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Comando Vermelho

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Comando Vermelho
FoundedEarly 1970s
Founding locationCandido Mendes Prison, Ilha Grande, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil
Years activeEarly 1970s–present
Territory
Leader(s)
  • Luiz Fernando da Costa[1]
  • Márcio dos Santos Nepomuceno
ActivitiesMurder, drug trafficking, bribery, loan sharking, arms trafficking, assault, rioting, money laundering, hijacking, fraud, and bank robbery[2]
AlliesPrimeiro Grupo Catarinense, Paraguayan crime groups, Comando da Paz, Bala na Cara, Sindicato do Crime do Rio Grande do Norte, Okaida, Comando Revolucionário Brasileiro da Criminalidade, Primeiro Comando de Vitória
RivalsPrimeiro Comando da Capital,[3] Terceiro Comando, Terceiro Comando Puro, Amigos dos Amigos, Brazilian militias, Família do Norte, Guardiões do Estado

Comando Vermelho (Portuguese: [koˈmɐ̃du veʁˈmeʎu], Red Command or Red Commando), also known as CV, is a Brazilian criminal organization engaged primarily in drug trafficking, arms trafficking, protection racketeering, kidnapping-for-ransom, hijacking of armored trucks, loansharking, irregular warfare, narco-terrorism, and turf wars against rival criminal organizations, such as Primeiro Comando da Capital and Terceiro Comando Puro.[2] The gang formed in the early 1970s out of a prison alliance between common criminals and leftist guerrillas who were imprisoned together at Cândido Mendes, a maximum-security prison on the island of Ilha Grande.[4] The prisoners formed the alliance to protect themselves from prison violence and guard-inflicted brutality; as the group coalesced, the common criminals were infused with leftist social justice ideals by the guerrillas.[4] In 1979, prison officials labeled the alliance "Comando Vermelho", a name which the prisoners eventually co-opted as their own.[4] In the 1980s, the gang expanded beyond Ilha Grande into other prisons and the favelas of Rio de Janeiro, and became involved in the rapidly growing cocaine industry. Meanwhile, Brazil's shift towards democracy and the eventual end of the military dictatorship in 1985 allowed the leftist guerrillas to re-enter society; thus, the CV largely abandoned its left-wing ideology.[4]

The cocaine trade brought the CV massive profits and growth; by the end of 1985 the gang controlled as much as 70% of the drug trade in Rio de Janeiro's favelas.[5] During this period, the CV established trading relationships with Colombian cartels. However, the group's decentralized leadership structure and disputes over profits prompted infighting, causing splinter groups such as the Terceiro Comando and Amigos dos Amigos to emerge. Conflicts with these splinter groups, as well as fierce resistance to state crackdowns on their operations, drove a sharp uptick in violence in Rio and throughout Brazil throughout the late 1980s and into the 2000s.[6]

Violence continued to escalate until 2008, when the state government implemented a new policy to mitigate violent crime, called Pacification, which used new permanent proximity-policing units (Unidade de Policia Pacificadora, or UPPs) to "maintain state control and provide social order" in favelas. Pacification proved initially successful; a sharp decline in violence between the state and the CV followed after implementation.[7]

However, in 2013, Pacification efforts eroded, and widespread violent conflict between the CV and state forces quickly returned.[7] Additionally, in 2016, a 20-year-old truce between the Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC), a rival criminal organization based in São Paulo, and the CV broke down, sparking an outbreak in violent clashes between the two groups.[8]

Today, while not as powerful as at its peak, the CV remains a significant presence in Rio and throughout Brazil; recent estimates suggest the group is the second-largest criminal organization in Brazil behind the PCC.[9] InSight Crime reports the CV may boast as many as 30,000 members throughout Brazil.[10] The gang continues to engage in drug trafficking, arms trafficking, and turf wars with rival gangs. Notably, in recent years a struggle has intensified between the CV, the PCC, and other rival gangs over control of trade routes and territory in the Amazon region.[11]

History

[edit]

Origins (1971–1979)

[edit]

The exact year that the Comando Vermelho was founded remains disputed, but sources agree the gang formed out of a prison alliance between leftist guerrillas and common criminals housed together during the 1970s by Brazil's military dictatorship at Cândido Mendes, a maximum security Brazilian prison.[6][5][4]

Soon after their regime began in 1964, Brazil's military dictatorship faced a persistent challenge from leftist guerrilla rebels, made up largely of "middle-class intellectuals". In hopes of delegitimizing the rebels, in the early 1970s the Brazilian government began placing those they captured in prison alongside common criminals. One such prison, Candido Mendes, located on Ilha Grande, housed a mix of violent criminals and guerrillas in its notoriously brutal "Block B", or "The Pit".[4][5] Inmates there were subject to frequent abuse at the hands of both their peers and the guards. The inmates banded together for mutual protection, shielding themselves from guard beatings and establishing a code of conduct for prisoners. Additionally, the guerrillas began to spread ideas about resistance, revolution, and social justice among the common criminals.[4] As the alliance cemented, members introduced a common code of prison rules, designed to promote loyalty among members, reduce violence within the prison, and advance the common cause of the prisoners, while still maintaining a degree of autonomy for individual members to act as they desired.[5]

In attempts to break up the alliance, prison officials moved inmate leaders to different wings and prisons, but this instead helped the group spread throughout the prison system.[4] During this period prison officials gave the group its name: one official called the group "Comando Vermelho" in a memo to his colleagues. The name was adopted first by the press and then later by the group itself.[4]

Split with the guerrillas and the cocaine boom (1979 – late 1980s)

[edit]

In 1979, sensing an impending democratization movement, newly-installed President Joao Figueiredo and his military regime began to fear that they and members of their armed forces could face trial for human rights violations in a democratic system.[12] To protect themselves, Figueiredo "manipulated a grassroots movement demanding amnesty for thousands of political prisoners and exiles to insulate himself and his colleagues from potential indictments," and passed the sweeping 1979 Amnesty Law, protecting political prisoners and their government captors from prosecution.[12] As a result, the leftist guerrilla elements of the CV were released from prison, weakening the group's ideological bent.[4]

Meanwhile, the CV began to spread beyond prison gates. While many of its original members were bank robbers, the group quickly became involved in the burgeoning cocaine market. CV members helped traffic drugs overseas for Colombian cartels and distributed cocaine into the local Rio de Janeiro market. The cocaine trade proved incredibly lucrative and the CV grew rapidly: "by the end of 1985, the gang already controlled 70% of the drug market in the favelas of Rio de Janeiro."

During this period, the CV became increasingly involved in the provision of social services and administration of justice for the favela communities which it controlled.[13] In exchange for the cooperation of favela residents, the CV prohibited theft, robbery, and rape, and provided public goods like school supplies, medical equipment, and food distribution for the poor.[5]

The official end of the military dictatorship in 1985 marked the end of all remaining ties between the leftist guerrillas and the CV. Many of the guerrillas re-entered society and "rose inside political parties;" some would go on to hold elected office.[4]

Infighting and growing cartel-state violence (late 1980s – 2008)

[edit]

Massive profits created incentives for different CV factions to splinter off as local leaders sought larger profit shares. Notable break-away groups which emerged during this period include Terceiro Comando and Amigos dos Amigos. As these groups clashed over territory in Rio, violence rapidly increased throughout the city.[6]

After Pablo Escobar's death, the CV established a working relationship with the FARC, a Colombian guerrilla group which moved into the cocaine trade. Led by Luiz Fernando da Costa (a.k.a. Fernandinho Beira-Mar or Seaside Freddy) the CV procured arms and ammunition, which they delivered to the FARC in exchange for their supply of cocaine.

Pacification (2008–2013)

[edit]

Beginning in 2008, in an effort to combat the widespread gang-related violence, Rio state police forces implemented a new "Pacification" strategy, "inspired by notions of community-oriented policing."[14] The strategy, which proceeds in stages, begins with state occupation of a target favela using overwhelming military force, followed by the installation of a proximity-policing unit (Unidade de Policia Pacificadora, UPP), which remains in the favela after military withdrawal. Rather than eliminating the drug trade, the UPPs were primarily tasked with securing the favela communities from gang-related violence.[7]

The early period of Pacification (2008–2010) saw 40 UPP battalions installed across 200 communities, and was largely successful for the state. The CV, which suddenly ceased their violent confrontation with state forces, ceded significant territory to the state; one UPP effort left "the CV's principal stronghold firmly in the hand of the state for the first time in more than a generation."[7]

Resurgence in violence (2013–present)

[edit]

Despite its initial success for the state, corruption and over-expansion caused erosion of the Pacification system, and by 2013 the program began to break down. Since then, violent clashes between the CV and state forces have surged.[7] In 2016, following the collapse of a 20-year truce between the CV and the PCC, violence surged further.[15] In 2023, sources consistently reported frequent violent clashes between the CV and the PCC as well as other rival gang groups.[16][17]

Additionally, an emerging struggle for control of the Amazon region has intensified between rival gangs including the CV.[11] Seeking access to the valuable trafficking routes in the Colombia-Brazil-Peru tri-border region, the CV, PCC, Familia do Norte, and Colombian militia groups including the Border Command and the Carolina Ramirez Front have violently fought, contributing to a significant uptick in regional fatalities.[16]

Armed militia groups in Rio represent another growing challenge for the CV. Militia groups, formed by former and current police officers purporting to fight crime, have grown to control substantial territory throughout Rio. In recent years, violence between militias and gangs has intensified; in 2020 and 2021, "clashes between gangs and militias were responsible for 28% of reported fatalities" in Rio.[18] For example, in July and August 2022, the CV clashed frequently with the Campinho police militia for "control of the Morro do Fuba community in the North Zone."[18]

Structure

[edit]

The Comando Vermelho's structure is loosely hierarchical yet allows significant autonomy throughout the organization. While there is no one single boss, imprisoned senior leaders exercise authority over favela leaders, known as donos, who deliver rents to the prison leaders as a form of "insurance scheme."[4] Essentially, non-imprisoned members provide financial support and carry out instructions from imprisoned leaders, thus protecting themselves from retribution in the event that they are captured themselves. Beneath the favela donos, there are gerentes de boca ('drug mouth bosses') who carry out drug trafficking, soldados ('soldiers') who protect the favela's turf, and vapors, the lowest-level gang members, who are often young teens.[4]

Within this structure, there is significant freedom for gang members to run operations as they see fit. According to Penglase, the "CV is most accurately described as a loose association of drug traffickers who come together for reciprocal assistance yet who act with great degrees of autonomy."[5] Members of the CV operate with a shared identity and a common set of norms, but negotiate separately with individual drug suppliers, known as matutos.[5] High levels of autonomy have been characteristic of the CV since its inception on Ilha Grande: while prisoners were barred from violence against each other, they were freely allowed to pursue independent business.[5] Another distinct aspect of CV structure is that they allow their leaders to freely step away from gang activity if they choose to do so, in stark contrast with many comparable gangs who require members to remain active until death.

Inside prisons with a strong CV presence, senior leaders practice internal criminal governance. These leaders "rule prison life, settle internal faction disputes that occur outside of prison and make the final decision on any matters of mutual interest for faction affiliates."[19]

Conflict with government

[edit]
See also: November 2010 Rio de Janeiro favela shootout

A defining characteristic of the CV is their willingness to openly engage the state in armed confrontation. Since the mid-1980s, as state forces steadily increased the severity of their crackdowns, the CV has responded with frequent violent clashes. Lessing writes that "nowhere else in Brazil, or in much of the world for that matter," have Rio cartels, and primarily the CV, "systematically engaged the state in armed confrontation for so long."[7] Currently, the CV continues to violently fight with state forces, and the ACLED reports that state violence represents a disproportionate share of reported fatalities in Rio de Janeiro.[18]

One suggested explanation for the CV's violent conflict with the state is the varying levels of conditionality in state crackdowns––whether the state cracks down harder on violent cartel behavior. In 2008, after the highly-conditional Pacification policy was implemented, cartel-state violence declined, only to see a resurgence after the policy eroded.[7]

Examples of CV–state conflict

[edit]

On 19 November 2016, a Rio de Janeiro police helicopter was shot down by small arms fire during a clash with CV gang members and crashed in a ditch. All four police officers on board were killed.[20][21] In June 2018, the CV launched attacks on a Bolivian Army base in Porvenir and a Brazilian police station in Epitaciolandia, in both instances stealing weapons and ammunition.[22]

Comando Vermelho and funk carioca

[edit]

The Comando Vermelho continue to attract new Brazilian youth and bring them into their ranks.[23][24] In addition to sponsoring groups like neighborhood associations and special interest clubs, and organizing sporting events, one of the most common ways in which the criminal organization is able to catch the youth's attention is through the popular musical style of funk carioca, a form of Brazilian music derived from Miami bass. Due to the genre's popularity with young Brazilians, the group "is known to have subsidized funk parties to recruit young kids for drug dealing".[25]

In addition to these funk parties (bailes funk), "where drugs and sex attract even bourgeois or petty-bourgeois youth",[26] held regularly by the organization every Sunday, funk artists are also sponsored by the CV to record songs and even entire CDs that promote the group and eulogize the group's dead members. Because the CV pays for the production and recording of the funk songs, they "are often well recorded and of a high technical quality, and are being played on pirate radio stations and sold by hundreds of street vendors in Rio de Janeiro and in São Paulo."[26] Thus the funk artists that are in league with the CV sometimes garner significant sales and airplay despite making a type of music that is Proibidão, or 'extremely prohibited', in terms of where it can be sold and who can play it. In addition to promoting the crime group, the funk sponsored by the CV also challenges the ideas and laws of the Division of the Repression Against Drugs.[25]

Notable leaders and members

[edit]
  • William da Silva Lima, a.k.a. "The Professor" (deceased): Lima was a founding member of the Comando Vermelho, having been imprisoned at Cândido Mendes during the 1970s after attempting to escape another prison. He took part in several bank robberies and was a major figure during the CV's initial rise to power.[4] He later wrote a memoir, Four Hundred Against One, which describes his experience during the early years of the CV.[27] He died of a heart attack in his home in the South Zone of Rio at the age of 76.[28]
  • Luiz Fernando da Costa, a.k.a. "Fernandinho Beira-Mar", a.k.a. "Seaside Freddy" (incarcerated): Beira-Mar is an imprisoned senior leader who led the CV's business dealings with the FARC, the Colombian guerrilla group that entered the cocaine trade following the death of Pablo Escobar. In 2001, he was captured by the Colombian military following a shootout, and was extradited to Brazil.[29][30][31][32]
  • Márcio dos Santos Nepomuceno, a.k.a. "Marcinho VP" (incarcerated): Considered the most powerful drug lord in Rio de Janeiro, he is currently[when?] the top leader of the CV, having taken control of this crime syndicate following the arrest of Fernandinho Beira-Mar in 2002, after Beira-Mar brutally killed Ernaldo Pinto Medeiros (a.k.a. UÉ), who was the founder and top leader of Amigos dos Amigos in retaliation for the murder of Orlando Jogador, one of the original leaders of the CV (which would have been ordered by UÉ).[33][34][35]
  • Elias Pereira da Silva, a.k.a. Elias Maluco ('Crazy Elias'; deceased): He was one of the most powerful drug dealers in Rio de Janeiro and one of the most dangerous members of the Comando Vermelho, until he was arrested for the murder of famous Brazilian journalist Tim Lopes. His death is unsolved: he was found dead, hanged in his cell on September 22, 2020, but it is unknown if he committed suicide or if someone inside the prison killed him and made it look like a suicide.[36][37]
  • Roni Peixoto, a.k.a. "Gordo" ('Fat Man'; deceased): He was known by the nickname Gordo because he was overweight during his leadership of the CV in Minas Gerais. Considered one of the biggest drug lords in the state during the 2000s, he was Beira-Mar's right-hand man, responsible for controlling drug trafficking throughout Minas Gerais and the introducer of crack in Belo Horizonte (the capital of Minas Gerais), which may have led to his brutal murder in 2022.[38][39][40][41][42][43]
  • Cláudio Augusto da Silva Duarte, a.k.a. "Mano C" (incarcerated): CV leader in the state of Pará in northern Brazil.[44]
  • Ocimar Prado Junior, a.k.a. "Coquinho" (incarcerated): CV leader in the state of Amazonas in northern Brazil.[45]
[edit]

In 2006, Ross Kemp's docuseries Ross Kemp on Gangs included an episode titled "Rio De Janeiro", which investigated the Comando Vermelho and their police adversaries.[46] The 2002 crime drama film City of God is based in a Rio favela and is inspired by true events surrounding the emergence of organized crime groups like the CV. The DVD release of the film contains an extra documentary "News of a Private War" which features interviews with the police and local children from the favelas.[47] In the 2010 documentary "Dancing with the Devil", director John Blair investigates criminal organizations in Rio's favelas.[48]

The 2010 Brazilian crime film 400 Contra 1 was inspired by CV founder William da Silva Lima's memoirs and narrates a fictionalized history of the birth of the gang in the late 1970s.[49]

See also

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Notes

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References

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  1. ^ "Os donos do crime: Marcola, Beira-Mar e Zé Roberto da Compensa". Istoé. 6 January 2017. Archived from the original on 22 March 2023. Retrieved 21 July 2022.
  2. ^ a b "Brazil". Uppsala Conflict Data Program. Archived from the original on 24 December 2013. Retrieved 21 December 2013.
  3. ^ Fonseca, Pedro; Brooks, Brad (6 January 2017). "Brazil gang kills 31, many hacked to death, as prison violence explodes". Reuters. Archived from the original on 7 January 2017. Retrieved 7 January 2017.
  4. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n Grillo, Ioan (12 January 2017). Gangster Warlords: Drug Dollars, Killing Fields and the New Politics of Latin America. Bloomsbury Publishing Plc. p. 43. ISBN 978-1-4088-4591-2. OCLC 982214269. Archived from the original on 21 April 2024. Retrieved 27 April 2023.
  5. ^ a b c d e f g h Penglase, B. (1 June 2008). "The Bastard Child of the Dictatorship:: The Comando Vermelho and the Birth of "Narco-culture" in Rio de Janeiro". Luso-Brazilian Review. 45 (1): 128. doi:10.1353/lbr.0.0001. ISSN 0024-7413. S2CID 145404286. Archived from the original on 21 April 2024. Retrieved 27 April 2023.
  6. ^ a b c Jański, Kamil (7 June 2022). "Primeiro Comando da Capital and Comando Vermelho: Genesis, Evolution and Their Impact through Narco-culture". Ad Americam. 23: 18–19. doi:10.12797/AdAmericam.23.2022.23.01. ISSN 2449-8661. S2CID 249480164. Archived from the original on 26 April 2023. Retrieved 27 April 2023.
  7. ^ a b c d e f g Lessing, Benjamin. Making peace in drug wars : crackdowns and cartels in Latin America. p. 164. ISBN 978-1-108-18583-7. OCLC 1055867117. Archived from the original on 21 April 2024. Retrieved 27 April 2023.
  8. ^ Blair, Laurence (23 June 2022). "'The PCC are after me': the drug cartel with Paraguay in its clutches". The Guardian. Pedro Juan Caballero. ISSN 0261-3077. Archived from the original on 2 July 2022. Retrieved 27 April 2023.
  9. ^ "The Evolution of the Most Lethal Criminal Organization in Brazil—the PCC". PRISM | National Defense University. Retrieved 27 April 2023.
  10. ^ "Red Command". InSight Crime. 27 March 2017. Archived from the original on 4 April 2023. Retrieved 27 April 2023.
  11. ^ a b "Tussle for the Amazon: New Frontiers in Brazil's Organized Crime Landscape". Diálogo Américas. 16 November 2022. Archived from the original on 27 April 2023. Retrieved 27 April 2023.
  12. ^ a b "Brazil: Five Centuries of Change". The SHAFR Guide Online. doi:10.1163/2468-1733_shafr_sim190140287. Archived from the original on 21 April 2024. Retrieved 27 April 2023.
  13. ^ Gay, Robert. "Between Drug Gangs, the Police and Militias". ReVista. Archived from the original on 27 April 2023. Retrieved 27 April 2023.
  14. ^ Magaloni, Beatriz; Franco-Vivanco, Edgar; Melo, Vanessa (May 2020). "Killing in the Slums: Social Order, Criminal Governance, and Police Violence in Rio de Janeiro". American Political Science Review. 114 (2): 552. doi:10.1017/S0003055419000856. ISSN 0003-0554. S2CID 85519663. Archived from the original on 21 April 2024. Retrieved 27 April 2023.
  15. ^ "Red Command". Americas Quarterly. 26 January 2021. Archived from the original on 3 January 2023. Retrieved 27 April 2023.
  16. ^ a b Pierre, Eduardo; Martins, Marco Antônio (2 April 2023). "Tráfico x milícia: por que a guerra de facções no Rio piorou desde janeiro e quem é quem no conflito" [Trafficking x militia: why the faction war in Rio has worsened since January and who is who in the conflict]. G1 (in Brazilian Portuguese). Archived from the original on 5 July 2023. Retrieved 27 April 2023.
  17. ^ "Comandos de la Frontera". Insight Crime. 2014. Archived from the original on 24 March 2024. Retrieved 20 April 2024.
  18. ^ a b c Franciotti, Bhavani Castro, Julia Lins (14 February 2023). "Deadly Rio de Janeiro: Armed Violence and the Civilian Burden". ACLED. Archived from the original on 10 April 2023. Retrieved 27 April 2023.{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
  19. ^ Dowdney, Luke (2005). Neither War Nor Peace: International Comparisons of Children and Youth in Organised Armed Violence. 7Letras. p. 32. Archived from the original on 16 October 2023. Retrieved 27 May 2023.
  20. ^ "Brazil: Four dead after police helicopter 'shot down by gang'". BBC News. 20 November 2016. Archived from the original on 27 August 2021. Retrieved 27 August 2021.
  21. ^ "Brazilian police probe military chopper crash" on YouTube
  22. ^ Bargent, James (19 June 2018). "Red Command Arrests in Bolivia Point to Group's Likely Expansion". InSight Crime. Archived from the original on 20 June 2018. Retrieved 25 June 2018.
  23. ^ Grillo, Ioan (26 February 2016). "The gangs who rule Brazil's favelas are not afraid to be seen". The World Weekly. Archived from the original on 24 June 2021. Retrieved 20 June 2021.
  24. ^ "Brazil: the Red Command (Comando Vermelho, CV) criminal organization, including activities, areas of operation, membership, structure, networks, political connections, and resources; state protection available for victims of crimes committed by the Red Command (2017-March 2019) [BRA106243.E]". 8 April 2019. Archived from the original on 24 June 2021. Retrieved 20 June 2021 – via ecoi.net/en/document/2011300.html.
  25. ^ a b Behague, Gerard (Spring-Summer 2006). "Rap, Reggae, Rock, or Samba: The Local and the Global in Brazilian Popular Music, 1985-1995." Latin American Music Review. 27 (1): 79-90
  26. ^ a b Benoit, Hector (18 May 2006). "Brazil: The social contradictions underlying the violent eruption in Sao Paulo". World Socialist Web Site. Archived from the original on 3 January 2023. Retrieved 3 January 2023.
  27. ^ "Morre William 'Professor', um dos fundadores da maior facção criminosa do Rio". Extra Online (in Brazilian Portuguese). Archived from the original on 27 April 2023. Retrieved 27 April 2023.
  28. ^ Dia, O. "Morre aos 76 anos um dos fundadores do Comando Vermelho | Rio de Janeiro | O Dia". odia.ig.com.br (in Brazilian Portuguese). Archived from the original on 27 April 2023. Retrieved 27 April 2023.
  29. ^ "Conheça a história de Fernandinho Beira-Mar". Jornal Extra (in Brazilian Portuguese). 22 November 2007. Archived from the original on 14 April 2023. Retrieved 14 April 2023.
  30. ^ "Beira-Mar fica atrás das grades até 2045". Jornal O Dia (in Brazilian Portuguese). 15 May 2015. Archived from the original on 14 April 2023. Retrieved 14 April 2023.
  31. ^ "Como foi a prisão de Fernandinho Beira-Mar numa selva da Colômbia, há 20 anos". Jornal O Globo (Blog do Acervo) (in Brazilian Portuguese). 20 April 2021. Archived from the original on 14 April 2023. Retrieved 14 April 2023.
  32. ^ "O Empreendedor do Crime: A impressionante história de Fernandinho Beira-Mar". Iconografia da História (in Brazilian Portuguese). 9 April 2021. Archived from the original on 14 April 2023. Retrieved 14 April 2023.
  33. ^ "Marcinho VP: quem é o traficante 'mais importante do que o secretário de Segurança'". Jornal Extra (in Brazilian Portuguese). 30 April 2021. Archived from the original on 14 April 2023. Retrieved 14 April 2023.
  34. ^ "Gabinete na prisão". UOL Notícias (in Brazilian Portuguese). Archived from the original on 14 April 2023. Retrieved 14 April 2023.
  35. ^ "O poder do crime". UOL Notícias (in Brazilian Portuguese). Archived from the original on 14 April 2023. Retrieved 14 April 2023.
  36. ^ "Morte de 'Elias Maluco' pode ter sido motivada por saída do 'alto escalão' do 'CV'". O São Gonçalo (in Brazilian Portuguese). 23 September 2020. Archived from the original on 14 April 2023. Retrieved 14 April 2023.
  37. ^ "Filha de Elias Maluco divulga carta e diz que pai não se suicidou: 'Mataram meu pai'". Jornal O Dia (in Brazilian Portuguese). 23 September 2020. Archived from the original on 14 April 2023. Retrieved 14 April 2023.
  38. ^ "Veja quem era Roni Peixoto, um dos maiores traficantes de MG, morto hoje". Estado de Minas (in Brazilian Portuguese). 11 April 2022. Archived from the original on 14 April 2023. Retrieved 14 April 2023.
  39. ^ "Saiba quem é Roni Peixoto, braço direito de Beira-Mar em Minas Gerais". Radio Itatiaia (in Brazilian Portuguese). 11 April 2022. Archived from the original on 14 April 2023. Retrieved 14 April 2023.
  40. ^ "Saiba quem é Roni Peixoto, traficante morto a tiros em Santa Luzia". Jornal O Tempo (in Brazilian Portuguese). 11 April 2022. Archived from the original on 14 April 2023. Retrieved 14 April 2023.
  41. ^ "Quem era Roni Peixoto, braço-direito de Beira-Mar achado morto em carro". UOL Notícias (in Brazilian Portuguese). 11 April 2022. Archived from the original on 14 April 2023. Retrieved 14 April 2023.
  42. ^ "Veja quem era Roni Peixoto, um dos maiores traficantes de MG, morto hoje". Correio Braziliense (in Brazilian Portuguese). 11 April 2022. Archived from the original on 14 April 2023. Retrieved 14 April 2023.
  43. ^ "Quem é Roni Peixoto, braço direito de Beira-Mar encontrado morto". G1 (Minas Gerais) (in Brazilian Portuguese). 11 April 2022. Archived from the original on 14 April 2023. Retrieved 14 April 2023.
  44. ^ "Líder do Comando Vermelho no Pará é preso em Sete Lagoas". Estado de Minas (in Brazilian Portuguese). 23 September 2020. Archived from the original on 14 April 2023. Retrieved 14 April 2023.
  45. ^ "Líder do Comando Vermelho no Amazonas é preso no Paraguai". portalvoce.com (in Brazilian Portuguese). 15 March 2023. Archived from the original on 16 April 2023. Retrieved 16 April 2023.
  46. ^ Ross Kemp on Gangs (TV Series 2005– ) - IMDb, archived from the original on 15 May 2023, retrieved 26 April 2023
  47. ^ "City Of God (Cidade De Deus) - Official Site - Miramax". www.miramax.com. Archived from the original on 27 April 2023. Retrieved 26 April 2023.
  48. ^ "Dancing with the Devil". FILM PLATFORM - Educational Rights and Screening Licenses. Archived from the original on 26 April 2023. Retrieved 26 April 2023.
  49. ^ 400 Contra 1 - Uma História do Crime Organizado, archived from the original on 26 April 2023, retrieved 26 April 2023

General bibliography

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