Santhal rebellion

Santhal rebellion
Part of Indian independence movement
An illustration of an engagement during the Santhal rebellion by The Illustrated London News
Location	Santhal Pargana, Jharkhand 24°46′N 87°36′E
Commanded by	Sidhu and Kanhu Murmu
Objective	Removal of the zamindari system
Date	June 30, 1855 – January 3, 1856 (1855-06-30 – 1856-01-03) (6 months and 4 days)
Santal Parganas Tenancy Act, 1876
Casualties	15,000 deaths, many displaced
Santhal Pargana Location of the rebellion

The Santal rebellion (also known as the Santhal Hool), was a rebellion in present-day Jharkhand and West Bengal against the East India Company (EIC) and zamindari system by the Santhals. It started on June 30, 1855, and on November 10, 1855, martial law was proclaimed by the East India Company which lasted until January 3, 1856, when martial law was suspended and the rebellion was eventually suppressed by the presidency armies. The rebellion was led by the four sibling brothers - Sidhu, Kanhu, Chand, and Bhairav and their two sisters Phoolo and Jhano, who sacrificed their lives for the cause.

Background

The rebellion of the Santals began as a reaction to end the revenue system of the East India Company (EIC), usury practices, and the zamindari system in India; in the tribal belt of what was then known as the Bengal Presidency. It was a revolt against the oppression of the colonial rule propagated through a distorted revenue system, enforced by the local zamindars, the police and the courts of the legal system set up by the British East India Company.

Santhal Pargana area before arrival of the Santhal people. Damin-i-koh region labeled as "Country Unexplored by Europeans" (1776 map by James Rennell).

The Santals lived in a territory that stretched from Hazaribagh to Medinipur, spanning the Subarnarekha River, along with other Munda ethnolinguistic tribals, and they engaged on agriculture. Those areas were greatly affected by the 1770 Bengal famine. In 1832, the EIC demarcated the Damin-i-koh region in present-day Jharkhand and encouraged the pre-existed Paharia tribe of the Rajmahal hills to clear forests and practice agriculture. However, the Paharia tribe declined the offer, leading the company to invite the Santals to settle in the region. Due to promises of land and economic amenities a large numbers of Santals came to settle from Dhalbhum, Manbhum, Hazaribagh, Midnapore, and other surrounding areas. Soon, their population increased significantly from 3,000 to 83,000 in between 1830 and 1850. This growth in the number of agriculturists resulted in a 22-fold increase in Company revenue from the area. Subsequently, Mahajans and Zamindars, acting as money lenders, tax collectors, and other intermediaries employed by the EIC, came to dominate the local economy, governance, and administration. Many Santals became victims of corrupt money lending practices. They were lent money at exorbitant rates. When they were unable to repay the loan, their lands were forcibly taken and they were forced into bonded labour. Numerous petitions were made by disgruntled Santal leaders to the administration against these activities, but these were largely ignored. This sparked the Santals to mobilise against the intermediaries, eventually leading to a rebellion against the EIC and the establishment of self-governance.

In the lead up to the rebellion, the EIC recorded numerous instances of dacoits who were especially targeting Bengali zamindars. One was Bir Singh Manjhi, a Santal who led a gang of robbers and who claimed to have received support from a god who had whispered a secret mantra into his ear. Many other leaders like him promoted a mix of anti-state activity mixed with millenarian fervour, making the Santals ripe for rebellion.

Simultaneously, a chieftain called Margo Raja began cultivating a network of secret disciples throughout the Damin-i-koh, aiming to unite all Santals into a single body. In addition, several calamitous portents arrived in the Damin-i-koh that frightened the Santals:

• The appearance of Lag Lagin snakes
• Women with equal numbers of children exchanging vows of friensdhip
• Buffalo calves were resting in front of houses, during which time the occupants would die
• A golden boat in the Ganga sank after a Dom touched it
• A child born to an unmarried girl was a suba (short for Subedar, identifying an official leader)
• People were coming to kill the dikkus (non-tribals) and to identify themselves Santals should hang a buffalo hide and pair of flutes at the end of the village street

The tales of these various calamities made the Santals more fearful, and the rumours of them spread from village to village and made them alert for anyone promising to save them.

Rebellion

A skirmish between British railway engineers and Santhals

On 30 June 1855, two Santal rebel leaders, Sidhu and Kanhu Murmu, mobilised roughly 60,000 Santals and declared a rebellion against the EIC. Sidhu Murmu had accumulated about ten thousand Santals to run a parallel government during the rebellion. The basic purpose was to collect taxes by making and enforcing his own laws.

Soon after the declaration, the Santals took to arms. In many villages, the Zamindars, money lenders, and their operatives were executed. The open rebellion caught the Company administration by surprise. On 9 July, a missive was sent to Kolkata from the District Magistrate of Bhagalpur based on information from Zamindars. According to their information 1,000 Santals were ready, with 4-5,000 others ready to mobilise when called. The district magistrate of Aurangabad, A. Eden, informed by zamindars and a traitor who had been a scribe at the court of Sidhu and Kanhu Murmu, sent a message to Kolkata on 9 July 9,000 Santals were mobilised in the village of Murdapur, intending to attack the Pakur Raj, then Samserganj, and come back to Rajmahal and Bhagalpur after taking a dip in the Ganga. A missive sent on 10 July claimed 10-12,000 Santhals were mobilising near Jangipur, and later the Magistrate of Aurangabad sent a message that they had occupied the railway houses. Another missive from the magistrate said that 13,000 Santals were mobilising from Birbhum, threatening Pakur and burning railway bungalows in a large swathe of land. There were even rumours that Santals from further away, in Bankura and Singhbhum districts, were joining the rebellion. In some cases members of non-Santal tribes, namely the Mal Paharias, joined the rebellion. Sindhu and Kanhu even sent letters to zamindars, hoping to cajole or threaten them into supporting his cause.

The numbers gathered around Sidhu and Kanhu himself were less well-known. The most accurate information was obtained from a non-Santal interrogated under oath on 9 July, who claimed they had 7,000 men with them, while a report a few days later claimed they had 30,000 men, of which 12,000 would attack Rajmahal and the rest proceed down the railway line to Jangipur and thence to Murshidabad. A person recorded on 14th July recorded that all the traders from Suri, Rampurhat and Nalhati had fled.

To the west, in Bhagalpur town and the regions immediately around it, initially the Santals knew nothing of this rebellion. However eventually the news spread, so that by 11th of July a British farmer claimed that armed bands of Santals, not under 20,000, were proceeding to join the rebels and were threatening non-Santals that they would "return with an order from the Soobah for their extermination." The Santals began to move to attack regions west of the Damin-i-koh, usually leading attacks with 1,000 man bands, and by the 11th of July were 11 miles from Colgong (modern Kahalgaon). Many of these groups were not around to meet Sidhu and Kanhu and were likely acting independently. By the 17th they had moved further to the west and had cut off road and rail connections between Colgong and Bhagalpur, although eyewitnesses told the District Magistrate that the Santals were attacking villages saying that Company rule was over and the rule of their suba had begun. On July 15, the District Commissioner of Bhagalpur sent a proclamation asking the Santals to lay down their arms and promising to examine their grievances, but this proclamation was ignored and the Santals continued to fight. These Santals fought a company of Hill Rangers (Paharia soldiers), who fled. The Santals also defeated a contingent of regular EIC soldiers and officers, who had pursued them to a village called Narayanpur, making a stand, killing several Indian officers and 25 sepoys, the worst EIC defeat during the rebellion. During this battle, the EIC troops' guns would not go off when fired due to wet gun caps, making them essentially unarmed. To prevent their troops from fearing the Santhals had divine favour, as Sidhu and Kanhu had claimed the EIC's guns would turn to water when fired, the EIC invested much time in persuading them that their guns' impotency was due to natural causes.

British forces searching for Santhals during the rebellion

The news of the Santal victory at Narayanpur spread like wildfire, and motivated the Santals to fight and believe victory was still possible. On 21 July 1855, the Bhagalpur Commissioner wrote that the Santhals were in force all along the road from Rajmahal to Palassour, and were looting and burning villages along the plains to the west of Colgong. Many zamindars had taken shelter in the city but were not permitted to lead out their troops and attack the rebels.

To the east, Rajmahal was little defended except for some barricades that had been put up, and the only forces available were a small number of policemen, 12 armed Europeans and 160 sepoys with very little ammunition. The majority of their normal garrison had been sent to attack Barhait, the assumed centre of the rebels. 12,000 Santals were marching to attack the city. On 21 July, the Bhagalpur Commissioner, who had kept most troops for the defence of Bhagalpur, was ordered to spread out his troops more evenly, and keep no more than 100 for the defence of the city. However troop transports were bringing more troops up the Ganga to Rajmahal, and around 200 troops were deputed to Colgong.

Meanwhile the Santals, under Sidhu and Kanhu Murmu, had moved south of the hills to the village of Mohulpahari, where they held a Chata festival. They then intended to march east to Pakur and kill the Rani, thence to Maheshpur to kill the Raja, and march to Samserganj, then to Banaigram to do Puja in the Ganga, and from Rajmahal towards Bhagalpur and Munger. Estimations of the rebel force varied widely, with some saying 10-12,000 on 8 July, and others 13,000 on 11 July. By 15 July, the numbers were estimated at around 20,000, although the real number was never known. By the 16th, it was reported that the Santals had moved towards Rampurhat, and a day later, they had defeated any resistance and burned the town to the ground. Before 15 July, the Santhals destroyed the town of Pulsa. By 19 July, a group of Santhals were moving towards Maheshpur, numbering 15,000 and being joined by more men as they marched. Moreover another group of Santals numbering around 10,000 was looting and burning villages to the south along the base of the hills, moving towards Suri.

Many Santals at this time were granted the title of suba thakur, a leadership position under the suba. Many of these titles were granted to various followers during Sidhu and Kanhu's brief period of administration, while others simply claimed the title for themselves. Some others were granted the title nazir, for a senior leader or administrator. During their expansion, Sidhu and Kanhu had desired to organise a more just settlement of the land, appointing Zamindaris and charged a much lower rent to the peasants (mainly Bhumij and Bengalis) than the EIC had.

East India Company initial response

Each district could call on military assistance on its own, but to coordinate all anti-rebellion activities the EIC created a "Special Commissioner for the Suppression of the Sonthal insurrection", a job given to A. C. Bidwell, who was a commissioner of a district to the east of the Ganga and was already in Kolkata. Letters sent to all relevant districts indicated that Bidwell would be responsible for civil affairs in the districts during the period of the rebellion. The governor's council authorized full military action to crush the rebels. They intended to send troops from Barrackpore to Raniganj, and redistribute troops already in the town to defend the railway station and the Grand Trunk Road. The eventual plan was to secure threatened positions near the Ganga, limit their movement to the north side of the road, and cut off the rebels' line of retreat to the hills. On 10 July, 160 men marched from Bhagalpur under a Major Burroughs and others were deputed to protect villages in Samserganj thana. A number of local Zamindars were sent letters asking them to place their elephants at the service of the EIC, including the Nawab of Murshidabad, who sent 30 elephants. Even the Commissioner of 24 Parganas, outside Kolkata, was asked to purchase or hire elephants for the campaign. However, despite recommendations for 1,500 troops sent by the Divisional Commissioner of Burdwan, the Lieutenant Governor refused to send more troops, deeming such a large force unnecessary for what he termed a 'local' insurrection.

The main attack which largely began the end of the rebellion came on 24 July. 50 EIC troops, led by a Commissioner Toogood along with 30 elephants and 200 soldiers sent by the Nawab of Murshidabad had marched from Pulsa towards Maheshpur, on the plain east of the Damin-i-koh, where they fought 5,000 Santals. It took the soldiers 10 minutes to kill 100 Santals, after which the rest scattered, leaving behind many of their possessions. It appears that Sidhu and Kanhu were encamped here, and later Sidhu told of how both he and his brother were wounded in this battle. However the EIC troops did not move further towards Bhagnadi because spies informed them 20 to 30,000 Santals remained in the area and there were numerous bands of Santals operating nearby. On 22 July, they were 14 miles from Bhagnadi and the next day they were 6 miles away. Most of the Santals had fled their villages ahead of the EIC troops. Those who remained often heorically resisted the EIC forces, while some gave up and collaborated. Many of these eventual collaborators had written desperate pleas to Sidhu and Kanhu asking for instructions or assistance after being surrounded by numerically superior forces.

Sidhu and Kanhu were not completely idle. Kanhu marched out to face the soldiers, and on 24 July the EIC marched towards Barhait, from which they would proceed to Bhagnadi. As they came into a large valley through a pass in the hills, around 200 Santals moved out of the villages towards the EIC troops. Although the EIC troops fired a few shots, they did not appear to hit the rebels, but later when they came to Bhagnadi they heard rumours that Kanhu had been shot and killed that day. After hearing tidings of Kanhu's death, Sidhu, Chand and Bhairab had retreated to the hills taking as much of the plundered property as they could. Later events would prove Kanhu was not killed at that time. Toogood then posted troops at Barhait to secure the hills, and August 1855 was generally peaceful.

To the southeast in Birbhum, the fighting was back and forth. In open confrontations, the EIC soldiers won, but the Santals would simply retreat and return when the Company soldiers had left. On 17 July, a large group of Santals were moving towards Dumka and Birbhum. Due to the high water in the Mor river, they were unable to ford it, but once they did they planned to attack Suri. The EIC was using the Mor as a defence line, and often engaged the Santals. In one on 22 July, a Lieutenant Toulmain took only 106 men, and was attacked by a force of 8000 rebels. The rebels managed to kill Toulmain along with 13 others, with the loss of 300 of their own, before allowing the others to flee back towards Suri. In another, at a place called Nangolia, the Santhals forded the river Mor but were met by EIC troops, who fired continuously and slowly pushed the Santals back across the river, with 200 casualties for the Santhals.

However maintaining control over the territory recaptured was often difficult for the EIC commanders. In some cases civilians accompanying the EIC troops burned Santhal villages in revenge.

Regrouping

Towards the end of July, both the British and Santals reorganised their forces. The ECI brought in Major General G. W. A. Lloyd from Dinajpur district, who took control of the troops from Bidwell, and gathered even more forces for the full suppression of the rebellion. At the time his command was established, he had 5 regiments of local infantry, Hill Rangers, some European troops, and cavalry, in addition to the various soldiers sent by the many Zamindars who were aiding the EIC.

After his retreat from Bhagnadi Sidhu had regrouped with Ram Manjhi, a suboordinate near Birbhum, who became the new leader of the rebellion, along with other suba thakurs.

Resumption of guerilla warfare

Eventually the East India Company resumed its attacks. Captain Sherwill, who had passed through the hills several times, had come to offer his advice in Rajmahal. The EIC troops in Rajmahal began moving into the country, splitting up Santal forces and turning the villagers into refugees. The District Magistrate of Munger had armed some of the ghatwals and discharged sipahis, and sent them to block the passes into the plains in early August. Later some 4,000 Santals who had intended to move into Munger's plains had found the passes blocked and moved further south. On 10 August, a steamer carrying General Lloyd learned in Cologong that the Santhals had been driven out the northern part of the hills and most of Bhagalpur.

The Santals now resorted to a policy of hit-and-run attacks on the EIC troops. These attacks generally resumed in August 1855, although it is unclear whether these attacks were organised by the central leadership of the rebellion or whether thakurs were acting on their own in what they saw as the best interests of the rebellion.

Declaration of Martial Law

During the period of these guerilla attacks by the Santals, the EIC was debating whether to impose martial law. On 23 August, the Bhagalpur Commissioner issued an Urdu proclamation allowing for the killing of Santals "found collected together in armed parties", but opposed the harming of women or children. The magistrate who was at Rajmahal had in fact urged the EIC to exterminate the entire Santal tribe while he was under threat of Santhal attacks. However the EIC refused to declare martial law and thus allow the burning of villages or execution of unresisting Santals. However many officers in the field continued to burn villages, claiming that they housed participants in the rebellion. On 23 July, Bidwell wrote to the government writing that it would be impractical to collect prisoners and not to take the "plunder" of the insurgents, and saw the application of martial law, killing of any Santal under arms and burning of villages thought to contain plundered property as the only solution to stamp out the rebellion.

Eventually even the Lieutenant Governor sought to persuade the Governor General of India to declare martial law in the districts affected by the insurgency. He claimed that it would be difficult to suppress the rebellion without committing acts which were crimes under civil law, and that troop actions might be unreasonably hindered by civil officers. Initially the Governor-General was averse to declaring martial law, and replied that the troops were already given sufficient freedom to fight the insurgents without this step. A repeated request from the Lieutenant Governor was similarly turned down.

However on 8 November, the Governor General declared martial law. This applied to the area from Bhagalpur district on the right bank of the Ganges to the left bank of the Ganges in Murshidabad district. This allowed for immediate punishment of death to any Santal caught under arms, although the Government of India requested to the Government of Bengal that they try and "reduce them to complete submission with as little bloodshed as possible."

Troops of the 45th Regiment of Bengal Native Infantry recovering property stolen by Santals after burning a Santal village

Initially the Bhagalpur commissioner announced a bounty of Rs.10,000 to arrest Sidhu or his brother Kanhu Murmu, 5,000 for his Dewans and 1,000 for the chiefs of various parganas under Sidhu and Kanhu. This reward was seen as "enormous" by the government, and was rescinded. In August 1855, the EIC stressed to its commanders that they should pardon any insurgent to speedily surrenders, except any principal leaders. As the rebellion was gradually suppressed, the EIC began to offer grace periods or rent annulements for the villagers but only if they surrender their arms and give up anyone who was "guilty of murder or plundering". However the commanders on the ground did not distinguish between insurgents and civilians often. In one case, after having one of their soldiers shot by an insurgent near a village, the commander ordered its plundering despite its inhabitants declaring they were not insurgents.

The demands for the arrests of rebel leaders from surrendering villages often led to Santals who had surrendered being compelled to betray insurgents who had not surrendered. In this way rebels in the forest of the Gurmala country. This also led to the capture of Sidhu either on 20 August or in early October by a group consisting of Santhals and one Bengali, who later requested compensation from the government for their work.

Kanhu had hid himself along with Chand and Bhairab in the hills after being wounded, with what was initially deemed as only a few followers. In November however, it was reported there were still thousands of armed Santals south of the Mor river. However Kanhu and his companions were captured in early December 1855 by Paharia rangers while pretending to be peasants. In January 1856, marital law was revoked and military operations ended the following month.

A number of skirmishes occurred after this which resulted in a large number of casualties for the Santal forces. The primitive weapons of the Santhals proved to be unable to match the gunpowder weapons of the EIC army. Troop detachments from the 7th Native Infantry Regiment, 40th Native Infantry, and others were called into action. Major skirmishes occurred from July 1855 to January 1856, in places like Kahalgaon, Suri, Raghunathpur, and Munkatora.

British forces escorting captured Santhals to prison

In this event, over 15,000 were killed, tens of villages were destroyed, and many were displaced during the rebellion. During the rebellion, the Santal leader was able to mobilise roughly 60,000 Santhal forming groups, with 1500 to 2000 people forming a group. The rebellion was supported by poor tribals and non-tribals like Gowalas and Lohars (who were milkmen and blacksmiths) in the form of providing information and weapons. Ranabir Samaddar argues that apart from Santhals, other aboriginal inhabitants of the region like Kamars, Bagdis, Bagals and others also participated in the rebellion.

Legacy

English author Charles Dickens, in Household Words, wrote the following passage on the rebellion:

There seems also to be a sentiment of honor among them; for it is said that they use poisoned arrows in hunting, but never against their foes. If this be the case and we hear nothing of the poisoned arrows in the recent conflicts, they are infinitely more respectable than our civilized enemy, the Russians, who would most likely consider such forbearance as foolish, and declare that is not war."

Mrinal Sen's film Mrigayaa (1976) is set during the Santhal rebellion.

Karl Marx commented on this rebellion as India's first organised 'mass revolution' in his book Notes on Indian History.

See also

• Sidhu and Kanhu Murmu
• Kol uprising
• Bastar rebellion

Bibliography

• Andersen, Peter B. (2022-11-22). The Santal Rebellion 1855–1856: The Call of Thakur. Taylor & Francis. ISBN 978-1-000-78087-1.
• Kaviraj, Narahari (2001). Santal Village Community and the Santal Rebellion of 1855. Subarnarekha. ISBN 978-81-86263-16-7.
• Dasgupta, Atis (2013). "Some Aspects of the Santal Rebellion of 1855—56". Social Scientist. 41 (9/10): 69–74. ISSN 0970-0293. JSTOR 23611090.
• Rottger-Hogan, Elizabeth (1982-01-01). "Insurrection... or ostracism: A study of the Santal rebellion of 1855". Contributions to Indian Sociology. 16 (1): 79–96. doi:10.1177/006996678201600104. ISSN 0069-9667. S2CID 144392323.
• Macdougall, John (1977-07-01). "Agrarian reform vs. religious revitalization: collective resistance to peasantization among the Mundas, Oraons and Santals, 1858-95". Contributions to Indian Sociology. 11 (2): 295–327. doi:10.1177/006996677701100203. ISSN 0069-9667. S2CID 143707259.
• Banerjee, P. (2002). Re-Presenting Pasts: Santals in Nineteenth-century Bengal. In P. Chatterjee & A. Ghosh (Eds.), History and the Present. London: Anthem Press. pp. 242–273.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: numeric names: authors list (link)
• Guha, Ranajit (1983). Elementary Aspects of Peasant Insurgency in Colonial India. Oxford University press. ISBN 978-0-19-561517-3. Retrieved 10 September 2023.
• Guha, R. (1988). The Prose of Counter-Insurgency. In R. Guha, & G. C. Spivak (Eds.), Selected Subaltern Studies. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 45–89.
• Banerjee, Prathama (1999-08-01). "Historic Acts? Santal Rebellion and the Temporality of Practice". Studies in History. 15 (2): 209–246. doi:10.1177/025764309901500202. ISSN 0257-6430. S2CID 161192305.
• Anderson, Clare (2008-08-01). "'The wisdom of the barbarian': Rebellion, incarceration, and the Santal body politic". South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies. 31 (2): 223–240. doi:10.1080/00856400802192895. hdl:2381/9827. ISSN 0085-6401. S2CID 143993817.
• Chakrabarty, Dipesh (1998-01-01). "Minority histories, subaltern pasts". Scrutiny2. 3 (1): 4–15. doi:10.1080/18125441.1998.10877327. ISSN 1812-5441.
• Clossey, Luke; Jackson, Kyle; Marriott, Brandon; Redden, Andrew; Vélez, Karin (2016). "The Unbelieved and Historians, Part I: A Challenge". History Compass. 14 (12): 594–602. doi:10.1111/hic3.12360. ISSN 1478-0542.
• Rycroft, Daniel J. (2006). Representing Rebellion: Visual Aspects of Counter-insurgency in Colonial India. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-567589-4.

Further reading

• Gott, Richard (2011). "The Gathering Storm, 1854-58". Britain's Empire: Resistance, Repression and Revolt. Verso Books. pp. 423–469. ISBN 9781844677382.

External links

• "Tribals celebrate Hool Maha festival". The Hindu. Retrieved 2017-05-17.