McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting
McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting or the McDonnell-Douglas burden-shifting framework refers to the procedure for adjudicating a motion for summary judgement under a Title VII disparate treatment claim that lacks direct evidence of discrimination. It was introduced by the United States Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas v. Green and Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine and has been elaborated on in subsequent cases.
In contrast to the McDonnell Douglas model, which is typically used in cases in which direct evidence of discrimination is lacking, courts may instead evaluate disparate treatment claims under the Price Waterhouse “mixed motive” framework.
The framework
- A plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case by a preponderance of the evidence, i.e. allege facts that are adequate to support a legal claim.
- Then the burden of production shifts to the employer, to rebut this prima facie case by "articulat[ing] some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee’s rejection.”[1]
- Then the employee may prevail only if he can show that the employer’s defense is merely a pretext for behavior actually motivated by discrimination.[2]
Even though the employer bears the the burden of production in the second step, the plaintiff bears the burden of persuasion at all times.[3]
References
- ^ McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
- ^ St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993). In Hicks, the Supreme Court revisited the burden of proof scheme established by McDonnell Douglas and Burdine, holding that it is not enough for the plaintiff to show that the employer’s proffered reason was false; the plaintiff must show that the employer’s proffered reason is both false and that the employer’s actions were motivated by discrimination. In Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., the Court emphasized that “a plaintiff’s prima facie case of age discrimination, combined with sufficient evidence to find that the employer’s asserted justification for its action was false, may permit the trier of fact to conclude that the employer unlawfully discriminated,” and the plaintiff need not always introduce additional and independent evidence of discrimination. 530 U.S. 133, 148-49 (2000).
- ^ Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 255-256 (1981).