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Raids inside the Soviet Union during the Soviet–Afghan War

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Raids inside the Soviet Union during the Soviet–Afghan War
Part of the Soviet–Afghan War and Operation Cyclone
Date1984–1988
Location
Belligerents
Soviet Union Soviet Union
Afghanistan Democratic Republic of Afghanistan
Afghan mujahideen
Supported by:
 Pakistan
 United States
 United Kingdom

The raids inside the Soviet Union during the Soviet–Afghan War were an effort to foment unrest and rebellion by the Islamic populations of the Soviet Union, starting in late 1984 Director of CIA William Casey encouraged Mujahideen militants to mount sabotage raids inside the Soviet Union, according to Robert Gates, Casey's executive assistant and Mohammed Yousef, the Pakistani ISI brigadier general who was the chief for Afghan operations. The rebels began cross-border raids into the Soviet Union in spring 1985.[1][2][3]

Raids

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In August 1985 Afghan Mujahideen bombed a Soviet military airbase in Krasnovodsk, Turkmenistan. Three soldiers were killed.[2][failed verification] In January 1987 a bomb exploded on a Moscow-bound train in northwestern Uzbekistan, killing three citizens. The attack was likely meant to target Soviet troops.[2][failed verification] In April 1987 three separate teams of Afghan rebels were directed by the ISI to launch coordinated raids on multiple targets across the Soviet border and extending, in the case of an attack on an Uzbek factory, as deep as over 16 kilometres (10 mi) into Soviet territory.[4]

One of the most notable attacks launched by the Mujahideen inside the Soviet Union was the 1988 attack on the town of Kushka. The Afghan Mujahideen captured the town and held it for several days before being forced to withdraw.[2][failed verification] Pakistan's ISI requested limpet mines from Britain in the hope of attacking Soviet transport barges on the South bank of the Amu Darya River. MI6 facilitated the attacks which included the limpets. In this they were successful in destroying a number of barges as well as damaging the bridge pylons spanning the river near Termez.[5]

Foreign involvement

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United States

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CIA director William Casey secretly visited Pakistan numerous times to meet with the ISI officers managing the mujahideen,[6] and personally observed the guerrillas training on at least one occasion.[7] Coll reports that

Casey startled his Pakistani hosts by proposing that they take the Afghan war into enemy territory—into the Soviet Union itself. Casey wanted to ship subversive propaganda through Afghanistan to the Soviet Union's predominantly Muslim southern republics. The Pakistanis agreed, and the CIA soon supplied thousands of Korans, as well as books on Soviet atrocities in Uzbekistan and tracts on historical heroes of Uzbek nationalism, according to Pakistani and Western officials.[7]

United Kingdom

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The UK's role in the Soviet–Afghan War entailed direct military involvement not only in Afghanistan but the Central Asian republics of the Soviet Union.[8] From 1984 in conjunction with the CIA and ISI, MI6 helped organize and execute "scores" of guerrilla-style attacks. These included rocket attacks on villages in Tajikistan and raids on Soviet airfields, troop supplies and convoys in Uzbekistan which flowed through these areas, some 25 kilometers in these territories.[9]

These were the first direct Western attacks on the Soviet Union since the 1950s and they reached their peak in 1986.[10] MI6 directly remitted money into an account of Pakistani leader of Jamaat-e-Islami Qazi Hussain Ahmad who had close links with Hekmatyar & Massoud. MI6's aim was for Ahmad to spread radical and anti-Soviet Islamic literature in the Soviet republics in the hope of rebellions against their Communist governments. These went as far as Chechnya and Bosnia.[11] The uprisings did not occur but the Soviets were concerned about potential uprisings during the war and even threatened retaliation with bombings in Pakistan.[9]

See also

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References

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  1. ^ Coll 2004, p. 104.
  2. ^ a b c d Westermann, Edward B. (Fall 1999). "The Limits of Soviet Airpower: The Failure of Military Coercion in Afghanistan, 1979–89". Journal of Conflict Studies. XIX (2). Retrieved 3 October 2015.
  3. ^ Kaplan 2008, p. 128: "... the farmer told Wakhil [Kaplan's translator] about all the irrigation ditches that had been blown up by fighter jets, and the flooding in the valley and malaria outbreak that followed. Malaria, which on the eve of Taraki's Communist coup in April 1978 – was at the point of being eradicated in Afghanistan, had returned with a vengeance, thanks to the stagnant, mosquito-breeding pools caused by the widespread destruction of irrigation systems. Nangarhar [province] was rife with the disease. This was another relatively minor, tedious side effect of the Soviet invasion."
  4. ^ Coll 2004, pp. 161–162.
  5. ^ Riedel 2014, p. 48.
  6. ^ Schaffer, Howard B.; Schaffer, Teresita C. (2011). How Pakistan Negotiates with the United States: Riding the Roller Coaster. US Institute of Peace Press. ISBN 9781601270757. Retrieved 4 July 2020 – via Google Books.
  7. ^ a b Coll, Steve (19 July 1992). "Anatomy of a Victory: CIA's Covert Afghan War". Retrieved 4 July 2020 – via www.washingtonpost.com.
  8. ^ Cormac 2018, pp. 235–36.
  9. ^ a b Coles 2018, p. 48.
  10. ^ Curtis 2010, pp. 146–47.
  11. ^ Sareen 2005, p. 74.

Sources

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