated that Georgia had proposed sending its Foreign Minister to Russia for further talks and suggested that PM-nominee Lado Gurgenidze might visit Russia after the new cabinet was confirmed. Furthermore, he revealed plans for a Russian delegation to visit Georgia to review the Georgian wine and mineral water trade, which had been banned by Russia in 2006.
  • Saakashvili reflected on the economic embargo imposed by Russia, asserting that it had not caused any significant harm to Georgia’s economy, which actually grew by 12% in 2007. He also addressed his campaign promise to return internally displaced persons (IDPs) to Abkhazia, calling it a realistic goal, but emphasizing the need for a change in the mandate of the Russian-led peacekeeping mission in the region. He clarified that his intention was not to resolve the issue through military means but through peaceful and constructive steps.
• On January 25, 2008, a UN report by Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon highlighted how inaccurate Georgian media reports were fueling uncertainty and alarm in the Gali district of Abkhazia. The report covered the period since October 2007 and raised concerns about the discrepancy between on-the-ground realities and the narratives being presented by the media, including official Georgian sources. These inaccurate reports were intensifying distrust and insecurity, which could potentially increase the risk of confrontation in the conflict zone. (https://civil.ge/archives/114170)
  • The UN noted that while individual false media claims may have had minimal impact, collectively they contributed to a growing sense of fear and hostility on both sides of the ceasefire line. This made it harder to restore confidence between the communities, which was an important goal for peace. The UN observers who patrolled Gali found that many of the media reports were either groundless or only partially correct.
  • For instance, Georgian media widely covered several allegations, such as the declaration of a state of emergency in Gali, the deployment of more Abkhaz forces, and attacks on villages by Abkhaz forces and Russian peacekeepers. These reports were found to be mostly inaccurate or distorted by the UN. Another notable example was a report on January 5, 2008, claiming that Russian and Chechen peacekeepers had engaged in a shoot-out in Ochamchire, injuring six peacekeepers, but this claim was also disproved by UN observations.
  • The report also noted the deterrent effect of misinformation on Gali residents during the January 5 presidential election. While Abkhaz officials had discouraged ethnic Georgians in Gali from voting in Zugdidi, Georgian media further fueled fears by falsely claiming that the ceasefire line would be closed around election time.
  • The overall situation in 2007 was described as having the lowest point in relations between the Georgian and Abkhaz sides since the 1998 violence, with deep political divides evident, as both Tbilisi and Sukhumi pushed for reunification and independence, respectively, with urgency.
• On January 29, 2008, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) issued a press release addressing the issue of Kosovo's potential independence and its implications for Russia's stance on Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The MFA’s statement was a response to President Saakashvili's claims that Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov had assured him that Kosovo would not affect Russia's approach to the breakaway Georgian territories. (https://civil.ge/archives/114155
  • In Saakashvili’s previous statements, including an interview on January 28, he had mentioned that Lavrov had told him during a meeting in Tbilisi on January 20 that Russia would not recognize Abkhazia or South Ossetia, even if Kosovo were granted independence. Saakashvili emphasized that although some Russian officials had suggested that Kosovo might create a precedent for the recognition of Georgian breakaway regions, Lavrov had reassured him that Russia would not take that step.
  • However, the Russian MFA’s press release clarified Lavrov's position. According to the Russian statement, Lavrov had explained during a news conference on January 23 that Russia had never stated that it would immediately recognize Abkhazia or South Ossetia following Kosovo's potential independence. Nevertheless, Lavrov suggested that Kosovo’s recognition would indeed set a precedent, not because Russia wanted it to, but because it would influence the situation in many regions, including not only Abkhazia and South Ossetia but also other areas worldwide.
  • The Russian MFA concluded that Saakashvili had misinterpreted Lavrov's statement, and emphasized that Russia's principled position on the matter remained unchanged.
• On January 29, 2008, the secessionist authorities of South Ossetia expressed their anger over the Georgian government's renaming of the State Ministry for Conflict Resolution Issues to the State Ministry for Reintegration. The South Ossetian authorities, like their counterparts in Abkhazia, stated that they would not cooperate with this newly named ministry. (https://civil.ge/archives/114182)
  • Boris Chochiev, the chief South Ossetian negotiator in the Joint Control Commission (JCC), remarked that South Ossetia would not work with the Ministry for Reintegration, emphasizing that renaming the ministry further complicated any efforts toward negotiations. Despite this, Chochiev clarified that South Ossetia would still cooperate in the JCC, a quadripartite framework for dialogue. However, he added that if the Georgian government appointed someone else, such as the minister of agriculture, to serve as co-chair of the JCC, South Ossetia would continue to engage.
  • Meanwhile, Abkhaz Foreign Minister Sergey Shamba also condemned the renaming of the ministry. On January 28, he declared that Abkhazia would refuse to engage in any talks with the Ministry for Reintegration or its representatives, further complicating the prospects for future dialogue.
  • In related news, the Russian ambassador to Georgia, Vyacheslav Kovalenko, visited Tskhinvali on January 29, where he met with South Ossetian leader Eduard Kokoity, signaling continued Russian involvement in the region.
• On January 31, 2008, Georgian Foreign Minister Davit Bakradze held a phone conversation with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov. During the conversation, both sides expressed their readiness to take practical steps to deepen the dialogue and implement earlier agreements aimed at improving Russo-Georgian relations. (https://civil.ge/archives/114201)
  • Bakradze, who had just been approved by the Georgian Parliament on January 31, emphasized the importance he placed on the relationship with Russia during this first official engagement.
  • According to the Russian Foreign Ministry, Lavrov reiterated Moscow's willingness to work constructively toward improving the bilateral ties between the two countries.
  • The phone call followed a meeting in Tbilisi between President Saakashvili and Lavrov on January 20, where they had discussed the potential for improved relations. Saakashvili had earlier mentioned that they had agreed to arrange a visit for the Georgian foreign minister to Moscow.

Prelude to the war

KAVADZE

• At the last Putin-Saakashvili meeting on February 22, 2008, Putin warned MS that any further integration of Georgia into NATO would lead to serious consequences (72)
• Putin warned MS that he would have to pay the price of Kosovo's independence (72)
• "Your Western friends promise you nice things but they won't deliver, I don't promise you nice things but I definitely will deliver" (72)

• Russian propaganda amped up against Georgia and discussed the prospects of invading from January to August (Panfilov 280-285)

IIFFMCG II

• It was only with the escalation of tensions that the international community started to oppose publicly Russian peacekeeping in the occupied territories (17-18)

International outcome

Western support for Georgia

KAVADZE

• 13 June 2007: Council of the Baltic Sea States meeting in Malmo. Lavrov and Bildt meet on the sidelines. (74-76)
  • Bildt raised the issue of Georgia
  • Bildt affirmed Sweden's support for Georgia's territorial integrity, national sovereignty, and EU membership path, while endorsing Tbilisi's recent moves for peace settlement with the conflict regions
  • Bildt expressed concern for the trade and transportation embargo
  • "A democratic, developed, united Georgia meets the interests of everyone and especially its neighbours"

IIFFMCG I

• Prior to the war, there were reportedly more than a hundred US military advisers in the GAF and an even larger number of US specialists and advisers are thought to have been active in different branches of the Georgian power structures and administration (15)
• Besides the US, Georgia received much military assistance from Ukraine, the Czech Republic, and Israel (15)
• Most EU members did not wish to add to the military aid but took an active part in seeking peace through the GOF (16)
  • Many others maintained close ties with Tbilisi, especially Eastern and Northern EU countries, assisting in reforms for Euro-Atlantic integration. (16)

IIFFMCG II

• MS visited the US and met with Bush on July 5, 2006. Bush said "I believe that NATO would benefit with Georgia being a member of NATO and I think Georgia would benefit" (42)
  • He then endorsed the MAP for Georgia (42)
• In September 2006, the Alliance agreed to offer Georgia an Intensified Dialogue (42)
• Those who were opposed to Georgia's NATO integration were worried about their relations with Russia. Those who were in favor saw this as a push for democratisation and would effectively curb any Georgian desire to use force to solve its internal conflicts (42)
• Anti-Georgia sentiments in the alliance grew after the 2007 crisis (43)
• The mandate of the EUSR was extended in 2006 “to assist creating the conditions for progress on settlement of conflicts.” (53)
  • This extended mandate has permitted the new EUSR, Peter Semneby, to increase EU effectiveness by expressing common European positions in the region and by supporting the development of a more comprehensive policy within the EU institutions. (53-54)
• The ENP Action Plan endorsed by the EU-Georgia Cooperation Council in November 2006 aimed at contributing to economic integration and deepening political co-operation. These action plans are instruments designed to provide clarity on priorities, challenges and the next steps to be taken. They also provide benchmarks for further integration.144 The question of the extent to which conflict resolution should be regarded as a priority was the one that raised most obstacles before an agreement on this plan could be reached. The EU was reluctant to take it up as a main priority, as requested by Tbilisi. (57)
  • The 2006 ENP Action Plan eventually defined the promotion of the peaceful resolution of internal conflicts as “priority area 6” and included an extensive list of initiatives to be taken, ranging from support for “the active involvement of civil society in the conflict resolution efforts” to raising the issue of their settlement in EU-Russia political dialogue meetings. (57)

IIFFMCG III

• In 2006, 2007, and 2008, Georgia requested an increase in OSCE monitors in SO several times (207)
  • Though a majority of states supported the measure, Russia vetoed it repeatedly (207)
  • On September 20, 2007, the Spanish Presidency of the OSCE presented a Draft Decision on Increasing the Number of Mission Monitoring Officers, endorsing by a majority of member states and Gerogia, but vetoed by Russia (207)

• On May 25, EU Special Representative for the South Caucasus, Peter Semneby, voiced concerns over the worsening relations between Georgia and Russia, which could hinder the conflict resolution process in the region. Speaking at a press conference in Tbilisi, Semneby stressed the risk of escalation between the two countries and emphasized the need for the European Union to play a role in normalizing relations. (https://civil.ge/archives/110679)
• According to the WP, the US was pushing to include Georgia on the G8 Moscow summit agenda in June 2006 (https://civil.ge/archives/110878)
• During a two-day energy security conference in Tbilisi in June 2006, Georgian Foreign Minister Gela Bezhuashvili emphasized Georgia's potential role as a significant energy transit country for Europe, stating that Europe needs to diversify its energy sources to enhance safety and reduce dependence on a single supplier. The conference, titled Eurasian Energy Security, was co-hosted by the International Energy Agency (IEA) and the Georgian government on June 20-21. Bezhuashvili stressed the importance of the Trans-Caspian gas pipeline in transporting Central Asian hydrocarbons through the Caucasus to Europe, noting that while this project is vital, additional efforts are needed to attract investors and develop a cohesive vision to bring the project to fruition. (https://civil.ge/archives/110900)
• In July 2005, Bush met Saakashvili in DC and pledged his support, namely for NATO integration (https://civil.ge/archives/110978)
• AUgust 2006: U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary Matthew Bryza stated that an international police force is needed in the Gali district of Abkhazia to address crime and support local authorities. He clarified that this international police would complement, not replace, CIS peacekeepers, who lack a mandate for crime-fighting. Bryza emphasized the necessity for such a force in Gali to facilitate the return of internally displaced persons (IDPs) by ensuring security, citing the recent successful anti-crime operation in Kodori as a precedent. (https://civil.ge/archives/115034)
• On September 19 2006, U.S. Army Europe Deputy Commander Gen. William E. Ward and Georgian Armed Forces Chief of Staff Levan Nikoleishvili signed an agreement in Tbilisi to continue U.S. military support for Georgia through the Sustainment and Stability Operations Program II. This $40 million program will focus on training Georgia’s 3rd Infantry Brigade, with Georgia now providing its own equipment—a shift from previous phases where the U.S. supplied both training and equipment. Discussions with the U.S. delegation, led by Gen. Ward, also covered U.S.-NATO cooperation and efforts to align the Georgian army with NATO standards. (https://civil.ge/archives/115369)
• On September 21, 2006, NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer announced that NATO has invited Georgia to initiate an "Intensified Dialogue" regarding its aspirations for membership in the alliance. This announcement was made during a news conference following an informal meeting of NATO Foreign Ministers in New York. Scheffer emphasized that this dialogue would facilitate closer collaboration and communication between NATO and Georgia as they work together towards Georgia's membership goals. (https://civil.ge/archives/115388)
  • On September 22, 2006, Russia’s Foreign Ministry expressed strong opposition to Georgia’s potential NATO membership, warning it would harm Russia’s political, military, and economic interests and destabilize the Caucasus region. Moscow views NATO’s engagement with Georgia as a significant step toward membership, which could shift Georgian-Russian relations into a NATO-related context, complicating regional security and existing disputes over Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Russian officials expressed concerns that Georgia might leverage NATO support against Russia’s influence, which could negatively shape Russian public opinion on NATO. Though Russia's Defense Minister Sergey Ivanov downplayed Georgia’s NATO aspirations as a sovereign choice, Russia remains wary that the move signals Georgia’s anti-Russian stance and could impact the peacekeeping dynamics in contested regions. (https://civil.ge/archives/115395)
• On October 2 2006, a delegation from the European Union Troika and Georgian Foreign Minister Gela Bezhuashvili signed a joint statement finalizing the text of the Georgia-European Union Action Plan under the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). The plan is set for formal approval during the EU-Georgia Cooperation Council meeting on November 14 in Brussels. The EU delegation, which included Commissioner for External Relations Benita Ferrero-Waldner, Finnish Foreign Minister Erkki Tuomioja, and German Deputy Foreign Minister Günter Gloser, engaged in discussions with Georgian leadership about enhancing bilateral relations, addressing internal conflicts, and exploring economic cooperation, including the potential for a future free trade agreement. (https://civil.ge/archives/115513)
• On October 3, 2006, U.S. Department of State spokesman Sean McCormack expressed Washington's disappointment over Russia's imposition of additional sanctions on Georgia. McCormack urged Russian authorities to reconsider these sanctions, emphasizing that such actions are unhelpful in addressing ongoing tensions. He reiterated the U.S. commitment to maintaining dialogue with both Russia and Georgia, hoping for a resolution of their differences to tackle the underlying issues between the two nations. (https://civil.ge/archives/115527)
• On October 4, 2006, EU foreign policy chief Javier Solana warned that the situation in Kosovo could set a troubling precedent for the conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, expressing concerns about the implications for Georgia's territorial integrity. During a meeting with the European Parliament's Foreign Affairs Committee, he noted President Saakashvili's "tremendous worry" over the issue and emphasized the complexity of finding a resolution that benefits all parties involved. Solana ruled out the deployment of an EU peacekeeping force to South Ossetia, stating that the focus should be on determining the best security solutions for Georgia, which may not necessarily include peacekeepers. (https://civil.ge/archives/115539)
• On October 17, 2006, the European Union expressed "grave concern" over Russia's sanctions against Georgia and urged both countries to tone down their rhetoric amid escalating tensions. EU foreign policy chief Javier Solana indicated that the situation would be addressed at a meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin on October 20. During a press conference, Commissioner for External Relations Benita Ferrero-Waldner emphasized that both Georgia and Russia hold responsibilities in de-escalating the situation, particularly calling on the Georgian authorities to avoid inflammatory statements. The EU condemned the measures affecting Georgians in Russia, including sanctions against businesses and students, noting that these actions hinder the restoration of normal relations. While the EU seeks to balance its strategic partnership with Russia and its relations with Georgia, it remains cautious regarding deeper involvement in the South Ossetian peace process. (https://civil.ge/archives/111218)
  • During the 2756th External Relations Council meeting held in Luxembourg on October 16-17, 2006, the European Union adopted a set of conclusions concerning the escalating tensions between Georgia and the Russian Federation. The Council expressed grave concern over the deterioration of relations and emphasized the need for both sides to tone down public rhetoric and resume diplomatic dialogue to normalize their interactions. It welcomed the efforts of the Foreign Ministers' Troika and other representatives in facilitating the return of Russian detainees, while condemning the measures taken by Russia against Georgia and urging an end to actions targeting Georgians in Russia. The EU reiterated its commitment to strengthening its strategic partnership with Russia and deepening relations with Georgia through the European Neighbourhood Policy. The Council called for a peaceful resolution to the conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, emphasizing respect for Georgia's sovereignty and compliance with relevant international agreements. (https://civil.ge/archives/111200)
• Finnish Europe Minister Paula Lehtomaeki remarked on October 25 that Georgia's expectations for a greater EU role in resolving the South Ossetian conflict may be "unrealistically high," urging the Georgian government to exercise patience while discussions are ongoing. She cautioned that hasty decisions regarding the peace processes could jeopardize the presence of UN and OSCE forces in the region. Lehtomaeki highlighted that the EU maintains a strong role in the Transdnestrian peace process, and a draft resolution criticizing Russia's policies towards Georgia and Moldova is set for a vote on October 26, which advocates for the deployment of UN and EU peacekeepers in South Ossetia. Additionally, Georgia's situation is expected to be addressed in upcoming meetings between EU and Russian foreign ministers. (https://civil.ge/archives/185489)
• On November 14, 2006, Georgian Foreign Minister Gela Bezhuashvili and Erkki Tuomioja, the Finnish Foreign Minister and current holder of the EU presidency, signed recommendations for the implementation of the EU-Georgia Action Plan under the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) in Brussels. The signing took place during a session of the EU-Georgia Cooperation Council. The European side highlighted the ENP Action Plan as a cornerstone for future cooperation, expressing its commitment to assist Georgia in successfully implementing the plan and addressing the country’s political and economic challenges, as reported by the Georgian Foreign Ministry. (https://civil.ge/archives/111413)
• During a news conference in Tbilisi on December 18, 2006, Estonia's Foreign Minister Urmas Paet announced that Estonia is prepared to contribute to peacekeeping operations in Georgia's conflict zones, contingent upon changes to the existing peacekeeping formats. Emphasizing the need for a "really adequate international format" for peacekeeping, Paet expressed confidence in Estonia's participation, stating, "I cannot imagine Estonians not participating in this mission." He also mentioned that Estonia is collaborating with its partners in the European Union on this issue. (https://civil.ge/archives/111638)
• On February 6, 2007, Russian Ambassador to Georgia Vyacheslav Kovalenko stated that Moscow desires Georgia to be an independent, sovereign, and neutral state, maintaining neighborly relations with Russia. At a news conference in Tbilisi, Kovalenko emphasized that Russia has never questioned Georgia’s territorial integrity or sovereignty but seeks a neutral Georgia, free from threats and with no hostile neighbors. He called for Tbilisi to take "reciprocal steps," particularly by halting the ongoing anti-Russian rhetoric in Georgia. Kovalenko also addressed a recent incident involving uranium, claiming that the facts were distorted and that Russia was open to cooperating with Georgia on the matter. (https://civil.ge/archives/111870)
• On February 23, 2007, senior MPs from Georgia’s ruling National Movement party accused the Kremlin of backing an anti-NATO campaign in Georgia, led by marginalized political forces such as the National Forum and Traditionalist parties. These groups have argued that Georgia should pursue neutrality instead of NATO membership. MP Givi Targamadze claimed that the campaign was orchestrated by Russian President’s aide Modest Kolerov, referencing a similar strategy used in Ukraine. Targamadze criticized two main false narratives of the campaign: one claiming NATO would accept Georgia without its breakaway regions, and another suggesting that Georgian neutrality would secure territorial integrity through Russian concessions. The MPs urged opposition parties to clarify their stance on NATO accession. (https://civil.ge/archives/111978)
• On February 23, 2007, Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili criticized opposition calls to abandon Georgia’s NATO ambitions in favor of neutrality, describing them as “foolish” and “dishonest.” Responding to a journalist's question about the growing opposition campaign, which argued that NATO membership would require abandoning South Ossetia and Abkhazia, Saakashvili linked the campaign to Russian influence. He dismissed the argument, stating that the proponents of this view were both “foolish” and “dishonest,” calling it a dangerous combination. His comments were a sharp rebuke of the anti-NATO rhetoric gaining traction among certain political groups. (https://civil.ge/archives/111981)
• On March 9, 2007, during a visit to Tokyo, Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili announced plans to expand Georgia's military presence in Iraq from 850 to 2,000 troops for a maximum of one year, demonstrating Georgia's commitment to coalition efforts. He also revealed that Georgia would initially deploy 100 servicemen to Afghanistan as part of NATO-led forces, potentially increasing to 200 by year’s end. Consultations with U.S. partners were underway regarding the specifics of the Iraq deployment. With this increase, Georgia would lead coalition contributions per capita. Since joining the coalition in August 2003, 18 Georgian soldiers have been injured, with current deployments stationed in Baghdad, Baqubah, and Kosovo. (https://civil.ge/archives/112043)
• On March 10, 2007, Russia's Foreign Ministry cautioned South Caucasus nations against hosting U.S. missile defense components, emphasizing that such installations near Russian borders could hinder regional relations. This warning followed a statement by Lt. Gen. Henry A. Obering of the U.S. Missile Defense Agency on March 1, indicating potential interest in placing an anti-missile radar in the Caucasus, though Georgian officials confirmed that no formal U.S. request had been made. Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman Mikhail Kaminin expressed particular concern over the strategic implications of U.S. missile defense facilities near Russia, viewing it as detrimental to fostering friendly ties in the region. (https://civil.ge/archives/112048)
  • On May 4, 2007, Georgian Foreign Minister Gela Bezhuashvili clarified that Georgia has no plans to negotiate with the U.S. about hosting an anti-missile radar site. This statement followed speculation from a recent Financial Times article in which Bezhuashvili mentioned Georgia’s openness to discussions if the U.S. proposed it. Although he indicated willingness to consider talks if requested, he emphasized that no formal or informal discussions had been initiated and sought to downplay his remarks, noting that they were taken out of context. He added that any speculation on this topic would be “totally counterproductive” for Georgia. (https://civil.ge/archives/112334
• On March 30, 2007, U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Matthew Bryza endorsed Georgia's approach to conflict resolution in South Ossetia, following a constructive two-day visit to the country. Bryza praised President Saakashvili’s proposal to establish a provisional administrative unit led by pro-Tbilisi figure Dimitri Sanakoev, aimed at addressing the ongoing South Ossetian conflict and opposing Tskhinvali’s secessionist stance. Commending Georgia's restraint after the March 11 attack on the upper Kodori Gorge in Abkhazia, Bryza noted that such actions improved Georgia's international standing. He also condemned the March 25 killing of two Georgian policemen as a "terrorist act." While meeting with opposition leaders on March 29, Bryza acknowledged fair concerns regarding Georgia’s NATO ambitions and ongoing democratic reforms, highlighting both achievements and challenges in judicial and property rights reforms. Addressing Georgia’s lawsuit against Russia in the European Court of Human Rights, Bryza clarified it was not an "unfriendly act" but a legal measure in response to Russia's deportation of Georgian nationals, and expressed hope for eventual improvement in Georgian-Russian relations. (https://civil.ge/archives/112179)
• On April 10, 2007, U.S. President George W. Bush signed the NATO Freedom Consolidation Act of 2007, affirming U.S. support for the expansion of NATO and specifically endorsing the membership aspirations of Georgia, along with Albania, Croatia, Macedonia, and Ukraine. This law allows these countries to receive assistance under the NATO Participation Act of 1994 and allocates funds for military support in FY 2008. Earlier, on March 12, 2007, Georgian leaders signed a memorandum backing Georgia’s NATO bid, with the Georgian Parliament passing a supportive declaration on March 13. (https://civil.ge/archives/112212)
• On May 24, 2007, U.S. Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs Daniel Fried expressed concern over Russia's approach to its neighboring countries, especially Georgia and Ukraine, describing it as a “zero-sum mentality”. Speaking before the Helsinki Commission, Fried cited issues like political interference in infrastructure, referencing Russia's 2006 closure of its only legal border crossing with Georgia. Although he acknowledged “limited improvement” in Russian-Georgian relations, he criticized Russia’s ongoing sanctions and support for separatist regimes in Georgia’s South Ossetia and Abkhazia regions, actions that undermine Georgia's territorial integrity. Fried also noted that, while Russia has “almost fulfilled” its OSCE Istanbul commitments by closing most military bases in Georgia, the status of the Gudauta base in Abkhazia remains unresolved. Georgia demands independent international monitoring to verify the base's closure, while Russia claims it is already shut, allowing only a single monitoring mission. (https://civil.ge/archives/112439
• In June 2007, Georgia plans to increase its troop presence in Iraq from 850 to 2,000 soldiers, deploying additional forces to Wasit province to patrol Al Kut—a city 185 kilometers southeast of Baghdad—and the border with Iran, according to Defense Minister Davit Kezerashvili in a May 30 interview. Kezerashvili noted that while Wasit is considered one of the calmer areas in Iraq, intelligence indicates arms smuggling from Iran into Iraq through this region, which Georgian troops will be tasked with addressing, potentially escalating tensions. Unlike in Baqubah, where Georgian forces guard a base and bridge, the Wasit mission involves patrolling responsibilities and overseeing the entire province, marking a significant change in their operational role. (https://civil.ge/archives/112461)
• An anonymous email received by several opposition lawmakers on June 4, 2007, warned that the deployment of additional Georgian troops to Iraq could lead to negative consequences for the soldiers. The Georgian government planned to increase its presence from 850 to 2,000 troops, to be deployed in the Wasit province and Al Kut, located southeast of Baghdad. However, the email, allegedly from Georgian soldiers in Iraq, outlined concerns such as the extreme heat, the need for an adaptation period, and increased risks from changing operational tasks. While most lawmakers dismissed the email as not credible, Davit Berdzenishvili from the Republican Party emphasized that the issues raised, rather than the sender, should be addressed. The controversy was further fueled by an earlier email allegedly from an insurgent group, the Islamic Army in Iraq, warning against the troop increase. Some lawmakers speculated that these emails might be part of a Russian-masterminded campaign aimed at discrediting Georgia's military contribution to the coalition forces in Iraq. (https://civil.ge/archives/112487)
• On June 4, 2007, the European Union granted Georgia the right to align with political declarations adopted under the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy. This development, part of the EU Neighbourhood Policy Action Plan (ENP AP) agreed in November 2006, brings Georgia closer to Europe, allowing it to voice its position alongside the EU's 27 member states on global political issues. The Georgian Foreign Ministry emphasized that this move marked a significant step in strengthening Georgia's political cooperation with the European Union. (https://civil.ge/archives/112486)
• On June 8, 2007, Georgia's Parliament approved with 145 votes in favor and 2 against a proposal to increase its troop presence in Iraq from 850 to 2,000. This decision makes Georgia one of the largest contributors to U.S.-led operations relative to its population size. The additional troops will be deployed in Wasit province, tasked with patrolling Al Kut and the Iran-Iraq border. Georgian commanders will now be involved in operational decisions on the ground. The primary goal is to combat smuggling, particularly arms trafficking from Iran into Iraq. While some lawmakers, like Ivliane Khaindrava of the opposition, voiced concerns about the risks, the move was framed as a demonstration of Georgia's commitment to its strategic partnership with the United States. However, there were critical views, with some arguing the decision was a compensatory action for shortcomings in Georgia’s rule of law and human rights. (https://civil.ge/archives/112508)
• On June 20, 2007, Georgia and the United States signed a Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) aimed at boosting trade and investment relations. The agreement, signed by U.S. Deputy Trade Representative John Veroneau and Georgian Economy Minister Giorgi Arveladze in Washington, establishes a joint U.S.-Georgia Council on Trade and Investment. This Council will focus on issues such as trade capacity building, intellectual property, labor, and environmental concerns. It aims to remove barriers to trade and investment, thus increasing commercial opportunities between the two nations. The first meeting of the Council took place on June 21, 2007, with Veroneau highlighting that the TIFA will support Georgia's economic reforms and efforts to expand export markets. (https://civil.ge/archives/112578)
• On June 21, 2007, Georgia and the United States signed a comprehensive Open Skies agreement, aimed at expanding and liberalizing bilateral civil aviation relations. The agreement was signed by Georgian Economy Minister Giorgi Arveladze and U.S. Assistant Secretary for Economic, Energy, and Business Affairs Daniel S. Sullivan in Washington. This agreement, which follows a year of consultations between the two countries, is part of a broader package of economic cooperation initiatives designed to strengthen ties between Georgia and the U.S. (https://civil.ge/archives/112581)
• On June 21, 2007, Daniel Fried, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs, testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, emphasizing the need for Russia to end its economic sanctions against Georgia. He also urged Georgia to "continue to avoid provocative rhetoric" and pursue "exclusively peaceful means" to resolve its separatist conflicts. Fried noted that while Russian-Georgian relations had shown "tentative signs of improvement" after a period of extreme tension, Moscow needed to take further steps to normalize relations. He also condemned Russia’s renewed support for separatist regimes and veiled threats to recognize breakaway regions in Georgia and Moldova, stressing that there was "no linkage" between Kosovo's situation and Georgia's breakaway provinces of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. (https://civil.ge/archives/112582)
• On July 11, 2007, Georgia hosted a ten-day air exercise under the NATO Partnership for Peace (PfP) program at the Alekseevka military airfield near Tbilisi. The exercise, named Cooperative Archer 2007, involved participants from four NATO member states (Germany, Hungary, Turkey, and the United States), eight partner countries (Albania, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Croatia, Macedonia, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine), and Jordan. The goal of the exercise, according to the Georgian Ministry of Defense, was to improve coordination between NATO and its partners in conducting humanitarian relief air operations. (https://civil.ge/archives/112670)
• On July 16, 2007, a small group of Georgian servicemen was sent to Kuwait as part of a larger deployment plan. These soldiers were scheduled to join their comrades in Iraq on July 23. The overall troop increase aimed to raise the number of Georgian soldiers in Iraq from 850 to 2,000, making Georgia the second-largest contributor to Iraq operations in per capita terms, after the United States. The remaining additional troops were to be deployed to Kuwait and then moved to Iraq between July 20 and 22. (https://civil.ge/archives/112700)
  • On July 20, 2007, another contingent of Georgian troops departed for Iraq as part of an ongoing deployment. This troop increase would bring the total number of Georgian soldiers in Iraq to 2,000 by July 23, with 1,200 additional soldiers joining their comrades. Georgia already had over 800 troops stationed in Iraq, with 300 in Baqubah, securing two bridges and forward operating bases, and 550 in Baghdad, guarding the UN Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI). In per capita terms, this deployment made Georgia the second-largest contributor to operations in Iraq, behind only the United States. (https://civil.ge/archives/112724)
• On September 13-14, 2007, the New Group of Friends of Georgia, consisting of Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Ukraine, Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, and the Czech Republic, expressed their support for Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations during a meeting in Vilnius. The group’s declaration of support emphasized that Georgia's security, stability, and territorial integrity are vital to European security, and called for stronger cooperation with the EU and NATO to enhance regional stability and foster better Georgia-Russia relations. Additionally, they pledged to support Georgia’s efforts to establish visa facilitation and free trade agreements with the EU and affirmed that Georgia is ready for a Membership Action Plan (MAP). The group also underscored that no country outside NATO holds a veto on the Alliance's decisions. (https://civil.ge/archives/113047)
• On September 26, 2007, in an address to the UN General Assembly, President Mikheil Saakashvili announced that Georgia would contribute troops to NATO-led operations in Afghanistan. He confirmed that a new battalion would be sent to serve under French command in Kabul. Saakashvili had previously stated in March 2007 that Georgia was prepared to send at least 100 servicemen to Afghanistan, marking a significant commitment to the international military effort in the region. (https://civil.ge/archives/113120)

Peripheral opposition to Russia

• Putin did not trust Saakashvili as the latter promoted anti-Russian policies both in the South Caucasus and in the near abroad in general (Kavadze 72)
• Georgia's foreign policy sought to find like-minded allies such as Ukraine after the OR and to support together with them pro-Western orientation elsewhere in the extended string of countries ranging from the Batlic Sea to the Black and Caspian Seas, which did not go down well with Russia (IIFFMCG I 15)

• In Armenia, it was noted that Russia was defining its relations with Georgia without taking into account the interests of Georgia’s neighbours. By imposing a blockade on Georgia, which serves as Armenia’s main land route to Russia, the Kremlin strengthened the effects of the blockade imposed by Turkey and Azerbaijan on Armenia. (IIFFMCG II, 21)

• Two Georgian journalists, Nino Giorgobiani and Giorgi Lagidze, of the GPB, were arrested in Minsk and sentenced to two weeks in prison for hooliganism on March 27 (https://civil.ge/archives/110225)
• During the wine embargo, Tajikistan publicly offered to replace Georgian wines on the Russian markets, leading to condemnations by Georgia (https://civil.ge/archives/110341)

• Let's recall that the embargo was also on Moldova
• Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili warned on May 4 2006 that certain forces in Russia pose a serious threat to the wave of democracy initiated by Georgia. His remarks were made during the summit of Baltic and Black Sea leaders in Vilnius, Lithuania. Saakashvili claimed that well-financed forces within Russia are actively working to undermine democratic progress in both Georgia and Ukraine. He emphasized that these forces are "very serious" in their efforts. Saakashvili highlighted that this threat is not just a regional concern but a broader issue for Europe. He stressed that attacks on democracies in Georgia and Ukraine would also compromise European interests, suggesting that Europe should view the situation as a shared challenge. (https://civil.ge/archives/110513)
• On May 22 2006, the Foreign Ministers of the GUAM member states—Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Moldova—met in Kiev to formalize the creation of a regional organization focused on democracy and economic development, also known as GUAM. This development comes ahead of a summit scheduled for May 23 in Kiev, where heads of state from the member countries will convene. (https://civil.ge/archives/110647)
  • Creation of GUAM: The ministers agreed to establish GUAM as a formal organization. The initiative aims to enhance regional cooperation among the member states, focusing on democratic values, economic development, and security.
  • Free Trade Area Agreement: The Foreign Ministers signed a protocol to implement the Agreement on Establishment of Free Trade Area among GUAM states. This move is expected to enhance economic cooperation and demonstrates the organization's practical viability, especially compared to other regional initiatives that have struggled to implement similar agreements.
• Sergey Baburin, Vice-Speaker of the Russian State Duma, stated on June 14 that the newly formed Community for Democracy and Human Rights by the breakaway regions of Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Transdniestria is “a kind of anti-GUAM.” (https://civil.ge/archives/185480)
  • Baburin participated in a summit of the three secessionist leaders — Sergey Bagapsh (Abkhazia), Eduard Kokoity (South Ossetia), and Igor Smirnov (Transdniestria) — held in Sokhumi on June 14 2006.
  • Baburin welcomed the decision to establish joint peacekeeping forces among South Ossetia, Abkhazia, and Transdniestria due to the deteriorating security situation in these areas.
  • He expressed that the formation of joint peacekeeping forces aims to “calm down the hotheads” in Tbilisi (Georgia), Chisinau (Moldova), and Washington (U.S.).
• 2006: Georgian Prime Minister Zurab Nogaideli stated on July 8 that Russia's unilateral closure of the Zemo Larsi border checkpoint happened without prior notice to Georgia. Nogaideli noted that Georgia's exports to Russia are minimal, but Armenia will be most affected by the closure, as it heavily relies on this crossing. Nogaideli made this remark in Batumi, where he was hosting Armenian Prime Minister Andranik Margaryan, who had been informed about Russia's decision. (https://civil.ge/archives/111005)
  • Armenian Foreign Minister Vardan Oskanian emphasized the importance of reopening the Zemo Larsi border crossing between Russia and Georgia for Armenia. At a news conference, Oskanian acknowledged that Georgia had allowed 17 Armenian vehicles to cross the border via South Ossetia as a goodwill gesture. (https://civil.ge/archives/111023)
• On October 19, 2006, Armenian Trade and Economy Minister Karen Chshmaritian reported that Armenian businessmen were facing increased costs due to Russia's sanctions against Georgia. These sanctions forced Armenian importers to alter their shipping routes, with expenditures rising between 7% to 20% as they redirected cargo through ports in Varna, Bulgaria, and Ilichevsk, Ukraine, before reaching Georgia and then Armenia. Additionally, Armenian Parliamentary Chairman Tigran Torosian expressed concern during a meeting with Russian parliamentarians, highlighting that Russia seemed to disregard Armenia's interests in its dealings with Georgia. Russian MP Konstantin Zatulin reinforced this notion, suggesting that Armenia needed to choose between its relationships with Russia and Georgia, implying that failure to make such a choice would compromise Armenia's standing in the conflict. (https://civil.ge/archives/111233)
• On November 9, 2006, reports emerged that Russian President Vladimir Putin would seek to persuade Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev, who was visiting Moscow, to join an "anti-Georgian alliance." According to the Russian daily *Kommersant*, establishing a united front against Georgia within the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) was deemed crucial for Russia. A significant topic expected to arise during the discussions was Azerbaijan's potential involvement in an energy blockade against Georgia during the winter. Concurrently, Georgia was engaged in negotiations with Azerbaijan to secure additional Shah-Deniz gas beyond the current allocation, aiming to decrease reliance on expensive Russian gas. Aliyev's visit to Moscow followed his trip to Brussels, where he expressed a desire for improved relations between Georgia and Russia, indicating that Baku aimed to maintain a strategic partnership with both nations. (https://civil.ge/archives/111369)
  • Russia's efforts to persuade Azerbaijan to join an "anti-Georgian bloc" appear to have failed, as Baku threatened to reduce or cease oil pumping through the Baku-Novorossiysk pipeline following a significant gas price increase from Russia's Gazprom. Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev ordered an assessment of the economic impact of potentially halting this export route, which would cost Russia's pipeline monopoly, Transneft, about $25 million annually. Reports indicated that Azerbaijan was under pressure not to sell gas from the Shah-Deniz field to Georgia, which is seeking alternatives to Russian gas. The situation suggests Azerbaijan is positioning itself for a more independent stance, complicating Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Fradkov's planned visit to the country. (https://civil.ge/archives/111550)
• On November 17, 2006, officials from the Georgian and Ukrainian Defense Ministries signed a military cooperation agreement in Kiev, establishing key aspects of collaboration for the year 2007. The agreement was finalized during a working visit by Giorgi Muchaidze, the head of the international department of the Georgian Ministry of Defense, which took place from November 16 to 18. (https://civil.ge/archives/111455)
• 2006: Armenian Prime Minister Andranik Margaryan, in an interview published on November 30 by the Russian daily *Kommersant*, expressed Yerevan's desire for improved relations between Russia and Georgia. He acknowledged the current difficulties in Russo-Georgian ties but emphasized that the potential for resolving these issues remains. Margaryan stated that a quick resolution is vital, as cooperation between Tbilisi and Moscow is crucial for regional stability and the successful implementation of mutually beneficial economic projects. (https://civil.ge/archives/111533)
• On March 1, 2007, Ukrainian President Victor Yushchenko, during his visit to Tbilisi, expressed Ukraine's willingness to participate in peacekeeping in Georgia’s conflict zones, conditional on an internationally acceptable mandate. He acknowledged Georgia’s clear conflict-resolution strategy, focused on bilateral dialogue facilitated by international bodies like the UN and OSCE, without involving additional outside parties. Yushchenko also highlighted the shared ambition of Georgia and Ukraine for Euro-Atlantic integration, while noting the preparatory work required. Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili affirmed Georgia’s NATO aspirations, asserting that no country has the right to block its integration, though he refrained from speculating on the timeline, leaving it to NATO to decide. (https://civil.ge/archives/112007)
• During the GUAM summit held in Baku on June 18-19, 2007, officials discussed the transportation of Caspian oil to Europe through Georgia and Ukraine. The focus was on the Odessa-Brody-Gdansk pipeline, which is intended to facilitate oil transit from the Caspian region to Europe. (https://civil.ge/archives/112569)
  • Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev emphasized that Azerbaijan has sufficient resources to support the project and expressed willingness to open the pipeline to other Caspian oil-rich nations, notably Kazakhstan. The Azerbaijani Energy Minister Natik Aliyev revealed that working groups were already making progress on the project.
  • The next meeting of these groups is scheduled for Tbilisi in the summer of 2007, followed by a summit in Vilnius in September 2007 to further discuss the matter. This summit will continue the energy cooperation efforts initiated at the Krakow energy summit in May 2007, where the presidents of Azerbaijan, Georgia, Lithuania, Poland, and Ukraine signed a joint declaration supporting enhanced oil and gas transport from Central Asia to Europe via the South Caucasus.
• The establishment of a GUAM peacekeeping unit has become uncertain due to differing views among member states. Although the issue was highlighted at the GUAM summit in Baku on June 18-19, 2007, Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko revealed on June 25 that some of the GUAM partners were hesitant about the proposal. (https://civil.ge/archives/112588)
  • Yushchenko indicated that while no country outright rejected the idea, some viewed it differently. He did not specify which countries had reservations but suggested that further consultations would help clarify positions. Despite this, Yushchenko reiterated his support for the initiative, emphasizing that a joint peacekeeping force under UN or OSCE mandate could be a positive step toward resolving separatist conflicts in the post-Soviet space.
  • Georgia is strongly in favor of the joint peacekeeping force, seeing it as an effective tool for addressing regional security challenges.
• On September 17, 2007, during talks with Georgian Interior Minister Vano Merabishvili, Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko expressed his country's readiness to strengthen ties with Georgia, stating that they aimed to develop relations even more than during the Soviet era. He emphasized the potential for increasing trade, suggesting a turnover of at least USD 100 million per year. This shift in tone marked a contrast to the previous year, when Georgia had supported the Belarusian opposition in the March 2006 presidential elections, condemning them as undemocratic and criticizing Lukashenko’s regime as oppressive. (https://civil.ge/archives/113052

Munich Security Conference and Russian assertiveness

ZOURABICHVILI

• The Russia of 2007 was much stronger and assertive than before (307)
• It had just been granted the Olympics in Sochi (306)
• Russia was strengthened by an increase in raw matarial and oil prices (307)

• Putin used the MSC in 2007 to outline his doctrine, which was later implemented by Medvedev (Kavadze 72)
• On July 14, 2007, Putin issued a decree intended to suspend the observance of obligations under the Adapted Treaty on Convention Forces in Europe, effective 150 days later, stating that it was the result of "extraordinary circusmstnaces... whichb affect the secutiy of the Russian Federation and require immmediate measures." (IIFFMCG III, 198)

ASMUS

• Since 2006, Putin increased his rhetoric on separatist territories, warning about Kosovo and the need for "universal standards" (101)
• The 2007 MSC was the first time a Russian leader had been invited to speak there (105)
  • The expectation was that he was going to make an overture to the West (105)
  • Instead of a gesture of friendship, he spoke against unilateralism, uniplarism, NATO enlargement, missile defense, and Kosovo (105)

• In April 2006, Rejection of Kosovo Comparison: Saakashvili criticized efforts to compare Abkhazia with Kosovo, arguing that Abkhazia's situation involves ethnic cleansing, with the majority of the population forcibly expelled. (https://civil.ge/archives/110320)
• In an interview with the Russian newspaper Novie Izvestia published on April 18 2006 Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Grigory Karasin reiterated Russia’s position that the Kosovo solution should be applied to cases of other conflicts. (https://civil.ge/archives/110413)
• In April 2006, Mikhail Kaminin, the Russian Foreign Ministry’s spokesman, did an interview. Kaminin described NATO's open door policy as a “sensitive issue” for Russia, particularly concerning Ukraine and Georgia. He indicated that Russia would need to “re-orientate” its military potential in response to NATO's expansion. This reorientation would require significant resources for Russia to adjust its military capabilities and reorganize its military-industrial relations. (https://civil.ge/archives/110457)
• During a Conference to Review the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), held from May 29 to June 2 in Vienna, Georgia raised significant concerns about Russia's compliance with its international obligations under the CFE. (https://civil.ge/archives/110707)
  • Mamuka Kudava, Georgia's First Deputy Defense Minister, expressed that Russia is only partially adhering to the CFE, specifically due to its ongoing military presence at the Gudauta military base in breakaway Abkhazia and the accumulation of military hardware in South Ossetia.
  • The Georgian Ministry of Defense highlighted the presence of numerous conventional arms and equipment in both Abkhazia and Tskhinvali (South Ossetia), which are believed to be in violation of the CFE treaty. The ministry labeled the existence of this "uncontrolled equipment" as a significant infringement of the treaty's terms.
• In September 2006, Serbian Foreign Minister Vuk Draskovic has called for a halt to arms exports to Georgia, citing concerns that these weapons could be used against Russia. Although there are no strict bans on such exports, Draskovic has issued a decision to deny permits for weapons transfers to Georgia based on intelligence suggesting the potential use of these arms against Russian interests. Meanwhile, Dragoljub Grujovic, director of the Zastava weapons plant, noted that the Serbian government remains uncertain about the arms export situation concerning Georgia specifically. The Georgian Defense Ministry has refrained from commenting on any ongoing deals with Serbia. (https://civil.ge/archives/115323)
• On January 21, 2007, Russian President Vladimir Putin reiterated that the resolution of Kosovo's status should set a precedent for the post-Soviet space and beyond, emphasizing that the international community should respect the principles of territorial integrity. Speaking at a joint news conference with German Chancellor Angela Merkel in Sochi, Putin warned that neglecting these principles, as seen in Kosovo, could encourage other nations to adopt similar approaches to territorial disputes, undermining international stability. He drew parallels between the breakup of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, arguing that such precedents could have wider implications, even in European states dealing with separatism. Putin expressed concern over the temptation for powerful nations to redraw borders unilaterally, and called for joint consideration of the issue to avoid grave consequences. (https://civil.ge/archives/111789)
• On February 10, 2007, NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, speaking at the Munich Conference on Security Policy, expressed his goal of seeing more countries join NATO by 2009, including Serbia, Ukraine, and Georgia. Meanwhile, Russian President Vladimir Putin, also addressing the conference, described NATO's expansion toward Russia's borders as a "serious provocation" that diminishes mutual trust, questioning the purpose of such growth. Scheffer dismissed Putin's remarks as "disappointing" and unhelpful. Georgian Foreign Minister Gela Bezhuashvili supported Scheffer's comments, interpreting them as an indication that Georgia and Ukraine were part of NATO's strategic plans. U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, in his address, reassured that Russia need not fear democracies on its borders, while criticizing some of Russia's policies, including arms transfers and the use of energy resources for political leverage. (https://civil.ge/archives/111901)
• On March 21, 2007, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov stated that while the Kosovo settlement might set a precedent, it would not be appropriate to apply it to regions such as Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Transnistria. Lavrov clarified that the situation in Kosovo, where independence was granted to a former union-member state, is unique and should not be used as a model for other separatist regions. However, he emphasized that Russia feels responsible for the residents of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, as most hold Russian passports, and the country continues to develop comprehensive ties with these breakaway regions. Lavrov also commented on the divergence between the Georgian government and the Georgian society, suggesting that the Georgian leadership does not reflect the broader sentiments of its people. (https://civil.ge/archives/112129)
• On April 26, 2007, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced a moratorium on the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) in his annual state of the nation address. He argued that NATO members had failed to fulfill their obligations under the treaty, particularly regarding the withdrawal of Russian military bases from Georgia and Moldova, which was part of the 1999 Istanbul Agreement. Putin criticized NATO for using "false pretexts" to delay the treaty's ratification, while deploying military bases near Russia’s borders. He stated that Russia would not fully implement the CFE until all NATO countries ratified the treaty, emphasizing that the treaty's original intent was based on the existence of the Warsaw Pact, which is no longer in place. (https://civil.ge/archives/112301)
• On June 1, 2007, President Vladimir Putin warned that Kosovo’s independence could set a precedent with potential negative consequences for Russia. Speaking to G8 journalists, Putin argued that Kosovo’s case is not fundamentally different from situations in South Ossetia, Abkhazia, and Transnistria, all of which experienced ethnic conflicts, declared de facto independence, and established political institutions. He questioned why self-determination would be supported in one part of Europe but denied in others, particularly for smaller ethnic groups in regions like the Caucasus. Putin suggested that such double standards could fuel unrest among Russia’s own ethnic minorities, especially in the North Caucasus. He emphasized the difficulty of justifying Kosovo’s rights to groups like the Ossetians, who are similarly divided between Russia and Georgia. (https://civil.ge/archives/112484)
• From June 12 to 15, 2007, a Georgian delegation led by Deputy Foreign Minister Giorgi Manjgaladze will participate in an Extraordinary Conference on the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty) in Vienna, which Russia requested on May 28 to address a "CFE crisis." Russian President Vladimir Putin previously indicated that Russia might impose a moratorium on the treaty unless all NATO countries ratify it. NATO members have delayed ratification due in part to Russia's failure to meet its treaty obligations, including the withdrawal of military bases from Georgia and Moldova, as stipulated in the 1999 Istanbul agreement. (https://civil.ge/archives/112526)
• On July 11, 2007, Thomas Fingar, the U.S. Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Analysis, warned that developments in Georgia might become intertwined with the situation in Kosovo. During his testimony before the U.S. House Armed Services Committee, Fingar highlighted that if Kosovo were to gain independence without a negotiated settlement, Russia might recognize breakaway regions in Georgia—specifically South Ossetia, Abkhazia, and Transnistria—as a form of retaliation. (https://civil.ge/archives/112678
  • Russian President Vladimir Putin had previously argued that a Kosovo solution could set a precedent for similar actions in these disputed regions. Putin suggested that recognizing Kosovo's independence without an agreement would be a negative precedent for Russia, given its stance on territorial integrity in the former Soviet space. Observers believed that Russia’s goal was to freeze the conflict resolution process in both Kosovo and in the post-Soviet space, especially regarding Georgia’s breakaway regions.
• On July 14, 2007, Russia announced its decision to suspend participation in the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, which aimed to limit the deployment of military forces across Europe. President Vladimir Putin signed a decree citing "exceptional circumstances" affecting Russia's security as the reason for this withdrawal. The CFE, initially signed in 1990 and ratified in 1992, had led to significant reductions in military arsenals across NATO and former Warsaw Pact nations, including the withdrawal of over 60,000 military assets. (https://civil.ge/archives/112694)
  • The treaty had been amended in 1999 to address post-Cold War realities, with Russia agreeing to withdraw military bases from Georgia and Moldova. However, NATO countries had delayed ratifying the amendments, insisting that Russia fulfill these withdrawal commitments first, which led to tensions. While Russia had already withdrawn troops from Vaziani (2001) and Akhalkalaki (2007), and was in the process of withdrawing from Batumi, the base in Gudauta in Abkhazia remained a contentious issue, with Georgia questioning Russia's compliance.
  • Despite Russia's withdrawal from the treaty, analysts in Tbilisi believed that the ongoing withdrawal of Russian bases from Georgia would not be directly affected. However, Irakli Menagarishvili, former Georgian foreign minister, warned that the broader implications of Russia dismantling arms control measures could complicate security in the South Caucasus.
  • The decision raised concern internationally, with NATO and the OSCE expressing dismay, calling it a negative step for regional stability.
• On July 16, 2007, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon addressed the issue of Kosovo's potential independence, stating that it was a "sui generis" (unique) case and should not set a precedent for other regions seeking independence. He emphasized that Kosovo’s situation was distinct and should not influence similar conflicts elsewhere. (https://civil.ge/archives/112703)
  • Ban Ki-moon also warned that any further delay in reaching a settlement in Kosovo could have negative repercussions, not just for Kosovo but for the wider region. There was growing concern that Russia might use Kosovo's potential independence, especially if it occurred without a negotiated settlement, as a justification for recognizing the breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia in Georgia, further escalating tensions in the South Caucasus.
• On August 30, 2007, Russia expressed its desire for Georgia to remain a sovereign, neutral, and friendly country, according to a statement from the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This came after talks between Grigory Karasin, Russia's deputy foreign minister, and Georgia's Giorgi Manjgaladze and Davit Bakradze, Georgian officials, in Moscow. (https://civil.ge/archives/112938)
  • Russia indicated that it was open to normalizing relations with Georgia, including lifting the economic embargo that had been imposed on the country. However, Russia also stressed that Georgia’s NATO ambitions conflicted with Moscow's vision of Georgian neutrality. The Russian side mentioned that constructive responses to Georgia’s efforts at normalization would depend on Tbilisi moving towards real steps in restoring ties, but noted that recent accusations from Georgia about Russian aggression had hindered positive dialogue.
  • The Georgian government, on the other hand, maintained that its top foreign policy goal was to join NATO, which it said could not be compromised, further complicating the relationship between the two nations.
• On September 24, 2007, Russian Ambassador to Georgia Vyacheslav Kovalenko sought to clarify controversial comments made the previous week, in which he referred to Georgia as a “dying-out nation” due to growing globalization. His remarks sparked a strong reaction from Georgian officials, with Gigi Bokeria condemning them as inappropriate and Nino Burjanadze urging Kovalenko to focus on Russia’s own demographic issues instead. Kovalenko later explained that his comments were not intended to offend but to highlight Georgia’s demographic challenges within a broader discussion on global democratic issues. The Georgian Foreign Ministry summoned Kovalenko for an explanation, and protests were held by Georgian students demanding an apology. (https://civil.ge/archives/113093
• On October 25, 2007, President Mikheil Saakashvili firmly rejected the idea of Georgia adopting neutrality, stating that historical experience showed such a policy would not protect the country. Saakashvili referenced a 1920 neutrality agreement with Bolshevik Russia, which led to Georgia’s occupation just months later, and emphasized that Georgia would maintain a well-equipped, modern army and uphold democratic principles. This stance contrasts with Russia's calls for Georgia to adopt neutrality and focus on being a "sovereign, neutral, and friendly" state. Saakashvili reaffirmed Georgia's commitment to its NATO ambitions and outlined the ongoing transformation of its military to meet modern standards. (https://civil.ge/archives/113326)
• Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov accused Georgia of pursuing an anti-Russian policy to distract from internal issues and justify its failures in foreign and domestic affairs, particularly in resolving the conflicts with South Ossetia and Abkhazia. He claimed that certain forces in Tbilisi were preparing for a forceful resolution of these conflicts, evidenced by increased military spending. Lavrov noted that Russia had proposed steps to improve relations, including ending anti-Russian rhetoric and renouncing the use of force in the breakaway regions. He also criticized Georgia for provocations such as the unresolved missile incident from August 6, 2007. When asked about Russia’s stance on recognizing Abkhazia and South Ossetia if Kosovo's independence is recognized by the West, Lavrov avoided a direct answer but emphasized that Russia would act within international law. He also warned against unilateral declarations of independence like Kosovo's, which he argued could set a dangerous precedent for other unrecognized territories. Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili expressed concerns that Kosovo's situation could pose a serious threat to Georgia, particularly if Russia uses it to justify recognizing Abkhazia and South Ossetia. (https://civil.ge/archives/113643

Perceptions

Reactions in Georgia

IIFFMCG II

• A February 2007 poll on what people expected from NATO membership led to the following answers: security guarantees (57%), restoration of territorial integrity (42%), social welfare (22%), strengthening democracy (16%) (17)
• Despite Russian attempts to cause division in Gergia in 2006, on the eve of the October 2006 local elections in Georgia, almost all political parties, including the opposition, stated that despite internal divisions, they had no differences with the government on the Russia policy, at the eve of the spy scandal (22)
• Some, like former State Minister Khaindrava, were more critical of the spy affair and said it could have been handled in a more professional manner, without undue clamour, in order to avoid creating problems for the 800,000 Georgians in Russia (22)
• On September 3, 2007, Davit Usupashvili, leader of the opposition Republican Party, accused both the Kremlin and the Saakashvili administration of exploiting tensions between Georgia and Russia for political gain. In an interview with the Georgian daily Rezonansi, Usupashvili suggested that a "network of agents" within both governments might be orchestrating incidents, such as the August 6 missile incident, in which a Russian aircraft allegedly entered Georgian airspace and dropped a missile near the South Ossetian conflict zone. While Russia denied the allegation and claimed it was staged by Tbilisi, Usupashvili argued that both Mikheil Saakashvili and Vladimir Putin were using the tensions to further their own agendas. He noted that such incidents typically occurred whenever bilateral meetings between the two presidents were being planned, such as the one in August 2007, which was disrupted by the missile event. (https://civil.ge/archives/112954)
• Some opponents, like Okruashvili, criticized Saakashvili for not being hawkish enough against Russia (https://civil.ge/archives/113105
• On January 21, 2008, the nine-party opposition coalition in Georgia announced plans to leverage western pressure to ensure free and fair parliamentary elections in the spring. Levan Gachechiladze, the coalition's presidential contender, stated that a detailed plan would be presented to the international community within a week, but warned that if violence persists, they may boycott the elections. Davit Usupashvili, leader of the Republican Party, expressed that the U.S. and European governments owed the Georgian people for their positive assessments of the fraudulent presidential election. Usupashvili also discussed the international community's fear of unrest if the truth about the election was publicly acknowledged. The opposition emphasized the need for reforms in election administration, public TV, law enforcement, and the judiciary to ensure free elections. Additionally, the Party of People planned a protest outside the U.S. embassy in Tbilisi on January 22, urging the U.S. to stand with the Georgian people. (https://civil.ge/archives/114130)
• On January 22, 2008, a few hundred activists from the Party of People gathered outside the U.S. embassy in Tbilisi to protest the U.S. administration's support for the alleged falsified presidential election. Party leader Koba Davitashvili criticized the U.S. for ignoring electoral fraud, violence, and falsifications, claiming that such actions would not have prevailed without U.S. support. He emphasized that human rights and democracy should be central to U.S. foreign policy, but expressed disappointment that this was not the case for Georgia. While the protest was part of the nine-party opposition coalition, it was an independent initiative by the Party of People, with other coalition members not participating. Protests outside the U.S. embassy are rare in Georgia. (https://civil.ge/archives/114137)

Reactions in Russia

PANFILOV

• In the lead up to the war, the Duginists became very active towards Georgia, writing blogs, creating websites, and overall propaganda efforts against Georgia (139-140)
• In July 2008, the EUrasian Youth Union was created in Tskhinvali by Dugin (140)
• The main ideology of the Duginist movement was the fight against Atlanticism. To that effect, rcognizing South Ossetia was a step to prevent Georgia's NATO integration. The movement sought to create an Eurasian alliance (144)
• Dugin talked of the Georgian-Ossetian conflict as a civilizational clash (145)

Could there have been financial ties between Kokoity and Dugin?

IIFFMCG II

• Russia’s blockade measures towards Georgia also adversely affected its own North Caucasian republics by closing the main border crossing between North Ossetia and Georgia. (21)
• In a review of Russia’s foreign policy published in March 2007, Georgia was attributed the lowest score among all of Russia’s international partners. (23)
• At the time, Russia’s Ambassador to Georgia, Vyacheslav Kovalenko, who had recently returned to Tbilisi, gave an interview on the current state of Russia-Georgia relations to the Russian newspaper Vremya Novostey. To the question “What must Georgia do to normalise relations?” he answered:“ First and foremost, Tbilisi must give up the mindset that there is some threat to Georgia, which supposedly emanates from its northern neighbour, and must stop presenting the matter in such a way that it is specifically Russia that is hindering the restoration of Georgia’s territorial integrity. Tbilisi must also understand that Russia has its own interests in the Caucasus in the sphere of security, and has its own notions about how this security may be ensured. After all, the Southern Caucasus and our Northern Caucasus are in many ways a single organism. Finally, Georgia must understand that Russia is in no case hindering its course toward realisation of ‘European identity’, as is customary to say in Tbilisi”. (23-24)

• A group of prominent Russian human rights activists, including Lyudmila Alekseeva and Lev Ponomaryov, publicly criticized the Russian government's embargo against Georgia, describing it as a harmful act that disproportionately affects vulnerable populations and amounts to "collective punishment." In an open letter published on October 3 2006 by the online magazine Grani.Ru, the activists condemned the "anti-Georgian hysteria" and the creation of a warlike atmosphere, urging Russian civil society to impose a moral boycott on politicians who incite hatred towards Georgia and to reject preparations for war. They called for a collective denunciation of the blockade against Georgia. (https://civil.ge/archives/115522)

Role of religious and cultural relations

• On March 1, 2007, Patriarch Ilia II of the Georgian Orthodox Church traveled to Moscow for a four-day visit at the invitation of Russian Orthodox Church Patriarch Alexei II, to attend the presentation of the 13th volume of the *Orthodox Encyclopedia*. Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili described the visit on February 23 as a "goodwill mission" and a form of public diplomacy. Relations between the two Orthodox churches have been tense due to conflicts in the breakaway Georgian regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, with the Georgian Church accusing the Moscow Patriarchate of seeking control over churches in these areas. The Russian Orthodox Church, however, denied these claims, stating that its interactions with the regions are purely humanitarian. (https://civil.ge/archives/112005)
• On March 14, 2007, Russian Ambassador Vyacheslav Kovalenko met with Georgian Education Minister Alexander Lomaia to discuss plans to establish a Russian-language school in Tbilisi, aiming to revive interest in the Russian language among Georgian youth, as reported by the Georgian Ministry of Education and Science. Ambassador Kovalenko expressed concern over the decline in Russian language proficiency among Georgian teenagers. Minister Lomaia suggested that diminished interest could be due to strained Georgian-Russian relations, especially in light of Russia's political and economic sanctions against Georgia. Additionally, Lomaia raised objections to Russia’s practice of awarding diplomas from Tskhinvali State University in South Ossetia, a breakaway region. (https://civil.ge/archives/112081)
• On January 20, 2008, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov met with Patriarch Ilia II of the Georgian Orthodox Church in Tbilisi, expressing Russia’s sincere interest in resolving the conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Lavrov emphasized the importance of Georgia normalizing relations with these breakaway regions, ensuring that their peoples felt included within Georgia and had their rights defended. Patriarch Ilia II echoed his concerns, calling separatism “an infectious disease” and hoping for a resolution before the end of Vladimir Putin’s presidential term in March. Lavrov assured that Russia would act as a fair mediator to prevent any further destabilization in the region. (https://civil.ge/archives/114128)

Militarization

Talk about the drone program

• The appointment of Kezerashvili as MOD coincides with a rapid increase in arms procurement and modernization of equipment starting in 2007 (Zourabichvili 137)

GALEOTTI

• In 2007, Parliament increased the number of troops from 28,000 to 32,000. That number went up to 37,000 in 2008 (124)
• Russia seems to have decided to "do something" about Saakashvili in 2006, which is when the North Caucasus Military District started staging increasingly large war games near Georgia (125)

IIFFMCG I

• Under Saakashvili and before the war, military spending went from below 1% of the GDP to 8% (14)
  • "There were few who did not see this as a message" (14-15)
• Bases near the OTs, such as Senaki and Gori, were modernized heavily using American assistance (15)

IIFFMCG II

• The strengthening of the Georgian armed forces raised some concerns in Brussels. Speaking at a conference in Slovenia on 28 August 2006, EC External Relations Commissioner, Benita Ferrero-Waldner, deplored the fact that defence expenditure in Azerbaijan and Georgia were “going through the roof” – and that this was unjustified, taking into account the enormous financial needs of education, health and small businesses. (57)
• According to South Ossetia, the 2008 import of weapons reached one billion USD and actively procured offensive weapons from the US, EU, and OSCE member states, sich as the UK, France, Greece, Turkey, Israel, Lithuania, Estonia, Ukraine, Serbia and others. (193)

IIFFMCG III

• Russia built a new military base in the Zaka Valley of North Ossetia, just 7 km from the Roki Tunnel, in 2006 - which would then be used to enter RT (89)
• By the end of 2007, Russia had created special mountain brigades in the Northern Caucasus, the 33rd Brigade in Botlikh (Dagestan) and the 34th Brigade in Zelenchuk (Karachai-Cherkessya). These brigades were located strategically at a reach of SO and Abkhazia respectively and would both be deployed in the war. (90)
• From February to April 2006, Abkhazia held a major training with 5000 soldiers and reservists (93)
• In November 2007, Abkhazian forces' third battalion of mountain shooters hold tactical trainings (93)

• In April 2006, it was reported that Russia has commenced the construction of two modern light mountain rifle brigades at the Georgian border. This information was reported by Sergey Ivanov, the Russian Defense Minister, upon his arrival in Beijing on April 24. Ivanov indicated that Russia will synchronize the withdrawal of its military bases from Georgia with the formation of these two new brigades in the North Caucasus. (https://civil.ge/archives/110433)
• In April 2006, Mikhail Kaminin, the Russian Foreign Ministry’s spokesman, did an interview. Kaminin described NATO's open door policy as a “sensitive issue” for Russia, particularly concerning Ukraine and Georgia. He indicated that Russia would need to “re-orientate” its military potential in response to NATO's expansion. This reorientation would require significant resources for Russia to adjust its military capabilities and reorganize its military-industrial relations. (https://civil.ge/archives/110457)

• Senaki base was opened in 2006. Plans for a base in eastern Georgia were announced in May 2006 (https://civil.ge/archives/110597)
• Construction of a NATO standard base in Gori started in May 2006 (https://civil.ge/archives/110683)
• Georgia's arms spending surged by 143% in 2005, reaching USD 146 million, marking the largest increase globally, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). (https://civil.ge/archives/110825)
  • Mamuka Kudava, the Georgian Deputy Defense Minister, stated that the increase in Georgia’s defense spending aims to align with NATO standards. Sergey Ivanov, the Russian Defense Minister, expressed concerns about Georgia's military spending, stating that Georgia has acquired significant amounts of arms from Eastern European countries over the past year or two. (https://civil.ge/archives/110834)
• Indicators of Military Activity: Iნ July 2006, lavrov pointed to the construction of a new military base near South Ossetia and the frequent rotation of Georgian peacekeeping battalions as signs that Georgia may be preparing for military action. Lavrov suggested that these rotations allow more soldiers to become familiar with the operational environment. (https://civil.ge/archives/111046)
• In July 2006, Targamadze noted that Russian troops were conducting military exercises in the North Ossetian Republic, close to the Roki Tunnel, which connects Russia to South Ossetia. This raised concerns about the implications for stability in the region. (https://civil.ge/archives/111065)
• July 2006 Proposed Budget Amendments: The Georgian government has submitted draft amendments to the 2006 state budget, suggesting an increase in expenditures by GEL 323 million (approximately USD 182.3 million). A significant portion of the increase, GEL 212.5 million (up to USD 120 million), is earmarked for the Defense Ministry. The Finance Ministry reported that the increase in budgetary expenditures is possible due to a surplus of GEL 190 million in tax revenues and GEL 133.8 million in non-tax revenues. (https://civil.ge/archives/111137)
• On September 25, 2006, Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili proposed a bill to Parliament to increase the authorized number of Defense Ministry troops from 26,000 to 28,000. Earlier in January 2006, a law had already raised the limit from 23,000 to 26,000. Although the proposal was discussed in Parliament, the Georgian Ministry of Defense reported that the actual troop count currently stands at around 21,500, well below the current authorized cap. (https://civil.ge/archives/115414)
• On December 25, 2006, President Mikheil Saakashvili emphasized the need for a robust reserve force and the modernization of the Georgian army during a meeting with students at Tbilisi State University. He announced plans to recruit 1,000 to 1,500 university graduates as highly-qualified officers, highlighting the importance of English-speaking recruits to enhance the military's capabilities. Saakashvili proposed offering living accommodations and a monthly salary of GEL 600-700 for a four-year service term. Additionally, he signed a law mandating 18 days of compulsory training for men aged 27 to 40, with fines or imprisonment for evasion. Stressing the necessity of national unity in the face of foreign pressure, he drew parallels to Finland's resistance during Soviet aggression. Saakashvili also marked the recent withdrawal of Russian troops from Tbilisi as a historic day, while calling for improved ties with Russia, despite cautioning against any attempts to exploit ethnic tensions for imperialistic goals. (https://civil.ge/archives/111674)
• On December 8, 2006, the Georgian Parliament approved a proposal for a system of compulsory army reserve service during its first hearing. This initiative mandates that all males aged 27 to 40 participate in reserve training, which will occur every two years for 18 days. The goal is to train 20,000 reservists in 2007. Those wishing to avoid this service can complete 180 or 200 hours of alternative service instead. Non-compliance can result in a GEL 1,000 fine or a year in jail for repeat offenders. While the program is compulsory for men, women may voluntarily participate in the training. Certain professions, such as teachers, doctors, and clergy, as well as individuals who have completed alternative service, will be exempt from the law. The Defense Ministry will develop the training and recruitment schedule, and additional funding will be necessary to implement the proposal, which is part of Georgia's broader National Security Concept aimed at total defense. (https://civil.ge/archives/111581)
• On December 14, 2006, the Georgian Parliament approved a law during its third and final hearing to formally increase the number of troops in the Ministry of Defense from the current 26,000 to 28,000 starting in the following year. Official reports indicate that the actual number of MoD troops currently stands at 21,468. (https://civil.ge/archives/111618)
• On April 2, 2007, President Saakashvili vowed to significantly increase the pace of Georgia's army modernization, aiming to create "modern armed forces." Speaking at a military base in Senaki to students undergoing compulsory military training, Saakashvili emphasized that Georgia is prepared to have a 100,000-strong reserve army, well-equipped and well-trained. He stressed the importance of every citizen being capable of handling weapons and ready to defend the nation if needed, making it a key message to potential adversaries. Additionally, Saakashvili noted the growing interest in joining the reserves, signaling significant changes in Georgia’s approach to national defense. (https://civil.ge/archives/112182)
• In 2007, Georgia's defense budget was set to nearly double, increasing from GEL 513.2 million to GEL 957.8 million (about USD 566.7 million), making up 6% of the national GDP. This budget increase was proposed in an amendment discussed by the parliamentary defense and security committee on May 1, 2007. The amendment aimed to raise total government spending by GEL 641 million (USD 379 million), of which GEL 444.6 million was allocated specifically to the Defense Ministry, marking the highest defense budget in Georgia’s history. This funding, largely for weaponry, ammunition, and a military housing program, was justified as necessary for NATO integration and enhanced defense capabilities. Opposition lawmakers raised concerns over lack of transparency due to the absence of a detailed spending breakdown. Additional funds were also designated to the Interior Ministry, Education Ministry, energy projects, and foreign debt repayments. (https://civil.ge/archives/112326)
• On July 9, 2007, executives from Jotov & Son, a Bulgarian defense manufacturer, met with officials from the Georgian Ministry of Defense (MoD). The company, known for supplying spare parts, armaments, and special oils to the Bulgarian Air Force, was represented by its head, Ivailo Jotov. During the meeting, Jotov offered his company's services to Georgia’s Ministry of Defense, with a particular focus on procurement. The Georgian Deputy Defense Minister, Vera Dzneladze, was involved in the discussions. (https://civil.ge/archives/112666)
• On August 29, 2007, Georgia announced plans to increase its defense spending by USD 783 million (GEL 1.3 billion), with most of the additional funds allocated to the Ministry of Defense (MoD). This rise in spending is part of Georgia's strategy to bolster its military capabilities and move closer to NATO integration. The increased defense budget is a significant part of the overall state budget, which is expected to surpass USD 3 billion for the year. (https://civil.ge/archives/112930)
  • The increase includes GEL 320 million for defense, which will be used to purchase new weaponry, including fighter aircraft for airspace patrol, and other military equipment. This decision follows a previous budget increase in June, where GEL 442 million was also allocated to the MoD. President Mikheil Saakashvili had highlighted the need for modernizing Georgia’s air defense after a Russian aircraft allegedly violated Georgian airspace earlier in the month. The country had already been in talks with Czech authorities over potential fighter aircraft acquisitions.
  • The funding boost is credited to Georgia’s strong economic growth, which was projected to reach 12% in 2007, well above the initial estimate of 7-7.5%. The Interior Ministry and Ministry of Justice are also set to benefit from the overall budget increase.
• On September 11, 2007, Georgia's Ministry of Defense announced plans to increase troop levels from 28,000 to 32,000. A draft law was to be discussed in Parliament shortly. Col. Zaza Gogava, Chief of the Joint Staff of the Armed Forces, revealed that the establishment of a fifth brigade would follow the transition to an all-volunteer military force. Influential lawmaker Giga Bokeria supported the proposal, calling it "absolutely logical" and essential for the country's security amid growing threats. In 2005, the troop limit was set at 23,000, which was increased to 28,000 by 2007. (https://civil.ge/archives/113017)
• On January 18, 2008, President-elect Mikheil Saakashvili opened a newly built military base in Gori, marking a significant step in the modernization of Georgia's armed forces. He announced that the Georgian military was transitioning from Kalashnikovs to U.S.-made M4 Carbine assault rifles, part of a broader move to adopt Western weapons and NATO standards. Saakashvili highlighted that Georgia was the first post-Soviet country to modernize its military at such a pace and emphasized that these changes would strengthen the country’s democracy and freedom. He also expressed pride in Georgia’s growing international recognition, noting that it was featured in a U.S. Congress newspaper, with the headline “Georgia Offers Lessons with its Elections.” (https://civil.ge/archives/114116)

Impact

Russia's WTO accession

KAVADZE

• On July 14, 2006, Georgia renounced its bilateral market access agreement on Russia's accession to the WTO (74)
• In April 2008, Georgia suspended its bilateral talks with Russia, thus blocking the WTO accession process (74)

• On May 10, 2006, during his state of the nation address, Russian President Vladimir Putin emphasized that Russia's discussions regarding World Trade Organization (WTO) membership are strictly aligned with its economic interests. He condemned the actions of certain WTO member states that attempt to leverage these discussions for concessions on unrelated matters. (https://civil.ge/archives/110555
  • Putin asserted that Russia's economy is more open than that of many current WTO members, and he insisted that negotiations for Russia's accession to the WTO should not serve as a bargaining chip for issues that are irrelevant to the organization.
  • The remarks followed failed negotiations between Tbilisi and Moscow in March, where both sides could not reach a consensus on the terms of Russia's entry into the WTO.
  • Georgia, as a WTO member, has stated it will not support Russia's accession unless Moscow addresses several of Tbilisi’s conditions. This includes Georgia’s demand to regain control over customs checkpoints with Russia, which are currently located in the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
  • In response to Georgia’s demands, Russia has maintained that such issues should not be part of the WTO negotiations, indicating a refusal to discuss matters related to territorial integrity or control over customs in the context of trade discussions.
• 14 July 2006 (midst of crisis over South Ossetian blast and blockade and closure of border): The Georgian Foreign Ministry stated that it would reinitiate talks regarding market access with Russia, aiming to resolve issues that have arisen since negotiations stalled. Georgia accused Russia of violating a protocol signed in May 2004, which aimed to conclude bilateral market-access negotiations. This included a ban on imports of Georgian wines, spirits, and mineral waters, which Tbilisi deemed unjustified. (https://civil.ge/archives/111064)
• In the second half of July 2006: Saakashvili warned that Georgia would not support Russia’s accession to the WTO unless Russia ceased its ban on Georgian imports, specifically wine and mineral waters. (https://civil.ge/archives/111080)
• On October 12, 2006, Georgia's delegation to the World Trade Organization (WTO) announced that it would not set a date for the next round of multilateral talks regarding Russia's accession to the organization, effectively adjourning discussions indefinitely. The Georgian Foreign Ministry cited Russia's ongoing bans on Georgian imports, including wine and agricultural products, along with the severance of air, sea, land, railway, and postal communications between the two countries, which they described as a total economic blockade. In March 2006, Tbilisi had previously stated that it would only support Russia's WTO bid after Moscow ceased the illegal operations of two border checkpoints: Adleri-Leselidze, connecting Russia to breakaway Abkhazia, and the Roki Tunnel, linking Russia to breakaway South Ossetia. (https://civil.ge/archives/111195)
• Georgian Prime Minister Zurab Nogaideli stated on November 13 in Brussels that Georgia will support Russia's accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) provided that Moscow adheres to its commitment to conduct trade with Georgia exclusively through legally operating border checkpoints. Nogaideli emphasized that this stance stems from a 2004 agreement in which Russia promised to honor this condition. Tbilisi is specifically demanding the closure of two illegal border checkpoints: Adleri-Leselidze at the Abkhaz border and the Roki Tunnel at the South Ossetian border. With the U.S. recently agreeing in principle to support Russia's WTO membership, the focus now shifts to finalizing discussions with Georgia, along with Moldova and Costa Rica. (https://civil.ge/archives/111397)
• In a joint statement released on November 21, 2006, the Georgian Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Economy emphasized that Georgia will only support Russia's accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) following the legalization of two border checkpoints: Adleri-Leselidze, which borders breakaway Abkhazia, and the Roki Tunnel, which borders breakaway South Ossetia. The statement highlighted that according to WTO rules, if Russia does not complete bilateral market access negotiations with Georgia and lacks Georgia's consent for multilateral talks, its accession process will be halted. The Georgian government expressed its continued interest in Russia's WTO membership and reiterated its proposal for timely bilateral negotiations. Russia recently advanced its WTO bid after receiving approval from the U.S., but still needs to finalize talks with Georgia, Moldova, and Costa Rica. (https://civil.ge/archives/111460)
• On November 21, 2006, Sergey Shamba, the Foreign Minister of the breakaway region of Abkhazia, stated that Sokhumi would categorically reject any deployment of Georgian customs officers at the Adleri-Leselidze checkpoint on the border between Abkhazia and Russia. His remarks came in the context of a joint statement from the Georgian Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Economy, which reiterated that Georgia would consent to Russia's accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) only after the legalization of two key border checkpoints: Adleri-Leselidze, which connects Russia with breakaway Abkhazia, and the Roki Tunnel, linking Russia with breakaway South Ossetia. Shamba emphasized that he did not believe Russia would agree to allow Georgian customs officials on the Psou River, which delineates the border with Russia. (https://civil.ge/archives/111470)
• On November 22, 2006, Georgian Economy Minister Giorgi Arveladze reiterated Georgia's firm position regarding Russia's accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO), insisting that Moscow must legalize trade through two key border checkpoints: Adleri-Leselidze, which connects Russia to the breakaway region of Abkhazia, and the Roki Tunnel, linking Russia to South Ossetia. Arveladze stressed that Georgia's demands stem from commitments made by Russia in 2004, which remain unfulfilled, and asserted that Georgia would not approve Russia's WTO membership unless these conditions are met. (https://civil.ge/archives/111473)
• On January 26, 2007, Russian Economy Minister German Gref reported progress in the ongoing talks with Georgia regarding Russia's World Trade Organization (WTO) accession, although Georgia had not yet lifted all its objections. Georgian Deputy Economy Minister Tamar Kovziridze was in Geneva for discussions with Russian officials, but no comments were made by Georgian representatives. Georgian Economy Minister Giorgi Arveladze had stated on January 22 that Tbilisi was still insisting that Russia legalize trade at two border crossings with Georgia, located in the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Gref noted that while not all Georgian concerns had been resolved, the negotiations had been positive, and there were prospects for aligning both countries' positions ahead of Russia's WTO membership. (https://civil.ge/archives/111816)
• In an interview with Ekho Moskvy radio on January 27, 2007, Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili emphasized that Georgia's approval of Russia's World Trade Organization (WTO) accession was contingent on Russia legalizing trade at the two border crossing points located in the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Saakashvili described this as a "normal demand" and expressed frustration that despite some preliminary promises from Russia, the issue had not been resolved. He suggested that the matter might be addressed as part of the recent efforts to improve ties between the two countries. Saakashvili reiterated that Georgia would not compromise its territorial integrity and stressed that Russia's WTO membership aligned with Georgia's long-term interests. He also mentioned that technical talks were held in Geneva the previous week, and that while progress had been made, Georgia's objections had not yet been fully addressed. (https://civil.ge/archives/111827)
• On January 29, 2007, Stanislav Lakoba, Secretary of the National Security Council of breakaway Abkhazia, called Georgia's demand to deploy its officials on the Abkhaz border with Russia "ridiculous" and "unreal." Georgia had made this request as a precondition for supporting Russia's accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO), specifically asking Russia to legalize trade at the two border crossings in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Lakoba dismissed the demand, suggesting that Tbilisi's continued insistence on it was a "face-saving attempt," and he stated that the final outcome of the negotiations was already clear—Georgia's demand could not be met. (https://civil.ge/archives/111833)
• On February 26, 2007, Georgian Deputy Economy Minister Tamar Kovziridze denied Russian media reports suggesting that a new round of WTO talks between Russia and Georgia had begun in Geneva. Kovziridze clarified that during previous discussions in January, both sides had agreed to exchange written opinions by the end of February, but no bilateral meeting was planned. She reiterated Georgia’s stance, emphasizing that Georgia would only support Russia's WTO membership if trade at border crossings in the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia was legalized. (https://civil.ge/archives/111985)
• On May 17, 2007, Georgian Economy Minister Giorgi Arveladze announced that Russian negotiators were scheduled to visit Georgia on May 30-31 for talks regarding Russia's potential accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO). Arveladze emphasized Georgia's demand that Russia address smuggling and illegal trade at border crossings with the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as a precondition for Georgia’s support for Russia’s WTO membership. As a current WTO member, Georgia holds the right to veto Russia's accession. (https://civil.ge/archives/112403)
  • On May 30, 2007, a group of Russian negotiators arrived in Tbilisi to discuss Russia's accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO). Georgian Economy Minister Giorgi Arveladze had previously stated that, as a condition for supporting Russia’s WTO membership, Georgia demanded Russia address smuggling and illegal trade at the two border crossing points with the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Georgian Prime Minister Zurab Nogaideli reiterated this stance on May 29. (https://civil.ge/archives/112460)
  • On May 31, 2007, Georgia and Russia began WTO accession talks in Tbilisi aimed at resolving differences over Russia's membership. Russia’s chief WTO negotiator, Maksim Medvedkov, and Georgian Deputy Economy Minister Tamar Kovziridze led the respective delegations. Georgia, as a current WTO member, has the power to veto Russia's accession. Tbilisi's main condition for support is that Russia must legalize trade at the two border crossing points with the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. However, Russia views this demand as a political issue and argues it should not influence WTO talks. (https://civil.ge/archives/112465)
  • On May 31, 2007, Georgia and Russia failed to reach an agreement during WTO accession talks in Tbilisi. Georgian Deputy Economy Minister Tamar Kovziridze and Russia’s chief negotiator Maksim Medvedkov were unable to make progress. Georgia is demanding that Russia legalize trade at the two border crossing points with the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in exchange for supporting Russia’s WTO membership. Russia rejected this condition, stating that the border issues and WTO accession should be addressed separately. Both sides agreed to resume negotiations in four to six weeks. (https://civil.ge/archives/112471)
• On May 31, 2007, Georgia firmly maintained its stance on Russia's World Trade Organization (WTO) accession terms, demanding Russia's compliance with a 2004 agreement. This protocol required Russia to legalize trade along two border points in the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, a commitment Georgia claims Russia has not honored. During a seven-hour negotiation session in Tbilisi, Deputy Economy Minister Tamar Kovziridze underscored that Georgia does not oppose Russia’s WTO membership but insists on adherence to these prior commitments. Despite Russian chief negotiator Maksim Medvedkov arguing that WTO accession should remain separate from border issues, Georgia held its ground, emphasizing that this leverage would not be relinquished without tangible benefits. Both sides agreed to reconvene in July 2007 to continue discussions, though no specific date was set. (https://civil.ge/archives/112475)
• On July 31, 2007, the Georgian Economy Ministry reported that there had been no progress in the ongoing discussions about Russia's entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO). Georgia reiterated its position that Russia must legalize trade at two border crossing points in the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. These border points—the Roki Tunnel in South Ossetia and the Gantiadi crossing in Abkhazia—were seen by Georgia as a violation of the 2004 protocol between the two countries. Despite Georgia’s detailed position paper, Russia's response was described as irrelevant and failed to address the core concerns raised by Tbilisi. (https://civil.ge/archives/112776)
• On October 19, 2007, Russia and Georgia resumed negotiations in Geneva over Russia's accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO). Georgia is demanding that Russia legalize trade at two border crossings in the breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia as a condition for supporting Russia's WTO entry, but Russia views this demand as political and outside the scope of trade talks. Tamar Kovziridze, Georgia's deputy economy minister, and Maksim Medvedkov, Russia's chief negotiator, are leading the respective delegations. The talks follow a May round in Tbilisi that failed to make progress on this issue. (https://civil.ge/archives/113285)
• Georgian and Russian negotiators resumed talks on Russia's accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in Geneva on November 22, 2007. Georgia's preconditions for supporting Russia's WTO membership remain unchanged, specifically the legalization of trade at two border crossing points: one in South Ossetia (Roki Tunnel) and another in Abkhazia (Gantiadi). However, Russia argues that these demands are political and should be outside the scope of WTO negotiations. (https://civil.ge/archives/113605)

Economic impact

• On July 13, 2006, the BTC pipeline was officially inaugurated in a major ceremony in Baku involving the Georgian, Azerbaijani, and Turkish leaders and the US Secretary of Energy (Hoesli 889)
• Bendukidze argued that the embargo was an opportunity for Georgia as it provided a chance to move away from the Russian market. He said, "having 70% of your exports going to Russia and receiving subsidized and cheap energy from Russia is not normal. Now, we will have a real economy" (Panfilov 117)

SAAKASHVILI

• The embargo's short-term consequences were described by MS as being "catastrophic" (158)
  • But the embargo was long-term beneficial, according to him, as it forced the Georgian export industry to focus on new markets (European and Middle-Eastern) and differentiate their assets (158)
  • One example was that Georgia was forced to improve the quality of its wine and produce to accede the European market (158)
  • MS later told Putin, "several members of my cabinet have told me to build you a statue because you are the cause of the unprecedented modernization of the Georgian economy!" (158)
  • Bendukidze said, "Let's just imagine that there is an ocean north of us, and we will be forced to look for new markets" (159)
• The year after the embargo saw a 12% economic growth for Georgia (159)

IIFFMCG II

• The Georgian Economy Ministry released a report about the possible effects of suspending economic relations with Russia, noting that Russia was Georgia's main trade parter in 2006 despite the embargo. (21-22)
• In 2005, imports from Russia included 53% of the electric power and 95% of the natural has consumed in Georgia (22)
• Russian Parliamentary Speaker Boris Gryzlov argued that the sanctions were directed against the Georgian Government, not against the Georgian people. But it was the ordinary Georgians who were suffering. (22)
• In 2007, the total amount of Georgian exports to Russia was 53 million USD, a 30% decrease from the previous year. (22)
• The sanctions forced Georgia to restructure and reorient its export policies (22)
• The sanctions did not lead to a dramatic decline of Georgian economic growth rates, which remained high at 12% (22)

• In 2005, Georgia exported a total of 94,800 tons of mineral waters, including Borjomi and Nabeghlavi, to Russia, generating revenue of USD 23.6 million—USD 10 million more than in 2004. (https://civil.ge/archives/110399)
  • Approximately 80% of Georgia's prominent mineral water, Borjomi, is exported, with more than half of this amount going to Russia and 40% to 27 other countries worldwide.
• In 2005, Georgia exported about USD 63 million worth of wine to Russia, accounting for 87% of its total wine exports. Georgian officials projected that wine exports to Russia could reach USD 100 million in 2006 due to a good harvest. (https://civil.ge/archives/110416)
  • The International Monetary Fund (IMF) was requested by the Georgian authorities to evaluate the potential economic impacts of losing the Russian market. Robert Christiansen, the IMF representative in Tbilisi, stated that while the "wine shock" would not lead to macroeconomic instability, there could be significant microeconomic impacts, particularly on wine producers and workers in the Kakheti region. Christiansen estimated a potential slowdown in economic growth of less than 1% if Georgia could sell wine in alternative markets.
  • This situation could adversely affect the livelihoods of thousands of grape growers in Kakheti, where approximately 60% of Georgia's vineyards are located.
• Borjomi is one of Georgia's most significant mineral water brands, with 80% of its production exported abroad. Of this, 60% is exported to Russia, while the remaining 40% is distributed to 27 other countries worldwide, according to the Georgian Glass & Mineral Waters Company. (https://civil.ge/archives/110520)
• Experts suggest that the impact of the Borjomi ban is less severe than that of the wine ban. In 2005, the export value of all mineral waters, including Borjomi, to Russia was USD 23.6 million, compared to USD 63 million for wine. (https://civil.ge/archives/110524
  • The export markets for Georgian mineral waters are reportedly more diversified than those for Georgian wine, which predominantly goes to Russia (up to 87% in 2005).
  • In 2005, GGMW exported USD 22.1 million worth of Borjomi to Russia, with USD 7.7 million exported in the first quarter of 2006.
  • GGMW claims that 50% of its total production is sold in Russia, while 17% is exported to Ukraine, 15% is consumed domestically, and the remaining 15% is distributed to 25 other countries.
• In response to the potential threat of a ban on money transfers from Russia, the National Bank of Georgia (NBG) established a special group on October 2 to formulate a plan to mitigate the possible consequences. This move comes after Boris Grizlov, Chairman of Russia's lower house of Parliament, announced plans to draft legislation that could authorize such a ban. The NBG emphasized its commitment to ensuring that money transfers between Georgia and Russia continue uninterrupted, while also cautioning that a transfer ban would damage Russia's reputation. Notably, Russia accounted for 67.5% of foreign money transfers to Georgia, amounting to $219 million from January to August 2006. (https://civil.ge/archives/115514)
• Georgian Economy Minister Irakli Chogovadze expressed confidence that Russia's blockade on Georgia would ultimately be ineffective and hoped for its swift resolution. Following a meeting with executives from Georgian airlines on October 3, he acknowledged the lack of specific information regarding potential financial losses from the embargo but assured that calculations would be made. Chogovadze announced plans to introduce additional flights to Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan to accommodate passengers traveling from Moscow to Tbilisi. He emphasized that Russia's suspension of air links constitutes a violation of existing bilateral agreements. (https://civil.ge/archives/115523)
• On October 4, 2006, Georgian Prime Minister Zurab Nogaideli expressed confidence that Russia's sanctions would not negatively impact Georgia, stating that the country had already endured previous sanctions and would continue to thrive. He emphasized that any additional sanctions imposed by Russia would not cause harm, asserting that Georgia is on a path to becoming an independent and democratic nation. (https://civil.ge/archives/115535)
• Government officials and experts predict that a proposed increase in gas prices by Gazprom, which aims to raise the cost from USD 110 to USD 230 per 1000 cubic meters in 2007, will slow down Georgia’s economic growth but not cause severe damage. While precise estimates of the impact on GDP growth vary—ranging from 1.1% according to Standard and Poor’s to potentially 2-3%—officials believe Georgia's economy is resilient enough to absorb this shock. Energy Minister Nika Gilauri indicated that Georgia would begin receiving gas from the Shah-Deniz pipeline in December, providing an additional source to mitigate reliance on Russian gas, which may help lower the average price. The overall response to the gas price increase will depend on consumption patterns, government measures to manage the economic impact, and the success of negotiations for additional cheaper gas supplies from Azerbaijan and Turkey. (https://civil.ge/archives/111338)
• On November 21, 2006, Georgian Finance Minister Lexo Alexishvili informed lawmakers that Russia's economic embargo on Georgia is projected to reduce the country's GDP growth by approximately 2.5% to 2.8% in 2007. He noted that this estimated slowdown reflects a worst-case scenario, which may also include a potential increase in gas prices. Despite these external challenges, Alexishvili expressed confidence that Georgia's GDP growth would still reach at least 7.5% in 2007, equating to around GEL 16 billion (approximately USD 9.1 billion). He emphasized that the Georgian economy is resilient enough to withstand foreign economic shocks. (https://civil.ge/archives/185496)
• On December 12, 2006, an IMF mission reported that while Georgia's economy remains robust, it anticipates a slowdown in growth to about 6-7% in 2007 due to Russia's economic embargo. During its visit from December 2-12, the mission noted that inflation had decreased from a peak of 14.5% in mid-2006 and was expected to be below 10% by year-end. Despite losing Russian export markets, Georgia's real GDP growth was projected at around 8% for 2006. However, the IMF warned that the embargo would increase the external current account deficit by approximately USD 250-300 million in 2007, which the Georgian authorities planned to offset through foreign direct investment and increased tourism revenues. The IMF urged the government to reduce the projected fiscal deficit from 2.5% of GDP to better manage external shocks and emphasized the need for structural reforms to enhance export growth and property rights. (https://civil.ge/archives/111601)
• In 2006, Georgia saw a significant increase in money transfers from abroad, with a total of USD 546 million, marking a 35.5% rise from the previous year's USD 403 million, according to the Georgian National Bank. The majority of these funds, USD 365 million (66.8%), came from Russia. Other notable sources included the United States (USD 59 million), Greece (USD 16 million), Turkey (USD 14 million), and Spain and Ukraine (USD 11 million each). Despite threats by Russian politicians about potentially halting money transfers as part of an economic blockade, officials in Tbilisi dismissed these concerns, considering them "almost impossible to materialize." Additionally, Georgia's outbound transfers also grew, reaching USD 132 million, with the majority sent to Russia (USD 77 million). (https://civil.ge/archives/111758)
• On September 1, 2007, the Georgian daily Rezonansi reported that authorities were allegedly pressuring small and medium-sized business owners to buy grapes from farmers as the grape harvest approached. This came in response to challenges caused by the Russian economic embargo, which led Georgian wine producers to reduce output, leaving farmers with unsold grapes. President Mikheil Saakashvili had previously requested prominent businesspeople to purchase at least 10 tonnes of grapes in 2006 to mitigate the embargo's impact. However, this year, smaller businesses voiced concerns about the financial strain of such purchases. Criticism from opposition figures like Davit Usupashvili of the Republican Party and Davit Narmania from the Georgian Young Economists Association highlighted the government’s inadequate handling of the wine industry’s challenges. (https://civil.ge/archives/112949)
• On October 4, 2007, during a joint news conference with NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer in the Kakheti region, President Mikheil Saakashvili spoke about how the region had managed to withstand Russia's economic embargo, which had significantly impacted the Georgian wine industry. Despite challenges like low grape prices, Saakashvili highlighted the ongoing development in Kakheti, including new infrastructure such as roads, schools, and hospitals. His remarks were a response to opposition criticism over the government's lack of support for winegrowers affected by the embargo, and he emphasized that Georgia would not succumb to external pressure. (https://civil.ge/archives/113184)

References

• Civil Georgia
• Radio Tavisupleba
• Wikipedia Library
• General Research
• Individual Research