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Alawite opposition to the Assad regime

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Alawite opposition to the Assad regime had a history dating back to presidency of Hafez al-Assad, and continued during the presidency of Bashar al-Assad until Ba'athist Syria was dissolved in 2024. The Assad family was also Alawite.

Background

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After a series of coups, the 1963 Syrian coup d'état helped the Ba'ath Party seize power. Alawite military officers Hafez al-Assad and Salah Jadid took part in the coup. In 1970, Hafez al-Assad launched the Corrective Movement and overthrew fellow Salah Jadid.[1][2] Alawites were largely poor and rural, and were a marginalized group in Syria until Hafez al-Assad gained power.[2] Robert D. Kaplan claimed that an Alawite ruling Syria was an "unprecedented development shocking to the Sunni-majority population which had monopolized power for so many centuries."[3]

Under Hafez al-Assad, Alawites constituted the majority of Syrian military and political elites.[2] Although the social status of Alawites improved, the living conditions of Alawites remained relatively poor, and the Sunni-Alawite tensions persisted.[2] In 1971, Assad declared himself president of Syria, a position that was constitutionally reserved for Sunnis. In 1973, a new constitution was adopted, removing Islam as the state religion and only mandating that the president be a Muslim, without mentioning a specific sect.[4] In 1974, in order to ease tensions, Musa as-Sadr issued a fatwa recognising Alawites as Muslims.[5]

Opposition

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After the Islamist uprising in Syria, the Assad regime carefully ensured the dominance of Alawites in all factors of the Syrian government.[2] Despite increased Sunni-Alawite tensions, Syria remained stable until the Syrian civil war.[2]

During the Syrian civil war, the Assad regime deployed mostly Alawite soldiers, and also conscripted Alawites. The mass conscriptions disproportionately targeted Alawite regions. The conscriptions resulted in many young Alawite men dying, and caused suffering to the Alawite region along the Syrian coast. There were increased tensions between the Alawite community and the Assad government.[6][7] Regardless, many Alawites felt as if Assad was the only option, fearing that an opposition victory would lead to mass killings of Alawites, especially after the rise of Sunni Islamism among the opposition.[8][9][10] Alawites were described as being "hostage" to the Assad regime.[11] Over 100,000 young Alawite men were killed in combat by 2020.[12][7][13][6]

In 2016, Alawite religious leaders published a statement publicly disassociating the Alawite community from the Assad government. They also called for unity between all Syrians, and referred to Sunnis, Shias, and Alawites as "brothers and sisters". They stated that Alawites existed before the Assad regime "and will exist after it", and that Alawites "should not be associated with the crimes the regime has committed".[11]

Alawites had also opposed Iranian intervention in Syria and complained that Iran was a threat to the Alawite faith due to its Shia conversion campaigns in the Alawite regions with tacit approval of the Assad government.[14]

The Assad regime faced increasing opposition from the Alawite community as the Syrian civil war progressed.[15]

The Assad regime had attempted to supplant the Alawite religious identity. Bashar al-Assad attempted to integrate Alawites into Sunni Islam as to alleviate Sunni opposition to his rule, while Hafez al-Assad dismissed the Alawite faith as simply Twelver Shi'ism. Alawites insisted that they were a distinct Islamic sect, while accusing Hafez al-Assad and Bashar al-Assad of undermining the Alawite faith throughout their rule.[16][17][17][11] Syrian school textbooks in the Assad regime did not mention the Alawite faith as a religion.[18]

After the 2024 Homs offensive led by Tahrir al-Sham, many Alawites expressed relief as they were not targeted by HTS.[8] Abu Mohammad al-Julani assured minorities of safety during the 2024 Syrian opposition offensives.[19][20] After the Assad family hometown of Qardaha was captured by the opposition, HTS met with Alawite religious elders of the town and received their support.[21]

References

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  1. ^ Kaplan, Robert (February 1993). "Syria: Identity Crisis". The Atlantic.
  2. ^ a b c d e f Frederic C. Hof; Alex Simon (2013). "Sectarian Violence in Syria's Civil War: Causes, Consequences, and Recommendations for Mitigation" (PDF). Center for the Prevention of Genocide, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum.
  3. ^ Kaplan, Robert (February 1993). "Syria: Identity Crisis". The Atlantic.
  4. ^ Seale, Patrick. Asad, the Struggle for the Middle East. University of California Press, 1989, p.173.
  5. ^ The New Encyclopedia of Islam by Cyril Glasse, Altamira, 2001, p.36–7
  6. ^ a b Lazkani, Alimar (4 August 2020). "No Homeland, No Future: Alawite Youth As the Backbone of the Assad Regime". Arab Reform Initiative. Archived from the original on 3 February 2023.
  7. ^ a b "ديلي تلغراف: الطائفة العلوية تدفع ثمنا باهظا لدعم الأسد". Arab 21. 7 April 2015. Archived from the original on 3 October 2020.
  8. ^ a b Assad loyalists shaken by his fall, some relieved by lack of violence, Reuters (December 8, 2024).
  9. ^ Yaroslav Trofimov (9 July 2015). "After Backing Regime, Syrian Minorities Face Peril". Wall Street Journal. Retrieved 15 July 2015.
  10. ^ "The Alawi Community and the Syria Crisis". Middle East Institute. Retrieved 2024-12-15.
  11. ^ a b c "Syrian Alawites distance themselves from Assad". BBC News. 2016-04-02. Retrieved 2024-12-15.
  12. ^ Sherlock, Ruth (7 April 2015). "In Syria's war, Alawites pay heavy price for loyalty to Bashar al-Assad". The Daily Telegraph. Retrieved 15 July 2015.
  13. ^ "150,000 Alawites killed in 6-year Syria war". 20 April 2017.
  14. ^ Tsurkov, Elizabeth (22 July 2019). "Between Regime and Rebels: A Survey of Syria's Alawi Sect". The New York Review. Archived from the original on 31 March 2023.
  15. ^ Mohammed Alaa Ghanem, Alawites in Syria breaking silence?: Criticizing the dictatorship from within, Middle East Institute (August 11, 2023).
  16. ^ Rosen, Nir (10 October 2011). "Assad's Alawites: The guardians of the throne". Al Jazeera. Archived from the original on 22 June 2023. The state – even "Assadism" – supplanted the Alawite religion as the focus of their identity...To be accepted as leader, Assad had to persuade Sunnis and Alawites alike that Alawites were, in fact, mainstream Muslims... Alawites struck a bargain; they lost their independence and had to accept the myth that they were "good Muslims".. Assadism then filled the gap left by the negation of traditional Alawite identity. The loss of the traditional role of community leaders fragmented Alawites, preventing them from establishing unified positions and from engaging as a community with other Syrian sects – reinforcing sectarian fears and distrust.
  17. ^ a b Syrian comment. Asad's Alawi dilemma, 8 October 2004
  18. ^ "Islamic Education in Syria: Undoing Secularism". Open University. Retrieved 25 December 2012.
  19. ^ "Former al-Qaeda leader al-Golani rebrands as pluralist amid doubts". euronews. 2024-12-08. Retrieved 2024-12-15.
  20. ^ "Rights groups cautious about Islamist rebels' pledges to protect Syrian minorities". www.voanews.com. Retrieved 2024-12-15.
  21. ^ "Exclusive: In Assad's Alawite hometown, Syrian rebels win statement of support". Reuters. December 9, 2024.
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